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Foreword
I am writing these lines over the Atlantic and that is somewhat symbolic. I am
travelling for talks that are a part of an effort at Slovakia ’s accession to
international economic structures (OECD) and I am writing the foreword for a text
that is very important in this respect in terms of its content, but especially in terms
of its authors. These are young Slovak economists who represent (as this book
clearly confirms) the hope that this process will be successful.
Economic policy in Slovakia within the last ten years has been marked with
many changes, often downright turbulent in character. This is related mainly to the
fact that it was the first decade of post-communist transformation, connected with
not only dynamic, but frequently controversial political developments, as well as
with the split of the former federation and the formation of a new independent
state.
The first decade of post-communist transformation is generally viewed as a
complicated process in all countries affected - a process that has proven that, in
addition to simple technical solutions regarding free elections and macroeconomic
stabilization, it involves a much more complex transformation tied with deep
structural changes, the creation and functioning of new  institutions, changes in
ownership relations and a fundamental change in the role of the state in the
economy.
The past decade has shown that distortions of the communist regime were
deeper than most people were willing and able to realize. They rested not only with
the distorted structure of the economy and insufficient competitiveness of
economic entities, the lack of a functional system of formal rules of the game, but
perhaps to an even greater degree with the strongly distorted informal rules - with
the prevalent ethic, shared values and generally accepted patterns of behavior.
At the onset of transformation, all countries - including Slovakia - were in a
situation where there were no solutions proven in practice and the question of
economic policy was in this respect an open technical problem. Every post-
communist transition is also, at least in its early years, connected with a transitional
recession, growing unemployment, and a decline in living standards. People's
dissatisfaction with this situation, along with a very low level of knowledge and
information on the real causes and realistic possibilities of resolving the situation
then often allow populists and demagogues capable of politically exploiting this
wave of discontent. Their economic arguments or the arguments of their
"economic experts" often take the form of naive folklore. This, however, does not
imply that such tactics may not succeed (and in many countries including Slovakia
they indeed have succeeded).
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Social and national demagoguery and populism are the greatest obstacles to
successful and swift reforms. The best weapon to combat these phenomena and the
most effective way to create pre-requisites for real reforms is to raise the level of
information in the expert community and within the public at large on the causes of
problems, paths to their resolution, as well as on the consequences of not resolving
the existing situation.
With ten years of experience with reforms, most of them do not pose a
technical problem anymore. Various countries have attempted different approaches
and we can thus say there now are sufficient positive and negatives experiences
with respect to effective and ineffective economic policies. The argument of
exclusivity or the peculiarity of the conditions will not stand, since centrally
planned economies were similar and the laws of economics apply to every country.
The book in front of you serves as a good example and a tool for raising
public awareness of the problems of economic policy in the period of post-
communist transformation, both through its professional approach and its
erudition. It is also a book reflecting the latest findings of economic research in the
world.
The book describes developments in economic policy in a highly expert,
matter-of-fact and critical fashion, not only scratching the surface, but hitting the
core of the issues it deals with. Although most of them are young, the authors
clearly have substantial practical experience from their involvement in research,
government, banks, think-tanks or international financial institutions, in addition to
good theoretical training.
I am pleased that the authors prepared a comprehensive assessment of
economic policy in Slovakia in the past decade and even more pleased that they
came to terms with this task in such a competent manner.
I also see the economic policy recommendations for the future as very useful
and, in general, I share with the authors their views of the priorities and the need
for changes in the general approach to the implemented economic policy. The
cabinet, of which I am a member, is already moving in this direction, as evidenced
by several conceptual documents, e.g., the medium-term economic policy
priorities, industrial policy, the bank restructuring and privatization plan, and also
several proposed laws such as the amendment to the bankruptcy law, etc.
I bring this book to the attention of all those interested in economic
developments and economic policy, in particular to students of economics and
economic journalists. For all those who will read the book, it will certainly serve as
a light in the labyrinth of often highly contradictory and controversial claims and
assessments of any government's economic policy.
Ivan Mikloš
Deputy Slovak Prime Minister for the Economy
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1 Introduction1
The transition process has affected an estimated 1.65 billion people, and with
its importance and complexity, it became one of the most important economic
events of the twentieth century. Since the subject contributes to a better
understanding of capitalism as an economic system, economists’ interest in the
process is limited not only to transition countries themselves, but also to the
implementation of large institutional changes. The former is true because of its
relevancy to the relationship between incentives and markets, incentives and
ownership rights, legal rules and social norms, government and economic agents,
and the political system and economic interest groups. For example, it can help to
determine how to ensure that a government is neither too strong nor too weak to
fight organized crime and to encourage economic agents in productive activities
rather than rent seeking behavior. The latter is true, due to the relevance of the
transition process, and to economic environmental factors, as well as to the
dynamics of political games, which cause large institutional changes or, on the
contrary, oppose them.
Economists were not prepared to assist in the transformation of economies,
and even the most accepted theories of macroeconomic stabilization assumed that a
market environment was already in place. However, stabilization has been only
one of many aspects of the transition, and attention must also be paid to the
following: the creation and development of markets (including financial ones), to
the establishment and enforcement of ownership rights, to changes in legislation
and policy, and to privatization and restructuring. These complementary reforms
were meant to produce as few economic disturbances as possible and maintain
political support. It is obvious that the majority of knowledge about the transition
was formed ex post, after an unexpected fall in production, privatization by insiders
instead of external investors, an increase in organized crime, splits of countries and
sometimes after the return of communists to power.
The initial economic conditions of reforms included: the absence of real price
and market systems, the deformation of the production structure, the dominance of
heavy industry and scarcity of services, and the existence of large enterprises at the
expense of small ones. The lack of a consistent production plan for particular
goods led to permanent shortages, to the accumulation of existing commodities and
workforce, as well as to forced substitution and investment cycles. Some countries
                                                                
1 A large part of this chapter is based on G. Roland’s forthcoming book entitled Politics ,
Markets and Firms: Transition and Economics. Roland’s book is perhaps the first complex
summary of theoretical and empirical studies of the transition process and will certainly
become a popular textbook.
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gradually withdrew from central planning (Yugoslavia in 1965; Hungary in 1968;
Poland in the 1980s) and thereby gained, in our opinion, a head start in essential
reforms.
The goals of reform were:
·  improving efficiency by introducing flexible prices and creating a competitive
open market;
·  stabilizing the macroeconomy as a precondition for the correct functioning of
the price system;
·  providing enterprises with incentives to adjust to market signals by means of
privatization and the foundation of a corporate governance system;
·  establishing the government institutions necessary for the functioning of the
market.
In relation to government institutions, it is also necessary to ensure political
and institutional stability, the protection of private ownership rights not only
against the government, but also against the mafia, and the protection of taxpayers
against the influence of interest groups.
Barriers to reform consisted of:
·  outcome uncertainty that influences the behavior of economic agents;
·  interactions among complementary reforms;
·  the political goals of parties and interest groups.
Economic literature today explains the original fall in production by the
horizontal monopolistic structure of production and the disorganization effect of
price liberalization on existing production lines due to information asymmetry. The
question of the reform government, however, has not yet been satisfactory
answered. Why are some governments too weak to enforce the abidance of laws,
while others are not? Evidently, the explanation is related to geopolitical factors
and the perception of the mafia as a sub-optimal substitution of the government as
an enforcement agency.
The insufficient restructuring that followed the privatization process
disappointed many. Privatization ultimately aimed at increasing enterprise
efficiency by putting in place better managers and providing them with better
incentives; however, in reality, privatization was only a change of ownership
within a given framework of constraints.
These constraints  included the following:
·  low volume of domestic savings;
·  insufficient foreign resources caused by imperfections in the functioning of
international capital markets;
·  exchange rate risks and uncertainty;
·  need to counterbalance the loss of tax revenues, and especially the political
opportunity to gain power.
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The lack of restructuring itself has been caused more by the underestimation
of the corporate governance framework than by the selection of privatization
methods. The distortion of hard budget constraints through bank and inter-
enterprise loans developed into a moral hazard when agents expected the state to
bail out their liabilities; therefore, making it compatible with profit maximizing
behavior.
In our opinion, disappointments from the transition process are connected
with the overall understanding of it, as well as with the understanding of the way
the economy functions. First of all, the initial understanding of the transition
process did not consider the goals and roles of particular interest groups, as if it
were possible to separate economic reform from the political world. Economic
models, somewhat paradoxically, considered post-communist governments as solid
entities that maximized national welfare. Furthermore, nomenclature managers
were assumed to give up their leadership of enterprises voluntarily to new private
owners. On one hand, the models neglected the costs connected directly with
reform; on the other hand, they underestimated the revenues connected with
privatization, which was understood as a one-time opportunity. Secondly, too
much attention has been paid to macroeconomic indices, based on an implicit
assumption of a perfect correlation with microeconomic development. It was
exactly the Slovak case that proved this assumption wrong. Without a change in
the incentives of the behavior of economic agents, all macroeconomic successes
are only temporary and may signal the postponement of reforms, with consequent
costs to the economy.
This book, which is the result of a yearlong project and two seminars, has two
goals. The first of which aims to offer analysis of a decade of developments of the
Slovak economy, of applied economic policy, and of their consequences for and
impacts on agents, as well as to formulate recommendations for future economic
policy. The second aim is to contribute to the general understanding of economic
transformation.
All chapters in this book have led to the same conclusion: countries pay a
huge price if immediate success is preferred and reforms are postponed. Slovakia
recovered relatively quickly from the negative effects of the preliminary
transformation period, although at the cost of high unemployment. In 1994, the
country appeared on the path toward recovery. However, that same year saw a
fundamental reversal in Slovak politics and in economic policy. The linkage
between nomenclature managers and political parties was openly manifested and
was strengthened through privatization to such an extent that it had a significantly
negative influence on the further economic development of the country. This
“privatization of the country” led Slovakia to international isolation and in 1998
almost to economic collapse.
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The following thirteen chapters document and analyze the development of the
Slovak economy from different angles during the period of 1990-99. The chapters
present the scientific work of several experienced professionals in the area of
transition as well as of many young authors who did not previously have an
opportunity to publish their work.
Karol Morvay of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Chapter 2 draws a
picture of the country’s overall macroeconomic development.   Ján Tóth, of ING
Barings, addresses issues relating to fiscal policy in Chapter 3. Miroslav Beblavý,
of the Institute for Economic and Social Reforms (INEKO) deals with monetary
policy in Chapter 4. Developments on the global market and their connection to the
Slovak economy are analyzed in Chapter 5 by Andrej Salner of the Center of
Social and Media Analysis (CSMA). Foreign trade is pursued in Chapter 6 by
Marek Jakoby of M.E.S.A. 10, while Martina Lubyová of the Slovak Academy of
Sciences covers the labor market in Chapter 7. Lucia Haulíková of the Project
Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Health analyses the current status and
possibilities of social security reform in Chapter 8. Miroslav Beblavý writes about
industrial policy in Chapter 9, and Daniela Zemanovicová of INEKO addresses the
subject of competition policy in Chapter 10. Anton Marcincin of the Research
Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (RC SFPA) deals with
privatization in Chapter 11 and with enterprise restructuring in Chapter 12, while
Martin Barto and Tomáš Kmet, both of the bank Slovenská sporitelna, analyze in
Chapter 13 the status of bank privatization and restructuring. The final chapter,
written by Miroslav Beblavý, includes a summary of the main conclusions of all
the chapters as well as recommendations for future Slovak economic policy.
The opponents contributed significantly to the success of the book. They are:
Eugen Jurzyca of INEKO; Radek Lastovicka of Venture Capital Fund, Prague;
Katarína Mathernová of the Government Office; Michal Mejstrík of Institute of
Economic Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences (IES FSS) of Charles
University, Prague; Ján Oravec of the Ministry of Economy; Juraj Rencko of the
Finance Ministry and the Slovak Academy of Sciences, Olga Reptová of M.E.S.A.
10; Mario Strapec of Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education -
Economic Institute (CERGE-EI), Prague; Vladimír Tvaroška of the Government
Office and Zdenek Tuma of the Czech National Bank, Prague. It was splendid to
observe the commitment with which they shared their knowledge and experience
with the authors of the individual chapters.
We would like to thank the Embassy of the United States for financing this
publication from its Small Democracy Grants Program and Magda Vášáryová of
SFPA for the support and institutional backing of the project. Dagmar Pfeiferová
of RC SFPA managed the project, and her work enabled the successful publishing
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of this book. Our thanks also go to Zuzana Ulicianska of CSMA and Zuzana
Franová of SFPA for their organizations’ help.
The opinions and conclusions presented in this book are, of course, the
opinions and conclusions of its authors, who together with the editors take full
responsibility.
                                                                              Anton Marcincin
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2 Overall Macroeconomic Development
Karol MORVAY
Institute of Slovak and World Economy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the transition from a supply-constrained
centrally planned economy towards a demand-constrained market economy
represents a search for an acceptable relationship between growth and a balanced
economy. This has been complicated by conditions related to insufficient
restructuring and a distorted institutional framework. Slovakia has given the
impression of successfully achieving this transition. However, opportunities for
economic growth based on the stimulation of the demand side of the economy have
been exhausted.
The macroeconomic development of Slovakia's economy reflects a diversity
of economic approaches during the transition process of the last decade.  Disputes
have involved the shape of the mix of politics and economics, the overall
perception, and the direction of transition itself. At first, development reflected the
transition-related recession and export-driven revitalization. Later, excessive
unbalanced growth and attempts to re-stabilize the economy resulted in a return to
the economy’s pre-transition performance level. This was accompanied by
persistent structural distortions that tended to impede development.
 The transition’s questionable outcome suggests that it is necessary to
complete the setup of the institutional framework of the economy as well as to
stimulate the economy from the supply side.  Ten years after the fall of
communism, the economy nears the completion of the transition process. It will
require better coordination among individual economic policy segments, an
improved transparency, and a better conceptual approach.
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2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe Slovakia’s macroeconomic
development during the transition process.  This section will shape a background
for subsequent chapters and will characterize the individual segments of the
economic policy.  Despite the short history of Slovakia, economic policy has
created many different concepts and some dubious outcomes.  The macroeconomic
development assessment presented will be based on so-called soft data, i.e.,
currently published and accessible data.2
The chapter is divided into two sections.  The first section focuses on the
assessment of key macroeconomic parameters.  The second section analyzes
macroeconomic development as a result of various economic policies
implemented.  This section is presented chronologically by individual stages.
These stages were selected based on the occurrence of specific macroeconomic
phenomena and the marked changes in concepts, with additional analysis provided
in relation to typical  problems.  The objective has been to point out the differences
in development depending on the perception of economic policy priorities.
Another objective has been to confirm the hypothesis concerning the exhaustion of
the opportunities that enabled the achievement of seemingly outstanding
macroeconomic results, i.e., the blocking of the restructuring process and distorting
of the institutional framework. The chapter also examines arguments supportive of
new priorities of economic policy, with a more pronounced support for institutional
reforms of the economy’s supply side.
2.2 Characterization of the Development of Principal
Macroeconomic Parameters
In this section, we shall describe problems related to the development of key
macroeconomic indices and attempt to describe the development of economic
performance.  The macroeconomic results of Slovakia's economy have been
evaluated regularly by a number of domestic and international institutions and
analysts.  The 1993 OECD study represented a comprehensive analysis of the
macroeconomic development during the federal Czecho-Slovakia as well as during
the first months of the independent State’s existence.  Its conclusion stated that
there would be good prospects for revitalization of the Slovak economy in the
medium term.  It stressed that the disturbing split of the country created a need of
increased attentiveness to macroeconomic stabilization.  A 1995 World Bank study
highlighted the relatively unfavorable macroeconomic heritage and the necessity
for a cautious macroeconomic policy at the threshold of the establishment of the
                                                                
2 We may recall that during the period in question, statistics would be subject to substantial
changes.
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new State. The study also pointed out the necessity of restructuring the economy to
assure revitalization.  The analyses of the macroeconomic development conducted
within the period of 1994 – 1995 emphasized the positive development of
macroeconomic parameters and, at the same time, questioned the sustainability of
this development.  Rencko (1996) stated that the micro-level would determine the
nature of further development. It is at the micro-level that some risks associated
with the shaping of the ownership structure and the functionality of the allocation
mechanism appears. Okáli et al. (1996) expressed their doubts about the permanent
nature of the economy’s positive breakthrough. This was attributed to structural
weaknesses and banking sector problems.  Later analyses suggested a number of
economic problems. One study noted a growing “fragility” of economic growth
(Kárász and Rencko, 1997). Another analysis discussed the economy’s imbalance
associated with unsatisfactory progress in microeconomic adjustment and the low
effectiveness of the redistribution processes in the area of public finances (Kárász,
Rencko and Kárász ml., 1999). A problem noted by another analysis was the
chronic nature of the imbalanced development and the necessity to slow down
economic growth (Okáli et al., 1999).  Another one noticed the insufficient
coordination of the economic policy segments and the need of principal reforms
(OECD, 1999). A retrospective analysis of the major macroeconomic parameters
for the entire duration of the Slovak Republic’s existence was offered by a study of
INFOSTAT analysts (Haluška and Olexa, 1999).  This study stated that the 1996 -
1998 development showed the typical features of an overheated economy.
TABLE 1. GDP Volume Index in Constant Prices (1989 = 100)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP index 100 97.5 83.3 77.9 75.0 78.7 84.1 89.7 95.5 99.7 102.4
Note: 1999 data according to the forecasts by the Slovak Statistical Office.  Source: Author´s own
calculations according to the data provided by the Slovak Statistical Office.
2.2.1 Performance of the Economy
In 1999, the economy’s performance (in terms of the volume of gross
domestic product, GDP generated) oscillated around the 1989 level, which was
prior to the commencement of the reforms (Table 1).  The fact that GDP returned
to its pre-reform levels after one decade is disappointing since it was not expected
at the time the reforms were started.3 Certainly, a return to the original level of
GDP generation does not mean that the economy has reached the same position it
                                                                
3 E.g., see Federal Ministry for Strategic Planning (1990), Ministry for Economic Strategy
of the Slovak Republic (1991), and Government of the CSFR in the Memoriandum on
Economic Policy developed for IMF (1990).
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had at the start of the reforms. The quality of the economic developments
themselves had changed.  A prevailing part of GDP (about 85 %) is now generated
by the private sector.  During the transition process, the services share of GDP
increased while those of industry and agriculture decreased.  On the other hand,
there has been no substantial improvement in the level of valorization of inputs and
the level of economic efficiency after reaching the initial performance level as
mentioned.4 The performance restoring process has been and continues to be
accompanied by chronic disturbances of the macroeconomic equilibrium.  A
relatively high unemployment rate remains, the decline of inflation has stopped,
and problems with the negative current account balance has became acute (see
Chart 1).
The positive economic growth achieved in Slovakia after 1994 was
influenced from the demand side in a variety of ways (Chart 2).  While there still
were signs of transition-related recession in Slovakia during 1993, economic
growth started showing some signs of recovery in 1994. This growth was
associated with an increase in exports of goods and services.  The decrease in
imports was so significant that it even caused a further reduction in domestic
demand.5
The first positive increment of domestic demand occurred in 1995,
particularly in the area of capital investment. Gross capital formation grew 37.4 %
in real terms (thereof gross fixed capital formation only contributing 5.3 %).
Increases in exports of products and services started  to decline, resulting in
continuing reductions in annual net export surpluses.  These surpluses so far have
been the last positive result of the transition process.
In 1996, a reduction of exports (by 0.3 % in constant prices) was
accompanied by a marked growth in imports (by 20.3 %).  This trade imbalance
was accompanied by a record growth in domestic demand (by 19.6 %) to sustain a
high GDP growth dynamics.  In 1997, foreign demand again represented a positive
contribution to Slovakia’s economic growth.  Net exports were still in red figures
(Sk –44.4 bn in 1995 prices), but less negative than in the preceding year (Sk –55.8
bn).  On the other hand, there was a significant reduction in domestic demand.
                                                                
4 Added value that is at the basis of GDP generation, still was keeping a markedly smaller
share on gross production than intermediate consumption.  After 1995, this only changed
little, suggesting problems with respect to raising the effectivity of the economy.  Also see
Kárász, Rencko and Kárász ml. (1999).
5 The specific developmental parameters are shown in the Annex to this book.
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CHART 1. Development of the Principal Performance and Equilibrium Parameters
of Slovakia's Economy
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CHART 2. Contributions of Domestic Demand and Net Exports to the GDP
Growth Recovery
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In 1998, the growth was driven almost exclusively by domestic demand; the
negative value of net exports remained almost at the 1997 level.  A change in
economic policy along with an accumulation of problems caused the restriction of
domestic demand in 1999. This caused a slow-down in GDP growth. However, the
growth of exports acted against a more pronounced reduction of growth rates.
Taking a look at the supply side, i.e., GDP generation offers a view of the
economy’s tertiarization process.  According to estimates of 1989 GDP (World
Bank, 1995), agriculture had a 9.4 % share, industry had a 58.5 % share, and
services had a 32.2 % share. In 1999, the service sector almost reached a 60 %
share of GDP whereas agriculture’s share was only 4.4 %.
GDP generated after 1995 could not cover domestic demand. This is
documented by a non-sustainable trade balance deficit.  The pre-transition GDP
level was reached at a time when the overall status of the Slovak economy and the
status quo of the transition required the adoption of new stabilization measures.
2.2.2 Inflation
In a transition economy, inflation rates are influenced by non-standard
factors.  A peculiar feature of price development is the problematic relationship
between the growth of monetary aggregates and the growth of the overall price
level.6 The relationship between the development of monetary aggregates and the
development of inflation rates is masked by numerous non-standard measures that
affect the growth of prices in such countries.  They include:
· Price liberalization and deregulation - the unavoidable systemic steps in the
establishment of a market economy. Price liberalization is within the
framework of a broader liberalization (i.e., within the scope of economics/
politics and how these effect the proper functioning of an economy). This
created an inflationary stimulus that caused inflation rates in Slovakia and/or
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to reach historic levels (see Chart 4).
The adjustment of prices that had been capped contributed to a short-term
destabilization of price levels. This occurred throughout the process of
transition (see Chart 5).
· Tax reform (implemented as of January 1993 in Slovakia). Out of the total
growth of prices during 1993, a substantial portion (about 40 % of consumer
prices and about 50 % of industrial production and construction works prices)
occurred at the beginning of the year due to tax reform (according to Okáli et
                                                                
6 The questionability of the „M2-inflation“ links in countries in transition supplied one
argument top abandon M2 as a criterion of  the monetray policy of the Czech National Bank
and the using of inflation targets.  See Šmídková and Hrncír (1998),  and Janácek et al.
(1998).
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al., 1994). Charts 4 and 5 illustrate the price variations that followed
implementation of the new tax system.
· Strong influx of foreign resources.  Under certain conditions, an influx of
foreign resources may induce inflationary effects.  Dvorák (1996) indicated
that this will depend on whether such an influx is driven by an increased
demand for money on the part of domestic entities (low inflation-enhancing
impact) or by an enhanced supply of money.7
· Equalization of price levels.  The price levels of a country in transition are
usually lower than those in the developed countries it is doing business with.
There is also a discrepancy between the structure of relative prices in both the
domestic economy and abroad.  If the economy is quite open, as is the case
with Slovakia, there is a tendency for price levels to equalize. The structure of
relative domestic prices tends to adjust to those abroad while countries
undergo transition.
· Public finance imbalances - chronic deficit of public budgets.  In the interest
of financing a budget deficit, the State enters capital markets where it
attempts to draw on a portion of its national savings.  This practice pushes out
private investments and also causes interest rates to rise.  When interest
expense is a significant share on total expenditures, prices of outputs will
increase.
· Tendency of domestic demand to prevail over generation of GDP.
Unsatisfactory microeconomic restructuring may cause domestic supply to
become inflexible and not respond sufficiently to the development of
domestic demand.  When such a condition persists, it creates a constant
pressure on price levels.
· Business environment distortion. During the early stages of a transition, a
distorted competitive environment and the monopolization of many sectors
can cause price levels to soar. This type of environment does not generate
sufficient incentives to keep prices low.
An irregular and unequal development of various price indices occurred
during the process of transition (Chart 3).  In mid-1999, a consumer would have to
pay Sk 385 for a fictitious consumer basket that would have been priced at Kcs 100
in 1989.  Using a 1989 price of 100, construction works prices reached an index of
378; industrial producer prices reached 299; agricultural products reached 160.
                                                                
7 If the influx of resources is supply-driven due to institutional changes and excess of
financial resources abroad, such an influx will likely create pressure, via growing monetary
aggregates, on prices.  On the other hand, if the influx is due to a growing demand for
money, the positive effects of the influx will likely prevail, and its impact on inflation rates
will be not very marked.
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CHART 3. Development of Price Indices Level (1989 = 100)
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CHART 4. Development of Price Indices (change from preceding year)
Source: Slovak Statistical Office
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CHART  5. Development of Consumer Price Indices in Slovakia within 1993-
1999, and Descripton of Non-standard Influences
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As illustrated by Chart 4, the Slovak economy experienced two strong
impacts on inflation rates after the start of the economic reform (shown as two
notches on the curve).  The first was the price liberalization of 1991, which was
also associated with changes in exchange rates.  The other inflation-promoting
factors are the tax system changes of 1993 and the currency devaluation that
occurred six months later.
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Chart 5 illustrates the changes in overall price levels from 1993 to 1999.  It
indicates times when price levels jumped due to some non-standard factor (mostly
interferences of central institutions with the price development).  Due to a cautious
monetary policy, such pro-inflationary stimuli had one-time shock effects that were
short-lived and did not cause a more pronounced inflationary spiral.
In our opinion, the strengthening of several symptoms of macroeconomic
imbalance stopped the decline of inflation rates in 1996; inflation rates remained at
a relatively low level in 1996.  That low level of inflation could only be achieved
by establishing a gradually more restrictive monetary policy,8 keeping a fixed
exchange rate, and by postponing deregulation of capped prices (and of the
tackling of the status of natural monopolies).9 The postponement of price
deregulation perpetuated the distortion of relative prices and the economy’s
allocation mechanism. It also contributed to the distortion of the microsphere and
caused negative impacts on the fiscal sector.
2.2.3 Unemployment
Unemployment was not officially recognized at the start of the transition
process. By 1999, however, it represented the most acute problem of both social
and economic policies.
During the early stages of the transition process, unemployment rates
increased as a logical consequence of recession.  The cumulative reduction of
employment rates during the recession years, however, was much less than the
cumulative reduction of GDP.  Assuming that there was over-employment during
the period of a centrally planned economy, over-employment also persisted during
the first years of the transition process.  Okáli et al. (1995) pointed out that a
significant portion of employed labor was only partially utilized by the economy.
After restoring economic growth, the productivity of employed labor can be raised;
at least for a certain period of time, there is no need to hire new labor. This has
been one of the reasons for the paradoxical occurrence that changes in employment
remained small even in periods of strong economic growth.  To a great extent,
strong economic growth resulted from economic activities where growth in
production was not tightly linked to the growth of employed labor.10 However, the
reduction of the high GDP growth rates in 1998 and during the first half-year of
1999 was accompanied by a drop in employment and growth in unemployment
(see Table 2).
                                                                
8 It is expressed by reducing increments of the M2 monetary aggregate.
9 A typical example are the prices of electricity for the domestic sector that remained
unchanged within 1993-1998.
10 To these issues, also see the chapter dealing with labor market.
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Table 3 indicates how employment rates responded to GDP development.  It
is evident that there was an unambiguous link between economic growth and
employment growth.  The significance of the link between economic growth and
employment development is expressed in two ways.  First, it concerns the elasticity
of changes in employment with respect to changes in GDP.11 Second, it is
expressed in terms of the so-called threshold of employment growth (for details,
see Okáli et al., 1999). The relatively high positive values of this parameter suggest
that employment responds rather insensitively to high economic growth.  Thus,
employment growth can only be expected to occur during periods of very high
economic growth rates.
The high overall unemployment rates represent only one dimension of the
unemployment problem in Slovakia.  Another pronounced aspect is regional
differentiation due to a low mobility of labor, poor professional qualifications and
an unsatisfactory educational structure.  In addition, long-term unemployment
represented more than 50 % of overall unemployment.
TABLE 2. Development of Unemployment Rates *
In  % 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Unemployment 1.6 11.8 10.4 14.4 14.8 13.1 12.8 12.5 15.6 17.7
*Figures as of the end of the corresponding period. Data for 1999 relate to the first half-year. Source:
Slovak Statistical Office, National Bank of Slovakia
TABLE 3. Interlinkage of GDP and Unemployment
Parameter 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
A. GDP Growth  (%) -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 4.4 2.4
B. Employment Growth*  (%) -0.1 -1.8 1.7 3.6 -0.9 -0.3 -3.7
D Employment / D GDP (B/A) ** 0.03 -0.37 0.25 0.55 -0.14 -0.07 -1.54
Employment Growth Threshold (A-B) -3.6 6.7 5.2 3.0 7.4 4.7 6.1
* According to changes in the numbers of employees. Data for 1999 relate to the first half-year. **
Flexibility of the response by changes in employment to changes in GDP. Source: Data from Slovak
Statistical Office and author´s own calculations
Changes in the employment structure are related to changes in GDP structure.
In the secondary sector, the share of the processing industries’ share of overall
employment dropped from 27.2 % in 1993 to 26.7 % in 1998; in industry, the share
of manufacturing materials and semi-products sectors increased from 36.3 % in
1993 to 39.8 % in 1998. This phenomenon suggests that labor is not adequately
                                                                
11 The positive value of this parameter suggests that both indices studied – economic growth
and employment, were changing in the period monitored in the same direction;  and vice
versa (for a negative value).  The closer  the absolute value of the index to 1, the tighter the
correlation between GDP growth and employment growth.
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transitioning to sectors characterized by a high degree of processing,
sophistication, and generation of added value.
Slovakia’s unemployment problem has lead us to conclude that it cannot be
considered as cyclic unemployment; it is evidently of a structural nature.  The lack
of a successful economic policy in dealing with unemployment issues has also lead
us to believe that the high economic growth showed insufficient quality.
2.2.4 External Equilibrium
Chart 1 shows that during the transition process there were alternating
developments with respect to external equilibrium.  External imbalance presents a
view of internal imbalance because it provides a link between domestic demand
and GDP, and also a link between savings and investments.  Chart 6 illustrates the
key components of the current account balance of payments.  The illustration
suggests that export levels 12 (measured as the share of exports of products and
services on GDP) exceeded import levels (imports of products and services to
GDP) only in 1994 and 1995.  The sum of exports and imports that represent the
so-called openness of the economy has been above 120 % of GDP in recent years.
This indicates the economy has an extraordinarily high level of openness.
A pronounced deficit in the current account occurred after 1995. At the time,
the overall macroeconomic imbalance of Slovakia had intensified.  It was also a
reflection on the opening of the shears between the development of domestic
demand and GDP. This reflected the diminishing competitiveness of Slovak
producers in both domestic and international markets.  The current account of
payment balance and its assets is considered a measure of the competitiveness of
the economy.  The prevailing deficit of the current account, along with some other
symptoms of imbalanced development, has been an obstacle to further economic
growth.
The deficit of the current account resulted in a loss of foreign currency. This
was compensated for an influx of resources to capital and financial accounts.  The
influx of resources from abroad always exceeded their outward drain.  This left the
structure of foreign resources as a problematic area.
The most valuable foreign resource was direct foreign investments. Their
influx showed stagnation (Chart 7) while the growth (before 1998) of other capital
(loans) is conspicuous.  Its growth reflects internal imbalance between the
generation and utilization of resources.  Foreign indebtedness reflected this
development and grew to 62 % of GDP in late 1998.  Half of this indebtedness had
a maturity of less than one year. Slovakia's net international debt level represented
                                                                
12 The export performance of Slovakia is still based on a relatively narrow range of products
that is markedly sensitive to demand cycles in OECD countries.  For  details, see OECD
(1996) and the chapter on foreign trade herein.
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almost 30 % of GDP.  This level of net foreign debt and its rate of growth
contributed to a reduction of Slovakia's credit rating.  Another year of debt growth,
at the same rate as was seen from 1996 through 1998, could increase the net debt to
GDP ratio to 40 %. This level, based on the experience of other countries, may be
considered as the upper limit (according to OECD, 1999).
2.2.5 Macroeconomic Results Compared to Other V4 countries
A comparison of Slovakia’s macroeconomic achievements to other post-
communist economies is shown in Charts 8 and 9, which provide the so-called
magic quadrangles of economic policy success rates.  They illustrate the dynamics
of economic growth as well as the principal imbalance characteristics, i.e., inflation
rates, unemployment rates, and the status of the current account of payment
balance.  The more a monitored parameter deviates from the point of intersection
of the axes (thus the larger the area of the quadrangle), the more impact it has had
for the country’s success at developing the principal macroeconomic
characteristics.
CHART 6. Development of the Key Components of the Current Account of
Payment Balance13
Data expressed in terms of GDP percentages. Data for 1999 relate to the first half-year. Source:
National Bank of Slovakia
                                                                
13 With the exception of the data shown in Chart 1 data since 1993 have been used to
illustrate issues of external economic relationships.  The reason is that the meaning of the
term „other countries“ changed after the establishment of the independent Slovak Republic,
and this has been associated with some risks in  using statistical data.
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CHART 7. Selected Components of the Capital and Financial Accounts of
Balance of Payments
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It is evident that the position of Slovakia was significantly different in the two
separate three-year periods.  Both periods had a relatively great success rate in the
development of price levels, and a relatively weak success rate concerning
unemployment.  The difference is attributed to Slovakia's position with respect to
external imbalance.  During the first period, Slovakia showed the most successful
development of the current account of all countries within the monitored group, but
this development decreased during the second period.  This was a result of   high
economic growth.  Comparing the countries in transition requires that we examine
the implementation of reform steps.
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CHART 8. Comparison of the Macroeconomic Results Achieved by the Slovak
Republic with Those Recorded by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (1993-
1995)
Comparison based on the average values of parameters for the given period.  Source:  OECD (1999),
Nachtigal (1997) and Slovak Statistical Office
2.2.6 Conclusion
The successful development during 1994 and 1995 was only temporary.
Compared with other countries, Slovakia was relatively successful if judged by
economic growth rate and inflation rates. That success was partially achieved at the
expense of external equilibrium (and the associated indebtedness) and by the
postponement of some necessary measures.  The alternation of macroeconomic
successes and failures during the transition process requires a closer chronological
examination that is presented in the sections that follow.
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CHART 9. Comparison of the Macroeconomic Results Achieved by Slovakia with
Those Recorded by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (1996-1998)
Based on average values of parameters during the period of monitoring. Source: OECD (1999),
Nachtigal (1997), Slovak Statistical Office
2.3 Macroeconomic Development During the Various Stages of
Transition
The chronology of the Slovak economic development examines alternating
approaches to the understanding of economic policy and the process of transition.
It is a story of searching for possibilities of sustainable (balanced) growth and for
opportunities of convergence with EU countries.  This section focuses on the
results achieved at the macroeconomic level and also seen in function of policies.
The monitored period has been divided into several stages, as illustrated in the
Scheme (see Annex), and supplemented with some characteristic features of the
individual stages.  The stages cannot be strictly delineated because they overlap.
For each transitional stage, an analysis is given for economic policy, characteristic
technical discrepancies, and principal macroeconomic problems.
A gradual transition from a supply-side constrained economy towards a
demand-side constrained economy was necessary and has been analyzed by Kornai
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(1981a, 1981b, 1982).14 Laski et al. (1993) have presented transition possibilities
with an analysis of the first Slovakian experience.  Jonáš (1997) developed
characteristics of an ideal transition background for the common Czecho-Slovak
State environment.  He also provided evidence for the necessity of a transition-
associated recession.  The initial reform approach, within the framework of the
federal State, was critically assessed by Lysák (1997) and Plachtinský (1992).
They believed a pronounced respect of national specifics was required. In contrast,
Danco (1996) noted the risks associated with the use of various “third” ways and
warned against the lack of clarity, non-transparency, and the potential of abuse
from “specific” ways of transition.   Nemec (1998) and Okáli (1998) analyzed
recurrent imbalanced developments after a relatively successful primary
stabilization. They both point to the linkage between the condition of the business
sector and recurrent imbalances at the macro-level.
2.3.1 Characteristics of the Baseline Status Quo
The goal characterizing a baseline status quo is to offer a description of
relevant factors. At the time when the first transition steps were contemplated, the
factors influenced the macroeconomic parameters as well as the transition process.
Prior to WWII, Czechoslovakia ranked among the dozen or so countries with
the highest volume of national income per capita (Jonáš, 1997, Solimano, 1991). It
achieved high rates of economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s.  At the beginning
of the transition period, Czechoslovakia ranked between 40th to 50th based on its
GDP per capita.  The reason was that the opportunities to enhance economic
growth had been exhausted by utilizing production inputs.  Rectified values of
economic growth for the period of 1981-1989 suggest a stagnation and/or a slight
reduction of the economy’s performance level (Nachtigal, 1991).
Economic imbalances emerged as demand prevailed over supply in global
relationships and their structure. This would be a constant phenomenon throughout
the entire economic development of Czechoslovakia.  The imbalance15 also
manifested itself in the domestic consumer market, being relatively mildest there
since, unlike enterprises, households were very restricted in their budgets.
Imbalances were also manifested in intermediate and investment markets.
Imbalances were a continuous phenomenon of the Czechoslovak economy and
                                                                
14 For the originals in English language, see Kornai (1971,1980).
15 The term „disbalance“ should however be used with respect to the assessment of centrally
planned economy with the understanding that there was no actually functioning market and
equilibrium-creating prices.  The key criterion of the plan development was material balance
(as a certain replacement for the term balance).  For details on this issue, see Kocárník
(1987).
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were also accompanied by inflation, which reflected economic imbalances.16
When assessing the relationship between imbalances and inflation in a centrally
planned economy, we should distinguish between structural imbalances in the
individual markets and global imbalances.  Structural imbalances, where shortages
exist in some consumption sectors and a growth of idle stocks exists in others,
means that forced substitution processes exist, that consumption focuses on several
basic commodity groups, and/or that surplus money gets realized in shadow
economy. Any or all of these factors cause prices to substantially increase.  A
structural imbalance typically produces hidden inflation. A global imbalance is a
situation where an overall supply of goods does not cover the disposable income of
the population and, at the same time, the structure of this supply differs markedly
from the preferences of the consumers. This situation is reflected in suppressed
inflation.
The imbalance in the consumer market, unlike that in intermediate and
investment markets, was structural rather than global in nature.  Inflation
manifested itself as a way to treat hidden inflation imbalances in the Czechoslovak
economy of the 1970s and 1980s. The parallel (shadow) economy worked as a
specific mechanism to restore economic equilibrium.
The general irrationality of the price system and price distortions also
intensified.  The price development, which was based on cost pricing, was unable
to react to changes in the demand structure.  Price could not be the criteria for the
allocation and reallocation of resources. Retail prices did not fulfill a regulatory
role with respect to equilibrium due to the fact that the link to supply generation at
the producer level was rather weak.  The distorted price system was also a result of
the State’s pricing policy that gave preference to the social function of retail prices.
The imbalanced tendencies of the economy was one of the reasons for the
national economy’s changing structure.  Klaus (1991) states that the willingness of
consumers to purchase low-quality instead of expensive products led to the erosion
of quality, an inadequate supply structure, and hidden price increases (pseudo-
innovations). The elimination of imbalanced tendencies would unavoidably require
use of market forces in the management of economy. Without these forces, this
phenomenon would recur because of systemic conditions (Dlouhý, 1988). At the
same time, however, the pressures of economic imbalances would be a threat. If
market forces were used, such pressures might manifest themselves as inflationary
shock and create trade balance problems.
Central planning contributed significantly to the preservation of outdated
structures by emphasizing the proportionality of materials and on subordinating
prices to this objective.  These actions later manifested themselves as an
                                                                
16 Overt, hidden or suppressed inflation occurred frequently in communist-type economy.
For details, see Dlouhý (1988).
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underlying reason for the transition-related recession.  The reform steps, at the
early stages of the transition process, were prepared in a macroeconomic
environment. The environment suffered from growth stagnation, suppressed
inflation, chronic symptoms of imbalances, and structural defects.  All of these
problems arose as a manifestation of failures of centrally planned economy
processes. Many of them remain in various forms and contribute to present day
problems.
2.3.2 The Period of Initial Stabilization (1990-92)
2.3.2.1 Direction of Economic Policy
During the early stages of the reform (see stage 1, Scheme 1), the decision-
making sphere in Czechoslovakia chose the method of so-called “shock therapy”.17
The decision was influenced by economic neo-liberalism. The reform steps should
have been implemented immediately because of the likelihood of a transition trap,
i.e., a situation where the rules of the communist-type economy are already
weakened but not fully functioning, and economy is marasmic (Kornai, 1990 and
Jonáš, 1997).
In 1990, a transition scenario was developed. A significant number of prices
were liberalized on 1 January, 1991.  Price regulations remained for prices that
covered about 15 % GDP (5 % later on). The aim of this regulation, along with a
restrictive fiscal and monetary policy, was to prevent the shock of inflation from
evolving into an inflationary spiral, to suppress speculative and excessive swings
of prices, to prevent cartel agreements, and to weaken the differences between the
prices of inputs and final prices.
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, it was important that the first reform step
gave preferences to stabilization, to the establishment of equilibrium, to hinder
inflation, and to eliminate State budget deficits.  In the short term, economic
demand had to be suppressed because of the need to convert from a supply
constrained economic system to a demand constrained economic system.  Some
reduction in GDP generation was also expected for a transient period of time.  The
success of that stage was measured by the fact that the shock of inflation could be
stopped in a way compatible with a market based economy, i.e., by openly raising
prices. The weakening of the economy’s performance, the growth of
unemployment rates, and the reduction of real wages have demonstrated its failure.
                                                                
17 Laski et al. (1993) warned however of intellectual dogmatism in the form of outlining
slogans such as „shock therapy“ versus „gradualism.“ Also see Balcerowics (1993).
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2.3.2.2 Disputes Concerning the Pace of Liberalization
The need for price liberalization did not evoke any intensive disputes. The
method and the pace of the price liberalization was the subject of more discussions.
Criticisms of rapid liberalization and a parallel restrictive monetary policy can be
summarized as follows (see Seják, 1991):
1. At the time of price liberalization, the economy of Czechoslovakia was still
characterized by a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure in all sectors. Without the
assistance of an effective antitrust policy, monetization of the originally
demonetized economy threatened to confirm price distortions. Price liberalization
was not preceded by necessary institutional reform. Consequently, price
liberalization strengthened the monopolistic positions of Czechoslovak producers
in 1991.
2. With a market exchange rate of Kcs, a pronounced depreciation of the
domestic currency occurred. The prices of foreign substitutes for domestic
products were so high that they did not present any competition to domestic goods.
This paradox softened economic criteria.
3. Anti-inflationary actions of the government were in the form of a
restrictive monetary and budgetary policy that enabled a gradual stabilization of
price levels. The policy fiercely suppressed  the economy. It resulted in either
companies or households being unable to implement the necessary structural
changes because of their adverse revenue situations.
While an oligopolistic market structure actually existed, the initial
devaluation of the currency was aimed at helping corporations to overcome the
first transitional shocks, to gradually equalize the prices of domestic and foreign
substitutes, and to eliminate the monopolistic position of domestic corporations.
Based on model simulations, Hanousek and Krkoška (1997) have suggested that
the pre-announced, pronounced shock liberalization, in the end, had the least
inflationary effect.  One-time liberalization may have had the strongest inflationary
impact at implementation, but it had the least impact in the cumulative form. The
“shock” method caused inflation rates to decline substantially faster than any other
simulated impacts. Due to rational expectations of businesses, gradual
liberalization made inflationary expectations become an integral part of the
economy. Under the conditions that existed then in Czechoslovakia, it was the
announcement of radical and extensive price liberalization that would have
achieved the best results.
2.3.2.3 Transition-related Depression
A reduction of production was expected but underestimated.  The government
prognoses, laid down in the Memorandum on Economic Policy for 1991, projected
a production decrease of only 5 %. This proved to be only a half of actual decline
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in production.  The cumulative drop of GDP in Slovakia between 1989 and 1993,
when the transition-related depression came to an end, was about 25 %.  This
decrease was comparable with what was experienced in the Czech Republic,
Poland, and Hungary. It was also less than declines of GDP in a majority of less
developed post-communist countries (see Fischer et al., 1996).
In assessing reasons for the transition-related depression in Slovakia, the
World Bank (1995) brought COMECON disintegration into the foreground.  This
disintegration was not the only reason for the depression. Other  probable reasons
include the consequences of inflation, impulses stemming from uncertainty, and
structural defects, etc. (see scheme 2).  The pronounced drop in production that
occurred from 1990 to 1993 evoked numerous discussions concerning the necessity
of its extensiveness and whether economic policy makers could have prevented it.
This issue was frequently considered an index of deterioration in the population’s
standard of life. This became a politically sensitive issue. However, Jonáš (1997)
pointed out that the officially recorded drop of production overstated the actual
decline in the standard of life.  Statistics were unable to record some production
and consumption data due to the rapid growth of the private sector and the
emergence of a hidden economy.  Distortions also occurred due to the use of ratios.
The weights used to construct aggregate figures for the individual sectors were
outdated. Sectors that recorded higher than average reductions were therefore
overstated.18 One reason for the distortion of production volume and price indices
was the difficulty in measuring improved product quality.  The statistics for
production volumes  both before and after implementation of reforms may hide
substantial differences concerning the ability of the production to meet needs.
                                                                
18 The changed production structure thus resulted in an overstatement of its reduction.  The
production of rapidly developing services was statistically measurable but with great
problems.
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 SCHEME 1. Causes for GDP Reduction after the Reform Implementation in the
CSFR
1. Reduction of Real Wages
2. Pre-stocking Prior to the Start of the Reform
3. End of the “Shortage Economy” Phenomenon and the
Associated Reduction of Purchases for Stock
4. Uncertainty and the Associated Weakening of the Tendency to
Save
5. Growing Proportions of Demand Satisfied from Sales not
Covered by Statistics (street sales, etc.)
Consumption by
Households
6. Uncertainty of Corporations Concerning Future Development
7. Postponements of Capital Investments-related Decisions until
the Time when a New Ownership Structure Is Formed
8. Reduction in Inventories after the Launching of Reforms
Gross Capital
Generation
9. Limiting the Role of State in Economy Consumption by
State
Administration
10. Disintegration of the COMECON Markets
11. Drop in Production and Demand on the Part of other Former
Centrally Planned Economies
Net Exports
Influencing Overall Supply Influencing Overall Demand
1. Raising the Prices of Imported Inputs (transition to payments at world prices,
devaluations)
2. Higher than Expected Increase in Price Level and thus Greater than Expected
Reduction of Real Parameters
3. Restriction or Total Elimination of Subsidies from Public Funds
4. Transition to “Hard Budgetary Restrictions”
5. Managerial Shock, Loss of the Security of Secured Sales and Financing of the
Entire Volume of Planned Production, Waiting Positions, Postponing the
Necessary Changes as far as Possible
6. Delays in Opening New Productions behind the Closing of the Old Ones,
Structural Defect
7. Conversion of Military Production
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Recommendations on how to overcome the production decline included the
stimulation of aggregate supply. Another recommendation was that the State take a
more active role within the framework of industrial policies to support prospective
sectors.  During the early stage of transition, the production drop was of a different
nature than what occurred during the economic cycle.  Therefore, the usual
instruments of fiscal and monetary policies for stimulating demand could not be
used to treat transition-related depression.  Ineffective production attenuated much
faster in a short period of time than the starting of new activities.  As a result of
this asymmetry, changes in the production structure may have temporarily
produced a reduction in the overall volume of production (Jonáš, 1997). Artificial
stimulation of demand would allow corporations to postpone the eventual changes
and to continue production under temporarily sustainable conditions.  Jonáš argued
against a more active State industrial policy by contending that such a policy
would result in a softening of some corporate budgetary restrictions .  Over the
long run, support given to sectors or corporations of  “strategic importance“ cannot
bring in any pro-growth benefits.  Conversely, similar measures have anti-growth
effects because, in their framework, the State guarantees softer than market
conditions for some companies. This enables them to postpone the necessary shifts
of resources to places where they can be most effectively utilized.  Doing this, the
economy’s structural defects get preserved and the long term potential for growth
gets restricted.
With a better understanding of rules that govern the development of a post-
communist society, the production decline might not have been as severe. In our
opinion, the idea of transition without any recession is little weight.  There is no
transition economy that escaped a decline in economic performance, including
Hungary that pursued a different process of transition (see Kornai, 1998).
2.3.3 The Reversal and Revitalization Stage (1993-95)
2.3.3.1 Direction of Economic Policy
There were pressures to change the nature of reform from “Klausian” to a
reform that would respect Slovakia's specifics. These pressures were growing in
parallel to the establishment of the new State.  The OECD study (1993) pointed to
the opinions of economic policy makers who believed the 1991-1992 reform path
was too fast.  The study reports that the government born out of the 1992
parliamentary elections had wished to slow down the pace of economic reform,
especially in the area of privatization.  The critics19 of the previous method of
reform argued that the “erroneous Czechoslovak reform” disproportionately
harmed the Slovak economy because it was tailored to the Czech economy. The
                                                                
19 These arguments were used by Plachtinský (1992) and Lysák (1997).
41
restrictions triggered the population’s subsequent mistrust of the new State. The
reason for the mistrust was that the reform paralyzed the economy and threatened
social peace.  Plachtinský (1992, s.5) presented the position of professionals who
were committed to the continuation of the reforms: „There were three variants to
be considered.   Uniform reform in the common Czecho-Slovak State – this was the
first one, tested to result in enormous losses of Slovakia's economic potential.
Exactly the logical opposite was the combination of a genuine Slovak reform with
an independent Slovak State.  Evidently, the least understandable variant was
selected – Slovak State and Czecho-Slovak reform.”
This pressure to change the reform path resulted in a diversion from the
original Czecho-Slovak reform to a new approach in the transition from 1993
through 1998. The first government of the independent Slovak State set forth its
vision of building a socially and environmentally oriented market economy.  The
priority of the Slovak economy was made to be the restructuring and revitalization
of sectors that would produce long-term economic effectiveness and advantages.20
According to OECD (1993), the government confirmed its commitment to a
socially oriented market economy without having explicitly defined it in any way.
“Strategy of Economic Revival” was adopted in November 1992.  The major
points of this Strategy were: (1) stimulation of macroeconomic expansion by
relieving fiscal and credit policies, (2) an active trade policy that included support
of exports to European countries and CIS, and (3) restructuring of industry under
the leadership and financial assistance of the State.21 This program was developed
further and supplemented in 1993 with an emphasis on the need to keep a
restrictive fiscal and neutral monetary policy.  In 1993, the decision-making sector
found it had to pay more attention to managing the consequences of economic
policy failures, including an increase in the budgetary deficit, the disintegration of
the monetary union with the Czech Republic, and the loss of FX reserves by the
Central Bank. These activities diverted decision makers away from the
development of a coherent reform strategy.  The reform (according to OECD,
1993; similarly, Danco, 1996) actually recovered even though it had been slowed
down. Mikloš (1993) noted that the announced divorce with the so-called Klausian
reform could be questioned.  There were attempts to introduce a cautious and
rather restrictive fiscal policy and a more relaxed monetary policy  because the
proclaimed change in the transition strategy was not fully implemented yet.  The
reform process was therefore slowed down.
                                                                
20 See: Updated Tasks of the Slovak Government´s Programme Declaration after the
Establishment of Independent Slovak Republic (1993), and Slovakia´s Economic Policy
Doctrine for 1993 (1993).
21 For a description of this Programme, see OECD analysis (1993).
42
2.3.3.2 The Temporary Nature of the Successful Macroeconomic Development
There were signs as early as 1992 that the bottom cusp of transition-related
depression and subsequent revitalization had been achieved. The most important
influence was arguably the establishment of a new State even though it caused a
temporary recurrence of economic problems.  The World Bank study (1995) and
Mikloš (1993) noted that the recurring macroeconomic instability and the
unavoidable economic drop in 1993 were economic consequences of changing the
legal form of the State.
Declines in GDP generation in 1993 were at a milder pace (see Chart 1).
Public finances and FX reserves produced negative results while inflation rates
increased.  From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the subsequent period of 1994 and
1995 can be determined, with a certain caution, to be the most successful to date
(Chart 1).  Changes in Slovakia's economy in 1994, compared to the preceding
period, have been explained by Okáli et al. (1995) using the following arguments:
1. A relatively stable macroeconomic framework of economic activities
emerged thanks to restrictive fiscal and neutral monetary policies;
2.   Economic policies were established to improve exports and foreign trade
balances through a devaluation in the second half of 1993, anti-import
measures introduced early, and pro-export measures introduced late in 1994.
These actions were strengthened by favorable upswings in developed market
economies and CEFTA countries;
3.  The effects of recurrent economic recession caused by the split of
Czechoslovakia and the establishment of independent Slovakia came to an
end. 
The 1994 revitalization of Slovakia was achieved exclusively through the
growth of exports. Slovakia’s structural weakness of having an excessive
proportion of production of semi-products then became an advantage for quickly
overcoming the recession.  The trade in such products is dependent on prosperity.
The demand cycle on the part of Slovakia's trade partners improved in 1994 and
stimulated Slovakia’s exports of its existing export product range (for details, see
OECD, 1996). That development creates the risk of not recognizing the pressing
nature of structural changes.  Slovakia's economic situation confirmed that semi-
products and/or products with low level of processing can be produced with
enough quality, at least reaching the lower limit of world standards, more easily
than sophisticated final products.
Revitalization from the outside gradually translated to re-growth of additional
GDP components.  As a result, there was a substantial change in factors that
produced economic growth during 1994 and 1995. While GDP expenditures, in
constant prices, equaled the value of 1994’s exports of products and services, all
GDP components grew without exception in 1995 (compare with the Annex
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attached to this chapter).  The remaining problem was that domestic demand grew
faster than GDP and caused a strong growth of imports.  Simultaneously, export
rates started a downtrend.  This development threatened to produce repeated
destabilization of Slovakia's economy.  Slovakia did not seize the opportunity
offered by revitalization to implement the necessary structural and institutional
changes. This meant that the positive macroeconomic development was at risk of
reversing to adverse conditions.  Additional performance gains could not be
possible until the capacity of transition-related depression resources became
involved.  There was no sound microeconomic base in place yet to provide for a
self-sustaining harmonic development.
2.3.4 Disbalanced Growth Stage (1996-98)
2.3.4.1 Direction of Economic Policy
At this stage, there was a more pronounced implementation of the ideas from
the end of 1992 that concerned the “strategy of economic revival.”  The economic
policy deviated from liberalist models. Social motif and State responsibility views
became stronger; strong economic growth was preferred. It was supported by the
growing acceptance of a demand-oriented economic policy that included
stimulation of demand through expansion of public expenditures, realization of
extensive public infrastructure investments, deficit-generating management in the
interest of the stimulation of so-called developmental stimuli, etc.
The defense of the “own path” outlined in Scheme 1 frequently relied on
social arguments that highlighted features of Slovakia's transition from centrally
planned to market economy.  On the other hand, Danco (1996) warned that the
“own path” policy was blurred and actually prevented realization of the
transformation.22 The most important segments of the economic policy lacked
adequate coordination.  The Central Bank responded to excessively expansive
fiscal policy by requiring a restrictive monetary policy orientation.  As a result,
private loans became restricted and interest rates started soaring.  There was also a
lack of coordination between macroeconomic policies and progress in structural
reforms.
During this period, economic policy gave preference to high growth rates and
ignored institutional change requirements. There was no pronounced success in
restructuring the economy and no completion of transition-related steps. It ignored
and underestimated the potential of imbalances to produce questionable outcomes.
                                                                
22 The same author also warned against the abuse of the „own path“ (which, moreover, has
never been defined and publicly supported by considerations on the potential advantages or
disadvantages of this procedure) for the purposes of special-interest groups such as the
State-owned industries lobby.
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2.3.4.2 Unsustainability of Disbalanced Development
In 1996, macroeconomic development was seen as a breakthrough year.
From 1994 to 1995, several positive forces resulted in a changed development
pattern.  In the presence of high economic growth, there were still problems of both
internal and external imbalances,23 requiring marked interventions.  Chart 10
illustrates changes in the components of domestic demand and GDP compared to
1990 levels. Domestic demand components, except for consumption by
households, were growing in this period at rates substantially faster than GDP.
This caused domestic demand and GDP imbalances to recur, which naturally
produced external imbalances.
CHART 10. Domestic Demand and GDP Components Levels (1990 = 100)
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C – end-consumption by households, G – end-consumption by State administration, FI – gross fixed
capital generation (fixed investments), DD – domestic demand, DD = C+G+I. Data for 1999 relate to
the first half-year. Source: author's own calculations based on data from the Slovak Statistical Office
and OECD.
With domestic demand exceeding GDP, it raises the question of how
domestic demand could be met and to what extent economic imbalances participate
in this coverage.  Domestic demand can be met by gross domestic product and a
surplus of goods and services imports over exports (passive balance). If price
change issues are to be considered, the statement as above will have to be extended
to include the following formulae:
                                                                
23 So, the OECD study (1999) identified an excessively expansive fiscal policy as the major
reason for the macroeconomic disbalance.
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DDt = HDPt-1 + EMt-1 + DDt - DDt-1
DDRC = DDt - DDt-1
where DDt = domestic demand in prices of the year t, DDt-1 = domestic
demand in prices of the year t-1, HDPt-1 = GDP in prices of the year t-1, EM t-1 =
surplus imports of products and services over their exports (passive balance) in
prices of the year t-1, and DDRC = domestic demand covered by growth of prices.
With these formulae, percentage shares of the three components of domestic
demand can be expressed, as shown in Table 5.  In the real economy, there is
passive balance and growing prices. The sum of the components EM t-1 and DDRC
may therefore, for this purpose, be called factors of imbalance.24 Table 5 indicates
that a reduction in the share of factors of imbalance of domestic demand could be
stopped in 1996. Since then, factors of imbalance have been covering 14 % to 15
% of domestic demand.  The tendencies for imbalances fully manifested
themselves in 1996, due to a pronounced contribution of fiscal policy. The policy
provided a marked expansion of expenditures to cover the end-consumption by
State administration along with a strong growth in capital investments, with an
extraordinary portion allocated by State.
The tendency to imbalance was shown in the part of domestic demand that is
produced by the surplus imports of goods and services (passive balance).  There
was no marked change caused by price increases in the value of demand.25 It may
be stated that the imbalance between domestic demand and GDP generation was
shown by a disturbance of external equilibrium, while the impact on prices was
substantially less. Various countries in transition were found to have quite similar
economic behavior at respective stages of development. In the Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary, the GDP volume covers on average about five-sixths of the
domestic demand volume; the space for imbalance takes almost one-sixth a part of
the domestic demand volume.26 Under conditions of an inflexible supply side of
the economy, a growing domestic demand results in an insufficient GDP
increment.  This relationship is illustrated in Table 6.  Domestic demand
                                                                
24 In small and open economies, the volume of GDP almost entirely covers the volume of
domestic demand, and the effect of factors of disbalance makes up an almost negligible
contribution (see Morvay, 1999).
25 Certainly, the individual components of domestic demand will have to be understood as a
mathematic construction.  In reality, there are no demand components that would be
exclusively covered by, e.g., growing prices.
26 However, there are differences in the structure of factors of disbalance.  Import surplusses
over exports have a substantially greater share in Slovakia and the Czech Republic than in
Hungary and Poland.  This means that the disbalance in covering domestic demand arising
in Poland and Hungary was accounted for by prevailingly growing prices, whereas in
Slovakia by prevailingly growing surplusses of imports of goods and services over their
exports.
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increments in current prices were reflected partly in real GDP growth after 1995.
So, any additional 1 Sk of domestic demand only induced a real GDP increment
amounting to Sk 0.38.  In such a situation, stimulating domestic demand cannot
enhance economy growth.  The stimulation of domestic demand without a
principal revitalization of the supply side of the economy means the stimulation of
imbalance.
An analysis of the imbalance between savings and investments provides an
alternative view of the imbalance phenomenon.  When more is invested in an
economy than saved, the difference must be covered from savings of other
economies.  Table 7 indicates that the economic growth in this period was
markedly dependent on foreign resources.  Slovakia´s economy could be
characterized by unusually high investment rates (GCG/GDP ratio).  Such a high
ratio is unusual not only in developed industrial economies but also in countries in
transition.  It is evident from Table 7 that domestic savings cover only 40 % of,
which is shown in this example as gross capital generation.
TABLE 5. Structure of Domestic Demand Coverage and Disbalance between the
Development of Domestic Demand and Performance (GDP) in Slovakia
 (%) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
DDt 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1. DDRC 14.7 12.3 8.4 5.9 6.9 5.4 5.8
2. EMt-1 3.2 -5.0 -1.2 8.7 8.1 8.7 6.0
1+2 Factors of disbalance 17.9 7.3 7.2 14.6 15.0 14.1 11.8
3. GDP t-1 82.1 92.7 92.8 85.4 85.0 85.9 88.2
Note: Data for 1999 relate to the first half-year. Source: Morvay (1999)
TABLE 6. Sensitivity of Real GDP to Nominal Domestic Demand
Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP t-1 growth /  DDt growth 0.64 0.34 0.25 0.49 0.38 0.61
Note: Data for 1999 relate to the first half-year. Source: author´s own calculations based on data from
the Slovak Statistical Office
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TABLE 7. Generation of Savings and Investments in Slovakia
Parameter 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP 369.1 440.5 516.8 575.7 653.9 717.4 378.3
 - End-consumption by Households 196.2 221.9 252.7 286.1 325.0 363.0 193.1
 - End-consumption by State 92.3 93.9 108.1 132.1 143.5 151.8 76.4
 - Domestic Savings (DS) 80.6 124.7 156.0 157.5 185.4 202.6 108.8
Gross Capital Generation (GCG) 101.0 101.8 146.6 226.7 252.9 282.7 134.3
 - Covered by Domestic Savings,  %* 79.8 122.5 106.4 69.5 73.3 71.7 81.0
 - Covered by Not-own Resources,
%**
20.2 -22.5 -6.4 30.5 26.7 28.3 19.0
Need for Not-own Resources *** 20.4 -22.9 -9.4 69.2 67.5 80.1 25.5
Absolute GDP Increment 36.9 71.4 76.3 58.9 78.2 63.5 30.5
 - Covered by Not-own Resources,  % 55.3 -32.1 -12.3 117.5 86.3 126.1 83.6
GCG / GDP  (%) 27.4 23.1 28.4 39.4 38.7 39.4 35.5
Data in Sk bn current prices, unless indicated differently. Source: Slovak Statistical Office and author´s
own calculations. * DS / GCG  (%) ** Not-own resources / GCG, ***  GCG – DS
Also noteworthy is the data describing the share of foreign resources used to
finance our investments on GDP increments.  Foreign resources covered more than
100 % of the absolute GDP increment in 1996 and 1998.  Consequently, this
growth was “on credit.” Certainly, this phenomenon could not be taken as a clear
negative aspect if highly effective investment activities were financed from foreign
resources. That would show a marked positive effect on export sectors of the
economy.  The structure of investments implemented in Slovakia during this period
does not warrant a fast return or a pro-export effect of the investments.
An additional phenomenon of this period was the degradation of financial
indices for the corporate sector.  Table 8 indicates that after 1995, expenditures
were growing faster than revenues.  This certainly reflects an unhealthy
microeconomic environment that can be translated, via insufficient tax revenues, to
the macroeconomic level.
In summarizing the monitored period, it may be stated that changes in
economic policy priorities after 1995, to the benefit of growth and to the detriment
of equilibrium, became clearly reflected in the macroeconomic development.  The
high growth rates of the period were forced and some manifestations of imbalance
were no more acceptable during the subsequent development.
TABLE 8. Development of Some Parameters for Non-financial Organisations
Parameter 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Revenue Growth, in  % 22.3 12.3 15.3 14.6 9.3 8.4
Growth of Expenditures, in   % 20.7 12.6 14.4 16.1 9.7 10.6
Profits/Losses, in Sk bn 30.3 31.9 44.7 34.5 32.3 22.7
Cost Efficiency, in  % 3.2 3.4 4.2 2.8 2.5 1.2
Source: Nemec (1998) and Slovak Statistical Office
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 2.3.5 Equilibrium Recovery Stage (1999-)
2.3.5.1 Direction of Economic Policy
The deep macroeconomic imbalance of Slovakia has shown a need for
pronounced changes in priorities of economic policies. There has been no reason to
assume that any significant positive change would occur spontaneously while
retaining the previous direction of the macroeconomic development.  The trend
functions of the warning prognosis (Chart 11) show that the domestic demand-
GDP generation differential might even grow by an additional 14 % in 1999
compared to 1998.  This would mean further intensification of the macroeconomic
imbalance.
CHART 11. Warning Prognosis of the Development in Domestic Demand-GDP
Differential27
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In constant prices of 1995. C, I and G are presented on the left axis, DD and GDP on the right axis.  C –
end-consumption by households, G – end-consumption by State administration, I – gross fixed capital
generation, DD – domestic demand C+I+G (changes in inventories not accounted for). The DD trend
formula reads: Y = 139.5 * t 0,0822 (t is the time variable). The GDP formula reads: Y= -0.0976 * t2 +
3.1857 * t + 130.38. Source: data of  Slovak Statistical Office (1999) and author’s own calculations
There was a significant change in transition process concepts towards the end
of 1998. Efforts spent to eliminate the macroeconomic imbalance could not be
sustained, even at the cost of temporarily weakening economic growth.  The pillars
                                                                
27 Extrapolation of season-abstracted series of GDP components.  This method is not
sufficient to develop prognoses, but it may serve to outline the extrapolation of trends.
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of economic growth were defined as first, a new institutional framework, and
second a restructuring and improvement of competitiveness of the corporate sector.
These pillars arise from the goals proclaimed by the government, that the values
close to classical liberalism and institutionalism and/or neo-institutionalism should
be approached (proclaimed need for changes in formal but mainly informal rules of
the behavior of economic entities).
The criticism of economic policy was based on different assessments of the
need and the acceptable depth of restrictive measures needed to slow down
domestic demand growth.28 Critics attacked the concept of restricting domestic
demand as well as the idea of a temporary slow-down of GDP growth rates as
presented by Husár (1999, p.10): „It is a huge mistake that the government
economists have focused on reduction of domestic demand just because, as they
state, our domestic demand exceeds GDP, and thus domestic demand has to be
reduced... It does not arise from the fact that our domestic demand exceeds GDP
that we should reduce domestic demand; the logical way is to understand it as the
need for increasing domestic production to make it exceed domestic demand – and
then we turn into exporters....  The correct objective is not only 3 % GDP growth.
This is not enough, and I already blamed the preceding government that they
satisfied themselves by having 6 % GDP growth. If we take the history of many
countries when they were getting out of recession – they were reaching real GDP
growths of 12 %, we only achieved 6 %... A growth rate of three percent however
cannot save us, pull us through the poverty we witness. This is not a good policy.“
The actual problem is that the launching of the required high growth rates is a
long-term process whereas imbalance requires rapid treatment.  It is easier to slow
down the growth of domestic demand than to speed up the growth of domestic
production (for details on this issue, see Laski, 1993). In our opinion, future
development of Slovakia's economy concerns the establishment of a stable base for
long-term growth of performance.  Reliance on restriction of domestic demand
would be an excessively simplistic and shortsighted solution to imbalance without
supporting the supply side based on restructuring and improving the
competitiveness of the economy.
                                                                
28 Partisans of restrictions base their considerations on the assumption that excessive growth
of domestic demand and the associated disbalance and current account deficit are due to the
expansion of public expenditures and the persisting deficit in the management of the so-
called general government.  Then, to remedy this condition, the place where everything
should be started is public budgets.  This is also connected with the need to raise revenues
and reduce expenditures within the entire fiscal sector.
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2.3.5.2 Short-term Consequences of the Stabilization Operation
Experience from the stabilization operation  (short-term aspect) suggests that
one of the goals of the economic policy, namely diminishing of external imbalance
(Table 9), will obviously be achieved.  This goal is connected with an
improvement of the domestic demand-GDP generation ratio, and/or of proportions
between savings and investments (also see Tables 5, 6 and 7).  There is some
dispute concerning the price to be paid for the reestablishment of equilibrium,
being some negative trends of other parameters such as unemployment, GDP
growth rates, or inflation rates.  Some economists (see Mikloš, 1999) consider a
temporary worsening of some parameters as an unavoidable consequence of the
previous development, and prefer establishing equilibrium and institutional
changes warranting the growth of the economy at a higher quality level.  The
critics, so far without offering a comprehensive concept, require more pronounced
and clearly defined developmental incentives on the part of the State.
There remain issues behind these disputes that have accompanied the
transition process from its very beginning. The issues concern the acceptability and
the extent of restrictions, the possible extent to which domestic demand can be
reduced, preferences of more aggressive or milder methods, social, political and
societal costs of stabilization, more or less extensive responsibility of the State.
TABLE 9. Some Impacts of Reestablishing Equilibrium
Positive Changes Values Negative Changes Values
Reduction of External
disbalance (measured
here as the net share of
exports on GDP, in  %)
2ndQ1999  -7.5 %
2nd Q1998  -12.9 %
Reduced GDP Growth
Rates
2ndQ1999    2.9 %
2nd Q1998    6.1 %
Improved GDP
Structure (GDP growth
exceeds that of
domestic demand)
GDP Growth  2.9 %
Domestic Demand
Growth    -1.7 %
(constant prices, 2nd
Q99)
Growth of
Unemployment Rates
2nd Q1999    17.7 %
2nd Q1998    13.5 %
Reversal in the
Development of
Parameters for Non-
financial Organizations
Growth of Revenues /
Growth of
Expenditures
2nd Q1999    1.13
2nd Q1998    0.85
Expected Growth of
Inflation Rates (in  2nd
Q1999)
ŠÚ SR Prognosis for
1999    11.8 %
for 1998      6.7 %
Reduced Foreign
Indebtedness (USD bn)
7/1999     10.1
7/1998     11.9
Reduced Growth Rates
of Real Wages
2nd Q1999    0.5 %
2nd Q1998    2.8 %
Source: Date from ŠÚ SR (Slovak Statistical Office) and author´s own calculations
2.3.6 Notes on the Expected Development
There have been attempts to take a new approach for macroeconomic
regulation, including improved coordination of economic policy segments,
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recovery of the business sector and banks, as well as the formation of perspective
economic structures arising from the medium-term concept of the economic and
social development of the Slovak Republic (1999).
The scope and the requirements associated with the tasks to stabilize and
provide for further development of the economy will take more time. The risk of
repeated failures requires speedy solutions as possible for all reform units.
According to the macroeconomic scenario of the “Medium-term Concept”, any
postponement of reforms could lead the national economy to collapse. Hence, there
is a need for parallel changes in economic policies, conditions for the operation of
the banking and corporate sector, as well as changes in policies directed towards
the support to structural changes, and improved competitiveness.  A prologue of
stabilization measures was taken in 1999, mainly aimed at consolidating public
budgets, reducing domestic demand, and limiting trade balance deficit. It has to be
followed quickly by the implementation of principal and comprehensive
interventions into the whole, broadly conceived institutional framework of the
economy.
To enable the macroeconomic developmental stage (increase in employment
and of economic growth rates, and subsiding of the disbalance symptoms, see
Chart 12 after 2000, the stabilization measures must satisfy certain economic
conditions. They not only must be restrictive, but they have to also contain
developmental stimuli that encourages the creation of both domestic and
international developmental resources.  The growth of domestic developmental
resources requires the restriction of government spending and reducing public
budget deficits, thus reducing the need for government loans and gradually
enabling a relief of the tax burden.  This step will provide the corporate sector with
better access to funds.
A successful stabilization operation can improve the trustworthiness of
Slovakia's economy and may make a contribution towards the acquisition of
appropriate international resources in the form of direct foreign investments and
advantageous credits.  A stabilization policy, therefore, is not necessarily in
contradiction to developmental policy.  Holman (1991) has provided evidence that
a rational restrictive policy need not act against growth.  Although such a policy
restricts the opportunities for short-term demand-side stimulation of economic
growth, it develops its long-term pro-growth effects through the recovery of the
supply side of the economy. Through reestablishing equilibrium and stability, a
consistently and wisely implemented stabilization may create an environment for
the normal operation of the economy associated with economic growth.
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2.4 Conclusion
In our opinion, the macroeconomic development of Slovakia has reflected
two factors that have been underestimated during the process of transition to date.
The first factor was the underestimation of the institutional framework of a
functioning market economy.  The second factor was the underestimation of
required coordination of macroeconomic policies during the restructuring of the
economy.
Repeated destabilizations of the economy were the result of these factors
having been neglected.  Therefore, even after a decade since the initial transition
steps, the economic policy makers have to frequently consider problems similar to
those they were facing at the very beginning:  how to stabilize the economy, how
to restructure it, how to prevent the existence of soft budgetary constraints, how to
draft functional rules for the behavior of economic entities under new conditions,
etc.
Slovakia's example suggests that macroeconomic successes forced by the
economic and political center through inadequate stimulation of financial policy
tools will vanish, and will not be supported by a sufficiently viable corporate
sector.
CHART 12. Expected Development of the Principal Macroeconomic Parameters –
Medium Term Projections
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(1999), part III. (Macroeconomic scenario developed by Institute of Slovak and World Economy,
Slovak Academy of Sciences)
The fact that the imbalanced development has to be repeatedly remedied by
packages of unpopular measures suggests the limited ability of the automatic
economic regulators to operate, and the unreliability of the coordination
mechanisms of the economy.
In view of the above, we consider it necessary that economic policy support
the supply side of the economy. That type of support can improve economic
performance through effects on formal and informal rules of behavior, elimination
of allocation mechanism distortions, restructuring, support of human capital
development, and innovations, etc. While supply side support is less direct and not
as fast as demand-side support, supply side effects are long-term in nature.  Higher
quality economic growth and stability can be achieved by this approach.  Going
back to the economic stimulation of performance through domestic demand
stimulation would likely result in a recurrence of the problems of economic
imbalances.
A conceptual approach to completing the transition process is required. It
must strive to improve the coordination of individual components of economic
policy, provide links between macroeconomic policies and microeconomic
restructuring, and eliminate distorted parts of the institutional framework. It can
establish an environment that will not require more packages of rescue measures
for survival under strains and uncertainty.
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SCHEME 2. Stages of the transition process
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2.6 Annex
TABLE 10. 1990-99 Macroeconomic Parameters
Parameter 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP Growthi -2.5 -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 4.4 1.8
Unemployment ii 1.6 11.8 10.4 14.4 14.8 13.1 12.8 12.5 15.6 17.7*
Inflation Rateiii 10.4 61.2 10.0 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 9.4
Net Exports iv -9.0 -3.0 -4.0 -5.5 5.2 1.8 -12 -10.3 -11.2 -4.9
Data for 1999 are for quarters 1 through 3 except for „the first two quarters“.i Growth rates in  %,
constant prices. ii According to recorded unemployment rates, in  %. iii Change as compared to
preceding year, in  %. Inflation has been calculated based on consumer price index. iv Balance of
exports and imports of products and services expressed in terms of GDP  %.  Source: Slovak Statistical
Office, National Bank of Slovakia, OECD (1999)
TABLE 11. Development of GDP and Its Components, 1990-99
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP, Sk bn, c.p. 278.1 319.8 329.8 369.1 440.5 516.8 575.7 653.9 717.4 579.2
GDP,  % f.p. -2.5 -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 4.4 1.8
CH, Sk bn, c.p. 149.9 163.6 164.6 196.2 221.9 252.7 286.1 322.3 360.1 293.1
CH, Growth in  %
c.p.
-28.4 -6.4 -1.5 0.0 3.4 6.9 6.3 4.9 0.8
CH/GDP,  % 53.9 51.2 49.9 53.2 50.4 48.9 49.7 49.3 50.2 50.6
G, Sk bn, c.p. 60.9 65.8 85.0 90.5 91.8 104.8 129.7 143.5 151.8 116.2
G, Growth in  %
f.p.
-17.8 9.9 -2.2 -11.6 2.1 21.9 0.0 0.2 0.6
G/GDP,  % 21.9 20.6 25.8 24.5 20.8 20.3 22.5 21.9 21.2 20.1
FC,Sk bn c.p. 86.9 90.4 109.3 120.7 129.4 141.5 212.7 252.7 292.4 178.6
FC,Growth in   %
f.p.
-25.2 -3.3 -5.4 -4.6 5.3 39.8 14.5 11.0 -15.8
FC/GDP,  % 31.2 28.3 33.1 32.7 29.4 27.4 36.9 38.6 40.8 30.8
C, Sk bn. c.p. 92.3 99.9 93.3 101.0 101.8 146.6 226.7 252.9 282.7 196.4
C, Growth in  %
f.p.
-21.1 -13.1 -9.2 -11.8 37.4 40.8 3.7 5.2 -11.4
C/GDP,  % 33.2 31.2 28.3 27.4 23.1 28.4 39.4 38.7 39.4 33.9
DD, Sk bn, c.p. 303.1 329.3 342.9 389.5 417.6 507.4 644.9 721.4 797.5 607.7
DD, Growth ,in
%f.p.
-24.3 -5.0 -3.7 -5.7 11.2 19.6 4.1 4.1 -3.4
DD/GP,  % 109.0 103.0 104.0 105.5 94.8 98.2 112.0 110.3 111.2 104.9
X,Sk bn, c.p. 73.8 148.1 233.7 227.8 286.6 325.8 334.0 396.9 456.8 364.4
X, Growth in  %
f. p.
33.4 47.5 -0.5 14.2 3.1 -0.3 14.2 10.8 6.6
X/GDP,  % 26.5 46.3 70.9 61.7 65.1 63.0 58.0 60.7 63.7 62.9
M, Sk bn c.p. 98.8 157.6 246.8 248.2 263.7 316.4 403.2 464.4 536.9 392.9
M, Growth, in  %
f.p.
-14.7 47.1 -0.8 -3.6 9.6 20.3 9.1 9.6 -1.6
M/GDP,  % 35.5 49.3 74.9 67.2 59.9 61.2 70.0 71.0 74.8 67.8
NX, Sk bn   c.p. -25.0 -9.5 -13.1 -20.4 22.9 9.4 -69.2 -67.5 -80.1 -28.5
NX/GDP,  % -9.0 -3.0 -4.0 -5.5 5.2 1.8 -12.0 -10.3 -11.2 -4.9
Data for 1999 relate to quarters 1 through 3, c.p. – current prices, f. p. – fixed prices. GDP percentages
have been calculated from current prices. CH End-consumption by households, G End-consumption by
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State administration, FC Generation of gross fixed capital, C Generation of gross capital, i.e.,
FC+change in inventories, DD Domestic demand, i.e., CH+G+C, with immaterial deviations, if any, is
given by not including non-for-profit organisations serving households, X Exports of products and
services, M Imports of products and services, NX Net exports, i.e.,  X-M. Source: Slovak Statistical
Office, OECD (1999) and author´s own calculations basd on these data
TABLE 12. Additional Parameters, 1993-99
Parameter 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Industrial Producer Prices,  % I 17.2 10.0 9.0 4.1 4.5 3.3 2.7
Construction Work Prices,  % I 24.1 11.0 12.0 15.0 9.7 8.9 10.8
Agric.Prod.Prices,  % I 14.6 10.8 3.3 5.4 5.6 -0.3 -2.6
Deflator GDP, 1995=100 80.1 91.1 100.0 104.5 111.4 117.1 122.8*
Unemployment Rates,  %, VZPS ii 12.2 13.7 13.1 11.3 11.8 12.5 15.9
Average Monthly Wages, Sk 5 379 6 294 7 195 8 154 9 226 10 003 10 302
Growth of Real Wages,  % -3.6 3.2 4.0 7.1 6.6 2.7 -1.9
Growth of Productivity of Labor in f.p.,
% iii
-3.6 6.8 4.6 5.7 6.3 4.9 3.8
Constr.Industry Production Growth,  % -32.3 -6.8 2.9 4.4 9.2 -3.5 -28.0
Retail sales growth, c.p.,  % 9.8 1.7 2.0 7.0 4.6 8.2 7.0
Net Monthly Income per Household
Member, Sk
2 820 3 196 3 476 4 067 4 716 4 986 5 125
Net Monthly Expenditures per
Household Member, Sk
2 810 3 176 3 403 3 996 4 606 5 037 5 065
Growth of Deposits by Population,  % 25.4 13.6 22.8 16.1 16.4 12.8 13.6
Nos. of Natural Persons Doing Business
iv
282.9 287.0 275.1 258.2 277.2 295.8 299.7
Nos. of for Profit Organizations, in
thous.
29.0 36.2 43.6 47.9 53.8 60.3 59.0
 - in Public Sector, thous. 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.2
 - Private, thous. 25.7 34.5 42.1 46.2 52.4 59.0 57.7
Private Sector's Share /GDP,  % 37.3 53.3 62.6 76.8 82.6 82.4 84.5
State Budget Balance, Sk bn -23.0 -22.9 -8.3 -25.6 -37.0
 - Using the New Method -17.0 -19.2 -12.4
Unless stated differently, data for  1999 relate to Q. 1 through 3, except for „first two quarters“.  i Year
to year change, ii Sample survey of labor, iii Productivity of labor calculated based on GDP, iv Registered
by Slovak Statistical Office, in thous.persons.  Source: Slovak Statistical Office
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3 Fiscal Policy
Ján TÓTH29
ING Barings
The following chapter focuses on one of the most important macroeconomic
policies – fiscal policy. Slovak fiscal policy has undergone several different stages
since 1989. After the collapse of communism, the priorities were the elimination of
excessive taxation and the lowering of the gap between fiscal sources and public
demands. Slovakia succeeded in decreasing public expenditures and implemented a
modern taxation system. The fiscal policy between 1993 and 1995 was successful
with regard to bringing the fiscal deficit down from 7.2 % of GDP in 1993, to a
small surplus of 0.4 %, in 1995. Later, the fiscal prudence deteriorated markedly.
The rapid worsening of the tax discipline was translated into huge external
imbalances. Slovakia was running an average current account deficit of 10 % of
GDP in 1996-1998, and when combined with minimal foreign direct investment,
the country set out on an unsustainable borrowing spree. High real domestic
interest rates destroyed the profitability of most Slovak corporates. To keep the
fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank had to support the currency at the
expense of monthly import coverage falling from 3.2 months to 2.2 months. Slovak
external debt rating was cut from investment to noninvestment grade and the
central bank was forced to float the currency.
Since 1999, the new government has started to address the issue of the rising
public explicit and implicit liabilities. The following, more detailed discussion of
revenues and expenditures shows that decreasing tax-to-GDP ratio does not allow a
dramatic decrease in tax rates without the improvement of the tax discipline of
taxpayers. Public expenditures are still very high, and it would be imperative to
increase the effectiveness of the redistribution of public outlays.
                                                                
29 The views expressed in the paper are the author’s responsibility and are not necessarily
the views of the institution to which the author is affiliated. The author would like to thank
Vladimir Tvaroska of the Office of the Slovak Government, Renata Konecna of the Slovak
National Bank, and Miroslav Beblavy of INEKO Institute for very constructive discussions
and suggestions related to the topic. The IMF data are used.
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3.1 Introduction
Fiscal policy has immense consequences for the economy. It can ruin a
country’s rating by giving rise to external instability. It can destroy the profitability
of private companies with little access to international markets through higher
domestic real interest rates. It can rend monetary policy ineffective and break down
the fixed exchange rate regime. It can triple the amount of public debt and
contingent liabilities in the course of a few years. In addition, the policy can keep
an economy running in high gears for some time and help win elections. Thus,
fiscal policy plays a central role in determining overall economic developments of
a country. Together with monetary policy, it influences short-run economic
growth, balance of payments, debt levels, and rates of inflation. The policy forms
the entrepreneurial environment and decides on the redistribution of income.
This chapter discusses in some detail the last ten years of fiscal stance in
Slovakia, relying on IMF data. Slovak government data are either non-existent or
not detailed enough. The Ministry of Finance is pre-occupied with only one part of
the general government – the so-called state budget. However, recently, the state
budget has produced only around half of the general government deficit. In
addition, the state budget data are not time- and country-consistent.
This chapter separates the fiscal policy into four different periods. During the
pre-1993 period, the policy was implemented in Czecho-Slovakia, and the policy
execution was carried out without the benefit of a comprehensive tax reform. The
“good times” period lasted from 1993 till 1995 when the general government
balance turned into surplus from a deep deficit. The “bad times” period continued
throughout 1998, and a new period, since 1999, is being written with a new
government fighting the rising public debt needs.
This paper then discusses in more detail the revenue and expenditure side of
the general government and comes to a conclusion that the decreasing tax-to-GDP
ratio does not allow for a drastic reduction in taxes without improved financial
discipline and that expenditures are unsustainably high and their allocation
efficiency needs to be drastically improved.
3.2 Getting the Numbers Right
There are immense problems with getting reasonable data for a public sector
deficit from the government. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is probably a
combination of both unfamiliarity and the intention of the Ministry of Finance
(MinFin) that there have been no reasonably detailed data available for the general
government.
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One part of the general government deficit, the so called ‘state budget’ deficit
has been reported on a monthly basis since 1993 by the MinFin. However, it was
only in January 1998 that the government reported the state budget deficit in a
reasonable way, i.e., excluding the repayments of principals as an expenditure
item. 30 The monthly state budget deficit figures were not available before January
1998 using this methodology.31 What is more important, a vast array of state funds
outside the state budget was often created to improve state budget deficit numbers.
The expenditures of the Road Fund, for example, are not fully included in the state
budget. The Road Fund alone added around 1 % of GDP deficit to the general
government in 1997-1998. In addition, none of the social security, nor the National
Property Fund is a part of the state budget, too. In recent years, almost a half of the
overall fiscal deficit has been created outside the state budget. Anecdotal evidence
suggests the lack of realization on the side of Slovak policy makers reflecting that
it does not really matter whether the deficit is being created in the state budget or
off the budget.32 Having received technical aid from the IMF, the MinFin is
gradually moving to report overall fiscal deficit, however, on a quarterly  basis
only, not in a great detail, and not using the methodology of the Fund or
EUROSTAT. Therefore, this chapter does not use official government statistics,
but instead uses IMF data wherever possible in order to point out the very arbitrary
nature of the state budget deficit that is not in addition consistent over time and
across neighboring countries. Therefore, throughout this chapter the state budget is
not discussed in any detail.
Table 1 shows the general government statistics reported in the IMF country
reports on Slovakia. For analytical purposes, in order to best gauge the fiscal
policy, it is useful to exclude net lending33 since it usually represents one-off
revenues or expenditures. When considering the impact of the government on the
aggregate domestic demand, one should include the net increase in government
guarantees since the fiscal policy was implemented in this way, too. Then the
number should be cyclically adjusted.34 The resulting number is arbitrarily called
the Structural Quasi-Fiscal Deficit. This number best describes the fiscal stance. It
                                                                
30 Reporting repayments of principal as an expenditure could be of an interest in countries in
which the government is unable to raise money domestically or internationally, as this might
have been the case in Russia just after the Russian crisis in 1998.
31 However, even this methodology is not correct.
32 The ministers have been asking the MinFin to obtain financing other than from the state
budget for some of their expansionary plans. This is a consequence of the fact that the
MinFin is under constraint by budgetary law to keep the state budget deficit target only.
33 Net Lending includes, e.g., privatization revenues and the recalled government
guarantees.
34 For more details see Part 1.4 and Appendix 1.
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shows what would be the government-induced inelastic demand for resources
should the economy operate near its potential.35
The 1992-1993 deficit was mainly due to the creation of an independent
Slovakia as well as to the recession. Even once adjusted for the economic revival
in 1994-1995, it seems that fiscal prudence dramatically improved during that
period. In 1996, we saw the start of very expansionary government plans that were
mainly realized, at first, through government guarantees.36 During 1997-1998,  a 5
% fiscal deficit was preserved. In 1999, a reversal of sorts has been indicated
mainly due to the May 1999 fiscal austerity package. The structural quasi-fiscal
deficit is estimated to reach around 4 % of GDP in 2000.
CHART 1. The Fiscal Stance – Structural Quasi-Fiscal Deficit
Source: Author, IMF, author's forecast
                                                                
35 The numbers are more for illustrative reasons and are subject to a great margin of error.
For problems on estimations of a cyclical deficit, see part on Cyclical vs. Structural
Government Deficit.
36 Due to the lack of the detailed analysis of government guarantees, all government
guarantees are assumed to be fiscally-expansionary in one way or another. In 1996,
guarantees were used for power plant and dam constructions. In 1997, the guaranteed money
supported Slovak Railways. Dam construction, railway, and highway construction received
support from the government in the form of a guarantee in 1998. Slovak Railways and
Vodohospodarska Vystavba (dam construction) restructured their short-run portfolio in 1999
and the additional guarantee support went into highway construction.
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TABLE 1. The General Government
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 99e 00f
1 Revenues 400.2 489.4 149.2 159.3 200.8 251.7 274.5 293.5 304.1 312.2 321.8
2 Expenditures 401.5 510.6 191.5 188.0 207.5 250.5 282.8 322.7 336.9 338.1 353.7
3 Net Lending 3.8 6.2 -2.7 -2.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 4.9 3.4 2.0 3.1
4 Net Interest and Recalled
Guarantees
4.7 11.5 16.5 12.5 13.4 13.7 18.5 26.2 33.8
1-2-4 Basic Balance -44.8 -39.3 -23.0 -8.9 -17.9 -38.7 -51.8 -43.8 -45.7
Basic Balance /GDP,  % -13.5 -10.6 -5.2 -1.7 -3.1 -5.9 -7.2 -5.5 -5.2
1-2 Revenues-
Expenditures
-1.3 -21.2 -42.3 -28.7 -6.7 1.2 -8.3 -29.2 -37.6 -26.0 -31.9
(Revenues-
Expenditures)/
GDP,  %
-0.2 -2.2 -12.7 -7.8 -1.5 0.2 -1.4 -4.5 -5.2 -3.3 -3.6
1-2-3 Fiscal
Deficit -5.1 -27.4 -39.6 -26.0 -5.9 1.9 -7.7 -34.1 -36.1 -28.0 -35.0
Fiscal Deficit
/GDP,  % -0.6 -2.8 -11.9 -6.7 -1.3 0.3 -1.3 -5.0 -4.8 -3.5 -4.0
5 Net Increase in Government
Guarantees (excl. state funds)
6.1 12.6 1.2 9.9 37.3 0.9 0.8 8.4 11.1
Net Increase in Government
Guarantees /GDP,  % 1.8 3.4 0.3 1.9 6.5 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.3
6 Recalled Guarantees (already
in state budget)
1.1 0.5 0.1 1.2 1.9 2.1 2.1 4.2 10.0
1-2-3-5+6 Quasi-Fiscal Deficit -44.6 -38.6 -6.9 -6.7 -43.0 -33.6 -41.4 -32.2 -36.1
Quasi-Fiscal Deficit /GDP,  % -13.4 -10.5 -1.6 -1.3 -7.5 -5.1 -5.8 -4.0 -4.1
1-2-5+6 Quasi-Fiscal Deficit
(excl. Net Lending)
-47.3 -41.3 -7.7 -7.4 -43.6 -28.7 -36.6 -30.2 -33.0
Quasi-Fiscal Deficit /GDP
(excl. Net Lending),  % -14.2 -11.2 -1.7 -1.4 -7.6 -4.4 -5.1 -3.8 -3.7
1-2-5+6+7 Structural Quasi-
Fiscal Deficit (excl. Net
Lending)
-51.6 -36.2 -2.1 -5.7 -45.8 -35.3 -38.1 -31.7 -26.7
Structural Quasi-Fiscal Deficit /
Potential GDP (excl. Net
Lending),  %
-15.9 -9.0 0.4 -1.0 -7.6 -5.3 -5.2 -4.0 -2.9
Memorandum Items
Nominal GDP* 811.3 977.8 332.3 369.1 440.5 516.8 575.7 653.9 717.4 797.5 883.1
Real GDP,  % -2.5 -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 4.4 1.9 1.4
Newly Issued
State
Guarantees
0.2 12.2 6.5 13.5 3.0 12.6 41.5 5.8 13.8
29.3 44.6
Maturing State
Guarantees
0.0 0.3 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.2 4.9 10.6 9.6 25.4
7 Cyclical Fiscal Deficit
(estimate)
5.1 5.5 1.7 -2.2 -6.6 -6.6 -1.5 6.4
Skbn. * The data are for Czecho-Slovakia before 1992. 1999 data abstract from the privatization
revenues from CSOB bank sale. Source: IMF, MinFin, author, and author’s forecasts
Since the MinFin was unable and probably not willing to provide the public
with reasonable budget deficit data, the central bank has used their own monetary
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survey data as a proxy for the fiscal deficit. The bank defines the fiscal deficit on a
financing basis as the change in the net credit to the government and the state
privatization body the National Property Fund (NPF). The analytical attractiveness
of the data is that it is available on a monthly basis. However, the data is only an
approximation; it does not include holdings of government debt by non-residents
and non-banking entities.37 In addition, the data is not fully consolidated. The
average difference between the IMF and the central bank data was about 1 % of
GDP in 1994-1998 period. The bank’s data tend to underestimate the fiscal deficit.
3.3 Fiscal Policy Formation
This part discusses the possible forces that were behind the formation of the
fiscal policy. It provides a feasible explanation as to why there has been a
slowdown in reforms and the resulting fiscal policy slippage in 1996-1998 period.
Much of the traditional economic theory concerning the politics of economic
reform is based on the assumption of a J-curve. A J-curve simply describes
consumption pattern seen after the start of reforms – reforms drive aggregate
consumption down in their early stages before future consumption reaches higher
levels than was the initial level. The traditional theory assumes those short-term
losers of the reforms such as unemployed, pensioners, and threatened state
bureaucrats will take revenge against reforms at the very first opportunity and
populist parties will gain power and halt the reforms. Therefore, in order to
implement radical reforms, the state should be “isolated” from the pressures of
these short-term losers until consumption reaches such high levels that it will
create a majority of winners. This was the basis for the view that authoritarian
governments had an advantage in implementing radical reforms; recent evidence
from countries in Eastern and Central Europe conflicts with this conventional
wisdom.
Hellman (1998) shows that early net winners might be at least the same
influential than losers. The evidence suggests that it is precisely the most
democratic countries (i.e., countries most vulnerable to short-term losers) that
implemented the most radical reforms. Even though the early reform governments
usually were voted out of the office, succeeding governments have not in general
rejected reforms and in some cases even intensified them. Hellman argues that the
most common obstacles to the progress of reforms came not from reform losers,
but rather from early reform winners such as enterprise insiders, local officials, and
                                                                
37 The central bank looks at balance sheets of domestic commercial banks and its own to
determine the net credit to government and the National Property Fund. The new
methodology to be used from 2000 on will include the debt of non-residents and non-bank
entities.
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managers of state banks, and state companies. ‘Crony capitalists’ bought
companies dirt cheap only to then strip their assets; managers of state companies
profited on full trade liberalization that was implemented. At the same time, when
domestic prices were subsidized, local officials were bribed in order to prevent
others from gaining market entry, and managers of state banks stripped deposits by
giving credit to friendly counterparts. Early stages of reforms have created
immense arbitrage opportunities that provided these short-term winners with
concentrated rents. It was then in the very interest of these winners to block
specific advances in the reform process since these would eliminate special
advantages and market distortions upon which their own early reform gains were
based.38 Therefore, the winners strove to prolong the maintenance of partial
reforms. The usual interests of these winners included:
·  the prevention of foreign direct investment inflows into banks and
        industry;
·  the imposition of trade barriers;
·  maintenance of poorly defined property rights;
·  inefficient law enforcement.
The data suggest that the highest social costs in terms of output declines39
occurred in countries that implemented partial economic reforms as opposed to
advanced reform countries or countries without any reforms.
Elections analyses have suggested that the voters supporting the government
that was operating in 1996-1998 were the most populous in the group of basic
education citizens (these people have suffered most from unemployment) and
pensioners. Both of these groups suffer in early stages of reforms and therefore are
early short-term losers. Traditional economic theory would suggest that the
government should have favored these groups. Surprisingly, Slovakia offers a very
poor replacement rate (the ratio of average pensions to average wages) and
unemployment benefits are low in general.40
It is probably too early to discuss in great detail which forces were behind the
formulation of the government's policy. One also needs to realize the great fiscal
monitoring problems discussed earlier. Without proper monitoring, policy
formulation cannot be conducted with a very clear vision.
                                                                
38 Hellman (1998).
39 The advanced reform countries and the countries that have not implemented almost any
reforms fared best as far as their current output level is compared to the initial 1989 level.
Intermediate reform countries have suffered most in terms of their output and their income
inequality (when measured by Gini coefficient) changed most drastically. See Hellman
(1998).
40 For more details, see Part 1.8.3.3.
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However, in view of the previous discussion, it is informative to consider
short-term winners as the possible force behind the fiscal policy slippage in 1996-
1998. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the possible winners could be among the
new owners of privatized companies, building companies involved in highway,
dam, and nuclear power constructions,41 managers of state companies and
monopolies, retail bankers,42 and owners of inefficient domestic companies that
are facing foreign competition.43 The possibly high concentrated gains in the hands
of these winners could have been one of the important reasons for the fiscal policy
slippage during those years.
3.4 Twin Deficits in Small Open Economies
Too expansionary fiscal policy raises domestic demand and this could result
in inflationary pressures and thus internal imbalance. Booming domestic demand
could increase import growth and give rise to external imbalance. Eventually, these
imbalances will affect the private sector’s performance through higher interest
rates or exchange rate losses. Therefore, very loose fiscal policy could institute
unfavorable entrepreneurial environment and necessitate lower potential output
growth.
The current account is defined as the difference between national investment
and saving. An increase in budget deficit causes an increase in domestic demand,
which under inelastic domestic supply usually translates into higher imports.
Therefore, an increase in fiscal deficit creates an increase in current account
deficit, hence the term twin deficits is used for both government and current (or
trade) deficits. For example, when the Slovak government decided to start its
extensive highway construction program - despite the political preference for
domestic producers – Slovak firms were not able to supply the necessary
equipment in the short-run and these then had to be imported. In addition, the
Slovak government gave investment ‘privatization tax’ credit to the new domestic
owners of Slovak companies. Fixed investment/GDP ratio reached an
unsustainable 35 % average during 1996-98, and domestic savings could not cover
all investment needs.
The rising budget deficit needs to be financed by an increase in foreign
savings. Foreign savings flow could cause real exchange rate appreciation of the
domestic currency. Numerous studies have shown that the overvalued domestic
                                                                
41 Or in general, companies linked to the increased state expenditures.
42 This is because of the lack of competition in the retail banking sector and the cases of the
possible deposit-stripping in several Slovak banks.
43 Because of the implementation of import certificates and tariffs.
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currency is the best indicator of the future currency crisis.44 Therefore, the rising
real exchange rate of koruna in 1996-97 posed as the threat to the fixed exchange
rate regime 45 and made the monetary situation more vulnerable.
CHART 2. Twin Deficits – Government Deficit Creates Trade Deficit
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TABLE 2. Fiscal Deficit Using the Methodology of the Slovak Central Bank
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Net Credit to Government and NPF
(change)
-38.8 -2.5 10.5 -2.9 -29.5 -35.0 -21.1
Net Credit to Government and NPF
(change) /GDP,  %
-9.9 -0.5 1.9 -0.5 -4.3 -4.7 -2.6
1999 data is adjusted for the privatization sale of CSOB bank. Source: Slovak Central Bank, author
Since Slovakia was not fully open in its early years,46 the central bank has
decided to sustain the fixed exchange rate (for more details see the chapter on
monetary policy); real domestic interest rates started to rise. The government-
spending spree crowded out private investment through higher domestic real
                                                                
44 Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhard (1997).
45 Koruna was fixed to the basket of USD (40 %) and DEM (60 %), and before 1994 to the
basket of 5 currencies.
46 There were capital and current account restrictions, as well as the unavailability of
sovereign and corporate ratings prevented companies to easily borrow from abroad.
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interest rates. Moreover, the government entered international capital markets in
199847 and crowded out private investments even from these markets.48
Very high real interest rates have negatively affected corporate results and
forced smaller companies to rely exclusively on their working capital for financing.
(Table 3).
 CHART 3. Fiscal Deficit Could Cause Real Appreciation of the Domestic
Currency
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CHART 4. The Crowding Out of Private Investments and Real Interest Rates
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domestic loans during the 12 months. A ratio of 100 % describes a complete crowding out of private
                                                                
47 The government borrowed USD 1 bn in Eurobonds in 1998 and another EUR 500 mn in
2000.
48 Slovakia was facing rather thin international market once external indicators started to
worsen and the crises in Asia and Russia caused worldwide flight to quality.
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investments domestically, i.e., all new (net) domestic credits go to the government. Fiscal deficit is
proxied by the change in net credit to the government and the National Property Fund.
With the smallest foreign direct investment inflows in the region, the
expansionary government policy effectively hindered small and medium-sized
enterprise growth, since the high monitoring costs prevented these companies to
borrow from abroad. This worked against the increase in employment despite the
high output growth since it is services and small entrepreneurs that are believed
tocreate new jobs.
3.5 Cyclical vs. Structural Fiscal Deficit
Government deficit is defined as government revenues minus expenditures.
Both are cyclically responsive, i.e., they change as the economy enters a different
part of the economic cycle (a boom or a recession). In recession, incomes and
profits fall, which drives tax revenues lower. In addition, expenditures rise since
unemployment is increasing. Hence, government deficit increases even without a
change in fiscal policy. An increase in the deficit increases domestic demand and
short-term growth – hence, it functions as an automatic stabilizer. Therefore, it is
of more interest to adjust the deficit for the cyclical stage of the economy and look
at what is left – the so called structural government deficit.49 In other words, it is
much more dangerous to run a huge fiscal deficit at times when GDP growth is
already high and by the same token, a bigger deficit might be of a less concern
when GDP growth is low. If revenues are up only because the economy is
operating in high gears, the revenue increase should be considered only temporary.
An increase in expenditure in a deep recession ought to be viewed as short-lived.
TABLE 3. After-tax Profits of Slovak Corporates
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total Economy w/o Financial Services, Sk bn 29.9 42.8 33.6 32.3 6.6
Percentage of HDP,  % 6.8 8.3 5.8 4.9 0.9
Note: Before 1996 the data are for companies with 25 and more employees, from 1997 on for
companies with 20 and more employees. Source: Slovak Statistical Office, IMF.
TABLE 4. The Structural vs. Realized Fiscal Deficit
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000f
Structural Fiscal Deficit/GDP,  % -5.2 -0.1 0.6 -1.6 -6.1 -5.8 -3.7 -3.1
Fiscal Deficit/GDP,  % -6.7 -1.3 0.3 -1.3 -5.0 -4.8 -3.5 -4.0
Source: Author, IMF
                                                                
49 Structural, full-employment, or cyclically adjusted budget deficit is based on estimates of
what the deficit would be should the economy be operating near its potential GDP.
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The biggest improvement in the structural fiscal deficit (see the methodology
note in Appendix 1) was recorded in 1993-94 and in 1999. In line with the warning
of the IMF,50 the structural budget deficit worsened in 1996-1998. When adjusted
for the favorable cyclical stage, the fiscal deterioration was even more pronounced
than the official data suggest. The structural deficit worsened by 2.3 % (of GDP) in
1996 and 4.5 % in 1997. In 1998, the fiscal slippage was less pronounced, due to
the limited access for external funds since the country was downgraded to
noninvestment grade.
3.6 Fiscal Policy before 199351
Czecho-Slovakia experienced transformation recession comparable to other
Central European countries at the start of the reforms. However, the
macroeconomic imbalances were far less evident in communist Czecho-Slovakia
than in Hungary or Poland. Even though in the 1980s consumption was increasing
at the cost of lower investment and thus a growing obsolescence of capital stock,
communist Czecho-Slovakia had a relatively prudent fiscal and monetary policy
“partly attributable to the greater importance attached to financial developments by
the central planners in Czechoslovakia than in most other planned economies”.52
Realizing the disparity between available sources and wants, the communist
government introduced some measures in 1988-1989.53 However, the reform
legislation adopted in 1990 abandoned the continuation of these gradual reforms
and sought a massive reduction in the role of the state in the economy.
TABLE 5. Czecho-Slovakia: Federal Government Budget Balance (Kcs bn)
1988 1989 1990 1991
Total Revenues 359.9 431.2 400.2 489.4
Total Expenditures 376.1 446.6 401.5 510.6
Net Lending x 13.4 3.8 6.2
(Revenues-Expenditures)/GDP,  % -2.2 -2.0 -0.2 -2.2
Fiscal Deficit -16.2 -28.8 -5.1 -27.4
Fiscal Deficit/GDP,  % -2.2 -3.8 -0.6 -2.8
Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook
                                                                
50 IMF (1997).
51 This part relies on IMF’s Transition to Market, Studies in Fiscal Reform, Chapter 3: The
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Government Finances in a Period of Transition, Jim
Prust, Vito Tanzi, 1993 and CEPR Discussion Paper #1151, Tax and Benefit Reform in the
Czech and Slovak Republics, Christopher Heady, Stephen Smith, March 1995. Unless stated
otherwise, the data in this part refer to the Czecho-Slovak Federation, not Slovakia.
52 Prust, Tanzi (1993)
53 The measures included the simplification of bureaucracy, a breakup of a number of large
enterprises into smaller units, a possibility of a joint-venture, and preparations for the
establishment of the usual two-tier banking system.
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TABLE 6. Consolidated Tax Revenues of All Federal and Local Governments,
1989
Kcs bn  % Share
Profit Tax 83 21
Payroll Tax (employer's contribution to social security) 95 24
Turnover Tax (positive) 135 33
Wage Tax and Other Income Taxes 53 13
Other Taxes (on agricultural land, trade taxes, etc.) 37 9
Total Tax Revenues 403 100
Total Tax Revenues /GDP,  % 53
Note: Presented taking negative turnover tax as a subsidy (i.e., part of expenditures, not revenues).
Negative turnover taxes on food were abolished in July 1990 and on non-food items later. Source:
Czecho-Slovak Federal Ministry of Finance; Heady, Smith (1995)
The main tax revenues came from taxes on ‘enterprise surpluses’ (profit
taxes),54 payroll,55 and turnover. The tax on individual incomes was less
significant.56 Incentives in the tax system were not intended to play any role, taxes
were often not predetermined ex-ante (e.g., profit taxes). Elimination of the scope
for discretionary reduction in taxation for less profitable enterprises is a key step
towards eliminating the ‘soft budget constraints’.57 Payroll taxes were simple and
flat. There were no redistribution concerns since wage was already determined
through an administrative process. A shift from the total tax burden from enterprise
to indirect and personal income taxes was needed. In 1990, after three sharp
administered devaluations, the government provided transfers to the banking sector
to cover the devaluation losses on the net foreign liabilities.58 In 1991, the
ambition was to significantly cut the revenues and expenditures in real terms. The
reduction in profit tax and in turnover and foreign trade59 taxes decreased the share
of revenues in GDP by 10 % to 53 %.60 On the expenditure side, (budgetary)
subsidies were sharply cut from 13 % to 7 % of GDP.61 Retail subsidies were
                                                                
54 The profits tax was cut from 75-85 % to 55 %.
55 Payroll taxes represented the employer’s contribution to social security and were paid by
enterprises. The rate was 20 % before 1989 and then it was increased to 50 %.
56 The tax rates ranged from 5 to 20 % for most incomes. The highest marginal tax rate was
33 % in 1992.
57 Kornai (1986).
58 Prust, Tanzi (1993).
59 Czecho-Slovakia experienced the collapse of trade with its most significant trading
partners organized by CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance – a trading block of
communist countries). Czecho-Slovakia  relied heavily on intra-CMEA trade for both cheap
raw material supplies and the undemanding markets for its goods. A 20 % import surcharge
was imposed in 1991 and later reduced to 10 % in two stages.
60 Excluding some exceptional items. Prust, Tanzi (1993).
61 Budgetary subsidies were equivalent to 16 % of GDP in 1989 excluding cross-
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removed in May 1991.62 Subsidies to agricultural producers were cut by one-
third.63 To sum up, real government consumption collapsed by 18 %, the highest
drop in the last 20 years.64 The budget balance was in a strong surplus of 5 % in
the first half o 1991 party due to the boost in profits tax revenue from price
liberalization; however, it ended up in a deficit of 2 % for the year as a whole.65
The reform accomplished its goal of a substantial decrease in the government's role
in the economy to a more reasonable level. However, with the new government
arising from the elections in June 1992 and the foundation of an independent
Slovakia, government expenditures reached this low level for a short-time only in
1995-1996, before the government set off on a public spree again.
                                                                                                                                                     
subsidization. This was a relatively small level than seen in other communist countries.
Prices for energy and most primarily materials were low to the large extent due to sub-
market prices offered by CMEA, thus 60 % of the subsidies applied to agricultural
producers and retail subsidies on food (in the form of negative turnover tax). The negative
turnover tax on foodstuffs was equivalent to almost a 25 % of the value of retails sales of
such items in 1989. In July 1990, the retail subsidies on food were eliminated causing a 25
% rise in food prices. The remaining subsidies were offered to housing and other high-cost
producers. The average monthly rent was equivalent to less than 5 % of average monthly
earnings. Prust, Tanzi (1993).
62 The Slovak public seems to be very nostalgic about the low level of basic food prices
even 10 years after the Velvet Revolution, not fully realizing that the almost free and heavily
subsidized goods were largely paid by the public anyway in the form of low salaries
(because of heavy taxes and other levies imposed on the enterprise sector) as documented by
the bigger wage disparity than GDP per capita disparity between Western Europe and
Czecho-Slovakia.
63 Prust, Tanzi (1993).
64 The structural collapse in expenditures was probably even greater since real GDP growth
decreased by 14.6 % in 91. The data refers to Slovakia.
65 Prust, Tanzi (1993).
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CHART 5. Government Consumption (growth and the level) since 1988, Sk bn
Source: Slovak Statistics Office, author
3.7 Two Phases – The Good Times followed by The Bad Times 66
Slovakia has, what the IMF report called, a “modern tax system with few
exemptions.” The IMF suggests that the tax-to-GDP ratio 67 has been one of the
highest in the region and much higher than in other economies with a similar GDP
per capita level. In addition, it has been higher than in more developed OECD
countries. Tax-to-GDP ratio is expected to decline in 2000 as a consequence of
personal income tax bracket creep, the decrease of import surcharge, and the tax
holidays for foreign direct investment (FDI) investors.
The „Good Times” (1993-1995) were characterized by the healthy reduction
of expenditures while preserving very high tax- and revenue-to-GDP ratios. On the
other hand, the ”Bad Times” (1996-1998) reflected the significant deterioration of
tax revenue collection as well as a public spending rampage on health, public
administration and major public investment projects such as highways and power
plants.
                                                                
66 This part relies heavily on two recent IMF reports on Slovakia: Slovak Republic: Recent
Economic Developments, June 98 and Slovak Republic: Selected Issues and Statistical
Appendix, September 1999.
67 The IMF reflects that cross-country comparisons of tax revenue are more reliable than
comparisons of total revenue since the treatment of non-tax proceeds is different.
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TABLE 7. Fiscal Balance
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000f
State Budget -25.3 -4.6 -2.4 -11.1 -17.1 -16.4 -14.1 -17.1
% GDP -6.5 -1.0 -0.4 -1.8 -2.5 -2.2 -1.8 -1.9
Local Authorities 0.3 -1.0 0.8 0.9 0.5 -1.6 -1.4 0.0
% GDP 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
Social Security
System (social and
health insurance)
2.9 4.1 5.0 -5.1 -3.1 -7.8 -7.1
% GDP 0.6 0.8 0.8 -0.7 -0.4 -1.0 -0.8
Extra-budgetary
funds (‘state funds’) 0.3 -1.0 0.2 -3.7 -11.8 -8.8 -3.7 -4.5
% GDP 0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.6 -1.7 -1.2 -0.5 -0.5
Extra-budgetary
projects (incl. Nat.
Property Fund)
-1.7 -2.0 -0.7 1.3 -1.3 -6.2 -1.0 -6.3
% GDP -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -0.1 -0.7
Fiscal Deficit -26.5 -5.8 2.0 -7.6 -34.8 -36.1 -28.0 -35.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP -6.8 -1.2 0.4 -1.3 -5.1 -4.8 -3.5 -4.0
Note: State budget balance as recorded using the methodology of the IMF. Source: IMF, author’s
forecast
TABLE 8. Tax-to-GDP Ratios,  %
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999f 2000f
Slovakia 34.4 36.7 39.8 39.0 36.6 35.4 34.5 32.5
Czech Republic 41.2 40.5 40.0 39.0 37.9 36.8
Poland 39.1 39.3 38.9 38.3
Hungary 42.4 39.7 37.2 36.1 38.4 40.7
OECD 37.0 38.4 37.0
“Good Times” 1993-95, “Bad Times” 1996-98. Source: IMF, author’s forecasts”
The upcoming Phase Three (1999-) focuses on keeping the tax revenue in,
public wage restraints, price deregulation, while showing the lack of political will
for the structural reforms on the expenditure side. Yet, the fiscal adjustments that
rely on spending cuts in transfers and the government wage bill have a better
chance of longer-term success of lowering budget deficit (and may even turn out to
be expansionary over time) rather than fiscal adjustments that rely on tax
increases.68 These tend to last shortly and may even decrease long-term growth
potential.69
                                                                
68 Alesina, Perotti (1997), Perotti (1996, 1999).
69 Musgrave (1959), Feldstein (1994), Fullerton, Walker, Long (1994), Anderson (1997).
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3.7.1 Phase One: The Good Times
A comprehensive tax reform took place in 1992 when the parliament
approved new legislature on income and value-added tax (VAT).70 Hence,
Slovakia started to have a tax legislature similar to those of developed countries.
Despite the fiscally expansive rhetoric of the government in 1992-1994, the
government was basically following all the routes in fiscal policy that were laid
down during the Czecho-Slovak Federation. From 1993 to 1995, the fiscal deficit
was driven from huge (cyclically unadjusted) fiscal deficit/GDP of 7.2 %71 to a
surplus of 0.4 %. This was achieved by both an increase in total revenue and a
significant decrease in total expenditures (of course, economic recovery helped
tremendously as GDP growth recovered from –3.7 % in 1993 to 6.7 % in 1995).
The revenue received a boost from indirect taxes (especially VAT), direct
taxes (both personal and corporate profit tax) and social security contributions (the
balance of social security/GDP remained positive 0.8 % in 1995).
CHART 6. “Good Times” vs. “Bad Times” – Two Different Fiscal Policies
1993-98
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Source: IMF, author’s forecasts
                                                                
70 Before 1993, turnover tax rates were rationalized to a basic structure of four rates: 0, 12,
22, and 32 percent (higher rates were intented to function as excises). In January, the
standard VAT rate was set at 25 % in Slovakia (at 23 % in the Czech Republic) and the
lower rate was set at 6 % in Slovakia (5 % in the Czech Republic). Heady, Smith (1995).
Excises were set for alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline.
71 The deficit was partially ‘justified’ by the break-up of the Czecho-Slovak Federation.
Slovakia had to create new institutions that were needed for the existence of independent
state.
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3.7.2 Phase Two: The Bad Times
In 1996, the government started to foster investment through highway
construction and dam and nuclear plant constructions. Highway construction was
artificially hasted so that the first signs should have been visible before the general
elections in September 1998. In addition, the government tried to minimize the
purchasing costs of the new owners by giving them tax investment credit. There
was also a revitalization attempt, which was supposed to involve direct bailouts of
the indebted companies by the state. This further worsened the corporate
governance that probably reached an all time low in 1997-98 when asset striping
was pervasive.72 Corporate profit tax took a huge dive, decreasing from 6.8 % of
GDP in 1995 to 3 % in 1999.73 Inefficiencies in social security and higher
unemployment changed the social security/GDP surplus of 0.8 % to the deficit of -
1 % in 1999.
TABLE 9. Direct and Indirect Taxes,  % of GDP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999f 2000f
Direct Taxes
Slovakia 9.3 10.7 10.7 10.7 8.9 9.1 8.7 7.8
Czech Republic 10.1 10.4 10.2 9.4 8.9
Poland 13.2 13.2 12.8 12.3
Hungary 8.3 7.5 7.1 7.8 8.7
Indirect Taxes
Slovakia 12.0 12.5 13.2 11.6 11.2 10.4 10.5 10.2
Czech Republic 12.0 13.1 12.6 12.5 10.3
Poland 11.4 11.5 11.4 12.1
Hungary 11.0 12.3
Note: Direct taxes represent corporate and personal income taxes. Indirect taxes represent value-added
and excise taxes. Source: IMF, author’s forecast
3.8 Revenues
3.8.1 Direct Taxes
 3.8.1.1 Corporate Profit Income Tax
Slovakia has had the highest corporate profit tax in the region. The new
government agreed in December 1999 to lower the corporate tax from 40 % to 29
% effective in 2000 to decrease the benefit of tax avoidance, to make Slovakia
                                                                
72 Since the new owners of companies did not command expertise, sometimes it was in their
own interest to exhibit ‘rent-seeking’ behavior instead of ‘profit-seeking’ one.
73 The decrease is not cyclical since the corporate tax/GDP has been steadily decreasing
even in 1996-1997 with GDP growth reaching 6.6 % and 6.5 %, respectively. However, part
of the drop from 1996 to 1997 is attributed to the removal of paper profits at the state banks.
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more competitive in this area, and to decrease direct taxation at the cost of the
indirect one.
Box 1: 1999 Discussion about Corporate Taxes in Slovakia
The MinFin proposed cutting corporate tax from 40 % to 35 % and later settled for 29 %.
The EconMin was fighting for a 20 % corporate tax rate citing the Hungarian scenario
where the Hungarian corporate tax rate was cut from 36 % to 18 %, and it allegedly
prompted an increase in tax collection of 36 %. The government offered no detailed analysis
of the impact on the 2001 budget.
Czech Republic: The current corporate income tax rate is 35 % in 1999, unchanged from the
previous year but down from the 45 % in 1992. A new law, adopted at the end of June 1999,
lowers the corporate income tax rate to 32 % in 2000.
Poland: The Polish parliament is debating the plan approved by government which calls for
the corporate income tax rate to drop to 30 % in 2000, from the current 34 %, and then to
decrease by an additional 2 % annually until it reaches level of 22 % in 2004. However,
most tax deductions are to be cut, while amortization rules will become more favorable. The
corporate income tax has been lowered gradually from 38 % in 1997, to 36 % in 1998, and
then to 34 % in 1999.
Hungary: Its ability to attract the lion share of Eastern European FDI can be in part
contributed to its corporate income tax rate, which was cut in January 1995 from 36 % to 18
%, by far the lowest number in the region. The 23 % tax on dividends was introduced.
Hungary’s decentralized taxation system grants municipalities power to add generous
incentives for investors. (e.g., in the city of Szekesfehevar, most investors pay no corporate
income tax until 2000, then they will pay 7.5 % until 2005).
Corporate Profit Income Tax Rate in Central Europe and Expectations
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04
SK 45 40 40 40 40 40 40 29 29 29 29 29
HU 36 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
PL 38 36 34 30 28 26 24 22
CR 45 42 41 41 39 35 35 32 32 32 32 32
In percent. Source: Reuters, ING Barings
During Phase One, the Slovak legislature did not offer many tax exemptions74
and corporate tax/GDP had been reaching a hard-to-believe 6-7 % of GDP. High
                                                                
74 Even though substantial tax incentives to foreigners and backward regions existed, the
lack of sizeable FDI till 1999 caused that the incentives were not used in any major way.
They were removed at the beginning of 1996 and enacted again by the new government in
April 1999. Further discussions need to take place on how to make Slovakia more
competitive with other countries in its struggle for FDI.
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paper profits of state banks were part of the reason of such a high number till 1996.
In Phase Two, the tax income has halved as a consequence of declining fiscal
discipline and corporate governance, asset-striping by the new owners originating
from the political privatizations in 1994-98, and tax exemptions for investments.
Tax evasion has become widespread. In 1998, despite the deep recession in the
Czech Republic and higher corporate profit tax rate, the Czech government was
able to collect more corporate taxes/GDP than Slovakia. In 1999, Slovakia was
able to lure only 32 % more taxes (of GDP) despite having a 120 % higher tax
rate75 than Hungary. Revenue is now dropping even below the average in the
OECD and EU countries.
A simple exercise offers the answer as to whether the huge drop in corporate
profit tax revenue was mainly due to the removal of paper profits at state banks,
lower profits of state monopolies, or lower economic growth.
Table 10 suggests that when adjusted for the aforementioned, the drop in the
corporate revenues is still very evident. If Slovakia were able to sustain the same
corporate tax revenue/GDP in 1998 as in 1995 (for private companies), this could
have decreased the fiscal deficit by huge 2.3 % of GDP in 1998
3.8.1.2 Personal Income Tax
Personal income tax (PIT) is a more successful story. The Slovak Republic
has continually increased its personal income tax revenue/GDP during both Phases,
starting from 4 % of GDP in 1993 to 5.9 % of GDP in 1998. In 1997, PIT brought
more tax revenues to the government than corporate tax for the first time. This was
a hot political issue, but looking at other countries’ experiences, PIT brings more
money to the government budget in all neighboring countries. A pick-up in PIT
partially offset the shortfall of corporate taxes causing direct taxes to decrease from
10-11.5 % on GDP to 9.5 % in 1998, roughly in line with other countries’
experiences in the region. However, direct taxes would probably reach the
minimum in the region in 1999-2000 at 7.6 %. As such, PIT rate is relatively
modest in Slovakia. In 1997, the average wage was taxed at 12 % average tax rate
(as it was in the Czech Republic), but in Hungary and Poland the average tax rate
was substantially higher (19 %, 18 % respectively). In addition, the Slovak tax
code has fewer exemptions and marginal tax rates have been relatively low.76
However, neither tax brackets, nor a personal exemption was indexed for inflation;
therefore, Slovak tax authorities were imposing an increasing real tax burden on its
                                                                
75 However, the Slovak tax system has much more tax deductible items compared to the
corporate tax regime in Hungary.
76 In 1997, the marginal tax rate for a 300 % average wage was 32 % in Slovakia and the
Czech Republic, while the rate was substantially higher in Hungary and Poland (42 %, 44
%, respectively). Slovak Republic, IMF (1999).
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citizens (which explains an ever-higher share of PIT on GDP). Cumulatively,
consumer prices doubled in 1993-1999.77 Average wage was taxed at 15 % in
1993 and at already 17.2 % in 1999. In 2000, tax brackets will be moved up. The
lower income groups will even enjoy lower average taxation then it was in 1993;
higher income groups will get only a partial indexation.
TABLE 10. Corporate Profit Income Tax
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Corporate Profit Income Tax 31.9 35.2 34.8 24.4 26.0
Corporate Profit Income Tax /GDP, % 6.8 6.4 5.7 3.6 3.5
Out of which state companies (monopolies and banks) 13.2 12.6 11.3 10.3 12.3
Private companies 18.7 22.6 23.5 14.1 13.7
Private companies /GDP, % 4.0 4.1 3.9 2.1 1.8
Private companies (structural revenues) 19.9 23.1 23.0 13.3 13.0
Private companies (structural revenues) /Potential GDP, % 4.2 4.2 3.8 2.0 1.8
Note: See Appendix 1 for more details on structural vs. cyclical adjustment. The corporate income tax
revenue of state companies was rather crudely approximated by the taxes of natural monopolies and
banks using the available data in M.E.S.A. 10 (1999).
TABLE 11. Average Personal Income Taxation in 1997
Slovakia Czech R. Hungary Poland
75 % of average wage 7 7 19 18
Average wage 12 7 25 18
300 % of average wage 24 24 31 23
Note: The calculation assumes that the taxpayer claims exemption for spouse, or 1.3 children on
average. In percent. Source: IMF (1998)
TABLE 12. Average Personal Income Tax Rate in Slovakia
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
75 % of average wage 15.0 15.0 15.4 15.9 16.4 16.7 16.9 13.2
Average wage 15.0 15.0 15.4 16.1 16.7 17.0 17.2 13.0
300 % of average wage 17.3 18.7 19.9 21.7 23.3 24.2 24.9 20.1
Note: The calculation assumes the general personal exemption as the only tax deduction. In percent.
Source: Author
3.8.2 Indirect Taxes
3.8.2.1 Value-added Tax (VAT)
Slovakia's VAT is high at 23 % compared with EU and OECD averages of 19
% and 17 %, respectively. It is the second highest after Hungary’s one of 25 %.78
                                                                
77 CPI increased by 102.3 % in 1993-1999.
78 The reader should realize that since corporate profit tax rate in Hungary is only 18 %, to
some extent, Hungary is taxing more at other different tax rates (such as VAT) and therefore
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In contrast, Slovak’s lower VAT rate (covering basic food and services) was very
low at only 6 % (compared with 12 % in Hungary and 7/12 % for Poland). In May
1999, the lower rate was increased to 10 % as one of the measures implemented in
the austerity package of the new government. The two different rates are causing
distortions and could be used for tax-evasion purposes, e.g., in construction
activities.79 In the future, Slovakia should be increasing the lower VAT (which is a
cause of political concern among leftist parties) and lowering the standard 23 %
VAT.
3.8.3 Excise Taxes
Slovakia’s excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and gas seem to be behind those
of EU and even behind the ones imposed by neighboring countries. Whereas
Slovakia will collect only 3 % of GDP in excise taxes in 2000, the average tax ratio
is 4 % for Central European countries. The shortfall in revenues from these taxes is
partially offset by buoyant VAT revenues causing indirect taxes to bring 10 % of
GDP revenues in 2000.
3.8.4 Other Taxes
3.8.4.1 Import Taxes
Slovakia is an extremely small open economy. Trade turnover is 120 % of
GDP, almost three times larger than household consumption. Slovakia is set to
benefit from labor specialization and comparative advantages and should, to the
maximum possible extent, try to stay open to all the markets in the world. In
contrast, recently, it has become a popular political issue to fight imports and boost
tax revenues through import certificates and import surcharge. The widespread
unfamiliarity with basic economic laws among politicians and per consequence a
political will to impose trade barriers might be one of the most damaging
maneuvers Slovak politicians could do to its long-run GDP growth potential.
Luckily, Slovakia has had low barriers imposed to free trade mainly as a
consequence of demands from IMF, World Bank, OECD, and WTO. Even though
the average statutory duty rate is about 8 %, many trade agreements have
effectively exempted most imports. The IMF suggests that the effective taxation of
imports was only 2.5 % in Slovakia compared with 9-10 % taxation in Poland and
Hungary (the Czech Republic had a low 2.1 % taxation of imports).80
In 1997, Slovakia imposed import certificates and later substituted a 7 %
import surcharge in the summer of 1997. The surcharge was removed in October
                                                                                                                                                     
might not be a good example.
79 Slovak Republic, IMF (1999).
80 Slovakia, IMF (1998).
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199881 only later to be introduced again as one of the measures of the May 1999
austerity package. Fortunately (for Slovakia), the same international organizations
urge Slovakia to remove the surcharge by January 2001.
3.8.4.2 Social Security Tax
Slovak social security taxes (SST) are by far the highest in the region with the
combined tax rate of 50 % compared with 47 % in the Czech Republic and 41 %
and 35.4-43.1 % for Hungary and Poland, respectively. SST are also well above
those in the EU (36.5 %) and the OECD (24.8 %).82 The very high employer’s
contribution of 38 % might be effectively deterring employment.
Despite these enormous taxes, the Social Security system has been turning
from almost 1 % surplus (of GDP) in 1994-1996 into a very deep deficit of 2 % in
2000. The state used to be the biggest debtor, not fulfilling its tax obligations for
the unemployed and students. There are great inefficiencies in the Slovak social
security system, ranging from inefficient operations of health care insurance
houses to employed people taking home unemployment benefits. Assuming that
the half of the 65,000 “shadow unemployed” people receive unemployment
benefits, the benefits would cost Sk1.9bn or 0.24 % of GDP.
3.9 Expenditures
The Slovak government still has too large of a role in the economy; its level
of public expenditures is the highest in the region. This part discusses the
expenditure profile in more detail.
TABLE 13. Effective Import Surcharge
 % 91 92 3/94 7/96 1/97 7/97 1/98 4/98 10/98 6/99 1/00 7/00 1/01
Import
Surcharge 20 10 10 7,5 0 7 5 3 0 7 5 3 0
Effective Import Surcharge x 2.5 0.0 5.3 3.8 2.3 0.0 5.0 3.8 3.0 0.0
Note: Effective import surcharge is defined as the product of import surcharge rate and the portion of
imports that the surcharge applies to.  Source: MinFin, author
                                                                
81 It was lowered to 5 % in January 98 and 3 % in April at the request of WTO.
82 Slovakia, IMF (1999).
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TABLE 14. Social Contribution Rates in Selected Countries ( % of wage)
Employer’s Contribution Employee’s
Contribution
Total
Slovakia 38.0 12.0 50.0
     Health 10.0 3.7 13.7
     Sickness 3.4 1.4 4.8
     Pensions 21.6 5.9 27.5
     Unemployment 3.0 1.0 4.0
Czech Republic 35.0 12.5 47.5
     Health 9.0 4.5 13.5
     Sickness 3.3 1.1 4.4
     Pensions 19.5 6.5 26.0
     Unemployment 3.2 0.4 3.6
Hungary 33.0 8.0 41.0
     Health 11.0 3.0 14.0
     Sickness n/a n/a n/a
     Pensions 22.0 5.0 27.0
     Unemployment n/a n/a n/a
Poland 16.7-24.4 18.7 35.4-43.1
     Health 0 2.5 2.5
     Sickness 6.5 6.5 13.0
     Pensions 9.8 9.8 19.5
     Unemployment 0.4-8.1 0.0 0.4-8.1
European Union (1) 23.6 12.9 36.5
Western Europe (2) 22.1 11.7 33.8
OECD (3) 16.2 8.6 24.8
(1) unweighted average of the European Union countries (excluding Denmark). (2) unweighted average
of  European Union countries (excluding Denmark) and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. (3)
unweighted average of OECD member countries. Source: World Bank, IMF
TABLE 15. Total Expenditures to GDP Ratio
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Slovakia 47.4 44.3 45.8 46.5 47.7 45.3
Czech Republic 46.0 45.7 43.9 42.8 42.9
Poland 50.5 48.9 47.9 47.5
Hungary 58.3 55.5 49.6 47.2
Source: IMF
3.9.1 Consumption
3.9.1.1 General Government Administration – Very Expensive
The 1994-1998 government implemented an administrative reform that
divided Slovakia into regional districts and opened regional offices as an
intermediary between state and local government. This was done mainly for
political reasons. Realizing the upcoming elections in 1998, the government was
very generous in offering nominal wage increases to state bureaucrats. In fact, the
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bureaucrats enjoyed an ever-higher margin over the average salary, starting from
15 % in 1993, and reaching 25 % in 1998. Despite the high average level of public
wages, the public sector does not offer competitive wages for highly skilled civil
servants. In addition, teachers were receiving an ever-lower margin over the
average salary; in 1993, teachers received only 87.5 % of average salary, and in
1998 teachers took home only 82.4 % of the average salary. The health sector was
in similar shape.
Labor costs are not the only reason why the government administration is so
costly in Slovakia. The purchased goods and services (as a proportion to GDP) are
expected to come down to more reasonable levels only in 2000.
3.9.2 Subsidies to Enterprises
Only recently, Slovakia set itself on the path to decrease state subsidies.
Around 1/3 of all subsidies are subsidies for agriculture (while agriculture
produces only 4 % of GDP in Slovakia). The allocation of subsidies in agriculture
indirectly supports inefficient producers, and the mechanism is known for its great
inefficiency and non-transparency. On the other hand, only 1 % of all subsidies
goes to industry. Heating subsidies decreased as a consequence of on-going price
deregulation.
3.9.3 Capital Expenditures
3.9.3.1 Extrabudgetary State Funds – Easy Way to Spend Money
Off-the-budget state funds are not constrained by the state budget deficit
target (set by the law). As argued previously, many expansionary (and inefficient)
plans of the ministries and the government are being implemented outside the state
budget via state funds. Yet, the state funds can borrow money at only higher
rates.83 A popular example to see the diminishing information value of state budget
deficit data is the Road Fund. In 1994, transfers from the state budget covered most
of the total expenditures; therefore, the Road Fund as such did not add anything to
the general government deficit. However, the transfers did not go hand in hand
with an increase in expenditures and the Road Fund produced 1 % fiscal
deficit/GDP (i.e., above the transfers from the state budget) in 1997-99.
3.9.3.2 Government Guarantees – How to Manipulate Fiscal Deficit Figures
Another favorite way of excessive spending and investments concerns the
usage of government guarantees. Government guarantees do not enter fiscal data
                                                                
83 Sometimes the rates are substantially higher. The Road Fund borrowed EUR120m in late
September 1999 at 4.7 % spread. Slovakia EUR eurobond paper was trading 1.5 % lower at
3.2 % spread.
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and can even be repaid by issuing another government guarantee.84 Therefore, it
seems that despite the enormous costs involved in financing through government
guarantees, the government decided to take these steps to limit the state budget
deficit, which was never a credible macroeconomic indicator to start with. Market
participants suggest that there is hardly a country in the world with such a wide
premium of government guaranteed debt over sovereign issue.
TABLE 16. Road Fund
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total Expenditures, Sk bn
Road Fund Deficit, Sk bn
Road Fund Deficit / GDP
2.066
0.113
 0.0
3.581
1.468
0.3
4.588
2.966
0.5
15.122
10.858
1.6
16.432
8.838
1.2
Source: IMF, author
TABLE 17. State Guarantees and the Net Cost to the State Budget
Sk bn ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99f ‘00f
Newly issued guarantees 0.2 12.2 6.5 13.5 3.0 12.6 41.5 5.8 13.8 29.3 44.6
Maturing guarantees 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.8 2.7 4.2 4.9 10.6 9.6 25.4
Net increase in gov’t
guarantees
0.2 12.2 6.1 12.6 1.2 9.9 37.3 0.9 3.2 19.6 19.1
Net increase/GDP,  % 0.1 3.8 1.8 3.2 0.3 1.8 6.2 0.1 0.4 2.5 2.2
Net cost to state
budget
0.48 0.11 1.21 1.89 2.06 2.14 4.2 10.5
Net cost/GDP,  % 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.2
Source: MinFin, author
It is only now that the government needs to face the fiscal burden with
government guarantees expected to be called upon at 1.2 % of GDP in 2000.
3.9.3.3 Social Security Funds
Social security expenses in Slovakia are the highest in the region. Whilst
these expenses in 1998 amounted to 21.5 % of GDP in Slovakia, they totaled only
9.2 % of GDP in Hungary, 19 % in the Czech Republic, and 21.1 % in Poland.
Pensions took a 40 % share, and health expenses reached a 30 % share.85 Sickness
expenses are twice as high in Slovakia than the OECD average.86
Health Insurance. Four health funds and six health insurance companies
supposedly competing for customers carry out health spending and insurance.
                                                                
84 In the 2000 state budget draft, the MinFin officers suggested that “due to the lack of
revenues in the state budget the direct financing of development projects from the state
budget would lead to an unacceptedly high level of state budget deficit and therefore,
momentarily, the government would need to use government guaranteed loans …”.
85 IMF (1999).
86 They amount to 1.3 % of GDP in Slovakia and 0.7 % of GDP in OECD. OECD (1999).
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However, competition is only illusory since services do not differ. Health
insurance companies are believed to have high wage and overhead bills. As much
as 96 % of the contributions to the health care system comes from public sources
compared with an average of 78 % for EU.87 Health spending seems to be
inefficient especially as far as medication expenses are concerned. Thirty-five
percent of total spending covers medication as opposed to 15 % in EU. Slovakia
also has too many hospitals per capita.
Pensions. Slovakia has a pay-as-you-go pension system, which is now a topic of
discussion. The government plans to implement a three-pillar pension system
gradually and increase the retirement age. Pension expenditure/GDP has been
relatively modest, reaching 7.9 % in 1998 (compared with 9.4 % for the Czech
Republic). This is primarily due to the low ratio of average pensions to the average
wage – the so-called replacement rate. In contrast, Slovakia spends too much on
disability and early retirement.88
TABLE 18. Social Security Funds
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Social Insurance 3.7 1.9 4.5 0.9 -0.2
       Sickness Fund 3.3 1.8 -0.2 0.9 0.6
       Pension Fund 0.4 0.1 4.7 0.0 -0.8
Health Fund -1.5 1.2 0.0 -5.7 -7.7
Employment Fund 0.7 1.0 0.5 -0.3 0.0
Total 2.9 4.1 5.0 -5.1 -7.9
Total/GDP,  % 0.6 0.8 0.9 -0.8 -1.1
Note: Social security was included in the state budget in 1993. Source: IMF
3.10 Debt Sustainability
Slovakia was born with a very small level of public debt and total liabilities.
The level has increased by 10 % (of GDP) and now, assuming bank-restructuring
costs, the level is slightly below 50 %. However, the debt rapidly started to
increase from the end of 1997.
Expansionary fiscal policy under a fixed exchange rate regime prompted the
central bank to tighten its monetary policy resulting in extremely high domestic
real interest rates. High interest rates in turn did not allow for the debt to be
decreased as a percentage of GDP in 1997-98.
                                                                
87 Slovak Republic, IMF (1999).
88 OECD (1999).
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TABLE 19. Central Government Debt and Contingent State Liabilities
Skbn 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 ‘99f ‘00f ‘01f
Domestic Debt 51.6 71.6 87.1 100.6 86.4 104.2 112.0 116.5 123.5 161.1
Foreign Debt 44.5 51.6 43.4 34.3 32.0 30.8 65.7 86.7 118.4 126.6
  - Bank Restructuring 18.2 26.4
Public Debt 96.1 123.2 130.4 134.9 118.4 135.0 177.7 203.2 241.9 271.9
Public Debt /GDP,  % 28.9 33.4 29.6 26.1 20.6 20.6 24.8 25.4 26.8 27.1
State Guarantees 18.5 31.1 32.3 42.2 79.5 80.4 83.6 103.3 122.4 107.6
Other Bank Restructuring Liabilities 77.8 42.8
Total Liabilities 114.6 154.3 162.8 177.1 197.9 215.4 261.3 306.5 442.1 454.7
T. Liabilities /GDP  % 34.5 41.8 37.0 34.3 34.4 32.9 36.4 38.3 49.1 45.4
Note: Public debt is defined as the sum of state budget deficits. The table assumes the sale of IRB bank
for Sk7bn in 2000 and the sale of VUB and Slovak savings bank for a total of Sk35bn in 2001. These
numbers should be regarded with a great caution and are for illustrative purposes only. Source: MinFin,
author, and author’s forecasts
TABLE 20. Public Liabilities Costs
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999f 2000f
Net Interest and
Recalled Guarantees
4.7 12.1 17.3 13.4 14.6 14.4 19.6 25.0 34.4
 % of GDP 1.4 3.3 3.9 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.7 3.1 3.8
Source: IMF, author, and author’s forecasts
CHART 7. Debt Sustainability– the Difference between Interest Rates and GDP
Deflator
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Source: Author
Slovakia's more prudent fiscal policy in 1999 together with its improved
international profile helped substantially reduce real interest rates to sustainable
levels.
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3.11 Conclusion
Fiscal policy has had different aspects since 1989. After the change of the
communist regime, the priority of the fiscal policy between 1990 and 1992 was to
eliminate the discretionary aspect of the taxation under communism, minimize the
disparity between available resources and wants mainly through the reduction of
subsidies and price deregulation. The goal was accomplished as far as the
substantial decrease of the role of the government in the economy is concerned.
Together with the foundation of an independent Slovakia, the government
introduced a modern tax system. Fiscal policy between 1993 and 1995 could be
characterized as successful, the fiscal deficit/GDP was brought down from 7.2 % in
1993 to a small surplus of 0.4 % in 1995. Enterprise insiders, managers of state
companies and banks, and local officials could be tempted to exert pressure on the
government between 1996 and 1998 in order to implement much more
expansionary policy. The fiscal stance rapidly worsened causing huge external
imbalances. Current account deficit averaged over 10 % between 1996 and 1998;
due to minimal foreign direct investment inflows, foreign indebtedness rapidly shot
up. High real interest rates negatively effected corporate results, and the
maintenance of the fixed exchange rate regime cost a decrease of monthly cover
from 3.3 months to 2.2 months. The country was downgraded from the investment
grade to noninvestment one, and the central bank had to float the currency.
The new government needs to address the rising public debt levels and
decreasing tax-to-GDP ratio. Privatization helps only temporarily, sooner or later
the government would need to give serious concern to decrease expenditures.
During this process the government should ‘insulate’ itself more from the early
reform winners, since they could exert pressure on the government to slow down
reforms. The most inefficient expenditures seem to be the likes of general
government administration, social transfers, agricultural subsidies, health
expenditures, and government guarantees. The reform of schooling, health system,
and pension reform should by high on the agenda. Theory and evidence suggests
that the fiscal adjustments that rely on spending cuts in transfers and the public
wage bill have a better chance of longer-term success of lowering budget deficit
and may even turn out to be expansionary over time. On the other hand, fiscal
adjustments based on tax increases tend to be only of a temporary nature and might
even decrease the long-term growth potential.
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3.13 Appendix 1: Structural vs. Cyclical Deficit, Methodology
In order to compute a structural budget balance, potential output data are
needed. Due to Slovak data limitation, the following assumptions have been made.
Potential output should represent an average growth. Unemployment should be
close to its natural rate, which is proxied here by the long-run average.89 Potential
(real) GDP growth is assumed at 4.5 %.90 Last but not least, it is assumed that the
Slovak economy was operating below its potential in 1999-2000. These three
arguments lead to a rather crude approach that assumes that the economy was
operating very close to its equilibrium between 1995 and 1996.91
Applying the methodology used previously in an IMF report on Slovakia 92
the structural value of the tax revenue (TS) is then calculated as:
TS = T(1-eGAP),
where GAP is defined as (Actual Output - Potential Output)/Potential Output in
nominal terms and e is the tax elasticity to the current output gap. Tax elasticities
are assumed the same as they were in the Fund report:
TABLE 21. Tax Elasticities
Tax Elasticity Tax Elasticity
Corporate Profit Tax 2.4 Social Security Contributions 0.7
Personal Income Tax 1.2 Other Taxes 1
Indirect Tax 1
Note: Due to the data limitations, tax elasticities presented in the table are averages for small industrial
countries. Source: IMF (1997), OECD (1994)
                                                                
89 The average unemployment rate between 1990-2000 is close to 12 %. The relatively high
rate is due to the lack of FDI-led company restructuring and high social security tax rate.
IMF (arbitrarily) assumed 9.5 % natural rate of unemployment.
90 The IMF in its report assumed 5.0 % growth citing the study by Fisher, Sahay, Vegh
(1996). Lower growth of 4.5 % is assumed here due to the market distortions introduced by
the government in 1996-1998.
91 The base year is set such that the sum of output gaps in 1995 and 1996 is equal to zero.
The choice of the base year is somewhat arbitrary. The last condition dictates that the base
year needs to be later than 1995. Therefore, 1995-1996 is assumed as a base year despite the
signs of huge external imbalances in second half of 1996.
92 IMF (1997).
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The structural value of unemployment benefits (UNS) is assumed to be
proportional to the ratio of natural rate of unemployment to actual rate and is given
by:
UNS = UN(US/U),
where US represents the natural rate and U denotes the actual rate.
TABLE 22. Structural Deficit
Sk bn 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000f
Total Revenue (structural) 164.3 206.6 253.7 272.2 286.9 298.3 313.5 332.0
Total Revenue 159.3 200.8 251.7 274.5 293.5 304.1 312.2 321.8
Total Revenue (structural)/ Potential
GDP, % 40.7 43.0 46.1 45.3 42.8 40.6 39.1 36.3
Total Revenue /GDP, % 40.8 43.1 46.1 45.3 42.8 40.5 39.1 36.4
Total Expenditures and Net Lending
(structural)
185.3 206.9 250.2 281.9 327.6 341.1 343.0 360.7
Total Expenditures and Net Lending 185.3 206.7 249.8 282.1 327.6 340.2 340.2 356.8
Total Expenditures and Net Lending
(structural)/ GDP, % 45.9 43.1 45.4 46.9 48.9 46.4 42.8 39.4
Total Expenditures and Net Lending
/GDP %
47.4 44.3 45.8 46.5 47.7 45.3 42.7 40.4
Structural Fiscal Deficit -21.0 -0.3 3.5 -9.8 -40.7 -42.7 -29.5 -28.6
Actual Fiscal Deficit -26.5 -5.8 2.0 -7.6 -34.8 -36.1 -28.0 -35.0
Structural Fiscal Deficit / Potential
GDP, %
-5.2 -0.1 0.6 -1.6 -6.1 -5.8 -3.7 -3.1
Actual Fiscal Deficit /GDP, % -6.8 -1.2 0.4 -1.3 -5.1 -4.8 -3.5 -4.0
Improvement over previous year
(structural deficit), %
9.9 5.1 0.7 -2.3 -4.5 0.3 2.1 0.6
Improvement over previous year
(actual deficit), %
5.1 5.5 1.6 -1.6 -3.8 0.3 1.3 -0.5
Memorandum Items
Nominal GDP 390.6 466.2 546.0 606.1 686.1 750.8 797.5 883.1
Potential Nominal GDP 403.8 480.0 550.5 601.2 669.6 735.7 801.3 914.4
Nominal GDP GAP, % -3.3 -2.9 -0.8 0.8 2.5 2.1 -0.5 -3.4
Note: Potential GDP growth assumed at 4.5 %. 1995-1996 is presumed to be the base year for potential
GDP. Source: Author
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3.14 Appendix 2: Detailed Fiscal Data
TABLE 25. General Government Fiscal Deficit
‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99e ‘00p
1 State budget (IMF
methodology) -25.3 -4.6 -2.4 -11.1 -17.1 -16.4 -14.1 -17.1
2 Local authorities 0.3 -1.0 0.8 0.9 0.5 -1.6 -1.4 0.0
3 Social security
system 0.0 2.9 4.1 5.0 -5.1 -3.1 -7.8 -7.1
3.1 Social insurance 3.3 1.8 -0.2 0.9 0.6 n/a n/a
3.1.1 Sickness fund 0.4 0.1 4.7 0.0 -0.8 n/a n/a
3.1.2 Pension fund 0.4 0.1 4.7 0.0 -0.8
3.2 Health fund -1.5 1.2 0.0 -5.7 -2.9 n/a n/a
3.3 Employment fund 0.7 1.0 0.5 -0.3 0.0 n/a n/a
4 Extrabudgetary funds (‘state
funds’) 0.3 -1.0 0.2 -3.7 -11.8 -8.8 -3.7 -4.5
5 Extrabudgetary projects (incl.
NPF) -1.7 -2.0 -0.7 1.3 -1.3 -6.2 -1.0 -6.3
1+2+3+4+5 Fiscal
deficit
-26.5 -26.5 -5.8 2.0 -7.6 -34.8 -36.1 -28.0 -35.0
Fiscal deficit/GDP. % -11.9 -6.8 -1.2 0.4 -1.3 -5.1 -4.8 -3.5 -4.0
A+B Total Revenue 149.2 159.3 200.8 251.7 274.5 293.5 304.1 312.2 321.8
A Tax Revenue 130.8 134.5 170.9 217.1 236.3 251.4 266.1 275.0 286.7
A.1 Direct taxes 54.3 36.4 50.0 58.5 64.9 61.0 68.5 69.3 69.3
A.1.1 Corporate
income tax 31.2 22.0 31.9 35.2 34.8 24.4 26.0 23.2 25.7
A.1.2 Personal income
tax 23.1 14.4 18.1 23.2 30.1 36.6 42.5 46.1 43.7
A.1.2.1
Entrepreneurial
income
1.9 3.2 3.5 3.6 4.7 5.3 5.4 n/a n/a
A.1.2.2 Wage income 21.3 10.7 11.7 15.7 20.3 25.6 29.6 n/a n/a
A.1.2.3 Capital income 0.0 0.6 3.0 3.9 5.1 5.7 7.6 n/a n/a
A.2 Indirect taxes 40.3 47.0 58.2 72.3 70.3 76.8 78.3 84.1 90.4
A.2.1 VAT n.a. 27.5 37.1 52.3 48.7 54.9 55.3 58.9 63.3
A.2.2 Excise taxes n.a. 19.5 21.1 20.0 21.6 21.9 23.1 25.2 27.1
A.3 Import duties and
surcharge 5.3 4.5 7.2 8.8 9.7 12.8 11.7 12.5 12.0
A.4 Road tax 0.0 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.6
A.5 Other taxes 0.8 2.1 2.6 4.2 4.8 4.2 4.5 4.6 4.4
A.6 Social security
contributions
30.1 42.9 51.4 71.9 85.0 94.0 100.5 101.3 107.0
B Nontax revenues 18.4 24.8 29.9 34.6 38.1 42.1 38.0 37.2 35.1
B.1 Budgetary and
subsidized organ’s
5.6 6.3 6.5 11.9 1.8 2.2 5.3 n/a n/a
B.2 Interest revenues 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.2 0.7 1.2 n/a n/a
B.3 Central bank profit
contribution
0.0 4.0 6.7 1.4 2.4 1.1 1.0 n/a n/a
B.4 Fees and fines 6.5 3.8 2.2 3.9 7.1 5.6 5.1 n/a n/a
B.5 Other 6.3 7.3 8.3 9.3 10.3 11.3 12.3 n/a n/a
1+2 Total expenditures 191.5 188.0 207.5 250.5 282.8 322.7 336.9 338.1 353.7
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and net lending
1 Total expenditures 188.8 185.3 206.7 249.8 282.1 327.6 340.2 340.2 356.8
1.1 Consumption 90.2 79.4 86.5 112.9 120.4 144.9 141.8 142.8 145.4
1.1.1 Gross wages 15.4 15.9 16.7 28.7 33.2 50.7 56.5 55.4 58.4
1.1.2 Health care 15.3 15.8 22.9 27.5 36.7 45.9 44.7 43.6 44.0
1.1.3 Other goods and
services
59.5 47.7 46.9 56.7 50.5 48.3 40.6 43.7 43.0
1.1.3.1 Education (w/o
wages) 8.0 8.0 7.6 7.7 1.9 2.2 1.5 n/a n/a
1.1.3.2 Other 51.5 39.7 39.3 49.0 48.6 46.1 41.5 n/a n/a
1.2 Subsidies to
enterprises 16.2 17.2 18.5 19.4 24.0 26.1 26.1 26.2 29.5
1.2.1 Agriculture 8.2 8.7 7.6 7.4 6.0 7.0 6.8 n/a n/a
1.2.2 Industry 1.1 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 n/a n/a
1.2.3 Transportation 1.7 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.2 2.2 n/a n/a
1.2.4 Heating 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.3 4.2 3.4 n/a n/a
1.2.5 Other (incl. state
funds) 3.2 2.9 4.8 5.2 10.5 12.3 13.6 n/a n/a
1.3 Interest expenses 3.6 11.6 17.2 12.2 12.7 12.3 17.5 23.3 25.1
1.4 Social expenditures 56.7 58.6 65.3 80.7 90.8 93.5 107.5 117.0 122.9
1.5 Pensions 28.0 32.7 39.3 43.3 46.1 51.0 56.9 n/a n/a
1.5.1 Labor policies 5.8 3.0 3.6 5.5 7.4 7.1 7.8 n/a n/a
1.5.1.1 Unemployment
benefits 2.0 1.9 1.7 5.5 7.4 4.0 5.5 n/a n/a
1.5.1.2 Active policies 3.8 1.1 1.9 0.0 0.0 3.1 2.3 n/a n/a
1.5.2 Sickness benefits 5.9 5.2 5.2 5.7 7.4 8.1 9.0 n/a n/a
1.5.3 Social assistance 2.4 3.1 5.2 11.3 13.7 11.0 16.4 n/a n/a
1.5.4 General income
support 7.2 4.3 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n/a n/a
1.5.5 Other state
benefits
7.4 10.3 9.5 14.9 16.3 16.3 17.5 n/a n/a
1.1+1.2+1.3+1.4+1.5
Current expenditures 166.7 166.8 187.6 225.3 247.9 276.8 292.9 309.3 322.9
1.6 Investment
expenditures 24.8 21.2 19.9 25.2 34.9 45.9 44.0 28.9 30.8
1.6.1 Budgetary and
subsidized organ’s
12.2 12.5 14.0 19.2 29.0 25.9 n/a n/a n/a
1.6.2 Transfers to
enterprises 3.0 6.9 3.9 4.8 5.2 5.3 n/a n/a n/a
1.6.3 Extrabudgetary
projects 9.6 1.8 2.0 0.8 6.8 6.8 n/a n/a n/a
2=2.1-2.2 Net lending -2.7 -2.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 4.9 3.4 2.0 3.1
2.1 Lending (e.g.,
recalled guarantees) 1.1 1.5 3.0 3.0 2.0 6.3 n/a n/a n/a
2.2 Repayments (goes
w/ (-) such as
privatization proceeds)
3.8 4.2 3.8 3.7 2.6 1.4 n/a n/a n/a
Source: IMF, author’s forecasts
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This chapter deals with monetary policy in Slovakia during the years 1990-
1999. First, it looks at two aspects of the common monetary policy of
Czechoslovakia in the years 1990-1992. The first aspect is the institutional
framework for monetary policy management from the viewpoint of Slovak
interests where we arrive at the conclusion that it was a system comparable to other
“federal” monetary policies. The second aspect is whether Czechoslovakia
represented an optimum currency area or whether, in view of much higher
unemployment, Slovakia required its own monetary policy from a short-term or
long-term perspective. Our answer is that the problem was not one of monetary
policy and that the costs of a common monetary policy were not high.
Next, we turn to an analysis of the independent monetary policy of the
National Bank of Slovakia in the years 1993-1998. The conduct of monetary policy
in those years can be viewed as successful due to low inflation, a stable exchange
rate, and rising levels of liberalization of the foreign currency market and the
money market. The monetary policy can be criticized in some respects, particularly
in the years 1997 and 1998 when it maintained a fixed exchange rate for too long
in the face of an expanded fiscal policy and an overheated  economy.
The last section deals with the current and future challenges for NBS’s
monetary policy. At the end of 1998 and in early 1999, the central bank switched
to a new   monetary policy approach characterized by a floating exchange rate and
the use of inflation targeting. The year 1999 was one of provisional inflation
targeting with several problematic aspects. A new, formally defined mechanism of
inflation targeting put in place on January 1, 2000, has eliminated most of these
problems.  The European Union accession is expected around 2005-2007 and the
European Monetary Union accession is expected a few years later. In view of this
we looked at the suitability of participation in the common currency. The eurozone
should generally represent an optimum currency area for Slovakia. With regard to
the monetary policy during the interim period, we recommend that inflation
targeting be preserved as long as possible and that a fixed exchange rate to the euro
be used for only a few years before the actual entry into the monetary union.
                                                                
93 The author would like to thank NBS Vice-governor Elena Kohútiková for her valuable
comments on the first draft of this chapter.
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4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with information on the
development of monetary policy in the Slovak Republic dating from when the
political regime changed in 1989 to the year 1999. It consists of two parts. The first
part briefly summarizes narrative information – it describes the development of
key macroeconomic indicators related to monetary policy (inflation and the
exchange rate) and their relationship with the monetary policy implemented by the
central bank. The second, much broader, part focuses on analysis of monetary
policy conducted in the years 1990 to 1999. Although the analysis is mostly carried
out chronologically, it is not our aim to describe in detail all aspects of monetary
policy in chronological order. This task would require much more space. Instead,
the analysis attempts to seek answers to questions that can be viewed as key:
· What was the institutional framework for monetary policy in Czechoslovakia
from the perspective of Slovak interests?
· Did the existence of a common currency pose significant disadvantages for
Slovakia – did Czechoslovakia constitute an optimum currency area?
· What is the institutional framework for the National Bank of Slovakia in terms
of its independence according to central bank theory?
· To what degree did monetary policy contribute to the successful stabilization
and revival of the Slovak economy in the years 1993 to 1995?
· Did the NBS respond correctly to expansive fiscal policy and macroeconomic
imbalances in the years 1996-1998? Should the NBS have abandoned the
crown’s fixed exchange rate earlier?
· What can be said about the provisional inflation-targeting regime conducted
by the NBS after abandoning the fixed exchange rate for the crown in October
1998?
4.2 Monetary Policy Results in the 1990s
In the last decade, the central bank’s aim has been, according to the law on
the State Bank of Czechoslovakia and later the law on the National Bank of
Slovakia, to ensure stability of the currency. This stability consists of two basic
elements – internal and external. Internal stability is the stability of domestic
prices. External stability should be understood as the stability of the exchange rate.
As this chapter will show, Slovakia’s monetary policy can be seen as successful in
comparison with other transition economies, since it has maintained one of the
lowest inflation levels and one of the most stable exchange rates.
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Inflation developments in Slovakia in the 90s are dealt with in greater
narrative detail and, in part, analytically in the chapter on overall macroeconomic
developments. To avoid repetition, let us only restate a few essential facts:
·  Before January 1, 1991, the vast majority of prices were regulated by the state
and official inflation in the years 1970-1989 oscillated slightly above 1 %
annually (IMF, 1990, p. 12). According to estimates of Czechoslovak
authorities, real inflation - including hidden and suppressed inflation that
appeared in the economy with regulated prices - was about 2.5 % annually
(ibid.).
·  Some 85 % of consumer and producer prices were liberalized as of January 1,
1991, as a part of a shock therapy economic reform (Svejnar, 1993, p. 29).
From then on, official inflation data can be considered relatively reliable,
although a fairly sizable portion of the consumer basket (about 20 %)
remained regulated. This allowed  the state to increase or reduce the rate of
price increases through the use of deregulation as a political and economic
instrument. At the time of this writing, 17.8 % of the consumer basket
remained regulated (NBS, 1999a).  Chart 1 depicts year-on-year changes in
the price level from January 1, 1992 and Chart  2 shows month-on-month
price increases since January 1, 1991.
These charts clearly demonstrate several facts. First, the price level has
increased during  the course of the decade by a factor of about 3.5 from the origin.
This is a very high level of inflation compared with the same period in developed
countries; however, such a comparison would be misleading. At the inception of
the transition, the economy had to correct  distorted prices through a one-time price
jump  as well as cope with several additional leaps caused by the introduction of a
new tax system or price deregulation (as demonstrated by Wozniak (1997). One –
time  deregulation leaps have an accelerating effect on overall inflation beyond
their contribution to the increase of consumer prices. All of these effects can be
viewed as a transition tax. Repeated devaluation of the Czechoslovak crown at the
end of 1990, devaluation of the Slovak crown in July 1993 and the floating of the
crown in October 1998 were the only “standard” influences on inflation. Both
charts illustrate, with the exception of the initial devaluation in 1990, that these
external devaluations of the crown had minimal or no effect on inflation.
The relative success of monetary policy in achieving the task of internal
monetary stability can be seen when economic results  are compared to those of the
neighboring countries. As shown in Table 3 in the text, the Slovak Republic and
Czech Republic had the lowest levels of inflation in the 90s. On the other hand,
this fact was partially a consequence of better initial macroeconomic conditions
than were available in most post-communist countries.
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CHART 1. Year-on-year Change in the Price Level in Slovakia from January 1,
1992, in  %
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1/3
1/9
2
4/3
0/9
2
7/3
1/9
2
10
/31
/92
1/3
1/9
3
4/3
0/9
3
7/3
1/9
3
10/
31/
93
1/3
1/9
4
4/3
0/9
4
7/3
1/9
4
10
/31
/94
1/3
1/9
5
4/3
0/9
5
7/3
1/9
5
10
/31
/95
1/3
1/9
6
4/3
0/9
6
7/3
1/9
6
10
/31
/96
1/3
1/9
7
4/3
0/9
7
7/3
1/9
7
10/
31/
97
1/3
1/9
8
4/3
0/9
8
7/3
1/9
8
10
/31
/98
1/3
1/9
9
4/3
0/9
9
7/3
1/9
9
10
/31
/99
Source: NBS (1999a)
CHART 2. Month-on-month Change in the Price Level in Slovakia from January
1, 1991, in  %
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The exchange rate was subject to more dramatic developments, although in
contrast with  other transition economies, the rate evolved in a calm and stable
manner. The Czechoslovak crown was  devalued several times in the second half
of 1990 in order to reduce the differential between the official and the parallel
black market exchange rate, and to create the requisite conditions for the
introduction of internal convertibility of the crown on January 1, 1991 (Svejnar,
1993, p. 33). The introduction of internal convertibility meant unrestricted access
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to foreign currency for all domestic legal entities for commercial purposes and, to a
limited degree, also for individuals.
The exchange rate of the crown was fixed against the following basket of five
currencies: USD 49.06  %, DEM 36.16  %, ATS 8.07  %, CHF 3.79  %, and FRF
2.92  %. On July 10, 1993, the currency was devalued by 10  % against the basket.
The basket was simplified on  July 14, 1994, when it was narrowed to only include
two currencies – 60 % the German mark and 40  % the U.S. dollar. The exchange
rate was set in this way until October 2, 1998, when the fixed exchange rate for the
crown was abandoned. Since then, the Slovak crown floats freely based on trading
on the foreign exchange market. Since January 1, 1999, the National Bank of
Slovakia has been using the euro as the reference currency for internal purposes,
although this does not affect the crown’s free float.
The exchange rate regime has been gradually liberalized through the
abandonment of administrative restrictions. This action preceded   the introduction
of full current account convertibility on October 1, 1995. The capital account also
has undergone gradual liberalization,  although some restrictions still remain in
place. At the time of this writing,  Slovakia basically met the foreign exchange
liberalization criteria required for  joining the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
A description of the monetary policy in a market economy should include
detailed data on the development of interest rates. However, due to the legacy of
the centrally planned economy, interest rates have long failed to play the role of a
basic monetary policy instrument in Slovakia.  Until  the mid-90s, the central bank
had extensively employed administrative instruments for monetary policy
management.  A  transition to the dominant use of interest rates by the central bank
has occurred only recently and mainly in connection with the evolution of the
interbank market. In spite of this, we provide some basic data on interest rate
developments in the 90s. The discount rate has been the basic indicative interest
rate used throughout this period. Table 1 shows its development.
However, the discount rate de facto lost its indicative value mainly in the
second half of the decade, due to the fact that  the NBS failed to modify it despite a
significant move towards restrictive monetary policy. We, therefore, supplement
the data with a graph depicting the development of one-day (overnight) rates on the
interbank market since April 1993 (from when these data are available) – see chart
3.
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TABLE 1. Discount Rate in Czechoslovakia and in Slovakia, 1990-99
From To Discount rate,  %
January 1, 1990 April 1990 4.0
April 1990 October 1990 5.0
October 1990 November 1990 7.0
November 1990 January 1, 1991 8.5
January 1, 1991 September 8, 1991 10.0
September 8, 1991 March 25, 1992 9.5
March 25, 1992 April 1, 1992 9.0
August 26, 1992 December 30, 1992 8.0
December 30, 1992 December 19, 1993 9.5
December 20, 1993 March 16, 1995 12.0
March 17, 1995 October 5, 1995 11.0
October 6, 1995 January 12, 1996 9.75
January 13, 1996 8.8
Source: SBCS, NBS
CHART 3. Development of Overnight Rates on the Interbank Market in the Years
1993-99
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In the case of a small open economy such as Slovakia, internal and external
stability are very closely connected although short-term divergence can occur. In
Slovakia’s case, monetary policy in the 90s achieved a relatively high degree of
external and internal stability, which has to be viewed favorably. This was
accomplished mostly through a monetary policy ranging from highly restrictive to
neutral in character. Only  occasionally (1994-1995) was it accommodating to
expansion. In this respect, we again refer to the chapter on overall macroeconomic
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developments. It is there that the monetary policy  can be seen in relation to other
macroeconomic policies.
4.3 Monetary Policy within Czechoslovakia
The success of the monetary policy since the year 1993 can be evaluated on
the basis of economic development in Slovakia providing   we  keep in mind its
limited influence on  the real economy. It is far more complicated to analyze its
role in the 1990-1992 period, since the policy was carried out to serve the interest
of a federative state with 15 million inhabitants, of which Slovakia only constituted
a third. It is therefore  not  entirely fair to evaluate federal monetary policy only
through the prism of Slovakia. On the other hand, it is appropriate to ask to what
degree this policy affected the Slovak economy and whether a separate or different
monetary policy would  have better served the economy.
4.3.1 The Institutional Framework – The State Bank of Czechoslovakia
Before 1989, the State Bank of Czechoslovakia (SBCS) was a so-called
monobank, combining the functions of a central bank (for instance issuing
currency) with the tasks of a commercial bank for enterprises (for example
maintaining accounts for and providing loans to enterprises). Commercial banks
did not exist, with the exception of banks dealing with foreign trade and savings
banks for individuals. The SBCS itself did not carry out real monetary policy tasks,
but rather the state plan utilized it as a transmission tool  to allocate  finances to
enterprises. This system was typical for socialist countries in Eastern Europe. The
system,  began to gradually change as a result of   socialist economic reforms and
even in socialist countries, central banks were split into one central and several
commercial banks (a so-called two-tier system). In Hungary, for example, this
transition took place in 1987. Czechoslovakia decided on its introduction even
before the November 1989 revolution by adopting Law no. 130/1989 Coll. and the
reform was put into practice on January 1, 1990. From this point, we can view the
SBCS as a real central bank. On the other hand, this was a law adopted under
socialism and  after the political system changed, further amendment was needed.
In the latter part of 1991, a new law amended the SBCS.  The law remained in
validity, not only until the end of the federation, but de facto  afterwards.  Both
laws on central banks in Czechoslovakia’s successor states (the law on the CNB
and the law on the NBS, 566/1992 Coll.) are based on it and have instituted only
small changes (all three laws are in turn significantly influenced by the law on the
German Bundesbank). Since we deal with the institutional standing of the NBS in
greater detail later, we will not analyze the almost identical law on the SBCS here
in greater detail. The one exception is that  we will look at how the existence of the
federative state affected the conduct of monetary policy from the institutional
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perspective. From the Slovak viewpoint, we can best look at the functioning of the
SBCS from the institutional perspective  by comparing it with other “federative”
central banks – the German Bundesbank and the European Central Bank, which
administers the eurozone’s monetary policy.
The bank board was the SBCS’s highest body. It consisted of seven members;
one of them - the governor - appointed at the federal government’s proposal by the
Czechoslovak president. The remaining members were proposed by the governor
and approved by the president after consulting the federal government (two
members), the Czech government (two members), and the Slovak government (two
members). With the exception of the governor, Czecho-Slovak parity was
established by law – three members had to be from the Czech Republic and three
from the Slovak Republic.
This system can hardly be considered institutionally biased against Slovakia.
In the case of a Slovak governor, it even gave one-third of the federation a majority
in deciding monetary policy. In addition,  the Slovak government was always able
to block the appointment of two members if it did not consider them suitable
defenders of Slovak interests. Slovak political representatives were also able to do
the same in the negotiations on a Slovak vice governor in the federal government
and on the government nomination for the key post of the governor. Slovakia’s
political representation thus had firm blocking  rights on the make-up of the whole
bank board, although its power to force through their own candidate was
significantly weaker.
This notion is confirmed by a comparison with the Bundesbank and the ECB.
In the Bundesbank, the federal government nominates 10 out of the 21 members of
the directorate, while the German states propose the remaining 11 members. As in
the case of the former Czechoslovakia, they are appointed by the federal president
(Forder, 1999, pp. 59-60). On the board that steers monetary policy within the
European Central Bank, every country has one vote – cast by the governor of the
respective central bank. It is therefore based on a similar principle as the SBCS. In
contrast to the  ECB, members of the bank board of the SBCS were not expressly
forbidden to promote their country’s interests, which gave them far more leeway
to represent the Slovak Republic. In addition, the ECB board also contains six
members who represent the eurozone as a whole rather than any single country.
This further strengthens the ECB’s centralized form.
4.3.2 Was Czechoslovakia an Optimum Currency Area?
During the existence of Czechoslovakia, debates raged from many
perspectives  as to whether or not it made sense for Slovakia to remain a part of
Czechoslovakia.  One of them was the monetary issue – did the common monetary
policy have negative consequences for Slovakia? The question can also be asked in
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another way. Did  the advantages of a joint currency for Slovakia dominate over
the  disadvantages? Before turning any analysis,   we must warn that it deals
exclusively with the issue of the common currency. The analysis  does not address
whether the existence of Czechoslovakia was optimal for Slovakia from other
angles and it  must not be interpreted   as an opinion either in favor or against the
existence of an independent Slovak Republic. It will be shown that the existence of
an independent Slovakia did not have major long-term consequences in
comparison with the existence of the Czechoslovak Federative Republic.
In economic theory there exists extensive theoretical and empirical treatment
concerning  the suitability of a common currency for two or more economies. In
the European context, it has evolved in relation to  the planned shift to a common
European currency. It is based on the so-called optimum currency area theory
proposed by Mundell (1961). We want to point out  that most of this section will
deal with the costs of the common Czechoslovak currency and examine whether
these costs were high. We will deal with the advantages of a common currency
only marginally, since the relevant theories and their application to the
Czechoslovak situation are fairly uncontroversial. With the exception of Krugman
(1991), there is a consensus that the advantages of a common currency (reduction
of transaction costs, reduction of entrepreneurial and exchange rate uncertainty) are
directly related to the level of economic integration of member regions (states),
especially  to the level of trade integration (see EC, 1990 and Gros and Thygesen,
1992). In this context, we can see significant advantages in  former
Czechoslovakia’s case due to high levels of mutual exchange in the area of trade,
capital and labor.
Let us turn to the costs. The theory of optimum currency areas is based on the
short-term stabilizing role of monetary policy. If a negative economic shock
occurs, relaxation of monetary policy may reduce the impact on the real economy.
Conversely, if the economy is overheating due to positive economic shocks, a more
restrictive policy can prevent inflation from accelerating and prevent other negative
consequences. If two economies have a common monetary policy, the usefulness
of this instrument is reduced, particularly if there are cyclical or structural
differences between them.94
                                                                
94 If two economies are very similar and have a synchronized economic cycle, a shared
monetary policy is not a problem for them. The following two examples illustrate when it
can be a problem. The first example concerns economies with a similar structure but at a
different point in the economic cycle. If one of them is in recession and the other is
experiencing economic recovery, a common monetary policy is not suitable for them.
Economies with significant structural differences represent the other possibility, since
identical shocks affect them differently. In a simplified example, if one economy specializes
in producing automobiles and the other on agriculture, then the entry of Japanese car
manufacturers into the market has a markedly varied effect on them. Such a shock – if it has
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  The question of optimality of a common currency area can be answered
from two angles – short- and long-term. The first concerns the specific reform path
chosen at the beginning of the 90s. Did Slovakia at that time need a different
monetary policy than that of the Czech Republic? A more long-term analysis deals
with the overall structural changes in the Slovak and Czech GDP and their
economic cycle in the 1990-1999 period. Based on the theory of optimum currency
areas, another question can be asked.  Was  the common currency sustainable in
the long-term for the Czech and Slovak economy?
Let us begin with the early 90s. Table 2 shows the overall decline in GDP
between 1989 and 1992 and the unemployment level in 1992 in selected eastern
European countries. We can see that the decline of GDP in Slovakia was almost
identical to that in Czech Republic and in line with the average in other transition
countries, particularly in comparison with the closest neighbors – Poland and
Hungary. Czechoslovak monetary policy can  hardly be  seen as excessively tight.
Similarly, there is little evidence that the monetary policy had a negative effect  on
Slovak output, since cumulative decline in GDP in Slovakia was comparable to
that in the Czech Republic. On the other hand, unemployment took a radically
different course in the two countries, as shown by the second column of the table.
In a normal market economy, changes in unemployment and the GDP should be
closely related but this was clearly not the case.  Monetary  policy has a direct
(short-term) effect only on the level of production in the economy and affects
employment indirectly through changes in the levels of production. We can see
that the effect of monetary policy and of other policies on the Czech Republic and
on the Slovak Republic was not too dissimilar, but the outcomes in terms of
unemployment were significantly different. This indicates that other policies
(fiscal, industrial, labor market policy) or structural labor market differences in
Czech Republic and Slovakia (see Svejnar and Ham, 1993 and Svejnar and Terrell,
1998) are more responsible than monetary policy for the significantly different
results in the area of unemployment.
                                                                                                                                                     
a different effect on the two economies – is called an asymmetric shock and its likelihood
and effect is considered to be one of the key indicators as to the suitability of a common
currency area. If the likelihood of asymmetric shocks is low then a monetary union is more
suitable for the economy and vice versa. It is a result of different degree of importance of the
stabilizing role of monetary policy.
104
TABLE 2. GDP Change, 1989-1992 and Unemployment in 1992
Country GDP, cumulative change,  % Unemployment, 1992,  %
Bulgaria -29 13.9
Czech Republic -21 2.6
Slovakia -19 10.4
Hungary -18 10.7
Former GDR -40 -
Poland -17 12.7
Romania -29 8.4
Slovenia -18 13.8
Ukraine (1989-1991) -15 0.3
Source: Godfrey (1995), pp. 6 and 8
We can say that in the long-term, the costs of a common currency rise if one
of the following conditions is met:
·   Do the above-mentioned asymmetric shocks occur?
·   Do the countries have different preferences with regard to the short-term
         tradeoff between inflation and unemployment (in this case, more between
         inflation and output)?
·   Do the countries have different levels of economic growth?
·   Do the countries have significantly different fiscal system levels and
         consequent needs to finance fiscal expenditure with revenues from printing
         money (so-called seigniorage)?
The more frequently the answer to these four questions is a yes, the more
likely it is for a common currency not to be the most suitable solution (although we
must stress that these are only indicators).
Asymmetric shocks are reflected by the  unequal effect of external shocks on
the domestic economic situation. They can be measured by the level of correlation
with the economic cycle. Fidrmuc et al. (1999) attempted an analysis of the
optimality of the Czechoslovak currency area based on data from 1948-1990. The
conclusion was that Czechoslovakia, under socialism, represented an equally
optimal currency area as the core countries of the European Monetary Union, but
less optimal than the core states of Germany or regions of the United States. We
must  note that this analysis suffers from a fundamental problem – the overall
unreliability of statistics from the given period and the fact that the macroeconomic
indicator used to represent the overall level of output (net material product) cannot
be automatically treated as a proxy for GDP,  particularly in estimating the
potential optimality of a common monetary policy.  The  distorted allocating
mechanism and distorted prices in the socialist era command economy  led to a
permanent macroeconomic imbalance. It  is not  advisable to measure the
optimality of the currency area using a methodology developed for the purposes of
a normal, open market economy.
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  The second question – whether Slovakia and Czech Republic had significantly
different preferences regarding the short-term trade-off between inflation and GDP
performance – can be satisfactorily answered in the negative. This answer is based
on developments in the years 1993-1998, when each of the countries conducted its
own monetary policy. Both countries achieved very close inflation levels, some of
the lowest  among transition countries (see table 3). It is  an unlikely assumption
that they would have significantly different preferences regarding inflation and its
relationship to the GDP.
TABLE 3. Average Year-on-year Inflation in Selected Countries, 1993-98
Country Inflation,  % Country Inflation,  %
1. Slovakia 10.6 5. Poland 23.6
2. Czech Republic 11.3 6. Romania 123.7
3. Slovenia 15.6 7. Russia 244.3
4. Hungary 20.9 8. Bulgaria 282.1
Source: ILO Yearbook of Statistics 1998 and others
 The  other two questions can also be answered in the negative. As we have
already shown, Slovakia and the Czech Republic suffered approximately identical
economic decline during the transformational recession period and conversely,
macroeconomic indicators evolved very similarly in both countries from after
recovery until 1997. It is  difficult to claim that they had radically different
potential growth levels. The tax burden and the effectiveness of the tax system are
also very similar and therefore we cannot  speak of different fiscal system levels
(see IMF, 1998).
It is  hard to find any stronger arguments within the theory of optimum
currency areas to prove that Slovakia paid a high price for the common currency.
The assembled data appear  to indicate that Slovakia’s problems stemmed from
different aspects of common economic policies on which monetary policy had little
effect.  This is confirmed by a study by Artis, Kohler and Mélitz (1998) that tried
to identify optimum currency areas throughout the world. Based on a methodology
similar to that used in this work, it came to the conclusion that an optimum
currency area for Slovakia could exist mainly with Czech Republic or possibly
with Hungary (Artis, Kohler and Mélitz, 1998, p. 34).
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4.4 Monetary Policy in Slovakia
4.4.1 The Institutional Framework and Central Bank Independence
4.4.1.1 Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policy
The relationship between the state/government and the central bank is one of
the most important factors influencing monetary policy. There is a basic consensus
among monetary economists that central bank independence from the government
has, ceteris paribus, positive effects – lower inflation can be achieved without
negative consequences such as  lower levels of economic growth. On the other
hand, we must admit that there is a minority school that contests the validity of this
theory.
On the basis of several theoretical models, it can be said that if the
government has direct control over monetary policy, the outcome is - again ceteris
paribus - sustained higher inflation without any long-term benefits. This is the so-
called time - inconsistency problem or in Nordhaus, the so-called political
economic cycle. Several theoretical solutions exist to this problem; in the last two
decades, increased central bank independence from the government has become
the most popular one. Furthermore, extensive empirical research started in the mid-
80s was aimed at either confirming or disproving the relationship between central
bank independence and inflation. Extensive literature exists in this area.  We  refer
the reader to the most highly respected analyses, which include Grilli,
Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), Cukierman (1992), Alesina and Summers
(1993) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1993).
The key results of empirical research may be summarized as follows:
·  there indeed exists a statistically significant empirical relationship   between
         high central bank independence and low inflation;
·  on the other hand, there is no evidence of a relationship between GDP growth
and central bank independence.
These conclusions have been unanimously arrived at by virtually all studies,
and they confirm the theoretical conclusions of the so-called dynamic
inconsistencies school. Additionally, there are results without  consensus; however,
we will not deal with them here. There  are also works that reject the whole theory
of central bank independence and empirical research in the area, although they
represent a significant minority (for example, Forder, 1996, Mangano, 1998). This
work will try to incorporate some aspects of these criticisms in its analysis of the
situation in Slovakia.
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4.4.1.2 Independence of the National Bank of Slovakia
In this section, we will look at the independence of the NBS from two
perspectives.  Traditional central bank independence (hereinafter CBI) analysis
represents the first angle. It analyzes, according to set rules, legislation treating the
status of the given central bank and assigns points in various categories. The
resulting CBI index is arrived at as a sum of points in the individual categories and
is comparable internationally. Most economists, who do detailed work in this area,
have constructed their own index with its own rules. These indices are determined
based on analyses of legislation on the central bank and other relevant legislation.
In this work, we will use two “classics” – the first comes from three Italian
economists Grilli et al. (1991, hereinafter GMT) and the second from Cukierman
(1992).
The second angle for looking at CBI responds to criticisms of traditional CBI
analyses from economists like Forder (1996), (1998) and Mangano (1998). Instead
of constructing quantitative indices, this approach attempts to look in depth at the
individual central banks  - see for example Berger and de Haan (1999). Due to the
constraints of space, this approach will be used here only to a limited degree.
The GMT index consists of two parts – political and economic independence.
Political independence is evaluated  primarily on the basis of the procedures for
appointing members of the central bank’s governing body,  the relationship of this
body to the government, and on the formally defined tasks of the central bank.
Economic independence is measured by  how much the government  can borrow
from the central bank and according to the character of the monetary instruments at
the central bank’s disposal (Grilli et al., 1991, pp. 366-8). Cukierman (1992) has an
index based on similar criteria, but more precisely determined criteria that can be
combined  into one index (Cukierman, 1992, p. 372). Higher scores are assigned in
all categories if in the given area; the central bank is independent from the
executive or  sets its own rules. Conversely, the greater the government’s
influence, the lower the CBI.
Both indices suffer from the problem of the so-called interpretation spread.
This was pointed out by Mangano (1988, p. 477). This research showed that
different scores could be assigned in various categories due to imprecisely defined
criteria. Specifically, in the case of NBS independence, the interpretation spread
for political independence reaches 2.3, with the possible values ranging from 4 to
6.3 (maximum value is 8). The criteria for economic independence of the NBS are
straightforward and the index reaches the value 5 (maximum value is 7). Using
Cukierman’s criteria, the independence index of the NBS reaches 0.71 – 0.83
(maximum is 1). We have determined these values in earlier research and, due to
constraints of space, we do not provide detailed analysis of the research process.
We refer readers to Beblavý (1999a). Table 4 provides a detailed comparison of
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NBS’s independence with a selected sample of developed countries, as provided by
the authors of the indices.
We can see that the National Bank of Slovakia has a very high degree of
independence, one of the highest among the banks under consideration. In this
regard, we need to point out one important difference. The other countries were
evaluated over a long post-war period and therefore their indices  do not
necessarily reflect the present situation. This is particularly important in view of
the fact that a significant shift in favor of greater central bank independence took
place in developed countries in the late 80s and the 90s. For example, Cobham et
al. (1999) have calculated that due to changes in central banks’ standing, the
independence of the Banque de France calculated, using Cukierman’s index,
increased to 0.87, for Banca d’Italia to 0.74 and for the Bank of England to 0.66
(Cobham et al. (1999, p. 39)). Nonetheless, we can conclude that the NBS has a
strong position and a high degree of independence in terms of independence
measured by traditional indices.
TABLE 4. Comparison of NBS’s Independence with a Sample of Developed
Countries
Country Central Bank Independence Indices
Grilli et al. Cukierman
Political Economic Overall
Czech Republic 5-8 5 0.71-0.83
Slovakia 4-6.3 5 0.71-0.83
Germany 6 7 0.66
Netherlands 6 4 0.42
Switzerland 5 7 0.68
USA 5 7 0.51
Canada 4 7 0.46
Australia 3 6 0.31
Austria 3 6 0.58
Denmark 3 5 0.47
Ireland 3 4 0.39
Great Britain 1 5 0.31
Source: Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman (1992), author’s calculations based on Beblavý (1999a)
The following section will deal with one type of criticism of these indices that
we consider to be substantiated. This is Forder’s criticism of the determination of
central bank independence on the basis of surveying legislation regarding the
central bank. One of his key arguments is that the possibility of a change in the
laws has an equal influence on the central bankers’ behavior as the diction of the
law itself. If the leaders of a central bank are aware that in the event of
“disobedience,” the law can easily change and independence can be taken away,
they are less confident about their position and will behave differently.  Therefore,
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our in-depth analysis of NBS independence will take into account the possibility of
a change in the law on the NBS.
The first point that deserves mention is constitutional protection of NBS
independence. The constitution is the basic law of the state. Since a higher quorum
is required to amend it, the independence of the central bank is  better protected if
it is written into the constitution rather than  established by an ordinary law. But
the Constitution of the Slovak Republic only contains the following clause: “The
Slovak Republic establishes an issuing bank. Details will be determined by a law.”
(Article 56, Constitution of the Slovak Republic) It  differs  from the Czech
constitution, which explicitly establishes the independence of the CNB and states
its basic aims – stability of the currency (see article 98 of the Constitution of the
Czech Republic). We can thus conclude that in this sense, the independence of the
NBS is less strongly protected because it can be eliminated or diminished through
the change of an ordinary law.
On the other hand, this analysis does not attend to the true content of Forder’s
criticism. Criticism  that  addresses the political and economic climate in the
society and asks to what degree it would be permissible, politically and socially in
various countries, to withdraw the central bank’s independence. For example, in
Germany the Bundesbank has gradually achieved a position where any attempt to
reduce the level of its independence would amount to political suicide. This  is also
related to a bank’s ability to achieve such prestige and standing that would
guarantee it public support.
In our specific Slovak circumstances, not enough time has elapsed since the
NBS’s creation to allow for a serious analysis of its position and public support.
But there has been an instance in history of a serious but failed attempt to de facto
eliminate the bank’s independence. The  analysis of this event can reveal what
truly protects the NBS’s independence. In 1997, Vladimír Meciar’s government
put forward an official parliamentary proposal  to amend the law on the NBS. This
proposal contained  three serious changes.
First, the number of members of the NBS would rise from eight to ten and the
government would be able to appoint and recall half of them (until then, the
government had the right to appoint three out of the eight members at the
governor’s proposal). Furthermore, the amount that the NBS can lend to the state
(through a technical issue of state treasury bills) would have increased from 5 to 10
% of state budget revenues in the previous year. Thirdly, parliament, rather than
the bank’s board, would approve the NBS’s budget – according to then Governor
Masár, a vast majority of the bank’s budget serves purposes related to the conduct
of monetary policy, so the National Council of the Slovak Republic would have
been able to de facto dictate to the NBS its policy (Financial Times, October 23,
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1997). Taken together, these proposals would have basically meant the
abolishment of the NBS’s independent status.
In the end, the proposal did not pass in parliament. This was one of the rare
cases when Vladimír Meciar’s government gave up on its original intentions to
reduce an institution’s independence or to replace its leadership. No reliable
analysis has been carried out as to the reasons for this move, but we would like to
point out one factor: the National Bank of Slovakia was seen abroad as one of the
essential guarantors of the relatively reasonable macroeconomic policies in the
1994 – 1998 period (for example, see OECD, 1999, p. 63). Due to low inflows of
foreign direct investment, Vladimír Meciar’s government was economically
dependent on foreign sources of credit both directly and for financing
infrastructure projects and the like. The loss of credibility for the Slovak Republic,
had the  NBS’s independence been abolished, would have made these funds
significantly more expensive if not impossible to get. Losses (both political and
economic) from this move could have  far  exceeded gains. Another factor was that
it would have also damaged domestic credibility and probably made domestic
funding more expensive. Slovakia’s gross foreign debt rose by 22.7 % in one year.
In  September 1997,  the government adopted the proposal and in the following
election year, the debt rose from $9.7 billion to $11.9 billion. $1 billion of that
amount was a government Eurobond issue and state-guaranteed loans represented a
further unspecified amount (NBS, 1998, Appendices). In the same period, net
domestic credit to the government rose by 32.4 %, from 89.2 billion crowns to
118.1 billion crowns. Preserving both the credibility of the monetary policy and
low inflationary expectations was in the government’s  long-term interest, as well
as  in the short-term interest.  This can   partly explain why it gave up on its effort
to strip the NBS of its independence.
4.4.2 Monetary Policy in the Years 1993-1995: From Zero to
Convertibility
On January 1, 1993, the independent Slovak Republic was formed. Five
weeks later, on February 8, 1993, the Czecho-Slovak monetary union split and the
NBS began implementing a fully independent monetary policy. Within it, the NBS
had to struggle with the following problems: low foreign exchange reserves,
continued economic recession, relatively high inflation caused by the introduction
of a new tax system (mainly a value-added tax), low credibility of the new state
abroad and zero credibility of monetary policy stemming from the existence of a
new central bank. Less than three years from its formation, the independent Slovak
Republic had one of the lowest levels of inflation among transition economies, one
of the highest levels of economic growth, satisfactory foreign exchange reserves
111
and full current account convertibility. The NBS achieved fairly high credibility
(see OECD, 1996 and OECD, 1999).
In this section, we will attempt to identify the key elements  of the National
Bank of Slovakia’s success during  this period. In our view, these are:
·  institutional independence of the NBS (see the section devoted to central bank
independence);
·  the use of a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor and the ability to
stabilize inflationary expectations;
·  an appropriate mix of market and administrative measures and a well chosen
timetable for a shift from indirect to direct instruments of monetary policy
management. On the other hand, there were certain problems in this area that
we will discuss later.
At its inception, the  central bank adopted two tasks for the first year – to
maintain internal convertibility and to minimize price level increases (NBS, 1994,
p. 1). It clearly met the first aim. With regard to the second aim, the insufficient
specificity of this criterion rules out a simple answer. We claim, however, that the
NBS was indeed successful, since given the three main economic shocks – a new
tax system introduced on January 1, 1993, a ten percent devaluation in July 1993,
and a relaxed fiscal environment – the rise in the price level was really minimal. To
compare: the year-on-year change in consumer prices in Czech Republic between
December 1992 and 1993 reached 18.8 %, while in Slovakia it was 25.1 %.
However, the Czech crown did not devalue and Czech Republic had a budget
surplus in 1993, while the state budget deficit in Slovakia reached 6.8 % of GDP
(NBS, 1994, p. 29). In the following two years inflation declined into the single
digits and the success of the NBS’s monetary policy was reaffirmed.
 We  have to keep in mind the dilemma faced by the NBS in the first years of
existence of the independent Slovak Republic. High inflation, low credibility of
both fiscal and monetary policy of the new state, low foreign exchange reserves,
relaxed fiscal policy, and the consequent deficit of the current account of the
balance of payments (-17.2 billion SKK in 1993) triggered pressures for further
internal and external depreciation of the currency. Given the price liberalization
and the underdeveloped financial market, the NBS had the following instruments at
its disposal: the exchange rate, administrative tools for setting the foreign exchange
regime (access to foreign currency funds, etc.) and administrative tools towards
banks. (As the money and credit markets gradually evolved, the situation changed.
This was demonstrated  towards the end of 1995, when administrative instruments
towards banks were becoming ineffective. The NBS’s response to this lagged
somewhat.)
Soon it became apparent that due to high expectations of devaluation early in
1993 and low foreign exchange reserves, the exchange rate of the crown was
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unsustainable given the prevalent degree liberalization of the foreign exchange
market and transactions. The NBS responded with a series of administrative
measures, mainly involving limits to banks’ access to foreign currency funds
(NBS, 1994, p. 47) and delaying payments for imports. (Credit limits for larger
banks were a further administrative tool used towards banks.) This approach alone
could not achieve success, because  it could not raise confidence in the Slovak
crown. As we have already stated, the low levels of credibility and foreign
exchange reserves were not the only problems: the fiscal deficit and external
deficits were also an issue. The aforementioned  administrative measures amounted
to de facto restrictions on internal convertibility, which could only temporarily
moderate the effects of these problems,   not resolve them. A purely administrative
solution would have led to a further deepening of the real imbalance and a gradual
backsliding on foreign exchange regime liberalization.
On the other hand, a pure “market” solution – a drastic devaluation to the
tune of 20 to 40 % – presented some major risks. Due to the one-time character of
the price level increase in January 1993, inflation was expected to stabilize at the
level reached in 1992 – around 10 % – relatively rapidly as long as the exchange
rate remained unchanged. A major devaluation would have probably resulted in a
sharp increase in inflation due to the openness of the Slovak economy. This would
have piled a more significant inflation impulse on top of the one-time impulse from
the beginning of the year. The result would have probably have been  a sharp rise
in medium-term inflationary expectations with subsequent problems for economic
policy along with erosion of gains from the sharp devaluation. Besides, in a
country with such undeveloped financial markets and low foreign investment
inflows, increased monetary risk posed a threat of sharp foreign exchange and
financial market volatility.
Therefore, the combination of instruments chosen in 1993 by the National
Bank of Slovakia – administrative tools combined with a 10 % devaluation – can
be considered a suitable choice, as evidenced by the fact that the crown’s exchange
rate was sustained and some administrative measures were eliminated as early as in
December 1993.  When the inward administrative measures used towards the
banking sector are also considered, it can be concluded (see Mathieson and Haas,
1995) that in banking systems with limited competition, large extent of state
ownership and a high share of bad loans, a rapid shift  to strictly market
instruments can have negative consequences.
The end of 1993 marked a turning point in Slovakia’s economic situation that
was marked by rapid improvement.  In 1994 and 1995, the economy saw high
levels of growth relative to the rest of the region. During  this period, the NBS did
not focus on aggressive disinflation, but instead accommodatingly allowed the
economy to grow,  concentrated on eliminating some administrative barriers, and
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raised  foreign exchange reserves. If we compare the inflation in 1992 with the
inflation in the years 1994 and 1995, we can see that after the effect of the
aforementioned changes in 1993 subsided, inflation gradually returned to 1992
levels (especially if the inflation is cleansed of volatile food prices, which are to a
large extent determined by the supply).
In the external monetary policy area, it is hard to object to the NBS’s actions,
since they led to a gradual liberalization of the foreign exchange regime along with
a concurrent rise in foreign exchange reserves. This liberalization led to the
stabilization of the level of dollarization. This was reflected in the economy of
1994 and followed by a gradual decline in the following years    (see Beblavý,
1999b).
It is more difficult to assess the inward monetary policy, particularly in 1995.
Understandably, after several years of a transitional recession, the NBS saw as one
of its targets “a growth-promoting monetary policy set within the frame of anti-
inflationary intentions.” (NBS, 1996, p. 14) On the outside, the target was
successfully met in 1994 and 1995 when simultaneously with rapid GDP growth,
the inflation declined. But monetary policy affects inflation with a one-year and in
some countries even a two-year lag. This raises the question of whether the NBS,
through its pro-growth policy in 1995, did not sow the seeds of future internal and
external imbalances, which had to be dealt with through heavily restrictive policies
in the years 1996-1998? The question is also raised by an analysis of real interest
rates in Slovakia in 1995 and overall monetary policy in Slovakia during  this
period. In 1995, inflation in Slovakia was already at fairly low levels, but
throughout the year, real interest rates remained negative (the only such period
between 1993-1999). This  implies an even larger decline of nominal rates. This
event was of  great importance in this period due to the open character of the
Slovak economy and a fixed exchange rate. We can thus speak of a significantly
expansive monetary policy.
The answer to the question of whether or not the NBS’s  pro-growth policy,
particularly in 1995, set  the foundations for  future internal and external
imbalance. This imbalance  had to be dealt with through strong  restrictive policy
in the years 1996-1998. The answer has three parts. First, fiscal policy in 1994 and
1995 was monetarily neutral (NBS, 1996, p. 14), and to a degree even restrictive.
The  ratio of credit to government on total credit, as well as the actual value of net
credit to government, either declined or stagnated and the budget deficit was
stabilized. Due to the absence of a medium-term fiscal outlook,  and government
changes, the NBS did not have at its disposal an overview of the future direction of
fiscal policy. In  1996, particularly in the second half, the fiscal policy became
sharply expansive (see for example Mikloš and Žitnanský, 1997 and NBS, 1997).
If  we consider the monetary policy in 1995 excessively accommodating in the
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view of future fiscal policy developments, it must be clearly said that the NBS did
not have this information at its disposal ex ante and its performance can therefore
hardly be criticized in this respect.
Secondly, the perceived risks of investing in Slovakia declined, mainly due to
the improving economic situation.  The fixed exchange rate and a sizeable interest
rate differential created room for short-term capital inflows and consequent
currency volatility. The NBS responded to this phenomenon not only by
introducing a fluctuation band and some administrative measures, but also by
issuing NBS treasury bills and by other restrictive instruments sterilizing funds
from the financial markets. The NBS  gradually began to introduce monetary
restriction, albeit very mildly, already during the year 1995.
In spite of this, the National Bank of Slovakia failed at one important stage of
the shift from administrative and quantitative monetary policy management to a
policy based to a greater extent on a qualitative, market approach. In 1995, the
NBS still used the administrative tool of credit limits for the largest banks (with
loan activities in excess of 20 billion crowns in 1995 (NBS, 1996, p. 46)). This
method was abandoned in 1996. Using  this instrument  enabled the central bank to
limit excessively rapid credit expansion. This was utilized in state-controlled banks
where there was a greater threat of moral hazard. In 1993 and 1994, these limits
were often not filled.  The largest banks were a part of the driving force behind
credit expansion and these limits were an effective monetary policy tool (see NBS,
1994, p. 40, NBS, 1995, p. 48). In 1995, the credit limits were  significantly
exceeded – by 20.6 billion crowns (NBS, 1996, p. 46) and this excess was one of
the key reasons behind the excessive credit expansion, particularly in the second
half of 1995. The excess was caused by significant credit expansion in the smaller
banks that were unaffected by credit limits. In simple terms, the central bank
excessively relied on an administrative instrument as an efficient tool to secure its
monetary goals and subsequently failed to adequately employ indirect restrictive
instruments. After realizing that this administrative instrument was becoming
progressively less effective and more distortive, the NBS ceased to apply it in
1996.
4.4.3 The Years 1996-1998: Conflict between Monetary and Fiscal
Policy
The years 1996 to 1998 in Slovakia saw a textbook example of a conflict or
lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. The state’s budgetary
policy was heavily expansionary and accompanied by a high fiscal deficit (and
deficit in the current account of the balance of payments). Monetary policy, in
contrast, turned from the second half of 1996 towards a policy of relative
restriction. This was seen as a way to prevent to prevent the imbalances from
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having negative consequences on the real economy. In this section, we will analyze
the NBS’s role within this conflict between monetary and fiscal policy and
examine possible solutions for  this situation.
The National Bank of Slovakia significantly modified its monetary policy  in
mid-1996 by moving towards  restriction; however  this shift was not accompanied
by a change in the indicative discount rate. The change can, however, be observed
from an analysis of one-month interbank rates (BRIBOR) – see chart 4, and  also
from a composite look at the internal and external monetary policy using the
monetary conditions indicator (MCI)95 – see chart 5.
Although up until the year 1998 this policy successfully prevented the
imbalances from turning into a full-fledged economic and financial crisis, it  failed
to resolve them – many of them actually deepened as a result. It could be argued
that monetary policy has only limited instruments at its disposal unless it is
coordinated with fiscal policy. In spite of this, it can be argued that the NBS could
have and should have taken the step that  it took when forced by events in October
1998 – the abolishment of the fixed exchange rate. A shift to a floating exchange
rate was the only really potent weapon at the central bank’s disposal. Furthermore,
such a shift  would have been optimal for the economy even in the absence of a
conflict between monetary and fiscal policy. In our view, the change in the
exchange rate regime should have been made in fall  1997 or at the very latest,
after the May currency crisis had been dispelled. If the abandonment of a fixed
exchange rate would have been a politically unacceptable action during “peaceful”
times, the NBS could have exploited the May crisis as an opportunity to move to a
floating exchange rate.
The NBS could have theoretically used an even more restrictive policy to
resolve the imbalance, prevent an overheating of the economy and the deepening
of internal and external imbalances. But real interest rates were already extremely
high – for instance, at the beginning of April 1997, ex post real interest rates in
Slovakia reached 13.1 %, while in Czech Republic in the same period they were
5.3 % and in Hungary 1.5 % (calculated on the basis of year-on-year inflation to
the end of March 1997 and the six-month interbank interest rate). A further rate
increase would have particularly affected the credit position of the state, which
during  the 1996 to 1998 period had drained away most domestic savings. But the
state displayed low levels of interest rate elasticity of demand even in the following
period and it was  unlikely that an interest rate increase would have altered its
behavior.
High  interest rates were already causing distortions in the economy through
the general phenomenon of adverse selection, when rising interest rates attract
                                                                
95 MCI = 0.35*the currency’s overvaluation above its arbitrarily determined equilibrium
level + 0.65*(real interest rates – real GDP growth).
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applicants with higher-risk or rent-seeking projects. In addition, the  unevenly
distributed access of economic entities to foreign currency credit posed an even
more significant distortion. These loans were available primarily to larger entities
and to ones with a government guarantee. We have already analyzed this
phenomenon in the chapter on industrial policy and in other chapters. A stricter
monetary policy would have exacerbated this imbalance.
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In this context, we need to address one question.  Should  Slovakia have
abandoned the fixed exchange rate earlier? There are several serious arguments
suggesting that it should have. A fixed exchange rate can be very useful in the
initial phases of transition when the need for a nominal anchor prevails over the
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drawbacks of a fixed exchange rate. In  Slovakia’s case, three basic arguments
support this assertion:
·  a fixed exchange rate is an unambiguous demonstration of the government’s
determination to keep inflation down;
·   a fixed exchange rate helps economic entities by serving as a nominal anchor
for setting prices and wages, especially in an economy with such high degree
of openness as Slovakia’s;
·  fixed exchange rate as a monetary policy target is transparent, popular and
easy to check for the public.
According to Sachs (1996), transition countries that have adopted a fixed
exchange rate policy have experienced significantly lower inflation without
noticeable output losses when compared with other post-communist states.  He
and several other authors reject long-term fixed exchange rate policies though, not
only for economies in transition, but also for small open economies in general. The
following paragraphs review the basic arguments against a long-term fixed
exchange rate and try to establish to what degree they apply to Slovakia. Our
conclusion is that they apply to a great extent.
According to Mishkin (1999), the drawback of a fixed exchange rate is that it
“removes the signal that, with a floating exchange rate, the foreign exchange
market gives every day on monetary policy.” (p. 582) The government can conduct
excessively expansive fiscal policy or the central bank can evoke excessively
expansive monetary policy without any short-term effect on the exchange rate,
until the situation becomes unsustainable and a currency crisis breaks out. In this
context, we can contrast the situation in the foreign exchange market under
Meciar’s (1994-1998) and under Dzurinda’s (1998-) government. The fixed
exchange rate made possible the first three years of significantly expansive fiscal
policy that led to a crisis, a significant devaluation of the currency and a slowdown
in economic growth. In contrast, the floating exchange rate gave a signal very fast
that Dzurinda’s cabinet’s reforms were progressing too slowly through the crown’s
dip in May 1999 – after a series of economic measures, it recovered very fast. In
general, more recent works in the area of relationship between fiscal, monetary and
foreign exchange policy emphasize the importance of a moderate fiscal policy for
the monetary regime especially in the case of a fixed exchange rate. Canzoneri and
Diba (1996) and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1998) also explain theoretically why
even an independent central bank cannot maintain low inflation and a fixed
exchange rate if the government is not restricted in the size of the public finance
deficit.
We can quote Mishkin with regard to economic developments:
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“Exchange-rate targeting in emerging market countries is likely to promote
financial fragility and possibly a full-fledged financial crisis that can be highly
destructive to the economy.
Because of uncertainty about the future value of the domestic currency, many
nonfinancial firms, banks and governments in emerging market countries find it
much easier to issue debt if the debt is denominated in foreign currencies. This
tendency can be further encouraged by an exchange-rate targeting regime which
may encourage domestic firms and financial institutions to issue foreign
denominated debt. The substantial issuance of foreign denominated debt was a
prominent feature of the institutional structure in the Chilean financial markets
before the financial crisis in 1982, in Mexico before its financial crisis in 1994 and
in East Asian countries before their recent crisis.
With an exchange-rate target regime, depreciation of the currency when it
occurs is a highly nonlinear event because it involves a devaluation. In most
developed countries a devaluation has little direct effects on the balance sheets of
households, firms and banks because their debts are denominated in domestic
currency. This is not true, however, in emerging marker countries with their very
different institutional structure. With debt contracts denominated in foreign
currency as in emerging market countries, when there is a devaluation of the
domestic currency, the debt burden of domestic firms increases. On the other hand,
since assets are typically denominated in domestic currency, there is no
simultaneous increase in the value of firms’ assets. The result is that a devaluation
leads to a substantial deterioration in balance sheets and a decline in net worth,
both for nonfinancial firms and financial firms,” this in turn  leads to reduced
credit activity, investment and economic slowdown (Mishkin, 1999, pp. 584-5).
This scenario  took place in Slovakia during  the years 1996-1998, especially
in connection with foreign currency loans to large firms such as Slovnaft and VSŽ,
and as well as by direct and indirect foreign currency loans granted to the state
(government eurobonds, government-guaranteed loans for state-controlled
enterprises) – see for example MH SR (1999). It is not coincidental  that the
relative economic contraction in Slovakia in 1999 was led by the state, a state that
was suffering from a growing debt burden.
Sachs (1996) emphasizes  that in order to maintain a fixed exchange rate in
the long term, the economy must have a high structural, price and wage flexibility.
Transition  economies generally do not have such flexibility.  With  a few
exceptions, long-term use of a fixed exchange rate is, in his view, not suitable for
transition economies.  (Sachs, 1996, pp. 150-1) NBS representatives argued that
they had hoped for a change in fiscal policy both before and after the elections. But
even a significantly stricter fiscal policy would not have sustained the fixed
exchange rate in the long term. First, as we have already stated, up to the point of
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devaluation, a fixed exchange rate does not exert pressure on the government to
reduce the deficit or the expansiveness of public finances.
Fixed exchange rate carries another  disadvantage in terms of its complicated
relationship to the equilibrium exchange rate for the currency. As Halpern and
Wyplosz (1997), among others, show, the equilibrium exchange rate shifts
significantly in the course of transition due to radical structural changes in the
economy. A floating  exchange rate allows the foreign exchange market to seek an
equilibrium value, although,  it can not be said that the market is at all times close
to this exchange rate. But with the exchange rate fixed, real currency appreciation
of the currency can easily occur  (based on higher inflation that in the countries of
the reference basket currencies). This can be accompanied by  significant
deviations from the (unknown) equilibrium value and subsequent  loss of foreign
trade competitiveness resulting in  a  foreign trade deficit problem and
macroeconomic imbalance. During 1999, the exchange rate of the freely floating
Slovak crown oscillated in the interval between 42.3 SKK/euro to 47.3 SKK/euro.
This  approximately corresponds to a 10 %-23 % deviation from the former central
parity (we are providing only an approximation, since the original parity was
against a basket composed of the DEM (euro) and the USD). We have pointed out
that it is extremely difficult to determine the currency’s equilibrium exchange rate
under such rapidly changing and transitive conditions. Tóth (1999) made an
attempt to calculate it, working under the assumption that the real exchange rate
was at an equilibrium at the beginning of 1995 and that no significant changes in
the micro economy justifying a change in the equilibrium exchange rate occurred
in the years 1995-1999. If we accept these assumptions, it appears that in 1997 and
1998 (before the fixed exchange rate was abandoned) a significant real
overvaluation of the crown took place. Jointly, these indicators show that the
equilibrium level for the Slovak crown was lower than the fixed exchange rate
already in 1998. NBS interventions validated this. The  bank intervened in
December 1999 (for the first time in history) against the crown, approximately at
the 42.3 SKK/euro level, or about 10 % above the former central parity, thus
confirming, that even the bank considered ex post that the former central parity
was unsustainable.
4.4.4 Monetary Policy after the Abolishment of the Fixed Exchange
Rate
The  National Bank of Slovakia cancelled the crown’s fixed band and moved
to inflation targeting from December 1998. Although  it was only a provisional
regime throughout 1999, this action  could hardly be labeled as true inflation
targeting. The NBS switched to actual inflation targeting in January 2000. We will
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analyze this regime in the final section. This section will examine the NBS’s
monetary policy in the interim period.
The National Bank divided the currency basket into three parts – food (26.8
%), goods and services with regulated prices (17.8 %) and other (55.4 %). It
decided to only target price changes in the latter group. It is understandable that
regulated prices were left out – they change on the basis of administrative
measures, often politically motivated ones, and unrelated to inflationary pressures
in the economy,  which the NBS’s focus. Food represents a more complex issue
with that  we will deal later. In general, however, prices in this group display high
volatility mainly due to  the influence of supply-side factors.  The impact of a poor
harvest or, conversely,  a surplus can cause these prices to oscillate far more
sharply than the rest of the consumer basket. If the central bank takes these prices
into account, it risks reacting to the high volatility  rather than reacting  to real
inflationary pressures. This could result in  changing  policy too hastily. The NBS
primarily looks at changes in prices in the limited currency basket. This represents
slightly more than a half of the overall basket.
In our analysis of monetary policy during  the interim period, we will deal
with the following issues: transparency and intelligibility of the NBS’s policy,
suitability of the NBS’s overall inflation strategy for the interim period and
practicality  of this policy.
In  regard to transparency and intelligibility of monetary policy, we will quote
the 1999 Monetary Program: “In view of price deregulation, as well as the package
of measures to reduce macroeconomic imbalances, the NBS will target net
inflation at the level of 5 – 7 %, while anticipating a primary effect on the overall
consumer price index of about 2 percentage points for every average 10 % increase
in regulated prices. The NBS will only influence secondary effects of price
deregulation, in the sense of acting against “price contagion.” Net inflation
concerns 55 % of goods and services in the consumer basket and includes the
increase or decline in prices caused by changes in the exchange rate, administrative
measures in foreign trade (e.g., the import surcharge), changes in consumption
taxes and value-added tax, secondary effects of price regulations in the other
sectors, secondary effects of accelerated food price increases in the other sectors,
changes in the population’s purchasing power, propensity to consume, seasonality
of purchases, changes in producer prices, developments in the relationship between
labor productivity and wages, etc.” (Biatec 1/99, p. 2)
This quote served as the basis for a misunderstanding between the central
bank and the financial markets (see the daily SME, June 19, 1999, p. 9). Inflation
targeting usually uses abridged price indices, although 55 % is one of the narrowest
– if not the narrowest – reduced basket (we will return to this issue). Core or net
inflation is usually calculated as the year-on-year change in prices in such a basket.
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But the NBS defined net inflation as the change in these prices multiplied by their
share on the overall basket, i.e., using a factor of 0.554 for 1999. In other words, if
the prices in this basket rose by 10 %, net inflation, according to the NBS, would
go up by only 5.5 %. Since this represents a unique approach, it was the NBS’s
duty in the interest of intelligibility to repeatedly warn that its indicator deviates
from the standard approach. But the NBS actually defined the whole issue in its
monetary program very vaguely, and although it stated its definition in the
monetary reviews, it never specifically pointed out its principle. The
misunderstanding was clarified only when it published the updated monetary
program in June 1999. Until this occurred, the financial  markets had  understood
the proclaimed 5-7 % net inflation target as a 5-7 % change in prices in the reduced
basket. In reality, the NBS meant their change by 9-12.6 %.96 The Statistical Office
of the Slovak Republic, which began publishing official net inflation data in
January 2000, shows that this was a confusing approach. It provides under net
inflation figures according to the standard definition, not according to the original
NBS definition.
The exclusion of food from the net inflation basket poses another problem. It
is questionable for two reasons. First, given the high share that food represents in
the basket and the exclusion of regulated prices, there is a risk that net inflation
will be irrelevant  in  the formation of inflationary expectations for most economic
agents. This will particularly affect the consumers, because  the net inflation basket
as defined in this manner contains only a half of their consumer basket. Secondly,
volatile items can be left out of an inflation basket only if their long-term path is
consistent with  the rest of the basket. It would be hard to find such consistency in
the Slovak case. Since 1995, food prices have consistently grown slower than the
remaining unregulated portion of the basket. Overall, in evaluating NBS’s
monetary policy in 1999, we can point to a vaguely  defined target and to problems
with the definition of the consumer basket.
4.4.5 The Monetary Regime after January 1, 2000
In  January 1, 2000, the National Bank of Slovakia moved from the
previously described provisional arrangements to a real system of inflation
targeting (NBS, 1999a). Simultaneously, a shift took place from quantitative to
limited qualitative monetary policy based on a single indicative NBS interest rate.
The new inflation targeting mechanism represents a significantly improved model
compared with the previous provisional arrangement – most criticisms from the
                                                                
96 The NBS revised this target to 6-7.5 % in June 1999, effectively implying a year-on-year
change in these prices by 10.9-13.6 %. The NBS simultaneously published its overall
inflation target, which was supposed to reach 13.5-15.5 % year-on-year in December.
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previous section do not apply to it anymore (the following part is based on NBS,
1999b). Nevertheless, it does have at least one significant problem.
The NBS targets clearly defined core inflation. It will be calculated and
published by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. This  will ensure not
only transparency of monetary policy results, but also independence  from the
NBS’s calculation. The core inflation consumer basket will contain not only the
basket used for the net inflation, but also food. As we  explained earlier, despite the
volatility of food prices, this  is an improvement.  Their  development diverges
from the basic basket and food represents a high share of the overall consumer
basket. Core inflation will be stripped of changes in indirect taxes and subsidies
that directly affect consumer prices (except for the import surcharge). Core
inflation will thus capture – assuming unchanged indirect taxes – 82 % of changes
in the consumer basket and will be very similar to “net inflation” currently used in
Czech Republic.
Another problem for the transparency and credibility of monetary policy is
that “the NBS comments on developments of the overall consumer price index only
in the form of a forecast while core inflation will gradually become the NBS’s
target.” (NBS, 1999b, p. 3) Although this distinction is clear for the more
sophisticated economic actors and means that only meeting the core inflation target
matters in evaluating the success and credibility of monetary policy, there  is a
major risk that the other economic actors will not understand the distinction
between a prediction and a binding target. The overall consumer price basket is a
natural anchor for economic actors’ inflationary expectations due to its clarity and
the importance of the changes in it. If the central bank issues its prediction along
with the core inflation target, it will be  natural for the less sophisticated actors to
focus on the overall inflation figure and view it as a monetary policy target. If this
prediction is not met due to circumstances beyond the central bank’s control, the
credibility of monetary policy will  be damaged even if the core inflation target is
met. Besides, the wording that core inflation will become the NBS’s target, without
specifying a clear timetable, also challenges the credibility of the new monetary
policy framework.
Along with this change, the central bank is moving to the use of an indicative
interest rate. The central bank  will employ this to influence the situation in the
money market and that  will become its basic operative monetary policy
instrument. It goes into effect on February 1, initially as a one-day (overnight) repo
rate, but with the perspective of a gradual lengthening to two weeks (see NBS,
1999b). Banking entities will be able to borrow relatively unlimited funds from the
central bank. Up until this point,  the NBS had  always limited the volumes of
money provided through repurchase loans. This represents a significant change.
Overall, the year 2000 can be viewed as the year of the most significant qualitative
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changes in monetary policy.  The introduction of a new monetary policy target and
a new operative instrument creates room for a gradual convergence of Slovak
monetary policy to the policy of the ECB.
4.4.6 Monetary Policy in Slovakia and the European Central Bank
The goal of all  Slovak governments has  been Slovakia’s membership in the
European Union. Since the formation of the European Monetary Union on January
1, 1999, we need to also keep in mind  the possibility of Slovakia’s membership in
the EMU. This is especially significant  if new members do not receive an
exemption from the Maastricht Treaty – in other words, if they have to join the
EMU. Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1998) warn that EMU membership will
become a part of the acquis communautaire that new members will have to adopt.
On the other hand, even the European Commission does not expect post-
communist countries to join the EMU right after joining the EU (The daily SME,
October 14, 1999). In spite of this, in the medium term we need to consider two
issues:
· Can entry into the monetary union cause serious economic problems for
Slovakia?
· What strategy should be chosen for the interim period of Slovakia’s
approximation and accession to the EU?
The  first case  brings us back to a theme analyzed in connection with the
existence of Czechoslovakia – optimum currency areas. In other words, will the
EU represent an optimum currency area for Slovakia? Very few studies have been
devoted to this issue, with the exception of De Graw and Lavac’s (1999) book. An
econometric study by De Graw and Aksoy in the book comes to the conclusion that
economic shocks in Central Europe are correlated with shocks in the EU countries
and that the economic cycle is synchronized. Boone and Maurel (1999) come to a
similar conclusion. Synchronization and integration can be expected to increase
due to intensifying trade and capital ties (see Boone and Maurel, 1999). We can
make the preliminary conclusion that participation in the EMU should not pose any
greater  problems related to    optimum currency areas than those experienced by
current EMU members.
The second question, which has so far received little attention, is that of
strategy during the interim period prior to  EMU entry. The interim period is likely
to last 8-10 years and the question of the optimum monetary regime is therefore
crucial. There are two basic monetary regime options for this period – a fixed
exchange rate to the euro and inflation targeting. Both present certain problems in
terms of functionality and the Maastricht criteria.
A fixed exchange rate to the euro brings all the problems discussed in the
section devoted to the 1996-1998 period. These problems were related to fiscal and
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monetary policy and to speculative attacks. Therefore, the fixed rate exchange  can
only be recommended for the final period prior to  EMU entry (one of the
Maastricht criteria states that the exchange rate has to be fixed to the euro at least
two years before accession). Additionally, the Maastricht criteria includes inflation
of no more than 1.5 % above the average of the three EMU countries with the
lowest inflation and interest rates meeting the same condition with a 2 % boundary.
With a fixed exchange rate, Slovakia may find it difficult to meet these conditions.
The Balassa-Samuelson model addresses the issue of developing countries efforts
to catch up with the developed world.  The model shows that for a rapidly growing
country “the stability of the overall price level is possible only if the exchange rate
appreciates in proportion to the multiple of the share of non-tradable goods on the
price index and the difference between productivity growth in the tradable goods
sector and the non-tradable goods sector.” (Masson, 1999, p. 16) There is a
problem that can occur with the  fixed exchange rate in a country in the process of
catching up for instance with EU countries. With high labor productivity growth
and GDP growth, the process can lead to inflation. This inflation can be several
percentages  higher than in the EU countries.
On the other hand, inflation targeting also has its risks (we refer those
interested in inflation targeting particularly to Bernanke et al., 1999). Two of the
risks are especially relevant for Slovakia. It is well known in monetary economics
that the measured inflation in most countries (including developed countries) is
somewhat higher than actual price growth. This is due to several factors – for
example, the inability to measure qualitative changes and the time lapse  between
the revisions of the basket used for calculating inflation. In developed countries,
the overvaluation is usually estimated at 1-2 %. Therefore, central banks targeting
price stability usually have an inflation target of about 1-2 %. According to Škrebo
(1998), this difference can be much higher in transition economies. This makes it
hard to target price stability without knowing what measured  inflation level
corresponds with  it.
The ambiguous relationship between various monetary indicators and
inflation represents the second risk for inflation targeting in Slovakia. No clear
relationship has been demonstrated in Slovakia between any of the other indicators
and subsequent inflation. Since the effect of monetary policy on inflation is subject
to a delay, inflation targeting requires the use of an intermediate target in the
interest of monetary policy transparency and in order to prevent dynamic
inconsistencies. The tool increasingly used in inflation targeting around the world –
inflation forecast targeting – is unlikely to be of much use in Slovakia in the next
few years. This is due  to a lack of solid and proven structural models for  the
Slovak economy.
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In spite of this, for the next few years inflation targeting should be the
optimal solution for Slovakia.  A fixed exchange rate is completely out of the
question in the short term due to the accelerated inflation caused by price
deregulation, tax changes and currency depreciation. Other factors relevant to the
issue are the low foreign exchange reserve coupled with a higher degree of capital
account liberalization.  In the next 2-4 years, monetary policy should focus on
stabilizing inflation and reducing it to the 5-6 % level. This goal  is served
perfectly by credible inflation targeting. This policy could succeed  because
Slovakia has already experienced a few years of  low inflation and it should  be
possible to quickly bring inflationary expectations back to these levels.  The lack of
an intermediate target and a solid structural model to serve as the basis for
forecasting should not be  a great problem due  to relatively high credibility of the
NBS.  The National Bank of Slovakia’s inflation targets could, as long as the
bank’s  credibility is preserved, be accepted by economic actors even under
conditions that are not completely transparent.
On the other hand, after joining the EU around 2005-2007, Slovakia should
prepare for EMU membership by gradually moving to a fixed exchange rate. The
European Exchange Rate Mechanism 2 (CERM 2) appears to be the optimal in-
between step. The system should be put in place for EU members who are not also
members of the EMU (Masson, 1999, p. 11). The mechanism fixes the exchange
rates of member currencies to the euro, but still allows them to fluctuate within
fairly broad, 15 % bands around the central parities.
4.5 Conclusion
The nineties in Slovakia were a decade of radical changes in terms of
economic policy and  monetary policy. In spite of this, monetary policy
represented one of the most stable elements of economic policy, not only through
its conduct, but also through the results (relatively low inflation and a relatively
stable exchange rate). Our analysis focused on the causes of this stability, as well
as on the  key issues of Slovakia’s monetary policy.
We have arrived at the following conclusions:
Monetary policy within Czechoslovakia did not constitute a real problem
from the institutional perspective or the perspective of the optimum currency area
theory. The institutional framework for Slovakia’s representation in monetary
policy conduct was similar to the frameworks used in other federal central banks in
Western Europe. The basic tests used to identify optimum currency areas have
shown that there were no major divergences between Slovakia and Czech Republic
and that the two countries probably constituted such an area. The explanation for
divergent unemployment rates should probably be sought by examining  other
aspects of economic policy.
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The National Bank of Slovakia  represents an independent institution even by
international standards. Based on research indicating a relationship between central
bank independence and low inflation, we can observe   one of the reasons for the
successful curbing of inflation in the 90s.
Monetary policy conduct in the years 1993-1998 can be viewed as successful,
especially from the viewpoint of the appropriate pace of liberalization, the
appropriate mix of market and the administrative monetary policy instruments. The
results were low inflation, a stable exchange rate and an increasing degree of
liberalization of the foreign exchange and money markets. However, certain
problems cannot be overlooked. Most notably, the NBS responded inadequately  to
new developments in 1996 in relation  to expansive fiscal policy and an
overheating of the economy. Although the central bank applied monetary
restriction, it failed to adopt the only measure that could have reversed these
developments. This measure  was necessary for several reasons – the shift from a
fixed to a floating exchange rate. This was one of the reasons why the five-year
period of exchange rate stability led to a monetary crisis in September 1998 which
subsequently  resulted in the floatation of the crown on October 2, 1998.
In October 1998, the central bank adopted a new approach on monetary
policy characterized by a floating exchange rate and the use of inflation targeting.
The year 1999 was one of provisional inflation targeting and it had several
problematic aspects. However, as of January 1, 2000, a new, formally defined
inflation targeting system has been put into use.  This system  should resolve most
of the aforementioned problems. Simultaneously, the central bank moved to
qualitative monetary policy management using one interest rate as the main
monetary policy instrument.
We have examined some of the basic issues that Slovak policy will have to
cope with in connection with European Union accession. This accession is
expected around the years 2005-2007 and the European Monetary Union entry is
expected a few years later. Although very little research has been conducted in this
area, existing works suggest that the so-called eurozone should  represent an
optimum currency area for Slovakia. The entry into the EMU in  about 10 years
should  not be a significant problem strictly  from a  monetary policy perspective.
In  regard to monetary policy during  the interim period, we recommend that
inflation targeting be maintained as long as it is deemed feasible and that steps to
begin fixing the crown to the euro should be taken only a few years before  joining
the monetary union.
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5.1 Introduction
Although Slovak (and Czechoslovak) markets have lacked the close ties that
connect most of the world’s industrialized countries into a global economy at this
point, several features of other economies have had a large impact on Slovakia’s
economic well-being. Due to its extensive and growing openness and an economic
structure based mainly on exports of products with lower value added, Slovakia
has been greatly influenced by the economic cycle of its main trading partners.
Hence, this chapter  emphasizes the economic growth in Western Europe  as well
as other East European countries, former trading partners within Comecon
arrangements. The United States economy, the largest in the world, to a great
degree determines the fate of its trade partners and is thus also dealt with in detail.
Several other emerging economies that seemingly have little connection to
the Slovak economy are mentioned in this chapter. Developments in countries like
Mexico or some emerging markets in Asia, at times, have had a profound influence
on other distant economies undergoing transition. That influence is due to their
effect on the general sentiment about emerging markets. Moreover, some
developments in emerging markets hold invaluable clues to understanding similar
features of Slovakia’s situation. When foreign investors burned their fingers in
Mexico and Russia, other emerging markets suffered severe repercussions in the
form of lower investment inflows. Another side effect of developments in far away
emerging markets was in the attitudes of international financial institutions whose
programs, some of which pertained to Slovakia, were affected in scale or form to
reflect new insights gained.
5.2 The End of the 80s – Cold War Ends
At the end of the 1980s, the world’s industrialized nations were nearing the
end of a long stretch of successful economic growth. The world economy had been
growing steadily since 1982. Although limited slowdown was expected by
economic forecasters for 1989, the gradual thawing of Cold War global tensions
gave rise to optimism that there would be benefits of improved trade relations and
reduced armament expenditures.
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The key concern among world economic leaders for the new decade was the
fear of a rise in protectionist pressures. This fear followed the breakdown of talks
on eliminating barriers to world trade within the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT) framework. Another major concern was the continued growth of
the U.S. balance of payments deficit. There was also a concern about massive
failures of savings and loans institutions, which called for substantial bailouts by
the state, creating further budgetary pressures.
Meanwhile, countries of the former Eastern Bloc pursued a path of economic
transition from planned economies to market economies. The transition of
economies toward free market was widely expected to be costly for Western loan
providers and especially for these countries’ own people who would carry the
burden of declining industrial production, rising deregulated prices, and the
previously unknown problems of unemployment.  The end of the 1980s already
showed serious slow-downs in economic growth of the Soviet Union and most of
its East European satellites, despite more or less half-hearted efforts tied to various
Perestroika programs.
5.3 1990 – Western Europe in Recession, German Re-Unification
The actual slowdown in economic growth seen in 1990 led to a recession that
lasted through 1993 in Western Europe. It came as a surprise. Economists and
policy-makers could not foresee one major event that took place during 1990 –
Iraq’s invasion of the oil-rich state of Kuwait. The subsequent doubling of world
oil prices had implications similar to the of oil shocks in the 1970s, a global credit
crunch and a shortage of loan funding, which negatively affected growth. The
credit crunch was first a result of a greater need for outside financing in developing
countries that did not have their own crude oil reserves. Rising oil import costs in
developing and developed countries alike increased the need for credit to finance
oil purchases.
German re-unification was already in its early stages and expected to
significantly affect the entire European economy, mainly due to the strain on the
budget of Germany, Europe’s largest economy. Although no clear figure can be
given for the total cost of the process, it is estimated at trillions of German marks.
Annual budgetary transfers from former West Germany to the five new states in
the early years of reunification were over 170 billion marks. The high fiscal costs
were translated into higher government borrowing, which in effect raised interest
rates and resulted in an economic slowdown. The existence of a nascent European
Monetary System (EMS), tying most European currencies together, provided for
the transmittal of slowing German growth to other already struggling European
countries. The EMS also complicated efforts at economic stimulation. It made rate
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cuts in individual countries cause a divergence in interest rates between members
and exerted pressure on the stability of the exchange rate mechanism.
Germany and the United States in particular attempted to set their own
economies, and indirectly the world economy, back on a growth track through a
series of interest rate cuts. But underlying cyclical recessionary pressures proved
too hard to tackle in this manner. Growth in the U.S. remained positive, albeit
unsteady, throughout most of this period. But Western Europe experienced a full-
blown recession with economic decline and soaring unemployment.
5.4 1991 – Russian Coup, Economic Slump Continues
The situation in Eastern Europe and Russia also deteriorated in this period. It
did so more because of economic reform effects than through transferred effects of
economic difficulties elsewhere. Russia failed to achieve one key component of
economic reform – political stability. Fears of a return to Communist rule were
suppressed by the election of Boris Yeltsin, arguably a pro-market reformist, to
Russia’s presidency and a failed 1991 coup. Yet domestic politics remained marred
by social tensions and fighting among the president, Russia’s parliament, and
powerful pressure groups in various areas of Russian industry.
Other Eastern European countries fared better than Russia, due to a more
solid structural foundation. But, they experienced a period of high inflation as a
result of price deregulation, the dissolving of a monetary overhang, and the stock
of excess currency held by households resulting from the unavailability of
consumer goods in the Communist-era shortage economy. Every country that
pursued economic reforms also experienced sharp contractions in output as
industries fell apart, hard hit by the collapse of Comecon trade links, and were
unable to compete in the world market due to inefficiency and obsolescence.
Some analysts called this period the worst since the 1930s Great Depression.
With the exception of a few Asian countries, the economies of most countries
slumped. Repeatedly in 1992 and 1993, economists heralded the beginning of a
recovery for Europe and a more solid recovery for the United States. But, these
predictions failed to materialize.
5.5 1992, 1993 – Maastricht Treaty
The year 1992 brought about one economic event with far-reaching
repercussions: the signing of the Maastricht treaty. This treaty represented a pledge
among member states of the European Union to create the European Monetary
Union and thus bring to completion the economic integration among member states
of this economic and political bloc. It promised to form an economic area that
could, in size and importance, compete with the United States. It also promised to
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converge economically and provide conditions for the establishment of a unified
currency. It was crucial that a single currency require the various nation states to
abide by strict fiscal and monetary rules that the Maastricht criteria defined.
Western Europe was thus given ambitious targets in terms of inflation, interest
rates, fiscal deficits, and debt levels, which would dominate economic policy of
individual states for years to come. In order to qualify for European Monetary
Union Membership in the first round, countries agreed to slash their government
deficits to not more than three percent of GDP annually, to reduce government debt
to below 60 percent of GDP, to keep inflation to no more than 1.5 percent above
the three best performing members in the previous year, to keep their currencies
within the normal fluctuation bands of the European Monetary System, and to keep
their interest rates at no more than two percentage points above the average of the
three members with the lowest inflation rates.
But lengthy delays connected to the ratification of the treaty by member states
created turmoil in the international financial market. This was cited as one of the
main causes of Europe’s sluggish growth in 1993. Late in 1992, two currencies, the
Italian lira and the British pound, were forced to withdraw from the European
Monetary System due to divergent economic developments in various countries of
the system. In 1993, bands within which currencies were allowed to move without
central bank intervention were also widened (to 15 percent from 2.25 percent).
This gave countries more monetary policy leeway, but set back monetary
unification significantly.
Economic recovery around the world was further hindered by difficulties in
the 1992 Uruguay Round of GATT talks. In Uruguay, nations of the world tried to
negotiate a new system that would replace the GATT for adjudicating trade
disputes. The aim was to create institutions with stronger enforcement abilities for
coercing nations to comply with agreed upon reductions in trade barriers. The
Uruguay Round was particularly difficult since it attempted to extend anti-
protectionist measures to previously untouched areas, like trade in services, fibers,
and agriculture.
The United States fared better than Europe in 1992 and 1993, but fell short of
economists’ expectations for fast paced growth that was typical of earlier
recoveries. Large problems remained with fiscal deficits and deficits in trade,
particularly with Japan. For instance, America’s trade deficit with Japan alone in
1993 reached 60 billion dollars and 116 billion dollars overall. These trade
imbalances persisted throughout the 1990s despite improvement in domestic fiscal
balances later in the decade. While the U.S. welcomed the strengthening of the yen
in this period as a means to battle these imbalances, Japanese leaders repeatedly
sought international cooperation against their currency’s strength, fearing it would
hurt their economy.
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5.6 1994 – US and European Recovery, WTO
Actual recovery from the slump of the early 1990s came about only in 1994,
with the exception of the United States which began doing better earlier. The
United States had by then begun growing at such a pace, that 1994 saw a series of
successive interest rate hikes by the Federal Reserve to prevent inflationary
pressures from rising. European economies, including Germany, then ceased to
contract and began growing quite solidly.
Improvements in Western European economies generally led to better
economic performance in Eastern Europe. The most advanced countries in the
area, which had in the meantime also progressed the most on liberalization and
restructuring, particularly saw an export-led return to a growth path for the first
time since the breakdown of Communism. These countries had made inroads in
stabilizing their economies, particularly in combating inflation and promoting
currency stability, and privatizing the functional portion of Communist era
industries, partly with the assistance of foreign capital.
Russia’s reforms in the same period were stalled amid continued political
turmoil that was marked by infighting between President Boris Yeltsin, along with
reformist forces within Russia’s government, and still widely popular anti-reform
forces. Industrial output continued to decline, inflation and ruble instability were
high, and Russia’s key role in international economic policy produced a continued
struggle for increased handouts from international financial institutions. However,
there was some cause for optimism for Russia when the International Monetary
Fund insisted on the meeting of certain conditions before providing further loans.
That forced the Russian government into an ambitious pledge of reducing inflation
(to seven percent per month) and cutting the fiscal deficit to below 10 percent
GDP. Russia surprised the international community by actually succeeding in
meeting these targets, resulting in vastly larger inflows of foreign investment as
sentiment about the previously ‘lost’ country gradually began to improve.
The year 1994 also brought a turnaround on the trade front with the final
signing of treaties that created the World Trade Organization with the strictest ever
rules and strongest ever enforcement mechanisms. It involved most countries of the
world. The system withstood several tests later in the decade as countries
challenged others’ trading practices. Nonetheless, it showed its limits too, as in the
end compliance remained a voluntary matter. A good example was that of a trade
war between EU states and the United States over U.S. export of hormonally
treated beef that has brewed over years as parties involved refused to abide by
WTO rulings on the matter.
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5.7 1995 – Recovery Continues, Mexican Crisis
Recovery trends throughout most of Europe retained their momentum in
1995. Growth in the West continued on a more solid footing and positively
affected the East. Optimism over Eastern European prospects was running at an
all-time-high. Poland grew at a fast pace and was closely followed by its
neighbors, with positive signs even in the less advanced parts of the region. Early
in 1995, Hungary adopted a radical package of austerity measures aimed at curbing
burgeoning trade imbalances and curbing the fiscal area. The Bokros package, as it
came to be known after its chief architect, Hungarian Finance Minister Lajos
Bokros (who later resigned after the package temporarily seriously cut into the
standard of living in the country), became somewhat of a blueprint for effective
radical fiscal reform to promote growth in transition economies. Its key features
included a one-third reduction in the budget deficit through radical expenditure
cuts, an import surcharge to reduce the trade gap, and significant forint devaluation
to boost trade. An opinion poll at the time of the passage found two thirds of the
Hungarian population “outraged” by the measures.
The Mexican financial crisis that exploded in late 1994 and early 1995 did
much to erode the excitement over emerging markets investment opportunities
built up over years. After the country’s economy hit a cyclical downturn and a
peasant rebellion in the region of Chiapas scared foreign investors, a sudden
withdrawal of foreign investment inflows created pressure on the peso currency.
The currency was devalued late in December 1994, leading to problems with
foreign debt financing for the state and for companies. Mexico was bailed out with
a package of some $40 billion provided mainly by the United States and the
International Monetary Fund. The effect was an overall withdrawal of Western
investors from emerging markets, as a bubble - built up over years- burst. The
crisis also posed a major challenge to the IMF, which by responding rapidly and
providing a sizable loan, was seen by many as reinventing its role in the world
economy.
5.8 1995, 1996 – US New Economy and Maastricht
The United States continued growing in 1995 and 1996 while European
economies, in particular Germany, experienced a less healthy period. Europe was
to a large degree “plagued” by its efforts to stand by the conditions of the
Maastricht treaty set out for creating the single European currency. As the 1998
deadline neared for an EU political decision on which countries would be able to
become part of the Eurozone in 1999, countries were forced to employ a
combination of real deficit cutting and creative national accounts book-keeping to
assure their role within the EMU.
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Already in 1996 many economists voiced concerns over how long growth in
the United States could persist. The country was seen approaching what had been
seen as full employment levels. However, despite widespread pessimism and belief
about the way the American economy functions based on empirical evidence, the
economy continued on a strong growth path until the end of the decade. This
prompted some to come up with theories of fundamental changes in the U.S.
economy. According to some economists, a “New Economy” had resulted from the
advance of information technologies, a growing openness of the United States to
trade with other players in the global economy, and a continued shift away from
manufacturing and even away from services to technology based industries. In this
new economy, proponents claimed, traditional ideas about overheating of the
economy based on unemployment data were no longer relevant, as the economy
could supposedly grow much faster than previously thought without triggering
inflation. For many years, economists believed that when U.S. unemployment fell
below six percent, inflation would accelerate. However, even after unemployment
fell to 5.2 percent in 1996 and continued declining in subsequent years, inflation
remained tame, below three percent. The Federal Reserve, to some extent,
gradually gave in to the new idea by allowing its traditional inflation and
unemployment ‘speed limits’ to loosen. The stable monetary environment that
resulted gave rise to another phenomenon – a steady rise in stock market prices,
bringing the Dow Jones industrial average index from 6,000 points late in 1996 to
well over 10,000 in late 1999. While some see the spectacular rise in stock-market
prices as a confirmation of new economy theories, others, including many Fed
officials, have stepped up their warnings of an impending crash as this alleged
“bubble” bursts.
Another event of key importance to the emerging markets was the Russian
election of 1996. An ailing President Boris Yeltsin stood up to tough opposition,
running against anti-reform candidates, in particular Genadi Zyuganov of the re-
legalized Russian Communist Party. Aside from fears of Western investors who
mostly withdrew due to concerns over the election outcome, Russia continued to
suffer from the effects of the drawn-out Chechen conflict. But, Russia’s economic
reforms continued their bumpy ride amidst frequent cabinet reshuffles and new
conditions from Western aid donors.
5.9 1997 – Asian Financial Crisis, Europe’s New Left
The year 1997 marked the beginning of the Asian financial crisis, another
blow to investor confidence in emerging markets. The crisis began in Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia. It then spread to other countries in the region, including
South Korea and the Philippines. The crisis was a result of severe macroeconomic
imbalances, structurally fragile financial systems in the region, and the reaction of
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the markets as they became unsustainable in the second half of 1997. In particular,
sizable deficits in the countries’ current accounts were financed primarily by short-
term capital inflows and resulted in a severe economic meltdown as investors
rushed away. Subsequently, currencies of several former Asian tigers were subject
to speculative attacks by currency investors. The real economy then came near to
collapsing as output declined and unemployment rose. No consensus exists among
experts as to the true causes of the crisis. But, most see the weaknesses in the
countries’ banking systems as key. Massive inflows of investment from abroad had
allowed banks to exercise insufficient prudence in their lending practices, resulting
in a heavy burden of bad loans. A related cause is seen in traditional Asian
cronyism, as poor lending practices were supported by interconnections between
the state, banks and corporations. Some policy-makers in Asia see the main culprit
being the very openness of their economies to capital inflows (and outflows) and
the ensuing vulnerability to investor sentiment.
Some Asian economies, such as China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore,
suffered the effects of the crisis to a far lesser degree. Although most countries hit
by the crisis gradually began to recover in 1998 and 1999 (partly thanks to loan
assistance from the IMF), it had taught the world financial community an
important lesson in particular about banking systems and the need for their
supervision. This has led to a global drive for tighter rules for banks in emerging
market economies. The United States, thanks to the continued buoyancy of its
economy, suffered only very minor reverberations of the crisis. Most European
countries were largely unaffected due to weaker ties to the region.
Growth in the European Union in recent years also failed to live up to
expectations, partly because of measures required to meet conditions for the
implementation of a single currency, and partly because of Europe’s suffering from
long-term structural inefficiencies in its labor markets and other regulated areas
affecting enterprise. As a result, elections across Europe have brought political
forces to the forefront of what has become known as the New Left. In Great
Britain, Tony Blair replaced John Major in office in 1997 after 18 years of
conservative rule. Also, mainly due to voters’ disenchantment with the state of the
economy, Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor of 16 years, was forced out of the
office in 1998 and replaced by Gerhard Schroder, a Social Democrat.. Similarly in
1997, Lionel Jospin, a socialist, replaced a center-right coalition that had been in
power. The shared policies of the New Left, in general, include a left-right mixture
with a stronger social element combined to varying degrees with economic realism
of the right.
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5.10 1998 – Russian Crisis
A year after the Asian financial crisis broke out in mid-1998, the Russian
economy also entered into crisis state. The ruble came under pressure due to
concerns about the overall health of the Russian economy and the inability of
numerous successive prime ministers nominated by President Boris Yeltsin to deal
with it. The currency fell and shares tumbled significantly. This happened despite
central bank efforts to raise interest rates and despite government  announcements
of spending cuts and enforcement of a tighter tax discipline. Although the currency
stabilized a few weeks later, mainly thanks to foreign donors’ willingness to come
to rescue, the stability of the economy as a whole remained fragile along with the
political situation.
5.11 1999 – Euro Introduction, EU  Accession Talks
The Euro project entered a further key phase when the currency was launched
(though not yet in paper form) in the beginning of 1999. The 11 participating
countries irrevocably locked in their exchange rates with each other and with the
euro. The newly created European Central Bank took charge of monetary policy
and started setting exchange rates for all participants. Markets received the new
currency quite hesitantly, showing no signs of plans to quickly replace the
importance the dollar plays as a reserve and transaction currency. Furthermore,
already in its first few months the euro saw a major dip to the dollar, from which it
has not yet recovered. Nonetheless, the so-called Eurozone saw more optimistic
prospects for growth in 1999 by showing a positive signal for transition economies
in Eastern Europe, some of which had suffered magnified effects of lower demand
for imports in EU countries. For these economies, the later part of the decade
brought about more economic differentiation as the effects of structural reforms
carried out after the fall of Communism brought their fruits. While growth in
Poland remained strong and Hungary accelerated towards the end of the decade,
the Czech Republic saw its GDP first slow and then even decline in 1998.
Most reforming countries in Eastern Europe have entered the path to EU
membership. The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia (and
Cyprus) opened formal membership talks in 1998. Six other countries, including
Slovakia, were invited to join the process in December 1999. Although debates still
rage both in academic and policy-making circles over the various aspects of the
enlargement process and its effects, it will clearly push Europe even more into the
spotlight as an economic area due to increased size. The effects on the candidate
countries, including Slovakia – should it succeed – are likely to be even more
profound.
141
As Slovakia proceeds on its path to integration with the West, and to bringing
its economy in line with Western economies and the global economy, it may well
become more sensitive not only to developments in its export markets, but also to
overall emerging markets movements once the country becomes a more popular
investment destination. While Slovakia was largely unaffected directly by most
world economic events of the 1990s described above, the events of the next decade
may carry far more relevance.
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6 Foreign Trade
Marek JAKOBY
M.E.S.A.10
Participation in international economic relations is of vital importance for the
Slovak Republic. Like other spheres of the economy, foreign trade has been
significantly influenced by the transformation process. It is also affected by the
structure of the economy, primarily industry. From the beginning of the
transformation, there have been two basic issues in the field of foreign trade: a
trade balance deficits and insufficient changes in the structure of foreign trade.
The deep trade balance deficits incurred between 1996 to 1998 are connected
with the disproportional development of domestic supply and demand. Maintaining
of the fixed exchange rate of koruna, some steps in the field of trade policy, and
external factors such as the boom in the relevant exporting items segments have
had an influence on trade. However, the main reason for insufficient changes in the
structure of trade has been the enduring low qualitative competitiveness of Slovak
producers which has led to the unsuitable qualitative structure of Slovak export.
Thus, inadequate changes in the structure of trade relate to the present insufficient
progress in real restructuring of the business sphere.
In the sphere of the foreign trade, there is an absence of an integrated
conception of  state foreign trade policy. This is due to the absence of an integrated
economic policy.  Increasing export performance still remains one of the main
challenges for the Slovak economy.
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6.1 Introduction
Foreign Trade (FT) is one part of the commodities and services circulation
sphere. It involves the exchange of material goods with foreign countries. The two
basic functions of foreign trade are: transformation and growth.  The function of
transformation rests in the adjustment (transformation) of created GDP before its
consumption. The function of growth has an impact on the effective utilization of
domestic sources. Through these two functions, the country obtains additional
sources of economic growth. It is executed in two levels:
·   sales rising abroad (export rising) enable the domestic entities to increase the
specialization level and the efficiency in reference to lower unit costs
achieved;
·  imports supply the country with products, which are not domestically
produced or products which could only be produced at prohibitive cost.
Considering its small internal market, the Slovak Republic belongs to a group
of countries where foreign trade plays a key role. Small countries are usually
dependent on raw materials and other imports and need to place their products in
other foreign markets. Slovakia has also inherited extensive production capacities
from the pre-transformational period which do not produce sales in the domestic
market. The existing base does not provide the requested products assortment,
mainly of investment and consumption character, to the domestic market (OECD,
1999). In many cases, foreign trade represents a significant factor in economic
growth. Slovakia is a country with the most open economy among Central
European transition countries (see the table 1).
TABLE 1. The Openness Level of Selected Transition Countries, in 1997,  %
SVK CZ H PL SLO
Export/GDP 49.5 43.8 41.8 18.0 46.0
Sales/GDP 109.6 96.0 88.2 47.6 97.4
Source : CESTAT
Slovak foreign trade is one of the spheres most notably marked by economic
transformation. The economy has been affected by the changes in nominal growth
and territorial structure of foreign trade exchange. After 1989, nominal growth was
related to the removal of the state monopoly in the field of foreign trade relations,
and to the foreign trade liberalization. The trade exchange base shifted from the
former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) markets to those of
the European Union.
The negative aspects of Slovak foreign trade are the surpluses of merchandise
imports over exports (trade balance deficit) and the insufficient change in the
commodities structure. The latter occurs when a significant part of the overall
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export consists of lower added value products and lower processing level products.
Therefore, the competitiveness of these products is very sensitive to price changes
on world markets. Finally, the industrial structure and the export structure are
closely related to the trade balance deficit growth seen in the first years of
transformation. This can be attributed to the Slovak exporters and their inability to
neutralize the growth of domestic demand for foreign products by increasing their
exports. On the side of import, Slovakia still remains dependent on strategic raw
materials, mainly oil and gas from Russia. Partial diversification has not yet been
accomplished.
   In addition, the backwardness of utilized technologies depicts the need for
raw materials for domestic production, thus conserving the existing commodities
structure.
6.2 Development in the Basic Indicators of Slovak Foreign Trade
From 1991 to 1993, Slovakia's foreign trade showed a negative balance but in
1994, trade results improved, and the balance of trade peaked at a surplus of SKK
2.6 billion. This improvement was the result of a favorable situation on world
markets, a 10 percent devaluation of the Slovak koruna in 1993, and introduction
of 10 percent import charge.
However, by 1995, Slovakia's foreign trade slipped into a deficit again, and
continued on this path until it reached a peak of SKK 80.9 billion in 1998. This
deficit growth was due to:
·  an absence of industrial restructuring;
·  an inability to achieve better results on foreign markets;
·  an inability to preserve the fixed exchange rate of koruna.
The fixed exchange rate became a political question  and endured till October
of 1998. As a result of the factual appreciation of the Slovak koruna (fixed
exchange rate and higher inflation rate than in most trade partners countries),
Slovakia attained a price reduction in imports and Slovaks exports declined in price
competitiveness. The unit labor costs also had a negative impact on Slovakia. Their
growth pace was one of the highest throughout the transition economies in 1995-
1997 (see Lukas, 1999).
In the scope of foreign credits and state guarantees from 1995 to 1998, the
government's policy can also be considered faulty. State guarantees flowed
practically and exclusively to the field of infrastructure without achieving the
increase of export performance and a recurrence of gained foreign currency. The
overall volume of state guaranteed loans represented 14 percent of GDP in 1999
(SKK 100 billion, see OECD, 1999). The practical depletion of state finance
cannot be expected to change in the near future and any advancement in providing
state guarantees to pro-export projects is not predicted.
145
In 1994, GDP growth was powered mainly by an expressive foreign demand
and thus by export. In the following period, a strong growth in imports and
increasing deficit reflected the growing disparity between the disproportionate
increase of domestic demand and the slow increase of domestic supply
(production). In 1996, the impact of export (foreign trade) upon GDP growth was
negative due to a lower real value when compared to that of 1995 (OECD, 1999).
The trade balance deficit also significantly contributed to the current account’s
deficit. It represented 10 % of GDP in 1996-1998.
In order to make accurate comparisons concerning the historical development
of Slovak foreign trade, we cannot use data before 1993. Prior to this date,
Slovakia was a part of the former Czechoslovak Federative Republic and mutual
trade with the Czech Republic was a part of inner trade statistics.
TABLE 2. Basic Indicators of Merchandise Foreign Trade of the Slovak Republic
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997* 1998 3Q1999**
Export, SKK billion 167.5 214.4 255.1 270.6 324 374.9 303.9
Change (  %) 28 19 6.1 19.7 15.7 9.9
Import, SKK billion 193.5 211.8 260.8 340.9 392.4 455.8 336.4
Change (  %) 9.5 23.1 30.7 15.1 16.1 0.9
Balance of Trade, SKK
billion
-26 2.6 -5.7 -70.3 -68.4 -80.9 -32.6
Change (SKK billion) 28.6 -8.3 -64.6 1.9 -12.5 24.2
Balance of Trade/GDP -7 0.6 -1.1 -12.2 -10.5 -11.3 -5.6
CA/GDP -5.4 4.8 3.7 -11.2 -9.9 -10.1 -5.6
*Based on the methodical change of statistics in 1997 the values are not fairly comparable.
**Preliminary indicators. CA is the current account of balance of payments.
Source: The Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, The Ministry of Economy and The National Bank
of Slovakia
Table 2 confirms the relatively dynamic development of foreign trade since
1993. It is expressed by high export growth, with the exception of the 1996 drop,
and import in the period 1993 – 1998. After a strong expansionary phase of import
cycles on the crucial markets of OECD countries in 1994 and 1995, a change
occurred in 1996. Slovakia, as well as remaining transition economies, experienced
a notable slow-down of the growth and a decline of the demand on OECD markets
(OECD, 1999). After the favorable year of 1994, growing import rates in 1995 and
mainly in 1996 led to a trade balance deficit, which exceeded 10 % of GDP for
three subsequent years. 1996 marked the biggest import expansion and the key role
was played by the cancellation of the import duty on cars with small engine
capacities (+ SKK 17 billion in imports) and the import of airplanes in the frame of
the Russian debt settlement (+ SKK 8.7 billion).
In 1998, the balance of trade showed a record deficit of SKK 80.8 billion,
representing 11.3 % of GDP. In 1999, a remarkable improvement in the balance of
146
trade was achieved, thanks mainly to a decrease in import growth. Exports grew by
9.9 % (+SKK 27.4 billion) on year-to-year terms, whereas import grew by 0.9 %
(+ SKK 3.1 billion) in the first nine months. Consequently, the trade deficit fell to
57.3 % of what was measured in the nine months of 1998.
Merchandise trade is usually used for foreign trade evaluation and less
attention is paid to services. In Slovakia, the trade with services is slowly
decreasing. This creates a paradox because trade services still represent about 20 %
of exports and imports (see Table 3).
TABLE 3. Services to Goods Ratio in the Foreign Trade of Slovakia
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999*
Export, Services to Goods Ratio,  % 35.9 33.7 27.7 23.4 26.3 21.6 20.1
Import, Services to Goods Ratio,  % 26.8 24.2 20.9 18.3 20.4 17.6 16.8
* data for 1-3Q of 1999.
Source: NBS
TABLE 4. Development of Foreign Trade with Services, SKK billion
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999*
Export 60.1 72.3 70.7 63.4 73 80.9 61.1
Import 51.8 51.2 54.4 62.3 70.5 80.2 56.6
Balance 8.3 21.1 16.3 1.1 2.5 0.7 4.5
According to balance of payments. * data for 1-3Q of 1999.
Source: NBS
In 1996, a significant drop in the active balance of services (Table 4) was
caused by an increase of foreign currency expenditures in tourism (+ SKK 5.3
billion). Slovakia achieves a surplus in the balance of services thanks mainly to the
transit of natural gas, which in turn contributes to a surplus at the balance of
transport. Moderate surplus is also being achieved in the field of tourism.
Next to the basic indicators of foreign trade, it is useful to measure
development in export performance and import intensity. Export performance is
usually expressed as a ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP. As we can
see from Chart 1, there was a clear decline in the export performance after 1994.
The lowest level was reached in 1996 and was accompanied by a notable growth of
import intensity (import/ GDP).
 Rising imports are caused by an insufficient domestic supply level. The latter
was not corresponding to growing domestic demand. The aforementioned high raw
materials dependency and high material demands of the Slovak economy was also
involved. In 1998, the disproportion between domestic demand and supply became
apparent when real growth in imports of goods and services (9.5 %) was 2.3 times
higher than domestic demand growth (4.1 %).
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The reason for this increase of imports can be attributed to decrease of import
surcharge in harmony with the WTO (World Trade Organisation)  decision, the
cancellation of the ± 7 % fluctuation range of koruna on October 1st of 1998, and
the quick follow-up 19 % depreciation of the Slovak currency. The cancellation of
the fixed exchange rate regime with the fluctuating range came relatively too late;
NBS's effort to keep the exchange rate steady in the pre-election period cost USD 1
billion from August to September. As a result, foreign currency reserves dropped
to the level of 2.3 times that of average monthly import and well below the level
considered a safe minimum.
CHART 1. Export Performance and Import Intensity of the Slovak Economy
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As an immediate effect of the aforementioned reasons, the foreign trade
deficit reached SKK 10.9 billion. This was due to the importers’ effort to
accumulate sufficient stocks when facing the expectation of further koruna
depreciation. Throughout 1998 the deficit was stabilized at SKK 5 – 6 billion, with
the exception of April (8 billion deficit due to the reduction of the import surcharge
from 7 to 5 percent) and December when the deficit reached SKK 8.5 billion. The
latter being attributed to the traditional Christmas shopping. The development of
both curves in 1999 confirms that an improvement in the balance of trade was
achieved due to the growth pace decline of import, influenced by the weakening of
koruna, rather than by higher export performance.
An interesting fact emerges if we calculate foreign trade data for 1999 in
USD. The nominal export growth of 9.9 % is lower than the depreciation of crown
against USD (about 15 %). Despite the nominal growth, exports expressed in the
foreign currency declined.
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6.3 Commodity Structure
Chart 3 illustrates the fact that since 1995 the weight of exported iron and
steel has decreased. This can be considered as a positive trend. However, it is
important to realize that this fact is related to the demand cycle (OECD, 1999) and
the general price decline in this segment. In the case of Slovakia, this segment is
particularly sensible due to the export fall and the steel production fall that affected
the second biggest employer in Slovakia and the biggest Slovak exporter –
Východoslovenské železiarne Košice (VSŽ). In 1996, the company's revenues
dropped by 23.3 % and export declined nominally by 11.5 % (Top Trend 1997). A
positive sign is seen in the increase of export of audio - visual equipment and
motor vehicles. This is a modern sector with higher added value. This growth was
mainly accomplished thanks to Volkswagen Bratislava, one of the biggest foreign
investors in Slovakia. This corporation had an overall export of  SKK 56.4 billion
in 1998, and became the biggest Slovak exporter. Yet, Volkswagen's impact on
decline of trade deficit is not this enormous. The company imports, according to
available data, about 85 – 90 % of its inputs.
Along with Volkswagen, there are other companies producing components
for the car industry that have increased their exports remarkably. According to The
Automotive Industry Association (Zväz automobilového priemyslu, ZAP), Slovak
companies increased their deliveries to the world’s cars manufacturing concerns in
1998 by SKK 9 billion to the total amount of SKK 26 billion (ZAP, 1999).
However, as seen from the Chart 3, the remaining part of machine industry did not
increase its share in export until 1998.  This relates to the actual agony of most
machine producing companies within the former ZTS concern. The DMD Holding,
which should have co-ordinated and improved business activities of single
companies according to the original intentions, has not brought about the desired
effect. At present, Slovak export is still dependent on the same products as it was
before 1989.  The most serious problem is that these products are, for the most
part,  on a low processing level and destined for intermediate consumption. The
export competitiveness of these products depends mainly on price factors. This
position is unstable due to the possibility of price growth of inputs and dependency
on the target markets booms.
The real appreciation of the currency can also negatively influence price
competitiveness. For example, we can present the problems with VSŽ's sales in
1998 due to the competition from producers in the Ukraine and Southeast Asia.
The competitiveness of their products (Ukraine and SE Asia) rose significantly
after devaluation of their currencies.  VSŽ itself admitted that higher added value
products that were more resistant to macroeconomic shocks presented only 15 % of
the overall production in 1998.
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6.4 Effect of Foreign Investments
In order to adapt to more sophisticated production, Slovak producers need to
improve the scope of industrial restructuring, attract new technologies, know-how,
and adopt new managerial and marketing methods. However, in order to create a
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new institutional framework one needs an effective ownership structure, and
sufficient investment sources. The first of the preconditions was questioned by the
previous privatization style. The availability of investment sources is strongly
limited due to problems in the banking sector, particularly in state controlled
banks. In addition, interest rates are too high and the capital market has virtually
collapsed. Lastly, foreign direct investments (FDI) stock is far from being
sufficient. Despite the existence of this fact, companies with foreign capital
participation contribute significantly to foreign trade exchange. It is documented in
Table 5.
Since 1994 , more than a third of overall foreign trade has been realized by
companies with foreign capital. Each year, since 1996, their total imports have
exceeded their exports. This has strongly influenced the trade balance results.
TABLE 5. Foreign Trade of Foreign Capital Companies to Overall Foreign Trade
Ratio
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
SKK
bill.
 % SKK
bill.
 % SKK
bill.
 % SKK
bill.
 % SKK
bill.
 %
Export 63.6 37 85.6 34 96.5 36 108.2 37 120.7 32
Import 65.7 42 89.9 36 131.7 39 152.8 44 158.5 35
Balance -2.1 - -4.3 75 -35.2 50 -44.6 66 -37.8 47
Source: NBS
There is an indication that the high deficit of the balance of trade is caused
mainly by the consumer goods import of big trading companies. According to the
NBS, their overall import share of the companies with foreign capital meant almost
40 % (SKK 53.9 billion) in 1998, whereas their overall export share meant 5.5 %
(SKK 6.6 billion). Abstracting from the trading companies influence, foreign
capital companies created a trade surplus of SKK 9.4 billion in 1998. A relatively
small stock of FDI (without trading companies) produced almost a third of the
overall Slovak export (30.3 % in 1998) and at the same time contributed to import
by 22.9 %. Another fact proving the positive effect of FDI is that 16 companies
with foreign capital, coming under 80 Top Trend biggest exporting companies in
Slovakia in 1997, increased their sales to export on a year-to-year basis by almost
SKK 9.7 billion. This was an increase of 27 % on average (Top Trend, 1998). A
higher inflow of foreign direct investments, mainly to production sectors, is needed
for further improvement of the trade balance and dynamic export growth.
6.5 Competitiveness of the Slovak Production
The effects of devaluations of the Slovak koruna from 1990 and 1993 had
enhanced price competitiveness of Slovak products. After 1994, this effect slowly
151
faded. Meanwhile, the Slovak government did not create the necessary institutional
and real prerequisites for the strengthening of non-price competitiveness. Under a
fixed exchange rate regime and with an inflation level higher than in western
countries, the koruna appreciated in real terms since 1995. This negatively affected
price competitiveness of the Slovak production on foreign markets. Since 1996, the
cheap labor force effect started to fade away slowly. At the same time, real salaries
growth markedly overran the labor force productivity. The year 1996 ended with a
record trade deficit of SKK 70.2 billion. This was reevaluated two years later and it
was determined to have been SKK 80.9 billion.
TABLE 6. Comparison of Product Groups Competitiveness
SR MHVEK
Products with High Labor Force Intensity 1.39 0.77
Products w/ High Capital Costs Intensity 0.95 1.03
Highly Sophisticated Products 0.57 0.94
Products of Traditional Sectors 1.74 0.88
Products of Modern Sectors 0.58 0.96
Short-time Consumption Products 1.63 0.95
Production Consumption 1.64 0.84
Long-term Consumption Products 0.71 0.95
Investment and Component Products 0.57 0.93
Comparison is based on import by export coverage ratio. MHVEK means small developed European
countries. Source: Outrata (1998)
Slovakia establishes itself on foreign markets mainly with products of high
labor and capital intensity (Table 6), i.e., products of traditional sectors, which
reach higher values of import by export coverage ratio. Based on the purpose of
use these are the products of short-time consumption and products destined to
production consumption – such as raw materials, materials or intermediate
products. They have been traditionally established in  international trade thanks to
price competitiveness and they represent 50 % of exports and 27 % of imports. The
share of long-term consumption goods and investment-component products in
overall processing industry exports represent 34 % and they make up 44 % of
imports (Outrata, 1998). On the other hand, Slovakia is constrained to import
products of high sophistication that are represented by modern sectors, i.e., long-
term consumption products and investment products.
A comparison of Slovakia with other small developed European economies
(Table 7) provides another useful source of information about the price
competitiveness of Slovak products. Compared to MHVEK, the Slovak economy
achieves better indicators’ values with products of higher labor and capital
intensity in traditional sectors. These sectors have a character of short-time
consumption intended for production consumption (Outrata, 1998). These
conclusions are also confirmed by the Terms of Trade assessment. Due to the
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absence of the last two years’ of statistical results, we can only present the 1994 to
1996 developments in Table 8.
TABLE 7. Competitiveness of Products Groups Based on Selected Indicators.
Group of Products TB/added value Import by Export
Coverage Ratio
RCA
SR MHVEK SR MHVEK SR MHVEK
Products w/ High Labor Force
Intensity
64.1 -21.7 1.39 0.77 54.1   -31.4
Products w/ High Capital
Intensity
95.7 1.9 0.95 1.03 16.5   -33.1
R&D Intensive Products -136.7 -28.6 0.57 0.94 -34.1   -11.0
Products of Traditional Sectors 107.8 -9.8 1.74 0.88 76.8   -17.4
Products of Modern Sectors -201.6 -34.2 0.58 0.96 -33.2    -9.2
Short-time Consumption
Products
82.9 1.9 1.63 0.95 70    -9.9
Production Consumption 123.2 -16.8 1.64 0.84 71  -22.5
Long-term Consumption
Products
-18 -9.2 0.71 0.95 -12.8  -10.2
Investment and Component
Prod.
-142.8 -14.7 0.57 0.93 -35.7  -12.3
MHVEK – small developed European countries. TB: Trade balance
Source: World Economy Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
TABLE 8. Terms of Trade in Slovak Industry.
Products  Export Price Growth / Import Price Growth Ratio  1994-1996
Traditional Branches 0.98
Modern Branches 0.89
Source: World Economy Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
The values presented show that export and import prices of traditional sectors
developed at approximately the same pace between 1994 –1996 (Terms of Trade
ratio is close to 1, see Table 8). Export prices, in modern branches, did not keep
pace with import prices (Outrata, 1998). Presently, the Statistical Office of the
Slovak Republic neither monitors the Terms of Trade developments nor foreign
trade prices. This practically disables any further analyses of this indicator.
For a more detailed commodity structure analyses of Slovak foreign trade we
can measure the competitiveness of Slovak export by means of RCA  ratio.
Values of Tables 9 and 10 confirm that Slovakia achieves higher comparative
advantages by commodities intended for production consumption. This includes
products from iron and steel, aluminum and products from aluminum, chemical
synthetic or artificial silk, salt, sulphur, moulds and stones, gypsum, lime and
cement and products for short-time consumption (clothes, shoes, paper and
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paperboard products). The biggest positive change can be seen in the production of
motor vehicles and accessories.
As seen from the comparison of Tables 9 and 10, the same group of eighteen
items retained the highest comparative advantage in 1998. However, for many of
them, the relative weight has shifted. Along with the move of the group “Vehicles
different from rail track vehicles” represented by aforementioned Volkswagen,
positive moves were registered by traditional items mainly (clothes, shoes, paper
and paperboard), and intermediate products, as well (aluminum and aluminum
products, organic chemical products). Export of all these product groups represents
a significant portion of relevant sectors production, thereby resulting in their vital
dependency on foreign markets.
TABLE 9. Export Items with Highest Comparative Advantage in 1994
No. Customs Tariff Chapter RCA Export* Import*
1 72 Iron and Steel 13.42 16.28 2.86
2 44 Wood, Wooden Products and Charcoal 2.86 3.41 0.55
3 54 Chemical, Synthetic or Artificial Silk 2.74 2.95 0.21
4 62 Textile and Textile Accessories, other than Knitted 2.01 2.54 0.53
5 94 Furniture, Medical and Surgeon Furniture 1.87 2.76 0.89
6 39 Plastics and Plastic Products 1.81 5.03 3.21
7 40 Caoutchouc and Related Products 1.46 2.83 1.37
8 48 Paper, Paperboard and Cardboard, Paper Products 1.42 3.46 2.05
9 25
Salt; Sulphur, Moulds and Stones; Gypsum;
Lime and Cement 1.32 1.90 0.58
10 64 Shoes, Leggings and Similar Products 1.19 1.75 0.56
11 70 Glass and Glass Products 1.12 1.64 0.52
12 89 Ships, Boats and Sailing Constructions 0.89 0.90 0.01
13 86 Railway and Tramway Locomotives 0.87 1.41 0.55
14 73 Iron and Steel Products 0.83 4.16 3.33
15 87 Vehicles different from Rail Track Vehicles 0.81 5.25 4.44
16 76 Aluminum and Related Products 0.30 1.34 1.04
17 29 Organic Chemical Products 0.22 3.03 2.81
18 4 Milk and Milk Products, Eggs, Honey 0.19 0.57 0.38
TOTAL 61.42 26.09
*share in total export or import  (%).
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TABLE 10. Exported Items with Highest Comparative Advantage in 1998
No Customs Tariff Chapter RCA Export* Import* DP**
1 72 Iron and Steel 8.15 10.63 2.48 0
2 87 Vehicles different from Rail Track Vehicles 6.27 18.86 12.62 13
3 62
Textile and Textile Accessories, other than
Knitted 3.15 3.72 0.56 1
4 48
Paper, Paperboard and Cardboard, Paper
Products 1.76 3.59 1.84 4
5 44 Wood, Wooden Products and Charcoal 1.74 2.44 0.71 -3
6 76 Aluminum and Related Products 1.51 2.52 1.01 10
7 54 Chemical, Synthetic or Artificial Silk 1.22 1.70 0.48 -4
8 64 Shoes, Leggings and Similar Products 0.98 1.72 0.75 2
9 94 Furniture, Medical and Surgeon Furniture 0.93 2.23 1.30 -4
10 25
Salt; Sulphur, Moulds and Stones; Gypsum;
Lime and Cement 0.91 1.27 0.37 -1
11 70 Glass and Glass Products 0.79 1.40 0.61 0
12 89 Ships, Boats and Sailing Constructions 0.76 1.17 0.41 0
13 29 Organic Chemical Products 0.63 2.52 1.90 4
14 73 Iron and Steel Products 0.61 3.54 2.93 0
15 86 Railway and Tramway Locomotives 0.58 1.54 0.96 -2
16 40 Caoutchouc and Its Products 0.57 2.07 1.51 -9
17 4 Milk and Milk Products, Eggs, Honey 0.25 0.44 0.19 1
18 39 Plastics and Related Products 0.24 3.74 3.51 -12
TOTAL 65.1 34.13
*share in total export or import. **Change of rank against 1994. Source: Ministry of Economy
TABLE 11. Imported Items with Highest Comparative Disadvantage, in 1994
No. Customs Tariff Chapter RCA Import* Export*
1 27 Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils and Related Products -14.62 19.26 4.64
2 84 Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machines, Instruments -6.97 14.86 7.89
3 85 Electrical Machines and Instruments and Parts -2.56 6.92 4.35
4 26 Metallic Ores, Slag and Ashes -1.93 2.03 0.09
5 90 Optical Instruments and Machines -1.90 3.40 1.50
6 30 Pharmaceutical Products -1.02 2.29 1.27
7 38 Various Chemical Products -0.42 1.43 1.01
8 88 Airplanes, Space Ships and Parts -0.32 0.43 0.12
9 28 Inorganic Chemical Products -0.14 1.18 1.05
TOTAL 51.81 21.92
* share in total  export or import.  Source: Ministry of Economy
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TABLE 12. Imported Items with Highest Comparative Disadvantage, in 1998
No. Customs Tariff Chapter RCA Import* Export* DP**
1 27
Mineral Fuels, Mineral Oils and Their
Products -7.47 11.02 3.52 0
2 84
Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machines,
Instruments -7.12 15.33 8.17 0
3 85 Electrical Machines and Instruments and Parts -3.18 11.01 7.80 0
4 30 Pharmaceutical Products -1.61 2.47 0.85 2
5 90 Optical Instruments and Machines -1.60 2.45 0.84 0
6 26 Metallic Ores, Slag and Ashes -1.06 1.13 0.08 -2
7 38 Various Chemical Products -0.66 1.21 0.54 0
8 28 Inorganic Chemical Products -0.50 1.13 0.62 1
9 88 Airplanes, Space Ships and Parts -0.49 0.62 0.13 -1
10 2 Meat and Edible Offal -0.21 0.26 0.05 -
TOTAL 46.63 22.61
* share in total  export or import  **  –  Change of rank against 1994.  Source: Ministry of Economy
From 1994 to 1998, export growth in several commodity groups such as
clothes and shoes may be related to the growth of wage-labor for branded foreign
companies. Such companies bring only a low added value of the production. Both
sectors are characterized by a significant scope of excess capacities. In the sector of
clothing and textiles alone, the wage-labor represented about 70 % of overall
production in 1999 (Trend Top 1999 v priemysle, see also the Table 13). It is
significant to emphasize that this trend is not sustainable in the long-term, since the
increase of labor costs will probably result in a transfer of such production to other
countries with a cheaper labor force.
A striking growth in the export of aluminum and related products from SKK
2.9 billion in 1994 to SKK 9 billion in 1998 was achieved by the group of former
ZSNP companies in Žiar nad Hronom. Most of this was attributed to those with a
significant foreign investor. As a consequence of the aluminum price drop in 1997
and 1998, a slowdown in export growth has occurred. The export growth of paper,
paperboard and paper products was assisted by the global boom in this sector after
1993. This sector has a positive impact on trade balance because it utilizes
extensive domestic raw materials basis. In the last few years, many significant
modernization investments have been carried out in this sector (SCP Ružomberok,
Harmanecké papierne, Assi Domän Štúrovo) and have been accompanied by the
foreign investors accession (Assi Domän and SCA Mölnlycke). The position of
raw construction materials (sulphur, moulds and stones, gypsum, lime and cement)
in export commodity structure remained practically unchanged during the
examined period. On the contrary, there was a notable drop (12 ranks) of
comparative advantage (as well as of overall export share) of plastics. This drop
was caused by an import growth of 135 % (to SKK 16 billion) in the relevant
period that sharply exceeded the export growth of 30 % (to SKK 14 billion).
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The presented conclusions were also confirmed by export developments in
the first three quarters of 1999. Along with the continuation of the positive growth
trend in the export of machines and appliances (29.2 %) and vehicles (17 %), a
clear year-to-year export growth was recorded in mineral products (39.9 %). In
addition, the export growth of wood and wooden products (27.7 %) and stone,
gypsum and cement conserve to a certain extent the existing inappropriate
commodity structure.
TABLE 13. Export to Revenues Ratio of Selected Sectors in 1998,  %
Cellulose and
Paper Industry
Production of
Aluminum and
Related Products
*
Organic Chemical
Products**
Cloth-making
Industry
Leather and Shoe-
making Industry
64.4 72.7 59.8 64.4 60.3
* The sector is represented by ZSNP group numbers. ** Sector is represented by production of basic
chemicals  (OKEC 241). Source: Top Trend in Industry 1999, Ministry of Economy
On the side of imports, products of modern sectors (machine industry,
electrical machines and equipment, see tables 11 and 12), beside a relatively stable
rate of input raw materials import, show the biggest competitive disadvantage, and
account for a high share in total import.  Almost half of total import was
represented by practically the same group of items, as in 1994, with only some
small inner moves noted.
 Based on import tariff classification, exports were dominated by transport
vehicles, basic metals and their products, appliances and electrical equipment,
textile and textile products. Share of motor vehicles in total export grew from 10.9
% in 1997 to 18.9 % in 1998.
Slovakia imported mainly machines, appliances and electrical equipment,
vehicles, raw materials, fuels, and chemical products. The share of mineral fuels in
total import ratio dropped from 17.7 % in 1997 to 10.9 % in 1998. This drop,
however, was achieved by lower world prices in 1998 rather than by a reduction of
the energy intensity of the Slovak economy. In regard to the growth in oil prices in
the second half of 1999, the depreciation of the Slovak koruna and the stagnation
of overall import growth, it is worth noting that hydrocarbon fuels import ratio has
grown again in 1999.
6.6 Transformation Effect
The transformation effect is another useful and simple indicator that shows
the progress in the area of restructuring and in the improvement of the foreign trade
structure. It is calculated as a ratio of final products export (classes 5,6,7 and 8 of
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international classification SITC) to raw materials and materials import (SITC
classes 2 and 3).
TABLE 14. Comparison of Transformation Effect in Slovakia and the Czech
Republic.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1-2Q1999
SR 1.58 2.31 2.64 3.44 3.62 3.18 3.28 4.94 5.23
CR 2.85 3.13 4.95 5.20 5.40 5.44 5.81 7.80 -
Source: M.E.S.A. 10 calculations based on data from Statistical Offices of the Slovak Republic and the
Czech Republic
According to Table 14, Slovakia experienced its first drop in the
transformation effect in 1996. This signifies that raw materials import grew quicker
than the export of final production. The development of the transformation effect
since 1993 and its relation to the  development of export and import of relevant
SITC groups is demonstrated in the Chart 4. After improvements of the
transformation effect in 1994 caused by a sharp year-to-year growth of final
products export 1995 showed practical stagnation. This was caused by an almost
equivalent percentage growth of export and import of relevant commodity groups.
Higher growth of import in 1996 resulted in the historical fall of the transformation
effect. Some improvement can be observed in 1998 and during first half of 1999
when the transformation effect increased to 4.94 and 5.23 points, respectively. This
development was favorably affected by the export of machines and appliances.
This resulted in a growth of SKK 60 billion and an impressive shift of share in total
export from 27.5 % to 40 %. Furthermore, the fall of world raw material prices,
especially crude oil, presented another positive impact.
CHART 4. Transformation Effect and Year-to-Year Change in Import/Export of
Relevant SITC Groups
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 Compared to the Czech Republic, the transformation effect in Slovakia is still
apparently lower.
6.7 Economic Policies in the Area of Foreign Trade
After experiencing insufficient progress in the restructuring of the Slovak
economy and the stagnation of non-price competitiveness, the Slovak government
decided to solve the trade deficit issue by means of import limitations. Significant
precautions restricting imports were adopted, especially after 1996. In 1996, as a
result of cancellation of import duty on small capacity engine vehicles, balance in
trade with vehicles contributed to a record overall deficit. Given the relatively low
general level of import duties (3.5 % in 1997) and the limited possibility to
increase duties due to membership of Slovakia in the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), import surcharges became a favorite tool to face trade deficit. Although its
real effect is just short-term, it has become a rewarding additional source of state
budget revenues.
In 1997, three legal precautions were adopted to regulate imports; the Law on
Protection Against Dumping, the Law on Protective Import Precautions, and the
Law on Subsidies and Equalization Precautions. The purpose of the first and third
regulations was to face the unfair practice of goods imported for dumped prices or
supported by forbidden subsidies. The second one, the Law on Protective Import
Precautions, possesses a clearly protectionist character. It uses vague formulations
such as “in the case of serious loss,” or “ in the case of serious loss threat” to
domestic production sector in order to enable an increase of import duty or to limit
the imported amounts through tariff quotas.
While these regulations can be considered more or less common, the
introduction of import deposits in May of 1997 was considered a completely non-
standard precaution. The measure was adopted as a reaction to the same step taken
by the Czech Republic. Under this measure, importers were obliged to deposit 20
% of imported value to a non-interest-bearing account for 6 months. Fortunately,
the import deposits lasted only a very short time and were replaced by an import
surcharge in July 1997.
The most controversial precaution measure was the strengthening of
certification requirements on imported goods in the autumn of 1997 that practically
liquidated numerous small importers. Crucial points included a requirement to
submit the certificate, and a confirmation of the fact that the commodity is not a
subject to certification directly on the border. It also required going through a long
drawn out procedure for certificates arrangement, and was further complicated by
the fact that even renowned international brands were not acknowledged.
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Apart from the fact that this certification strengthening most severely affected
small importers (M.E.S.A.10, 1997), this precaution only delayed imports; it had
no real effect (decline) on the demand for foreign goods (OECD, 1999).
Ineffective functioning of export-promotion institutions is another weakness
of Slovak foreign trade. The institutions have been viewed as non-transparent and
ineffective. Even after the new government came into office in 1998, no significant
progress in the sphere of institutional support of foreign trade was recorded.
Export-promotion in Slovakia is provided primarily by Eximbanka and
Foreign Trade Promotion Fund (Fond na podporu zahranicného obchodu - FPZO).
Eximbanka, founded in 1997, has not met expected targets regarding the promotion
of Slovak exports. In 1998, Eximbanka supported only 0.8 % of overall export
through export credits. That is a relatively low value compared to similar
institutions in the Czech Republic (5.5 %) or Austria (9.5 %). The number of
sources aimed for insurance operations in Eximbanka is also insufficient.
According to Eximbanka’s governor, this institution had only SKK 1.3 billion for
insurance operations at the end of 1999, whereas the similar Czech institution
EGAP disposed of CZK 70  billion for the same purpose. Eximbanka did not
succeed in obtaining sufficient external funds and still uses controversial obligatory
contributions of importers and exporters corresponding to 0.05 % of individual
imports and exports as a significant source of revenues. These will be cancelled in
the first half of 2000. Another criticism is the fact that Eximbanka, as an institution
established under special law, is not liable to the Law on Banks, or to NBS
supervision. It does not have to be managed in accordance with the circumspect
enterprising rule. Eximbanka's activities can thus be in conflict with the interests
and aims of the NBS's monetary policy (M.E.S.A. 10, 1998).
FPZO, which was founded to promote Slovakia abroad, was financed till
January 1, 2000 by similar obligatory contributions of exporters and importers. At
the same time, there exists an indication that enterprises are not familiar with
current FPZO activities even though FPZO works with significant funds. Since
1998, the obligatory contributions revenues alone reached SKK 800 million.
6.8 Territorial Structure
The territorial structure of Slovak foreign trade has improved since the start
of the transformation. Until 1993, the export to EU countries corresponded roughly
to a quarter of total exports (see Chart 5), and by 1998, it had increased 50 %. This
trend can be partially attributed to the accession of new countries into the EU in
1995. Such development was enabled by a gradual implementation of the
liberalization provisions in the scope of the Association Agreement that was
asymmetrically more advantageous for Slovakia.
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A quick reorientation of Slovak exporters to more solvent western markets
along with the continuing dependency of the Slovak economy on Russian raw
materials has resulted in a further deepening of the Slovak-Russian foreign trade
deficit (see Chart 6). In 1997, the bilateral trade deficit reached SKK 42 billion. In
1998, another change in the territorial structure of Slovak export was recorded
when OECD markets made up 89.9 % of total Slovak exports.
Export to OECD countries increased by 21.2 % on year-to-year terms, export
to the EU increased by 37.6 %, and export to CEFTA (Central European Free
Trade Association) countries remained unchanged.
With regard to individual countries, Slovak export to Germany increased by
41.7 %, to Austria by 19.8 %, and to Italy by 38.3 %. On the other hand, the
biggest drop was recorded in export to Russia (36.1 %), and the Czech Republic
7.7 %. Germany became the most important export market with 28.9 % share,
overtaking the Czech Republic (20.3 %). The latter has been slowly falling since
1993 in both export and import despite the existing customs union.
Trade exchange with the Czech Republic was specifically affected by a
recession of the Czech economy between 1997-1999. The largest foreign trade
deficit was recorded in trade with  Russia (SKK –38.2 billion), Germany (SKK-9.4
billion) and the Czech Republic (SKK – 8 billion). A long-term passive balance of
trade with Russia has its roots in Slovakia’s great dependency on the Russian raw
materials. From Germany and the Czech Republic Slovakia imports mainly motor
vehicles, machines, and machinery equipment. This is also confirmed by the
commodity structure in 1998 with mineral fuels and machines and mechanical
equipment recording highest trade deficits (SKK 36.8 billion and SKK 42.3 billion,
respectively).
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CHART 6. Share of Selected Territories in Total Slovak Import,  %
*Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU, ** The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined the
OECD, Source: The Statistical Office of the SR
6.9 Conclusion
Participation in international economic relations is of vital importance for
Slovakia. Problems result mainly from insufficient raw materials basis and limited
domestic market. The significance of international economic relations is proven by
the high and growing ratio of foreign trade to GDP.
  As in other scopes of the economy, the transformation process has
significantly affected foreign trade. Foreign trade closely follows the structure of
the economy, specially industry, since industrial companies export a relevant part
of outputs and obtains a significant part of inputs through import. Two main
problem issues have come about since the beginning of the transformation. First,
namely a negative balance of merchandise exchange with foreign countries and
secondly, insufficient changes in the commodity structure of the trade.
  Big deficits in the balance of trade from 1996 to 1998 are connected mainly
with the disproportion between the development of domestic demand and supply of
domestic producers. Another significant factor was the maintaining of a fixed
exchange rate of koruna, some trade policy measures (e.g., cancellation of custom
duties on small capacity engine vehicles in 1996), as well as external factors
(growth in relevant export item market segments). Insufficient changes in the
commodity structure of trade were caused by the insufficient qualitative
competitiveness of Slovak producers and  unsuitable qualitative structure of Slovak
export. Some progress has been noted due to foreign investments. Unsatisfactory
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changes of the commodity structure are closely related to the recent weak progress
of real restructuring of the business sphere.
Furthermore, the absence of an overall foreign trade policy concept is another
negative factor. It is rooted in the missing overall state economic policy.
Enhancement of export performance remains one of the key challenges for the
Slovak economy. Foreign trade should become a relevant factor in achieving
sustainable high economic growth.
       Basic prerequisites for an increase of export performance include:
· real restructuring of enterprise sphere, including a functioning bankruptcy
mechanisms with the possibility to restructure particular company under the
surveillance of creditors, in order to revive financial flows;
· significantly increasing FDI influx;
· continuing a reasonable fiscal policy in order to push down interest rates and
utilizing the tax policy to promote a higher savings ratio, thus leading to a
decline of import demand;
· restructuring and privatization of banks;
· capital strengthening of Eximbanka;
· unifying export promotion activities of FPZO, trade-economic departments of
foreign embassies and trade chambers;
· developing a complex foreign-trade policy.
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7 Labor Market
Martina LUBYOVÁ
Institute for Forecasting of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Since 1994, Slovakia’s economic growth has been highly rated by GDP
dynamics but this has  not been reflected in the area of employment, particularly
with respect to job creation.
In 1994, growth was jumpstarted  by a revival of exports. Later  problems
appeared  related to the  external economic imbalances. The  government achieved
continued growth mainly due to  a generous investment policy matched  with rising
public consumption. Over a period of time, this  strategy proved to be
unsustainable and at the end of 1998 new restrictions failed to support job creation.
Overemployment  was sustained  throughout the 1989-1995 period, and the decline
of real output was greater than the decline in employment.  1996 was the only year
that had a  gross labor productivity indicator (measures as the share of real GDP on
employment) higher than the 1989 level.
Slow and non-transparent implementation of key structural reforms is the
major cause of the aforementioned declines.  Initially, overemployment was kept
static  by maintaining  unprofitable enterprises  through delaying bankruptcies or
preparing revitalization schemes. Efforts to maintain  employment moved slowly
and this also delayed  restructuring. During 1989-1999, some of the
aforementioned restructuring barriers were removed and this action  led to a further
decline in employment. It is predicted that this situation is not likely to change.
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7.1 Introduction
Slovakia’s worst macroeconomic indicator has always been the country’s
high unemployment rate.  The initial sharp rise in unemployment  during the
transition period was perceived as a consequence  of economic restructuring.  Ten
years after the transition period, the unemployment rate remains above  double-
digit levels and has recently  increased.  In this chapter, we will explain the
underlying causes that help maintain this situation.
The chapter contains a brief description of how basic labor market indicators
developed after 1989.  We have provided  internationally comparable indicators
that were calculated using the methodology employed in the European Union and
by the International Labor Organization. Some data may  differ from what has been
previously published  in Slovakia. For instance, in Slovakia the  definition of
population of productive age is limited by the pension age whereas   in the
European Union, the definition applies to the 15-64-year old age group.
A thorough analysis  required  comparison of data from several sources,
particularly from selective surveys. Selective surveys have not been commonly
used in the past but they offer the advantage of  internationally comparable data.
We used the  selective labor force surveys (equivalent to Labor Force Surveys)
which have been carried out in accordance with International Labor Organization
methodology. This data does not necessarily  correspond with the  regular
administrative data (from unemployment registry, enterprise reports, etc.). We
compared the key indicators with the European Union averages (mainly from the
Community Labour Force Survey) and also with comparable data from the
Visegrad-four countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia).
The chapter presents a description of the situation,  the stylized facts, and the
results of academic studies. A brief description of the key Slovak labor market
problems is presented at the beginning of the chapter.
7.2 Employment
7.2.1 Global Changes and Productivity
From 1989 to 1995, the real GDP declined faster than the overall
employment.  The initial transitory decline in output was accompanied by a
significant - but not proportional - decline in employment. For example,  at the
beginning of  the 1989-93 period, real GDP in constant prices fell by about 25 %
while overall employment declined by about 15 %. If we compare industrial output
developments and employment, these values are about 38 % and 25 %. The turning
point came  in 1996 when  the gross labor productivity indicator (measured as the
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ratio of real GDP to total employment) began to rise above the 1989 levels. (Table
1 shows the development of labor productivity in the main sectors of the
economy.)
TABLE 1. Labor Productivity by Sectors 1989-1997
Index 1989=100 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Industry 97 87 84 83 91 96 99 103
Construction 97 70 91 70 71 75 78 86
Agriculture 95 94 78 92 90 97 105 108
Note: Real output in 1995 constant prices divided by total employment in the sector. Source:
Calculations based on data from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic
The initial period of transition in Slovakia was marked by a significant
decline in employment. According to administrative data, total employment in the
1989-98 period declined cumulatively by almost 20 percent. Employment fell both
in absolute terms as well as in relation  to the size of the productive age population.
This decline can be divided into three phenomena:
· demographic changes;
· move into  unemployment;
· move into the state of economic inactivity (outside of the labor force).
During the transitory period the size of the productive age population
increased. Under the conditions of transitional depression, demographic pressure
was demonstrated mainly by rising unemployment. This can be shown by a simple
calculation using administrative data. In 1990, the shares of the employed,
unemployed and economically inactive individuals in the 15-64 years age group
were approximately 72 %, 1 % and 27 % respectively. By 1998, these shares
changed to approximately  56 %, 12 % and 32 %. The share of employed
individuals in the 15-64 years age group thus fell by 15 percentage points, while
the share of inactive individuals rose by five percentage points and the share of the
unemployed by double that amount. On the basis of this calculation, we can
conclude  that the decline in employment represented a relatively greater burden on
unemployment than it did on the  outflow into economic inactivity.
The overall trend in unemployment can be assessed using administrative data
and data from LFS. The administrative  data reported by firms show that overall
employment fell by almost 18 % during  the 1989-97 period. This decline was
more extensive for women; their  employment fell by almost 25 % compared with
a 9 % decline for men. The share of women on overall employment fell by four
percentage points. Overall employment fell in every year except for two.
Administrative data tend to underestimate employment in comparison with
LFS data. This data  show positive tendencies in employment growth during the
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years 1995-96, but from 1997 overall employment  began to fall. The change in
1997 was –4.7 % overall and –6.7 % for women. Employment continued to decline
in 1998 and 1999.
Many current problems in the area of employment can be attributed to the
relatively high share of industry on overall employment and to the current crisis in
some industrial sectors. The industrial structure of Slovakia is  characterized by a
high portion of heavy industries and the prevalence of production with lower value
added. The situation is particularly critical in engineering which represents the
third largest sector by volume of production (after chemicals and heavy industries).
Productivity growth in engineering is presently achieved  mainly through labor
force reductions. This  leads to further tensions in the labor market.
7.2.2 Structural Changes in Employment
The sectoral breakdown of unemployment has undergone significant changes
in the transition period (Table 2). Administrative data show that the share of
employment in industry on overall employment fell from 44 % to 37 % and the
share of services rose from 44 % to 54 %. Employment in agriculture, which
originally represented 12 %, fell below 9 %. Although Slovakia has traditionally
been the more agriculturally oriented part of the former Czechoslovakia, the
current share of agriculture on overall employment is fairly low. According to LFS
data, the share of employment in agriculture is 8 %. That share  is not much more
than the average in the EU (5 % in 1997) and less than the comparative levels in
Portugal, Greece and Ireland.
A significant difference between Slovakia and the EU persists in terms of the
share of industry on overall employment – in Slovakia it is some 10-percentage
points higher. The opposite tendency persists in employment in services. That
share  is almost 13 percentage points lower in Slovakia than the EU average. These
data suggest that the process of approximation to the EU employment structure
may further reduce the share of industry on employment and raise the share of
services.
Employment levels according to gender and age groups show no significant
changes since 1994. The current level of employment for the 15-64 years age
group is 58.8 %, close to the comparable statistic of 60.5 % for the EU. With
regard to gender differences, we can still observe relatively higher employment
levels for women and relatively lower employment levels for men than the
averages in the EU, 50.5 % and 70.5 % respectively. It must be noted that in
Slovakia the pension age for men is 60 years and for women 53-57 years. Those
ages are  lower than in other transition economies and in the EU. Consequently,
employment levels based on “real” productive age population (15-54 women/59
men) in Slovakia are still higher than the EU average. On the basis of limited time
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series data (since adequate LFS data from before 1994 are not available), it is clear
that employment has declined the most for young people aged 15-24.
TABLE 2. Changes in the Sectoral Structure of Employment
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 EU15 ‘97 (a)
Total (in thousands of
persons)
2 178,5 2 243,5 2 293,7 2 185,2 2 171,9 149 042
 % Share of Women 46.2 46.0 45.8 44.9 45.1 41.8
Index Previous
year=100
99.2 103.0 102.2 95.3 99.4 100.6
 % Share in: (b)
Agriculture 9.9 8.7 9.1 8.2 7.5 5.0
Industry 39.7 38.9 39.9 39.4 39.6 29.4
Services 50.4 52.4 51.0 52.4 52.9 65.6
Note: Employment according to ILO definition, LFS data. (a) EU data from the Community
Labor Force Survey. (b) Total shares expressed as employment in the sector / total
employment. Shares of women expressed as employment of women in the sector / total
employment in the sector. Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, for (a)
Employment in Europe, European Communities, 1998
The formation of the private sector began practically in 1990 and continued in
1991 through small-scale privatization. The share of the private sector on overall
employment was about 1 % in 1989. At present, this share has surpassed 60 %.
This increase has been achieved at the expense of employment in the public sector.
That   share fell from 80 % to 35 %. The third group, represented by employment
in cooperatives, has registered a decline to less than a half and now constitutes only
less than 7 %.  Cooperatives may also be included in the private (non-public)
sector.   The  private sector consistently displays faster employment and output
value growth than the public sector.
The regional breakdown of employment reflects one of Slovakia’s key
contradictions – a high degree of regional segmentation. Regional diversification
of employment in not quite as important in terms of overall value, but its structure
is. Bratislava’s share on overall employment constitutes more than 14 % and the
shares of other regions range between 10 and 13 %. This   corresponds to the
shares of population of productive age in the regions, however  the sectoral
structure of employment tends to display a greater concentration. There are many
mono-industrial districts specialized in one or only a few sectors (for example,
engineering – Považská Bystrica, Dubnica nad Váhom, Martin, Zvolen, metallurgy
– Košice, Žiar nad Hronom, chemical industry – Humenné, leather products
manufacturing – Topolcany). Typical agricultural districts located mainly in the
southeastern lowlands  display particularly high unemployment levels.
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Regional concentration is also reflected in the regional breakdown of
entrepreneurs – legal entities. Bratislava’s dominant status is affirmed by its high
share (28 %) within Slovakia. According to the OECD (1999), Bratislava’s share
of entities with foreign capital is 52 % and 20 % of  the individual entrepreneurs
are based there. The tendency towards vast divergences between the capital and the
rest of the country is also apparent in Czech Republic and Hungary. In this respect,
we must mention the role of foreign investment in reviving job creation. Hungary,
with the most foreign direct investment per capita among the associated countries,
has not seen a major impact from these investments on reviving the labor markets
in crisis regions. Regional differences in this respect that have existed already in
1990 have further intensified  during the transition period. Foreign investors have
focused mainly on the Budapest area and  on a few well-developed regions (for
example, the districts Gyor-Moson-Sopron, Pest, Vas) rather than on crisis regions
in the north and east of the country. Following the implementation of the
Hungarian government’s support programs   foreign investors have  “crossed the
Danube” and headed for the crisis regions.  According  to data from the Hungarian
Ministry of Social Affairs and Family, foreign investment in the crisis regions has
not really acted as a significant job creation stimulus.
Regional segmentation in Slovakia has had severe repercussions on the labor
market situation. In conjunction with the very low level of job creation,  there are
many districts where job opportunities for the unemployed  are negligible.
7.2.3 Flexibility of Working Time and Hours Worked
Working time limits give the Slovak labor market an omen of inflexibility.97
LFS data for the last quarter of 1998 show that 80 % of workers (including the self-
employed) work 40 to 43 hours per week.98
According to LFS data, the extent of part-time labor is very modest. In the
last quarter of 1998, some 2 % of employees worked part-time. For women, the
                                                                
97 The Labor code sets the maximum weekly working time at 43 hours. Regular weekly
(full-time) working time may oscillate between 40-43 hours, depending on the nature of the
job or the economic sector. Since 1991, it is possible to set a different weekly working time
for full-time employment (not exceeding 43 hours) in collective contracts. This does not,
however, concern the public sector. Working time for part-time employment (the so-called
shortened working time) may be set in the contract at the request of the employee or the
employer. Due to the high level of unemployment, the maximum limit on overtime hours
per week or per year (8 hours per week or 150 hours per year) acts as a deterrent from
working overtime, although there are exceptions. But workers cannot be made to work
longer than the above-mentioned maximum limit.
98 Some 15 % work more than 43 hours and only 5 % work less than 40 hours.
Approximately two thirds of part-time employees worked less than 30 hours per week.
About a half of part-time workers worked between 20 to 24 hours per week. There were no
significant differences between the numbers of hours worked by men and women.
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share was higher (3 %) than for men (0.8 %). These shares are very low in
comparison with the averages in the EU. There  as many  as 17 % of the workers
work part-time (6 % of men and 32 % of women). These sizable disparities
indicate that the Slovak labor market is quite inflexible in terms of working time. A
majority of the economically active population is either employed full-time or
unemployed. Employers achieve the necessary flexibility  through temporary
contracts. This, in turn, promotes segmentation of the labor market, and creates a
group of temporary or seasonal workers who, during a crisis, are the first to be hit
by unemployment.  Further LFS data from the last quarter of 1998 (Table 3) show
that only 0.5 % of employed workers were underemployed due to their inability  to
find a full-time job or because their employer was unable to provide them with
full-time employment.
It is a widespread view that the “second job” phenomenon is very common in
transition economies. Survey  data does not support that viewpoint. The data
suggests that only a very modest share of workers have  a second job.
Administrative data show some 3 % of employees with an additional job, while
LFS data indicate an even lower share – 1 % on average (1.2 % for employed men
and 0.8 % for employed women). Only 0.8 % of men and 0.5 % of women
indicated that additional income was an incentive to hold a second job. These
relatively modest figures are surprising in the view of the relatively low standard of
living. One possible explanation may be that most additional activities are not
recorded.
TABLE 3. Part-time Work, Underemployment and Additional Job
 % of workers Part-time Second Job
Total 1.9 1.0
Men 0.8 1.2
Women 3.2 0.8
Underemployed Reason: additional income
Total 0.5 0.6
Men 0.1 0.8
Women 0.9 0.5
Note: Last quarter, 1998. Source: LFS, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic
7.2.4 “Hidden Employment”
The share of the hidden economy on Slovak GDP before the year 1990 was
estimated to be around 3 %. The share has increased during the initial period of
transition to 15-20 %. There are no regular evaluations on  the extent of the shadow
economy. Hajnovicova (1995) evaluated the volume of shadow (unregistered)
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production and activities in 1993 to be about 12.8 % of GDP. Out of that,
production reaching 5.6 % of GDP was estimated as hidden due to statistical
reasons, such as the non-response of small and medium enterprises. Among sectors
of industry, the largest share in shadow economy was attributed to trade, hotels and
restaurants (38 %), followed by trade services (26 %), and construction (15 %).
The rest was allocated mainly to the processing industry, transportation and
agriculture.
TABLE 4. Estimates of Hidden Production in Slovakia, 1993-96
1993 1994 1995 1996
In SKK billions 43.3 51.5 54.6 63.0
 % of total value added 13.0 13.1 12.0 12.0
Source: Infostat and Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic
Another source provides estimates on  the development of the hidden
economy in Slovakia in relation to the total value added. As can be seen in table
11, the volume of hidden production was increasing in nominal terms. However,
the estimated share of hidden production in total value added  declined between
1993 and 1996 from about 13 to about 12  %.
TABLE 5. Average Wage 1989-1998
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Average Wage (SKK/month)
Nom., 1989=100 100 104.4 120.0 144.6 171.2 200.3 229.0 259.5 293.6 305.5
Real, 1989=100 100 94.4 69.6 75.7 72.8 75 78.2 83.8 89.2 91.8
Minimum Wage (SKK/month)
 % change year/year - - - 10.0 11.4 0.0 0.0 10.2 0.0 11.1
Cost of Living Index
 % change year/year - 10.6 56.0 10.7 23.1 13.6 9.6 5.8 6.2 6.6
Index 1989=100 100 110.6 172.5 191 235.1 267.1 292.7 309.7 328.9 350.6
Minimum Wage /
Average Wage,  %
- - 53.1 48.4 45.5 38.9 34.1 33.1 29.3 30.0
Note: Average gross wage in SKK per month. Nom. = nominal
One of the aspects of a shadow economy is  unregistered employment. The
volume  of the so-called envelope salaries has not yet been estimated.  However,
given the relatively high load of taxes and contributions99, the phenomenon of
envelope salaries is believed to be spreading, especially  in the small private sector.
                                                                
99  According to data from the Cost of Labor Information System, the average burden of
taxes and contributions in 1997 represented about 42.2  % of total labour costs.
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7.2.5 Vacancies and Structural Imbalances
Job creation in Slovakia appears to be very low. The numbers of vacancies
reported to the labor offices by employers represent an indicator of the job-creation
process. Despite the usual deficiencies of the vacancy data, it is believed that the
reporting of vacancies is relatively high. This is mostly due to the legal obligation
of employers to report their vacancies to the labor offices. Further interaction
between employers and labor offices, such as providing wage subsidies and loans,
is conditioned on the reporting of vacancies.
The Research Institute of Labor, Social Affairs and Family organized a
survey of the state of vacancy reporting and the co-operation between employers
and labor offices in several Slovak districts (Liska et al., 1996). The results show
that co-operation depends on the size of enterprise. For example, in small firms
employing up to 24 employees, the ratio of reported vacancies to the total number
of created jobs was between 50 and 75 %. Large firms, with more than 500
employees, achieved the most effective reporting.  The  ratio of reported to total
created jobs was as high as 90 to 95 %. On the average, firms, via channels other
than labor offices (mediating agencies, advertisements, etc.), recruited 45 to 55 %
of the workers.
In the light of these figures, it is alarming that the numbers of reported
vacancies are very low compared to the numbers of registered unemployed. At the
end of 1998, there were about 39 registered unemployed per one registered
vacancy. In some regions, the ratio was close to 80. It is noteworthy that at the end
of 1998,  half of all the vacancies was suitable for workers with a  lower apprentice
education, i.e., those with practical skills and minimal general education.
Cumulative inflow of vacancies in 1996 was more than 120 thousand, and in 1997
it was more than 150 thousand. Compared to the stocks of vacancies, these figures
imply that the average duration of vacancy is  several months.100
Structural imbalances between labor demand and supply, from the regional
point of view, can be illustrated by a simple indicator of the mismatch between the
total numbers of vacancies (V) and unemployed (U). The ratio (U-V)U can be
interpreted as  the share of unemployed that cannot be placed in  regular jobs by
the labor offices. Values close to 1 indicate that whatever the absolute number of
vacancies, the value  is negligible compared to the number of unemployed in the
given group. After 1990, the average  value of the indicator  in every Slovak
district (with three to four exceptions) was above 0.95. The same was true for time
series of the indicator in particular districts. With  the exception of the very early
                                                                
100 The calculation is likely biased upwards due to the fact that “cleaning” of the vacancy
register may be done in regular intervals and it may lag behind the true time when the
vacancy was occupied.
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period (end of 1990), the average value of the indicator was higher than 0.95.
These results imply that the Slovak labor market is characterized by a permanent
and severe shortage of notified vacancies available to the unemployed.
7.3 Wages
7.3.1 Wage Growth
Despite the fact that wage regulation was in effect only on an irregular basis
and during short periods of time, nominal wages grew  modestly. Growth was so
slow  after 1989 that the real wage gap was not  closed by the end of 1998. Real
wages were initially undermined by the price liberalization of 1991, which resulted
in an  annual drop of 27  %. At the end of 1998, real wages  were still about 8  %
below the level of 1989, and the preliminary results prove that real wages have
modestly dropped during 1999 (see Table 13).
Slovakia is a country with a traditionally low level of income inequality.
Rutkowski (1996) studied wage differentiation in transitional economies during the
early transition period.  He found Slovakia to be an exception among all the
studied countries. Slovakia had  the lowest degree of wage inequality and  low
levels of relative poverty incidence. Other academic studies seem to confirm these
results (Garner, Lubyova and Terrell, (1994), OECD (1996)). Rencko (1995)
reported that in 1994 about two thirds of employees were receiving less than two
times the minimum wage and 90 percent were below the level of three times the
minimum wage. This led to the conclusion that in the initial stage of transition,
wages were viewed more like a tool of macroeconomic stabilization. The
microeconomic functions of wages was neglected, especially in regard to the
worker’s motivation.
Real wage growth in Slovakia has been relatively modest. During the period
between 1989-98, average nominal wages grew by more than 300  %, but in real
terms, they actually fell by 8  %. Minimum wage legislation was introduced in
1991. The level of minimum wage is determined by ad hoc administrative decision.
In 1991, it started at  2000 crowns per month, and in 1999, it was 3,600  crowns
per month. The latter  is about one third of the average wage in the national
economy. Since its introduction in 1991, minimum wage has been blamed for
providing disincentives to employment, mainly due to its low amount as compared
to non-labor income from social benefits.
7.3.2 Wage Differentiation
Data, from the latter phases of economic transition, show  substantial
progress in  wage differentiation. Data suggest that the differentiation by individual
characteristics, such as education or occupation was more pronounced than the
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differentiation by aggregate characteristics, such as type of ownership or sector of
the economy. Workers in the agricultural sector experienced the largest drop of
relative wages. In  1989, the wage levels in agriculture and industry were
approximately equal, but in 1998, the employees of the two sectors ended up with
79 % and 100 % of the national average, respectively. Wages in construction have
been traditionally higher than the national average, reaching 103  % of the national
average in 1998. That figure  is roughly equal to the pre-transition figure.
As to the breakdown of average wages by branch,  the highest wages are
observed in financial services. Relatively  high wages are also found  in public
administration, defense, real estate, and research and development. In the primary
sector, relatively high wages can be found in mining and energy industry. The
latter is also known for having the largest discrepancy between the increases of
labor productivity and real wages (in favor of real wages) among the industrial
branches.  Hotels,  restaurants, education, trade, health and the social sector, are
among the sectors with relatively low wages.  Their  average wage is comparable
to that of agriculture and forestry.
TABLE 6. Wage Structure 1989 - 1998. Average Wage by Economic Sector
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Average Wage (SKK/month)
Total 3 142 3 281 3 770 4 543 5 379 6 294 7 195 8 154 9 226 10 003
 % of the
average in:
Agriculture 102 103 98 91 85 82 81 81 80 79
Industry 102 101 102 100 102 103 104 104 104 100
Construction 108 107 102 102 103 103 104 107 108 103
Note: Data based on statistical reports for the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. A
continuous time-series cannot be constructed for the service sector due to changes in
sectoral classification and the lack of representative aggregated data. ECU equivalent: SKK
38.3 at the end of 1997, EUR equivalent: SKK 43 at the end of 1998. Source: Statistical
Yearbooks of the Slovak Republic and Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic
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TABLE 7. Wage Structure. Average Gross Wage by Ownership Type
1997 1996 1997
Selective Survey (a) Company Reports(b)
Total (SKK/month) 10 886 Total (SKK/month) 8 224 9 369
 % share by ownership:  % share by ownership:
Private 95.9 Private 101.6 100.5
Cooperative 89.7 Cooperative 78.6 77.1
Public 86.0 Public 98.6 99.6
State 106.6 State 99.7 100.7
Foreign 104.9 Foreign 126.8 128.9
Political Parties/NGO
Sector
81.3
International Private 103.5
Mixed 110.2
Note: (a) Calculations based on data from the Labor Cost Information System. (b) Excluding
employees of small enterprises and employees of private enterprises not registered in the
trade register (hence, overall averages in various tables differ). Source: (a) Štruktúra miezd
zamestnancov v SR, 1997, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. (b) Rocenka práce,
sociálnych vecí a rodiny 1997, Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak
Republic
TABLE 8. Gender Wage Gap (ratio of average gross wages)
Women / Men, share in  % 1995 1996 1997
Total 80.09 78.42 78.0
By Education Level:
Primary 74.5 73.8 73.9
Apprentice Lower 77.5 75.9 67.5
Vocational Lower 77.5 75.9 72.6
Apprentice Full Secondary 83.5 81.4 75.7
High School 78.5 81.6 68.1
Vocational Full Secondary 74.5 77.3 74.7
University 79.1 77.5 84.2
Scientific 79.9 86.7 107.6
By Wage Grids:
Lowest Ratio (7-th grid) 77.6 78.3
Highest Ratio (11-th grid) 96.3 97.0
Contract Wage 64.5 70.6
Notes: In 1995 and 1996 based on average hourly wages at end of year. In 1997, it was
based on the average monthly wages during the year. Wage grids are used in budgetary
sphere. Usually there are 12 wage grids. Source: 1995 and 1996 from Kostolna and
Hanzelova (1997), for 1997 own calculations based on enterprise survey “Information
System on the Cost of Labor”
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Wages in the private sphere on average do not seem to differ substantially
from those in the state sector (table 15). The highest pay can be found in firms with
foreign ownership, and the lowest pay can be found  in co-operatives and non-
profit organizations, such as municipal and political organizations and charities.
Gender wage gap in Slovakia is of the order of 20 percent, which means that
average wage of females represents about 80 % of that of males (table 16). Gender
differentials are most pronounced in the case of contract wages (i.e., bargained
wages in the entrepreneurial sector) and in lower wage grids.  The  differentials are
persistent but due to increasing wages and education, a gradual decrease can be
seen.
There is a clear tendency in Slovakia towards the increasing returns of
education. Results based on the enterprise survey “Information System on the Cost
of Labor” (Table 9) illustrate substantial and increasing wage differentiation
according to education. In 1998, the wages of the lowest and highest education
group represented about 80 % and 160 % of the average.
Filer, Jurajda, and Planovsky (1999) estimated development of returns to
education in Slovakia, using the same enterprise survey data (“Information System
on the Cost of Labor”). The analyzed sample ranged from 1.9 to 3.9  % of the total
labor force in the Slovak Republic. In 1997 the coefficient capturing effect of
college education as compared to primary school education was 0.7. A comparable
figure for the Czech Republic was 0.8. Roughly comparable figures from other
countries’ studies  include 0.64 for the United Kingdom, 0.73 for Western
Germany, 0.56 for Italy and 0.42 for Sweden.  The  authors have documented that
by 1997 the returns to education in Slovakia reached the level observed in
traditional market economies.  The returns to education in Slovakia increased
substantially between 1995 and 1997, and  reached a level two to three times
higher than the 1984 level.  Returns to education increased more in the private
sector and were greater in the younger population.  The rate of increase was
approximately equal for men and women.
 Regional  wage structure is influenced by the presence of large cities (such as
Bratislava, Kosice, Banska Bystrica).  The  highest wages (123 % of the total average) are
observed in Bratislava. The lowest wage level was found in the region of Presov, in the
eastern part of the country, where the unemployment rate is the highest. Rencko (1995) in
his analysis of wage policy in Slovakia concluded that there is an indirect (downward-
sloping) relationship between the unemployment rate and the wage level among Slovak
districts.
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TABLE 9. Wage Structure. Average Gross Wages by Education Level
1996 1997 1998
Total (SKK/month) 9 106 10 086 65,92(a)
 % share by education level:
Basic 81.7 66.1 78.3
Apprentice 94.5 86.1 92.6
Vocational 87.6 75.3 86.4
Full Secondary Vocational 93.9 93.9 101.3
High School 99.6 86.9 101.0
University 156.9 189.1 158.6
Note: Based on enterprise survey “Information System on the Cost of Labor”
(a) In 1998 gross hourly wages in SKK in the last quarter. Source: Statistical Yearbook of
SR (1996), Analysis of wage structure of employees in SR (1997), Statistical Office of SR
The overall  load of taxes and social security contributions is relatively high.
The average  load of taxes and social insurance payments represents more than 20
% of an employee’s gross wage. According to the enterprise survey “Information
System on the Cost of Labor,” taxes and insurance payments in 1997 represented
an  average 23 % of gross employee’s wage.  Wages  also represented an  average
68.8 % of  the employer’s total labor costs. An additional  24.8 % of the
employers’ labor costs were obligatory social insurance contributions and 1.6 %
were taxes related to the employers’ wage payments.  These figures imply that the
total burden of taxes and obligatory social insurance payments in 1997 represented
an  average 42.2 % of the total labor costs. Tax load is increasing over time, due to
the fact that  the income brackets for various tax rates were denominated in
absolute nominal terms in 1992. These income brackets had not changed by 1999
and have only been  modified in 2000 (see Chapter about fiscal policy).
7.4 Unemployment
7.4.1 Unemployment Data
At the beginning of the transition, the initial steep increase of unemployment
was welcomed as a signal of the economy’s restructuring.  However, after ten years of
transition, the Slovak labor market remains trapped with a double-digit and increasing
unemployment rate. Unemployment in Slovakia is monitored by the National Labor
Office (registered unemployment) and by the Statistical Office. The latter has been
performing  regular quarterly Labor Force Surveys since the second quarter of 1993.
These surveys provided  internationally comparable unemployment statistics
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according to the ILO definition of unemployment.101 The comparison of data related
to  the evolution of unemployment has been compiled from the previously mentioned
resources and is  represented in Chart 1.
In 1991, the unemployment rate in Slovakia increased sharply from almost zero
to 12 %. Since then, it has been fluctuating around double-digit levels. At  the end of
1998, it reached  about 16 % (428 thousand persons). A new concept of “available
registered job seekers” was introduced by the Ministry of Labor as a restrictive
definition of registered unemployment. It was designed to identify the  registered
unemployed who would be  immediately available for work (excluding those in
retraining, caring for children, or receiving sickness allowances). The corrected
unemployment rate is  approximately 1 % lower when compared to the total
registered unemployment rate.
Labor market dynamics, as captured by flows into and out of registered
unemployment, is  weak. By using monthly data averages from separate calendar
years, one can show that the total unemployment turnover (the sum of inflow and
outflow) represents less than 20 % of unemployment stock (table 10). Weak labor
market dynamics is also reflected in the magnitude of the monthly unemployment
flows, which have rarely exceeded 10 % of unemployment stock. In 1990-91, the
inflows prevailed  over the outflows. This was due to a high unemployment stock.
Later the inflows and outflows became roughly balanced, thus conserving the high
unemployment stock. In 1997 and 1998, inflows once again prevailed over the
outflows.
TABLE 10. Unemployment Dynamics. (Registered Unemployment)
In  % 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Inflow / Stock 66.2 18.3 8.8 10.7 7.4 8.5 9.8 9.9 9.4
Outflow / Stock 28.5 5.2 10.0 7.9 8.2 9.4 9.9 9.4 7.7
Outflow / Inflow 43.1 28.4 113.8 73.9 110.0 110.7 100.9 95.5 81.4
Turnover 94.7 23.5 18.9 18.5 15.6 17.9 19.7 19.3 17.1
Note: Data refer to annual averages computed from monthly data (flows are 1/12 of
annual flows, stocks are averages of end of month stocks in the indicated year).
Turnover = (Inflow + Outflow) / Stock. Source:  National Labor Office of SR
Registered unemployment in Slovakia is higher than LFS unemployment.
This implies the possibility of disincentive effects on unemployment insurance and
                                                                
101 According to this definition, a person is considered unemployed if he did not work for
wage or another form of compensation in the past week, is actively seeking a job and is able
to enter employment within the next two weeks. Registration with the labor bureau is not
taken into account, since it usually entails various institutional and administrative anomalies.
The ILO definition thus better reflects the economic essence of uenmployment than data on
registered unemployment.
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social benefits. The discrepancy between the LFS-based and registered
unemployment rate at the end of 1998 was close to 5 percentage points in favor of
the latter (11.8 versus 16.4 %). In terms of long-term unemployment, the difference
between registered unemployment and the LFS unemployment is much less
pronounced. Chart 2 demonstrates that the large discrepancy between the registered
and LFS unemployment is mainly due to the group of short-term and medium-term
registered unemployed.
Soon after the beginning of transition, long-term unemployment started to
increase until its share in the total unemployment according to LFS data reached
approximately 50 %. This share is relatively high. However, it was only slightly
higher than the EU average of 1997, which was 49 % in total, 48 and 51 for males and
females, respectively. Comparable Slovak figures were 52 % in total, 50 and 54 % for
males and females, respectively. The share of registered long-term unemployed at the
end of 1998 was 38  %.
CHART 1.Unemployment and Long-term Unemployment (LTU)
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Registered end of year, LFS last quarter. Source: National Labor Office of SR, Statistical
Office of SR
7.4.2 Structural Aspects of Unemployment
Educational structure of long-term unemployed reveals that the most
vulnerable  are those with the lowest skills and education. According to LFS, at the
end of 1998, the group with basic or no education represented 37.5 % of long-term
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unemployment, and  their share in total unemployment was 27.4 %. The share of
people with less than complete secondary education in long-term unemployment
was 75 %.
The Slovak labor market’s low  labor mobility is a frequently mentioned
problem.  Internal migration of the population is one  form of mobility. After 1980,
the extent of internal migration in Slovakia had a declining tendency (Table 11).
Although the past three years have seen a moderate revival, neither absolute nor
relative indicators come close to the 1990 levels. The volume of moves falls with
increasing distances. Migration  within districts (to shorter distances) prevails over
migration between regions. In 1998, the intensity of migration reached about 16
persons in one thousand. This figure appears too low to reduce regional
segmentation in the labor market.
Commuting represents another form of labor force mobility and is applicable
mainly within shorter distances. In this respect, we must mention a significant
improvement in the registry of job openings that  now allow  access to job
information  in all Slovak districts.102 But even a major increase in mobility could
not  significantly help reduce overall unemployment at the present. There is  an
intense and persistent lack of job openings in all Slovak regions and districts. The
imbalance between the numbers of registered unemployed and the job openings
have become worse  in all of Slovakia’s regions (Chart 2). The situation is  most
critical in the Košice and Nitra regions where there are  80 registered unemployed
per job opening. Traditionally, the situation is the best in the Bratislava region. The
situation in the Trencín and Trnava regions is also quite good with “only” about 20
registered unemployed per job opening. These indicators suggest that mobility
cannot be expected to have a greater effect on reducing unemployment because the
labor supply exceeds demand extensively in almost all regions.
In spite of this, the differences between unemployment levels among regions
are growing. The Slovak labor market is permanently marked by a significant
regional segmentation. Regional differences in unemployment are among the most
significant differences. The unemployment level is traditionally lowest in
Bratislava and highest in the Rimavská Sobota district (over 30 %). The spreads
between registered unemployment levels in various districts have been  growing in
the long-term and currently exceed 30 percentage points. The situation of  the
individual districts is depicted by Chart 3.
                                                                
102 Before 1998, information exchange on job openings took place mainly between
neighboring districts. The National Labor Bureau of the Slovak Republic established a
central electronic registry of job openings to allow the exchange of information on job
opening between all districts. Listings of job openings are also regularly published in
selected media.
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TABLE 11. Internal Migration in Slovakia
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998
Number of Migrants 115.6 102.2 100.8 68. 3 80.2 82.5 84.8
of that  % shares:
Within Districts 56.5 57 59.4 55.8 50.0 43.5 44.0
Within Regions 24.0 23.3 22.5 23.5 50.0 33.4 33.8
Among Regions 19.5 19.7 18.1 20.7 - 23.1 23.2
Note: Migration defined as the change of permanent address. Data for regions for 1996 are
not available. Source: Statistical Office of SR
CHART 2. Registered Unemployed Per Job Opening
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TABLE 12. Development of Unemployment Rate Variability Among Districts.
 (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Standard
Deviation
3.2 3.7 4.9 5.1 4.8 5.1 6.0 7.3
Coefficient of
Variation
25.1 30.9 29.6 31.5 32.9 34.8 42.6 41.6
Note: Computed on the basis of registered district unemployment rates at the end of the
indicated year. Standard deviation is an absolute measure of variability, coefficient of
variation is a relative measure of variability (st. deviation/mean). A break  in the
geographical division of SR occurred between 1996 and 1997 (see the text). Source: Own
calculations based on data from the National Labor Office of SR
182
CHART 3. Unemployment in Slovak Districts at the End of
1998.
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Table 12 captures the development of unemployment levels’ variance among
Slovak districts. Absolute variance, expressed as the standard deviation, has more
than doubled in the 1991-98 period. Relative variance expressed as the variance
coefficient has almost doubled in that period.103 We can thus conclude that during
the transition period, differences in unemployment levels between Slovak districts
rose both in absolute and in relative terms.104
The distinction between the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation
mentioned above show  the situation in different regions (CPHR, 1999). The region
of Bratislava has the lowest unemployment rate and the lowest variability of
district unemployment rates in absolute terms. In relative terms, the internal (inter-
district) variability is the largest in the Bratislava region. An opposite tendency
holds for the region of Presov, where the highest unemployment rate is
                                                                
103 Standard deviation is an absolute measure of variance. It is sensitive to the overall
magnitude of the given variable: it has a tendency to rise along with the measured variable.
Therefore, in years with higher average unemployment we can see higher absolute variance
levels. We therefore include the relative variance measure – the variance coefficient –
expressed as the standard deviation divided by the average unemployment level. This allows
us to compare the variance in the various years regardless of the overall unemployment
level.
104 Certain portion of the increase in variance between the years 1996 and 1997 is a
consequence of the new administrative territorial organization. A shift from 38 to 79
districts caused districts to become smaller and more homogenneous and differences
between them increased. A minor decline in variance towards the end of the period under
scrutiny is favorable from this viewpoint.
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accompanied by a low relative variability among districts. Judging by both
absolute and relative variability criteria, the largest segmentation of labor market,
in terms of unemployment rates, is present in the regions of Banska Bystrica,
Trencin and Kosice.  The lowest segmentation can be seen in the region of Nitra.
According to LFS, the unemployment rate for the age group 15-64 was 12 %
in the last quarter of 1998. This seems to be slightly higher than the EU average of
10.6 % in 1997. The incidence of unemployment in Slovakia is relatively high for
females and for young people. Unemployment rates for females have been
persistently higher than for males. At the end of 1998, the difference was about two
percentage points (11.1 as compared to 12.9 %). Young people under 25 years
seem to have a serious handicap in  the Slovak labor market as their
unemployment rate was about 27 % at the end of 1998 and 24 % as of 1997. In this
category, the comparable EU average value for 1997 was 21 %.
For the youngest and the oldest group of the labor force, the female
unemployment rate is lower than that of males. In the young group (15 to 24 years)
this may be partially due to  the effect of military service. Employers are reluctant
to accept young men before military service. Under the current budget deficit, the
waiting period for starting military service tends to increase. Authorities are
considering shortening  the obligatory military service. Another explanation of the
lower unemployment rate of the young females is their relatively large withdrawal
from the labor force. Females aged 21 to 25 have a much larger exit to out-of
labor-force status than their male counterparts.
It is difficult to assess the position of ethnic groups in  the Slovak labor
market because of the lack of suitable data. The main difficulty arises from the fact
that among the three main indicators - employment, population and unemployment
- only the latter two are monitored by nationality. The fact that the unemployment
register contains information on nationality has  been criticized  by the
representatives of Roma 105 and Hungarian minorities. Further data limitations are
caused by the biased nationality structure of the population data (self-reporting
based Census) and the absence of aggregate statistics on unemployment by
nationality. The limited available information is provided in table 13.
According to aggregate indicators, at the end of 1996 there were 62 thousand
unemployed Romas registered at the labor offices. This figure  represented 19 % of
                                                                
105 Notably the fact that in the sake of prevention of the self-reporting bias, the ethnicity was
determined by the labour office staff. The grounds for separate monitoring of Romas come
mostly from the fact their characteristics and reasons of their low ability to integrate into the
society are so specific that they cannot be unambiguously “diluted” and split-up among the
other disadvantaged groups, as this would hide one of the substantial causes of the problem.
Monitoring can be also useful in the sense that it illustrates the bad labour market position of
Romas, preparing grounds for more targeted actions.
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all the registered unemployed. This can be compared to the share of Romas in the
Slovak population of 1.6  % (according to the official census data), or to the
population share of less than 10  % (according to the most generous estimates).
Furthermore, the share of unemployed Romas receiving unemployment benefits  is
lower than the average share. This is mostly due to the long periods  of
unemployment  for  Romas. After exhausting their eligibility period for insurance-
based unemployment benefits, they are transferred to the open-ended social
security benefits. Of course, the aggregate comparison can be  used only as  a
rough illustration, because  it does not capture all the facts, such as   the age
structure of the population.
Individual data on the unemployed are aggregated at the district level.  At this
level the  nationality information falls out (with the exception of the Roma ethnic
group), and the data collected and published by the National Labor Office do not
contain a breakdown by nationality. Therefore, the evidence about unemployment
of separate nationalities is mostly anecdotal. For example, a study dedicated to the
evaluation of active labor market policies in Slovakia (Lubyova and Van Ours,
1999) indicates that in total inflow into unemployment during 1993 in 20 selected
Slovak districts, there were 4 % of Hungarians, 5 % of Romas and the rest of
Slovaks. With respect to the main examined indicator, exit rate to regular jobs,
Hungarians were not different from Slovaks. The  Romas had a lower exit rate to
jobs than any other group.
TABLE 13. Unemployment by Ethnical Groups.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 39 603 301 951 260 274 368 095 371 481 333 291 329 749 347 753 428 209
Roma  (%) 21.2 15.5 15.5 14.0 13.5 16.6 19.0 19.2 n.a.
Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits (a)
1992 1993 1994 1995
Total   (%) 33.6 33.4 22.9 27.0
Roma  (%) 15.2 10.7 4.7 5.3
Notes: (a) Within-group share of those with insurance-based unemployment benefits.
Source: National Labor Office of SR
No strong  statements can be made on the basis of aggregate data about the
Roma unemployed. These  data do not capture whether the situation is mostly due
to prejudiced employers, voluntarily unemployed Romas, or both factors.
Therefore, only anecdotal evidence and studies based on special surveys can clarify
the situation. So far, the studies have led to the conclusion that Romas have the
greatest  difficulties in  the labor market and none of the studies could measure  the
discrimination and incentive effects. Nevertheless, it is clear that the key to the
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solution of weak  labor market position of the Romas lies in increasing their
educational opportunities.
7.5 The Effect of Demographics on the Labor Market
7.5.1 Overall Development
The demographic situation in Slovakia is relatively favorable in comparison
with other transition economies. Due to the  strong years in the 70s, the size of the
productive age population is growing both in absolute terms and as the proportion
of the total population. The so-called dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of post-
productive age population to the population of productive age is still declining
slightly. It is expected to grow only after 2005 – 2010.  The  significant decline in
birth rates after 1989 is reflected by a new, alarming tendency. Despite  annual
increases in the absolute number of women of reproductive age, the absolute birth
rates are constantly declining.
CHART 4. Forecasts of Slovak Population Size (in millions)
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The high and low scenarios of the population forecast in Chart 4 were
prepared by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic on the basis of 1995
demographic data (as a revision of the original forecast based on 1993 data). We
computed the middle scenario on the basis of 1995 demographic data. The actual
mortality levels in 1994 serve as the basis point for the high scenario and the 1995
mortality levels are used in the low scenario. Age-specific mortality rates from
1995, slightly reduced further, serve as the basis for the middle scenario. The
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middle scenario assumes a constant reduction in birth rates until 2005 and a very
mild subsequent growth.106
The effect of demographic factors on the labor market is likely to be
unfavorable in the short-term. The  labor supply should increase, but  we cannot
expect a corresponding revival in job creation. In the long-term, population aging
should be reflected by an increase in the pension age, which will further raise the
supply of labor.
Regional differences in Slovakia in terms of population size and the level of
economic activity are much less pronounced than in the area of unemployment.
The share of regions on total population ranges approximately between 10 and 14
%.107 But birth data vary significantly, rising as one moves from the west to the
east. The highest gross birth rate levels in 1998 were reached in the Prešov and
Košice regions (13.6 promile and 12.6 promile), while the Bratislava region only
recorded 7.9 promile. Gross mortality levels fluctuate a  less – from 8.5 promile
(Prešov region) to 11.5 promile (Banská Bystrica region). These demographic
developments foreshadow deterioration in the labor market, particularly in the
eastern part of Slovakia, if  job creation is not revived sufficiently for the labor
market to absorb the growing supply of labor.
7.5.2 Economic Activity of the Population
The transition period can be divided into two stages according to
developments in the population’s economic activity. Before 1994, the economic
activity of the population declined quite significantly, much more so for women
(administrative data show a decline in their economic activity by almost 22 %
between 1989 and 1994). After 1994, the level of economic activity declined more
slowly. According to the OECD (1996), the level of economic activity in Slovakia
has traditionally been lower than in Czech Republic (although the difference is
small – to the tune of 5 percentage points). This tendency persisted throughout the
transition period. The level of economic activity in Slovakia declined more in
comparison to the Czech Republic and Poland, but less than in Hungary.
                                                                
106 The implied total birth rate per woman of reproductive age in 2015 is 1.33, 1.42 and 1.60
for the low, middle and high scenarios respectively.
107 Despite relatively equal shares of the population, the population density in the individual
regions varies widely (from 70 to 302 people per square kilometer), a consequence of
different sizes of the regions.
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TABLE 14. Level of Economic Activity by Age and Gender in 1998.
Age Total Men Women
15-64 66.8 73.2 60.4
15 – 24 43.2 45.3 40.9
25 – 49 87.2 92.6 81.7
50-64 42.4 55.6 31.0
65+ 1.5 2.3 1.0
15-59M/54W 72.5 76.4 68.3
Total 45.7 51.1 40.6
Labor supply / population of productive age in  %. Source: Own calculations based on LFS
and population data from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic
International comparisons of the levels of economic activity are complicated
by the variety of data sources and the different productive age definitions. In the
EU, data from labor force surveys and data on population between the ages 15 and
64 are used for comparative purposes. Since the implementation of LFS in
Slovakia in 1993, it is possible to provide comparative data for Slovakia (Table
14). In 1997, the level of economic activity was 67.6 %, almost identical with the
EU average in the same year (67.8 %). Comparative data, for the Slovak Republic
for the men are 75 %, and for the women are 61 %. This indicates that our men are
relatively less active and women relatively more active than the EU average (78 %
and 58 %).
In 1998, the level of economic activity of the population between the ages 15
and 64 again declined slightly and reached 66.8 %. The highest levels of economic
activity were achieved in the 25 to 49 years age group: 94 % for men and 81 % for
women. A very low level of economic activity, 1.4 %, among the oldest group
(over 64 years), reflects the low statutory pension age in Slovakia. A mere 2 % of
men and 1 % of women over 64 years of age are economically active. The low
pension age for women (53 to 57 years) is clearly reflected in the significant
decline of their economic activity after 55 years of age. This indicator is some 10-
percentage points lower than for men.
We can conclude that the economic activity of the Slovak population reaches
levels comparable to the EU average at the present time and that we cannot predict
a significant decline that would reduce the supply of labor.
The shares of preproductive, productive and postproductive age population on
total population in 1998 were 20.4 %, 61.8 % and 17.8 % respectively (data based
on “real” productive age of 15-54 years for women and 59 years for men). Age
structures of other nationalities in Slovakia display wide fluctuations. The Romany
ethnic group deviates the most from this structure. The share of postproductive age
population in the entire Romany population is only 5 % and in the productive age
population it is only 40 %. Accordingly, we can expect major pressures on the
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labor market from this group, particularly in the eastern part of Slovakia. Other
nationalities have a lower share of preproductive population in general and a higher
share of postproductive age population than citizens of the Slovak nationality.
It is difficult to assess the position of minorities in the Slovak labor market
due to the absence of appropriate statistics. The main difficulty lies in the fact that
of the three main indicators – employment, population and unemployment – only
the latter two are tracked on the basis of nationality. The bias in the tracking, the
ethnic breakdown, of the population poses a further obstacle (the census is based
on self-reported data). Summary data on unemployment is not broken down by
ethnicity and the absence of such data contributes to the problem. Administrative
data on employment are based on company reports and do not contain the ethnicity
of employees. The structure of employment by ethnicity is followed in LFS, but is
not available on an aggregated level.
7.6. Labor Market Policies
7.6.1 Passive Labor Market Measures
Passive labor market policies in Slovakia have often been subjected to
institutional reforms. As institutions in practice adjusted to rapidly changing
conditions, frequent reforms became common in other transition economies as
well. Major tightening reform, inspired by the soaring payments for unemployment
benefits, occurred in most countries during 1991-1992. In Slovakia, this restrictive
reform took place in early 1992. Originally designed as a 12-month entitlement,
period for unemployment benefits was halved. The eligibility conditions for
unemployment benefits were tightened and replacement ratios were slightly
decreased (from 65 and 60 %, corresponding to the first and second half of the
entitlement period, to 60 and 50 %, respectively). The reform was applied
retroactively, i.e., to citizens that had become unemployed prior to January 1, 1992.
TABLE 15. Public Expenditure for Employment Policies,  % of GDP
1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Employment Service(a) 1.02 0.80 0.82 1.16 1.29 1.08 1.08
Labor Market Training(b) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
Subsidized Employment (c) 0.13 0.26 0.39 0.67 0.62 0.36 0.22
Unemployment Benefits 0.86 0.50 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.43 0.54
Retirement Pensions 6.71989 8.9 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 8.1
Notes: (a) Total expenditures on passive and active labor market policies, (b) Including
training of employees supported by the labor offices, (c) Youth measures are part of
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subsidized employment. Source: National Labor Office of SR, Ministry of Labor, Social
Affairs and Family of SR
Unlike in other transforming economies, the unemployment insurance system
in Slovakia was loosened in 1995, and additional relaxing steps followed in 1996
and 1997 (through the extension of support periods, less strict entitlement
conditions, etc.). The period for unemployment benefit payments was extended
according to the age of the unemployed individual. It later depended on the length
of the preceding period of payments in the Employment Fund. This reform was
caused by budgetary considerations. Insurance payments were shifted from the
state budget to the National Labor Bureau. This was done on behalf of unemployed
beneficiaries. Savings in the state budget were achieved through an increase in the
number of beneficiaries. At present, this period is again being shortened due to
pressure created by the rising passive costs. This situation is a result of growing
unemployment and the reduction of the upper limit of unemployment benefits.
These reforms in passive policies were particularly reflected by fluctuations
in the share of the unemployed entitled to receive unemployment benefits (Table
16). The restrictive reform in 1992 cut this share from 82 % to 34 %. The relaxing
reform of 1995 was reflected by an increase of the share from 23  % in 1994 to 28
% in 1998. Following restriction in 1992, the number of registered unemployed
temporarily fell, but it is difficult to distinguish the effects of reforms from
seasonal and other factors.
TABLE 16. Registered Unemployed Receiving Unemployment Benefits ( % share
of total unemployment)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 82 34 34 23 23 28 27 28
Male 81 34 34 23 23 30 29 30
Female 83 33 35 23 23 26 24 26
Source: National Labor Office of SR, Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family of SR
Mass retirement, including disability pensions and a special old-age pension,
has been a popular measure used throughout the transition period to reduce labor
market pressures. Pensioners and workers of retirement age gradually withdrew
from the labor force. As can be seen from table 17, the share of employed
pensioners in overall employment declined from about one-third to about 10  %
during the transition period. Currently it is possible for old age pensioners to work
and receive both their pension and a reduced salary, providing that their labor
contract is for a definite period up to one year (can be renewable, though). Exits to
early retirement represented between 4 and 5  % of unemployment inflow. Early
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retirees do not have to be registered in the unemployment register prior to their
retirement. Early retirement can be granted within two years prior to reaching the
regular retirement age. The person must be laid off for so-called organizational
reasons and he/she cannot be offered a suitable job. Given the low statutory
retirement age, early retirement can be granted as early as at the age of 51 years for
females and 58 years for males. For some groups of workers, the retirement age
can be even lower, depending on the so-called labor categories. Labor categories
classify the jobs into groups with preferential treatment. This extensive usage of
retirement as a labor market tool will have to come to an end in the near future,
because the pay-as-you-go pension scheme may soon approach a negative balance.
TABLE 17. Early Retirement Pension Schemes
1989 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Annual Inflows
Early Retirements - 19 546 15 996 17 250 14 142 15 675
Relation to un. Inflow (%) 4.7 4.9 4.8 3.7 3.9
Share of Employed 1984 1987 1990 1992 1994 1996
Pensioners 33.3 32.7 27.7 13.1 12.6 10.4
Note: All shares are in  %. Source: Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family of SR
7.6.2 Active Labor Market Measures
 Active labor market policy (ALMP) may be aimed at improving the
functioning of the labor market from several perspectives. However, in practice,
ALMP are usually aimed almost exclusively at reducing unemployment. The
choice of appropriate measures or approaches of ALMP should depend on the
prevailing type of unemployment in the given labor market. In this respect, we can
briefly address certain types of unemployment (summed up in Box 1).
 Of the three situations described in Box 1, transition economies suffer the
most from the third problem – insufficient job creation. Causes include the lack of
capital resources, large uncertainty regarding future market and sectoral
developments, and technological and managerial deficiencies and so on. The
existence of long-term unemployment and structural unemployment is more of a
secondary phenomenon – a consequence of weak job creation. It is difficult to
analyze structural imbalances when there are few job openings for people with a
variety of professions and educational backgrounds. Structural ALMP measures
aimed at more effective placement of the unemployed in open jobs (like retraining
or labor mobility promotion) are effective only when these openings exist.
Programs aimed at job creation make sense in the Slovak labor market, although
the manner of their implementation is questionable.
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 The policies were introduced in 1991 and gradually developed into a
comprehensive system of more than eight basic types of programs. The last major
re-organization occurred in 1997. Until the end of 1996, the active labor market
policies in Slovakia contained the following measures: socially purposeful jobs,
publicly useful jobs, retraining, counseling, sheltered workplaces for the disabled,
subsidies for shortened working hours, jobs for school graduates. Act No.
387/1996 Coll. on employment has been effective since January 1997. It stipulated
the following active labor market measures: retraining, support of job creation,
support of employment of specific target groups, support for prevention of layoffs,
support for maintenance of existing jobs, support for elaborating proposals for
revitalization of employment, support for employment of disabled.
 BOX 1. Types of Unemployment from the Perspective of Appropriateness of
ALMP Use.
 There are enough job openings in the labor market, but unemployment is high due to a structural
imbalance in terms of profession or education between the unemployed and the openings. The
recommended approach in this case is to retrain the unemployed, after a certain initial unemployment
period. The initial unemployment period is required to give the unemployed a chance to look for a
suitable job. Those who fail to find an appropriate job can then get retrained. This action will raise their
chances of gaining employment. Retraining also prevents deterioration of working habits due to longer
periods of unemployment. But this type of structural unemployment is more characteristic for OECD
countries than it is for transition economies.
 Job creation exists in the labor market, but the outflow of the unemployed is lower than the
number of jobs created. This is due to a high share of the long-term unemployed. The long-term
unemployed both search less intensively than others and are less accepted by employers who tend to
hold prejudices against them. In this case, retraining of the long-term unemployed represents the
optimal approach. The supply side of the labor market (employers) does not require special subsidies,
since job creation occurs spontaneously. Again, this type of unemployment is more common during the
growth phase of the economic cycle in OECD countries. During the initial  revival period in an
economic cycle, certain unemployment inertia takes place. This is attributed mainly to the so-called
hard core of the long-term unemployed. This group was created during the preceding period of
economic recession.
 The situation in the labor market is characterized by insufficient job creation. In this case it is
important to find the causes behind this situation. If it is lack of capital or insufficient liquidity,
subsidies or other forms of job creation support would be the appropriate measure to take in the hope of
creating a multiplication effect (i.e., a certain self-reproduction of jobs in functioning enterprises). It
must be noted that other measures, other than the ALMP measures, may be even more effective. A
favorable credit policy would be very effective. Job creation is the appropriate measure, if insufficient
job creation is a consequence of poor adaptation of new, modern production technologies. This can be
augmented by management, expert retraining, and training. Source: Lubyová, CPHR, 1997
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When the old and new structures of active programs are compared it becomes
obvious that more attention is currently being paid to the preventive, as well as to
specific groups (disabled, older people, long-term unemployed, young and school
graduates). The original job creation programs were formally unified into one
program of job creation, but the distinction between the two types of jobs was
preserved. It is also interesting to note that counseling is not included in the new
structure of active labor market tools. This implies that counseling has to be
financed from labor offices’ general administrative budgets. This risks that it will
be eliminated in favor of the labor offices’ operational needs. Many experiences
prove that individual work and counseling are the most effective methods of
bringing about change in problem groups of unemployed.108
In this context, we must note that the financing of active measures is now
being scaled down significantly due to the increases in passive payments being
made to the unemployed. In the first quarter of 1999, the ration of active and
passive expenditures was 1 : 14. With these circumstances in mind, the Ministry of
Labor, Social Affairs and Family is an preparing the unemployment policy plan.
Given the insufficient job creation and the existence of a large “hard core” of the
long-term unemployed with low qualifications, preference is being given to the
short-term target of creating public service jobs. A pilot program with individual
approaches and retraining for the young unemployed is under preparation in
several districts in eastern Slovakia. It is there that the unemployment problem is
the most rampant.
The new ALMP instruments system has several drawbacks. The character of
certain instruments (barriers to firing, for example) violates the insurance principle
of premium collection. The selective use of certain instruments invites corruption,
distortions of the market competition among enterprises and substituting of
economic employment policies. A solution could be found in an across-the-board
application of the programs. This could be in the form of tax and contribution
reductions granted for employing persons from the target groups. Another critique
of the current system stems from the fact that after the geographic and
administrative reform of 1996, the number of district labor offices was
approximately doubled (according to the number of new districts). The system is
administratively costly, especially when the National Labor Office estimates that
among 79 district labor offices, only 40 are supervising a “real” labor market
(Table 18).
                                                                
108 The new “New Deal” policy of Tony Blair’s government in Great Britain is based on a
highly individual approach to the unemployed, particularly to the younger age groups. But
this approach is very costly and is financed mainly by proceeds from gas industry
privatization in Great Britain.
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A more detailed breakdown of active labor market expenditures is given in
table 19. It is obvious that socially purposeful jobs were the most important
throughout the period, followed by publicly useful jobs and retraining. The shares
of publicly useful jobs were higher at the beginning and at the end of the period.
Retraining has been used modestly and the rest of the programs occupied only a
negligible share of total expenditures.
TABLE 18. Employment Service.
1991 1993 1995 1997 1998
Number of Staff 2 026 1 128 3 527 4 441 4 462
Unemployed / Staff 149 326 94 78 96
Staff / Unemployed 0.007 0.003 0.011 0.013 0.010
Number of Placements 107 889 111 204
Placements / Staff 24 25
Placements / Unempl. 0.31 0.26
Source: National Labor Office of SR, Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family of SR
TABLE 19. Active Labor Market Measures Towards the Unemployed.
(Unemployment data are end of year stocks)
Reg. Unemployed 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 % share in:
Training 0.8 2.9 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.0 2.0 0.2
Subsidized Jobs:
Public Works 3.1 8.9 0.9 1.8 8.5 5.8 5.8 0.5
Other 6.9 39.3 30.9 27.7 32.8 30.5 18.0 7.8
Expenditures 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total (mil. SKK) 523 3 813 1 107 1 896 3 899 4 290 3 099 2 289
 % share on:
Training 9 8 11 6 4 5 7 7
Disabled 0 1 1 1 3 2 5 5
Subsidized Jobs: 91 92 88 93 93 93 40
Active / Passive 0.19 2.23 0.60 1.11 1.79 1.40 0.78 0.42
Contrib./Exp. 1.23 1.02 0.97 1.06 1.03
Note: Subsidized jobs include public works, youth measures and socially purposeful
jobs (subsidized jobs in private sector). The latter includes start-up loans. Source: National
Labor Office of SR, Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family of SR
 
Stocks of created jobs were built up, in the course of 1992, to approximately
120 thousand, and then stabilized. The stocks were strongly built up after two
major inflows of equal  size. These inflows occurred in the financing boom of
1992, and in the first half of 1995. The latter inflow was a result of the changed
priorities in 1995, that resulted in more means being put into publicly useful jobs at
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the expense of other programs. After the large inflows, the stocks were rapidly
depleted because of the limited duration of publicly useful jobs. The large numbers
of trainees in 1992 were due to the boom of active labor market policies in
Slovakia, and were connected to the split of the Czecho-Slovak Federal Republic.
Means for the active labor market policies in the federal budget had to be spent
prior to the split of the federation.
The structural considerations of labor market mismatch presented in earlier
sections of this chapter imply that there is a potential scope for the structural active
labor market measures, such as retraining and the promotion of labor mobility.
However, at the current stage, the absolute lack of vacancies does not allow for a
successful application of these tools. First of all, it is necessary to boost the job
creation. This could be done by subsidized job creation within the active labor
market programs, but the volumes of jobs created in that manner will never be
sufficient. For example, the stocks of existing socially purposeful jobs and publicly
useful jobs never exceeded  the level of approximately 150 thousand during the
period 1990 – 1996. The numbers of registered unemployed (not speaking about
other job seekers) are close to 400 thousand.
TABLE 20. Retraining of Unemployed and Employees Provided by Labor Offices
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Persons in Retraining
End of Year Stock 10 282 4 432 3 744 4 666 3 772 7 494 1 194
 % share
Unemployed 73 72 78 80 84 91 87
Employees 27 28 22 20 16 9 13
Expenditures
Total (million SKK) 70.7 117.4 108.2 164.1 200.6 257.6 167.0
 % share
Unemployed 96 96 96 97 98 97 98
Employees 4 4 4 3 2 3 2
Expenditures / Inflow 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total ( thousand SKK) 8.0 9.0 9.6 11.1
Unemployed 8.3 9.5 10.0 11.3
Employees 3.2 2.8 4.4 5.5
Successful Completion / Inflow  (%)
Total - 104 87 142
Unemployed 101 103 85 140
Employees - 116 105 195
Source: National Labor Office of SR
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BOX 2. Evaluating the Effectiveness of ALMP Programs.
It is quite complicated to assess the effectiveness of ALMP programs. Studies based on an analysis of
individual data are usually skewed by a certain selective bias. This bias makes it more difficult to
interpret the results. Positive effects of a program on an individual are usually measured by the
individual’s increased probability of gaining permanent employment after participating in the program.
Program participants are compared to other unemployed, although it is very difficult to account for the
non-random process of selecting program participants. If a certain program is aimed at a given group of
unemployed, there is a risk that the probability of gaining employment for this group is systemically
skewed by certain factors characteristic for the group that differentiate it from other groups of
unemployed. It is then hard to interpret comparative results with individuals who have not participated
in the program. Studies based on individual data can yield conflicting results, and promote moreover
with ambiguous interpretation.
The general practice of ALMP program implementation poses another problem in evaluating their
effectiveness. Local offices are frequently evaluated according to their success in implementing the
various programs. The number of retrained persons who found a job after attending training may serve
as one indicator of success. An effort to reach high effectiveness can then lead to a tendency to only
include more “able” individuals who do not have to depend on the labor bureaus’ assistance. The
“hopeless” cases, such as the unqualified unemployed, may  gradually become long-term unemployed.
Earlier participation in the programs may be able to prevent such a result. In many OECD countries,
there is a growing belief that it is better to prevent long-term unemployment from arising than to have to
focus on getting the long-term unemployed back to work.
Many selective distortions of results in researching the effectiveness of ALMP programs can be avoided
by analyzing aggregated data. This data usually include the entire set under scrutiny (all Slovak
districts, for instance). But the analysis of the aggregated data also poses certain difficulties. Some
processes are difficult to identify in aggregated data. For instance, in assessing the outflow of
unemployed due to participation in ALMP programs, a certain turnover of unemployed within the same
jobs is not taken into account. Several registered unemployed may take turns in the same job, while the
rest of them return into registration. These multiplication effects result in overestimation of the real
effect of created jobs on the outflow of unemployed and result in underestimation of the program costs
per participant.
The so-called dead-weight loss and substitution are further factors obfuscating the real effects of ALMP
programs on the labor market situation. The dead-weight loss means that funds for ALMP are used to
create jobs that would have been created even without support from ALMP funds. This problem is
particularly noted when jobs are created in the private sector (in our case with the so-called socially
beneficial jobs or their current modifications). In this situation, access to credit is difficult or almost
impossible, ALMP funds substitute for loans that should come from the banking sector. Labor market
institutions cannot effectively find out whether an entrepreneur applying for a subsidy to create a job
really depends on the subsidy or whether he would have created the job without it. In the latter case, the
subsidy is partly substituting for a bank loan.
Source: Lubyová, CPHR, 1997
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TABLE 21. Selected Results of a Study on the Effectiveness of the Use of Funds
from the Employment Fund of the Slovak Republic (Liška, Prušová, Bradácová,
1996)
LUCENEC RIMAVSKÁ SOBOTA
1994 1995 1994 1995
Number of Jobs
SBJ 533 1314 1 005 2 313
PWJ 172 907 335 2700
Dead-weight (a)
SBJ - 45 – 51 % - 52 - 68 %
PWJ - 10 – 35 % - 11 - 14 %
Prematurely Terminated Jobs
SBJ  20 % 20 % - -
PWJ (< 6 mon.) 22 % 52 % 0 % 23 %
Effectiveness of Spending (b)
SBJ - 49 – 55 % - 32 - 48 %
PWJ - 65 – 90 % - 86 - 89 %
Notes: „ - “ denotes that data are not available. (a) The percentage of jobs that would have
been created even without support from ALMP funds (expert estimate). (b) The
corresponding share on expenditure (100 % - % of dead-weight). Source: Líška, Prušová,
Bradácová (1996), Hodnotenie efektívnosti vynakladania financných prostriedkov z FZ SR
na aktívnu politiku zamestnanosti v okrese Lucenec a Rimavská Sobota, The Research
Institute of Labor, Social Affairs and Family, Bratislava
The development in retraining (captured by Table 20) documents poor usage
of this instrument. Between 2 and 4 % of the overall retraining budget were
annually spent on the retraining of employees. At the end the 1992, employees
represented almost one third of the trainees. Later, their share declined to about one
tenth of the retrained persons. Expenditures per trainee are lower for the employed.
Labor offices provide up to 50 % of costs and, in justified cases, the coverage may
be even higher. The contribution is conditioned by the prevention or reduction of
mass layoffs, or by the condition of at least 12-month employment after the course
completion. The rate of successful course completion within separate calendar
years appears to be higher for employed trainees than for unemployed (table 20).
A case study from two Slovak districts of Lucenec and Rimavska Sobota
(Liska et al., 1996b) indicates that the rate of success in retraining of unemployed
was rather high.  In 1994, about 80 % of retrained unemployed were placed in jobs
after completing their retraining. In 1995, the share was close to 60  %. Possibly
this was a result of the practice that an ex-ante promise of job-placement was
required by many labor offices before retraining. When one considers the severe
shortage of reported vacancies, the strategy does not appear unreasonable.
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In most Slovak districts, retraining has been applied modestly when
compared to the subsidized job programs. The high share of poorly educated
people found in long-term unemployment (almost 80  % of long-term unemployed
have less than complete secondary education) indicates the need for sizeable
retraining after the job creation is boosted.
Problems arising in evaluating the effectiveness of ALMP programs are
treated in greater detail in Box 2. No systematic studies of dead-weight losses have
been carried out in Slovakia. The data available are either anecdotal by character or
based on expert estimates. Emmerich (1994) dealt with a program of socially
beneficial jobs (SBJ) and states in his study that at a seminar for entrepreneurs,
using an SBJ program, five of the seven entrepreneurs present said that the jobs
concerned would have been created even without financial support from the labor
bureau. Although they represent a small sample of entrepreneurs, the number of
jobs then created was relatively high. In total, they have created 207 jobs since
1991, 156 of that subsidized through an SBJ program. Líška, Prušová, Bradácová
(1996) tried to estimate the dead-weight loss of funds used for ALMP in two
Slovak districts – Lucenec and Rimavská Sobota. Their data was based on expert
estimates, and the results for the various programs are summarized in Table 21.
The above-mentioned substitution effect is another undesirable phenomenon
of ALMP programs. This means that a subsidized job has to be taken by a
registered unemployed or a member of a certain target group (e.g., a recent
graduate). The person then in essence takes the job opportunity from another
applicant. That applicant may be unemployed or is not yet unemployed may
become unemployed as result of this substitution. The effects of substitution and
dead weight losses are not unique to Slovakia. They occur wherever ALMP
programs are used. Empirical research has been focused on evaluating job creation
support in the private sector in Australia (1989), Norway (1989) and the
Netherlands (1992), and was summarized in a study by Calmforse (1994). The
research has come to the alarming conclusion that both of these problems have
jointly affected 70 to 90 percent of funds expended to support the creation of these
jobs. In Sweden, research found that measures aimed at preventing lay-offs at
enterprises in crisis are far more effective (up to 40 %) than measures aimed at
creating new private sector jobs. However, one needs to keep in mind the nature of
these lay-offs in Sweden and in transition economies may extend the agony of
unsustainable enterprises. Attempts to prevent lay-offs may increase the risk of
dead-weight effects and violate the Employment Fund’s proclaimed insurance
principle.
198
7.7 Disincentive Effects of Pensions and Social Benefits
The disincentive effects of pensions and social benefits are among the most
dominant issues related to the labor market and social insurance system in
Slovakia. This section briefly presents several simulations comparing the rate of
substitution of labor income with social income for selected types of households.
The level of minimum income and the composition of households fundamentally
affect the defined levels of social benefits of the given household and it also affects
the potential disincentive effects in terms of employment. Developments in
minimum income for selected types of households and its relationship to gross
income from labor (minimum wage and average wage) are presented in Table 22.
TABLE 22. Developments in Minimum Income (MI), Wages and Living Costs in
the Initial Period of Transition and at Present.
MI by Household Type 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1998
1 Adult 1 700 1 700 1 980 1 980 2 180 3 000
2 Adults 3 050 3 050 3 510 3 510 3 850 5 100
2 Adults + Child 0-6 yrs. 4 100 4 100 4 710 4 710 5 190 6 450
2 Adults + 2 Children 0-6 yrs. 4 500 4 500 5 160 5 160 5 650 7 800
2 Adults + Child 15+ yrs. 5 000 5 000 5 720 5 720 6 320 6 870
2 Adults + 2 Children 15+ yrs. 5 800 5 800 6 620 6 620 7 240 8 640
Minimum Wage - 2 000 2 200 2 450 2 450 3 600
Average Wage 3 748 4 519 5 261 6 088 7 144 9 600
Cost of Living Index (1989 = 100) 173 191 235 267 293 351
Source: Hanzelová, Kostolná, Lubyová, 1999
The intensity of disincentive effects on the minimum income institution can
be viewed in the example on selected types of households. Law no. 195/1997, on
social assistance, set limits on guaranteed income according to need. In further
treatment of disincentive effects of social benefits, we have to distinguish among
cases of work activity (entitlement to have income augmented to the level of 1.2
times the minimum income), cases of material need for objective reasons
(entitlement to have income augmented to the level of 1 times the minimum
income) and cases of material need for subjective reasons (entitlement to have
income augmented to the level of 0.5 times the minimum income). The following
figure depicts the situation in the development of income from labor for various
types of households in comparison with the guaranteed income limits. Chart 5
shows that households with income from labor at the level of the average wage, a
1.2 multiple of MI does not pose disincentives, since their income from labor does
not fall below this level. The situation differs for households where income from
labor is equal to the minimum wage. Labor activity will lead to a higher income
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due to the implementation of the new limit at 1.2 times MI for all households (the 1
times MI limit would only apply to raising the income of households with a single
adult). The 1.2 times MI limit thus presents new stimuli for households with two
adults. Without the new limit, income from labor in these households would
virtually copy the 1 times MI level and income would be unlikely to increase due
to labor activity. The 0.5 times MI level appears very low in comparison with
income from labor of groups earning the average wage. The difference for the
group earning the minimum wage is not significant, but labor activity on the
average doubles the income in comparison with the status of material need for
subjective reasons.
Children allowances are among the benefits that are most often blamed for
providing disincentive effects for employment, especially since the introduction of
means-testing. The introduction of two levels for entitlement leads to a situation
where an increase in gross labor income leads to a decline in net household
income. This is attributed to a reduction or complete elimination of child benefits.
The existence of such limits may act as a disincentive, for instance in deciding
whether one or both parents of dependent children should seek employment. Limits
for gross income from labor of households whose net income declines due to the
loss of entitlement for family benefits depend on the income from labor and the
households’ make-up. For instance, if a household with two adults and a child
younger than 6 years exceeds the 1.28 times the average wage limit, its child
benefits will be reduced. If it exceeds the 1.78 times the average wage level, it will
lose child benefits completely. The elasticity of total net income of households
with respect to gross income from labor is negative in certain discrete intervals.
Net income decreases if gross income increases due to a reduction in or the loss of
entitlement to child benefits. The level and magnitude of income decline increases
with the number and age of dependent children.
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CHART 5. Situation of Various Types of Households in Various Positions of
Material  Need.
Net labor income of households compared with MI level
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
D
D
d 
0-
6
D
d 
6-
15
D
d1
5
D
2d
0- 6
D
2d
61
-5
D
2d
15 2D
2D
d0
-6
2D
d 
6-
15
2D
 d
15
2D
 2
d 
06
2D
2d
 6
-1
5
2D
2d
15 Type of
household
 thous.Sk / m
onth
Aver. wage
1,2 MI
MI level
Min.wage
0.5 MI
Note: Explanation of x-axis labels: The type of households is determined by the number and
age of its members. “D” denotes adults, “d” denotes children; number before the letters D or
d denote the number of adults or children; numbers at the end mark the age interval of the
children. (For example, 2D2d6-15 denotes a household consisting of two adults and two
children between 6 and 15 years of age. Source: Hanzelová, Kostolná, Lubyová, 1999
Chart 6 illustrates the so-called rate of substitution of labor income by social
income consisting of social benefits (according to the law on social assistance) and
child benefits. In the case of labor activity, it is the rate of income substitution from
labor. This is determined by a combination of labor and social income that
augments overall income to the 1.2 times minimum income level. We can see that
the substitution rate significantly exceeds 100 percent for low-income households
(up to 160 percent depending on the number of children) that have adults working
for the minimum wage. In the case of objective need, the rate of substitution
exceeds 100 percent if the household includes dependent children.
The rate of substitution is relatively low for households with average
potential income from labor. Similarly, the rate of substitution is quite low for low-
income households in need for subjective reasons – between 40 and 60 percent in
all cases. It is debatable whether or not a 60 percent rate of substitution would act
as a disincentive.  There appears to be no general answer to this question. The
overall disincentive effects of these social benefits depends both on the number of
households in each category and on their subjective preferred rate of substitution of
labor income by social income.
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CHART 6. Situation of Various Types of Households in Various Positions of
Material Need.
Ratio of labor and social income according to classification of material need
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(1999)
A registered unemployed is a typical example of a socially dependent citizen.
We have therefore focused on assessing the rate of substitution of labor income for
the unemployed throughout the duration of their unemployment. Since we again
take into account social benefits, we have to employ the concept of model
households. The decline in the rate of substitution is greater for higher income
households. For low-income households, the rate is 80 percent and it declines to 40
percent only in the case of subjective material need. For households earning the
average wage, the rate of substitution oscillates around the 50 percent level while
receiving unemployment benefits. In the case of objective material need, it
occasionally falls below 50 percent after a shift to social benefits. The presence of
children raises it above this level, especially for households with a single adult.
The rate of substitution, in the case of subjective material need, falls to about 30
percent. This can be considered low enough to rule out disincentive effects.
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In general, we can conclude that disincentive effects of social benefits in the
Slovak Republic exist, but apply to very specific situations that are dependent on
the composition of households and the potential income from personal labor.
Disincentive effects for low-income households with dependent children may be
quite strong. However, one must exercise caution in making general judgements
because disincentive effects depend on subjective factors.109 We can conclude that
the recent introduction of stricter conditions for social benefit entitlements (the
introduction of the so-called subjective reasons for material need) have markedly
reduced their disincentive effects. But the effect of this reduction may not be
significant since a shift to employment depends on objective conditions in the labor
market. These conditions are critical at present.
7.8 Conclusion
The current economic situation in Slovakia negatively affects the labor
market. Although Slovakia has recorded fairly rapid economic growth measured by
GDP developments since 1994, this growth has not had an effect on employment,
particularly in terms of job creation.
Throughout the 1989-1995 period, the state of overemployment has persisted.
It has established that real output declined more when compared with 1989 levels
than did employment. Only in 1996 did the gross labor productivity indicator
(measures as the ratio of real GDP to total employment) rise above 1989 levels.
The slow implementation of key structural reforms is largely responsible for this
situation. Keeping unprofitable enterprises alive (for example by postponing
bankruptcies or preparing revitalization plans) has contributed to maintaining
employment, that has in turn slowed down and postponed restructuring. The
elimination of some of these restructuring barriers in the 1998-99 has led to a
decline in employment. This decline  seems likely to continue because only
restructured enterprises can create more job opportunities.
In terms of changes in the sectoral structure of employment, Slovakia has
followed much the same path as other transition economies. Approximation to EU
employment structure can be expected to lead to further transfers of employment
from industry to services. This shift will most likely occur through higher
unemployment (as long as job destruction outpaces job creation).
Slovakia is marked by significant regional differences. Bratislava differs
greatly from the rest of the country in terms of GDP, in terms of the concentration
of entrepreneurial activities, and foreign investment. The Slovak labor market is
                                                                
109 Some people may for instance preffer employment that bring income roughly equal to
social benefits, since it keeps them socially active and may present a perspective of higher
income from labor in the future.
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also permanently marked by high regional segmentation and significant differences
in unemployment levels. Bratislava has traditionally had the lowest unemployment
and the Rimavská Sobota district has had the highest. The spread between
registered unemployment levels in various districts has been increasing in the long
term and is currently exceeding 30 percentage points. Internal mobility of the
population had once declined by about 20 %. This occurred during the 1990-98
period.
At present, it is difficult to speak of structural unemployment in Slovakia
(i.e., of unemployment caused by imbalances between job openings and the
unemployed in terms of profession, education, location, etc.), since the number of
job openings is negligible in comparison with the number of the unemployed. In
the short term, the room to apply structural labor market policy instruments, such
as retraining or labor mobility support, is limited. But the need for retraining and
education will increase significantly after job creation recovers. The education
level and qualifications of the Slovak labor force are far from optimal. There is a
dominance of unqualified workers among the long-term unemployed and a lower
share of university students among 18-24-year olds than in the EU. There is also a
lower share of employment in the tertiary sector (qualification-intensive) than in
other EU countries. Education and retraining can play a particularly large role for
the Romany ethnic group. This ethnic group is currently in desperate position in
the labor market.
Economic activity of the population has declined to levels comparable with
the EU average during the economic transition period and is not expected to
significantly decline further and reduce the supply of labor. International migration
has a negligible effect on the Slovak labor market. The share of legally employed
foreigner on the total workforce was 0.23 % in 1998 and their share on total
employment was 0.27 %.
The Slovak labor market is very rigid in the use of working time and part-
time work. LFS data suggest that most economically active individuals are either
employed full-time or unemployed. Employers achieve required flexibility by the
use of limited-period contracts. This promotes labor market segmentation by
singling out a marginalized group of limited-period or seasonal workers. This
group is the first to be affected by unemployment at times of crisis. Low registered
shares of workers with a second job may indicate a higher degree of unregistered
activities.
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8 Funding of Social Security
Lucia HAULÍKOVÁ
Project Coordination Unit at the Ministry of Health
Until 1990, social security had been part of a sweeping social policy that was
conceived in the fifties and sixties, and up until 1993, it had been funded from the
state budget. The existing comprehensive system of benefits catered to the needs of
the citizen from the cradle to the grave coupled with poorly differentiated wages.
The 1990s was a time of dramatic social and economic changes. A new
economic situation called for addressing the new social phenomena (such as, for
instance, unemployment). In conjunction with addressing the above phenomena,
there grew a need to draft and implement systematic changes in social policy, since
the then welfare system was a burden to the economy in transition. Among the
earliest interventions into the system was the introduction of  the principle of
benefit targeting. Despite the positive input of other implemented changes, the fact
whether these measures were systemic by their nature, especially from the point of
view of an actual need to change the concept, needs to be questioned.
The earliest comprehensive concept of the welfare system transformation was
drafted as late as 1996. The social security system leaned on three fundamentals:
social insurance, state social support, and social assistance. Significant delays
accompanied the implementation of the individual reform steps and a number of
them (i.e., acts) were never put into effect. Among the greatest inputs of this
concept  was a change in the State-citizen relationship. State assistance is
conditioned by material and social need which an individual is unable to cope with
on his/her own, and neither can he/she be helped by his/her family.
In the autumn of 1999, a draft of a new social insurance concept was
introduced, taking into account the reform steps that had been undertaken earlier.
The proposed system of social insurance includes all the state-regulated benefits
that are paid out on the basis of the paid insurance premium. The individual
portions of insurance will be structured by the nature of the insurance (basic,
obligatory, optional, commercial). A common feature of both concepts is the need
to enhance the citizen’s personal responsibility.
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8.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to present an analysis of the basic conditions
that establish the core of the welfare system in Slovakia. The purpose of this part is
also to highlight the correlation between the condition of the economy and the
standard of the welfare system. The chapter is broken down into two parts. The
first part contains a description of the adopted concepts of the welfare system
transformation and the steps implemented, as well as its institutional development.
The second part analyzes the creation of resources, social security expenditures,
and the management of the pension security and sickness insurance fund. The
relevance of this chapter is supported by data obtained from the Statistical Office
of the Slovak Republic, and international comparisons  involving data collated
from available foreign sources.
8.2  Social Reform
The federal scenario of the social reform that formulated the fundamentals of
the new welfare system was elaborated, together with the scenario of economic
reform, in the autumn of 1990. In 1991, the foundations of the employment policy
and wage income policy were adopted.109
In Slovakia, after the 1992 elections, an act on social and health insurance
was hastily passed, and the Slovak Administration of Social Security was renamed
the National Insurance Company in order to operate as an umbrella organization
for all insurance funds (i.e., pension, health, and sickness funds). Under pressure
from the International Monetary Fund, the principle of a targeted granting of child
allowances and the state compensatory grant was introduced. In 1994, the National
Insurance Office was split, and the original Slovak Administration of Social
Security was changed to the Social Insurance Office. The system of health
insurance was conceived in a novel way, and a pluralist  system of social
insurances was introduced.
Social reform in Slovakia is to be seen in the context of two facts. The first
concerns the relationship between social policy and the economy (i.e., employment
issues). After 1989, there were efforts made to introduce an equilibrium into this
relationship, and it was assumed that the adopted sociopolitical decisions would
facilitate the establishment of a sound economic environment in the country.
Another fact concerns the relationship between the newly drafted system of
social security and the system of social security inherited from the previous period.
                                                                
109 The new taxation system was adopted by the Federal Assembly of the CSFR in April
1992.
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Originally, as the transformation concept indicated, these goals were to be
met by passing and enforcing nineteen acts related to labor activities and twenty-
one acts  related to social security. The anticipated deadline was January 1, 1998,
and it was to largely involve amendments of acts.
The concept of the welfare system transformation was approved by the
National Council of the Slovak Republic in January 1996; it concerned the
establishment of a social protection system. This system was based on three
fundamentals:
· social insurance;
· state social support;
· social assistance.
8.2.1 Social Insurance
In the 1996 concept, the following was included under social insurance by the
architects of the reform:
· sickness insurance110 which consists of a system of benefits of short-term
nature that are funded continuously from the resources composed of the
insurance premium paid by employers, employees, and the State to the public
Social Insurance Office;
· pension security111 which is composed of a system of benefits of long-term
nature funded in a fashion similar to sickness insurance;
· supplementary pension insurance112 tying into pension insurance and
regulated by the State; these are based on the employer-employee principle
and funded from the contributions remitted to the individual accounts of
insured persons;
· indemnification for occupational injuries and occupational diseases which is
currently ensured by the commercial Slovak Insurance Inc., based on the
employers obligatory liability insurance.
Despite the fact that social insurance was conceived as the core of the entire
system in the 1996 concept, its implementation reports the greatest delays. The act
that was to change social security to social insurance was not passed. Among the
                                                                
110 Sickness insurance is set forth in the Act No. 54/1956 Coll. on the sickness insurance of
employees and the Act. No. 32/1957 Coll. on sickness care in the military, as amended. It
includes sickness benefits, family care benefits, compensatory grants in pregnancy and
maternity.
111 Pension security is laid down in the Act No. 100/1988 Coll. on social security, as
amended. It includes old-age pension, pension for the years worked-off, widow’s/widower’s
annuity.
112 Supplementary pension  insurance are set forth in the Act of the National Council of the
Slovak Republic 123/1996 Coll. on supplementary pension insurance of employees. The Act
was put into effect on July 1, 1996.
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reasons for not passing the act is the fact that if the insurance principle were to be
introduced, this would entail the elimination of all the features of false solidarity
from the current system; therefore, the amount of pension would correlate directly
with  the overall amount of the insurance premium paid. The current  system
computes  the pensions based on the 1998 act which ignores the current wage
differentiation and wage dynamism. Actually, the computation considers only
income up to SKK 10,000 and ignores higher income. This is so despite the fact
that for several consecutive years, the upper income limit for the payment of
insurance premium contributions has equaled eight times the minimum wage (SKK
32,000 presently). So, instead of insurance, one is concerned with an odd
combination of tax and insurance, whereby it is viewed as insurance in an income
up to SKK 10,000, while above this amount, the income is taxed, in fact (outside
the framework of personal income tax and other transfers), by a 27.5 percent tax
rate, which is paid jointly by the employer and employee.
In the social insurance area, the act on supplementary old-age insurance was
passed which, however, does not include all employees. It does not cover the
employees of organizations funded and co-funded from the state budget, and
neither does it include self-employed professionals. This situation should be
resolved by passing an act on civil service, and in the case of self-employed
professionals, by an amendment of the tax law that is envisaged to introduce tax
allowances for supplementary old-age insurance. The said act allows for the
participation only of those employees in supplementary old-age insurance whose
companies  have decided to contribute to supplementary old-age insurance.113
Hence, the participation of an employee is contingent on the participation of
his/her employer. This limiting factor together with the economic situation in
companies has resulted in the limited use of this instrument.
The Czech Republic, for example, has opted for the “civil” principle and
passed an act on supplementary old-age insurance with state contributions. So, as
opposed to Slovakia, any citizen of the Czech Republic is eligible to
supplementary insurance and a state contribution irrespective of his/her employer.
Since February 1994, when the said act was passed in the Czech Republic, over
forty pension funds have been established that manage the contributions of 1.5
million clients. With pension funds operating for several years already, it may be
stated that the system of supplementary old-age insurance is widely used as a
system of short-term savings.114 The original idea of establishing long-term funds
                                                                
113 As of December 31, 1998, three insurance companies, operating in the Slovak Republic,
effectively provide supplementary insurance.
114 A cap of Kc 500, at which the state contribution is still raised, is too low to encourage
bigger savings. In addition, a guarantee in the event of a pension fund bankruptcy is non-
existent; the state contribution is not indexed, and the like.
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available to the capital markets has been materialized, in both countries, in order to
encourage citizens to save over the long-term.
8.2.2 The State Social Support
The state social support is to be composed of a system of direct financial
contributions of the State, to partake in the solution of some events in the lives of
families and citizens.
As early as the spring of 1992, the first draft of the system of benefits was
agreed between the national and the federal ministries of labor and social affairs.
The basis of this system are contributions associated with children in families.115
In 1994, an act on child allowances116 was passed which enacted the very first
allowance of the future system of state social support. This act introduced a
targeted granting of the allowance, which means that the allowance is granted to a
person who really needs it. The allowance is also bound with the income of
persons under review and their subsistence level.
8.2.3 Social Assistance
Although the earliest principles of the act on social assistance were drafted in
early 1992, the act was passed as late as May 1998.117 It fulfilled the Article of the
Constitution of the Slovak Republic No. 39, Para. 2, which ensures that he/she who
is in material need, shall be rendered necessary assistance. The replacement of the
concept of “social care” by “social assistance” is to express more appropriately the
fundamental change in the approach of the State to the citizen, who is in need. The
change lies in the fact that the role of the State is only to assist the citizen in
overcoming his/her crisis situation, whereby it is expected that the citizen will
actively seek ways out and solutions. Hence, the rendering of social assistance is
conditioned by material and social need an individual is incapable of coping with
by himself/herself or with the help of his/her family.
The act stipulates the forms of coping with the citizen’s material or social
need. The forms include: social counseling, legal protection, social services, social
assistance benefits, services, and monetary benefits to offset the social
consequences of  severe disabilities. These benefits are derived from subsistence
levels.
                                                                
115 Includes child allowances, parental allowance, and child birth benefits
116  The Act of the National Council of the SR No. 193/1994 Coll. on child allowances and
additional child allowances invalidated the state compensatory grant for children which was
temporarily introduced at the time of price deregulation in 1990.
The amendment No. 196/1998 changed the allowance amount.
117 The Act of the National Council of the SR No. 195/1998 Coll. on social assistance.
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In 1998, the Subsistence Level Act118 was passed from which claims for
additional poverty level benefits are derived. The Act lays down the concept of
subsistence level as a socially recognized minimum income level of a natural
person below which the condition of material need takes place. The monetary limit
is set on the basis of the evaluation of the income of the other members of  the
economic household; therefore, the limit varies depending on the various
household structuring. The benefit represents a difference between an individual’s
income and his/her subsistence level, and is set depending on the causes of material
need (subjective reasons and objective reasons), and (not)having wage-earning
revenue.
The adjustment of the subsistence level will be implemented so as to reflect
the growth of the cost of living index in the low-income employee group.119
Currently, there is a new Concept of the Social Insurance Reform in the SR
which was presented for public discussion by the Ministry of Labour, Social
Affairs, and the Family of the SR in autumn 1999. The new concept observes the
starting points laid down in the basic concept of the social security transformation
from 1990 to 1992 that were subsequently elaborated in the Concept of the
Transformation of the Social System in the Slovak Republic, of 1996, whereby
emphasis was laid on the enforcement of the basic principles of social solidarity,
targeting of the benefits granted, while observing the citizen’s participation in the
enforcement of his/her rights and the enhancement of the citizen’s personal
responsibility for his/her fate.
It interprets social insurance more broadly than the present state of law and
includes all the state-regulated monetary benefits paid out on the basis of paid
insurance premiums or contributions. Social insurance will be composed of the
following:
· sickness insurance that rests on an obligatory, basic pillar of short-term
benefits (presently, sickness insurance benefits) and optional pillar of
supplementary short-term benefits (non-existent at present);
· pension insurance that leans on a mandatory system of long-term benefits that
will consist of the obligatory pillar No. I financed by a PAYG system of
                                                                
118  The Act of the National Council of the SR No. 125/1998 Coll. on subsistence level and
the setting of amounts for the purposes of state social benefits.
119 The subsistence level amounts will be, as a rule, adjusted at July of the current calendar
year. As of July 1, 1998, the subsistence level per adult was set to SKK 3,000. For the
purposes of this Act, low-income level households are deemed households the income of
which does not exceed the upper limit of the income of the first twenty percent of all the
households, arrayed in an upward fashion by the reached net monetary income per
inhabitant. The crucial period, for which the cost of living growth in low-income level
households is monitored, is a period between the month of April of the previous calendar
year and April of the current calendar year.
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funding (currently, pension security benefits) and an obligatory capitalization
pillar No. 2 (non-existent at present);
· supplementary pension insurance based on an optional pillar No. III of long-
term benefits (presently, supplementary pension insurance benefits);
· accident insurance based on a mandatory system of accident benefits
(presently, only a fragment of it exists, having the form of the indemnification
of occupational accidents and occupational diseases).
A new approach to social security was inevitable, especially for reasons
specified below:
· the current system is costly, demotivating, and inequitable; hence, there is a
need for a diversified system of multi-source funding. The current system,
especially pension security, will become insolvent in succeeding years and
incapable of ensuring the citizen’s claims enshrined in the law;
· the amount of the social insurance benefit ought to be appropriate to the
arisen social situation and at the same time, have regard for the financial
tolerability of the system;
· The current system is discriminatory, because for the same insurance
premium, various benefits and allowances are granted to some categories of
citizens and it does not take due account of the relationship between the
payment amount and the benefit amount and the function of tax is mixed with
obligatory insurance, which allows for concealing the high tax burden in the
Slovak Republic.
The new concept of social insurance not only gives the reasons underlying the
drafting of a new concept, but it also defines issues on which consensus must be
reached and simultaneously, sets forth the basic principles supporting a new system
of social insurance. Among the basic principles are:
a) obligatoriness (compulsory participation of each and everyone);
b) universal nature (by its nature, it covers/resolves the most common social
situations);
c) uniformity (at meeting the given conditions, each individual is entitled to
equal claim);
d) non-profit nature of organizations that are to provide social insurance;
e) public nature of an institution that administers the obligatory part of social
insurance and its management based on a tripartite model;
f) state guarantee of a specific scope of the claims of the parties to the
obligatory parts of the social insurance system;
g) functional and independent state supervision over the administration of social
insurance.
Similarly to other advanced countries and those in transition, it is essential to seek:
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a) a compromise between the amount of actual pensions provided by the  basic
social insurance system and the amount of contributions paid into the system;
b) rules for a gradual addition to age for the claim to an old-age pension;
c) a transfer of a portion of the obligations related to pensions to systems based
on the principles of individual saving schemes and capitalization.
8.3 Pension Security
As was mentioned above, the new concept of social insurance has identified
three pillars of pension insurance. The first pillar – obligatory pension insurance –
financed  by a „Pay As You Go“ system of funding, corresponds with the current
system that will be partly preserved. A second pillar was added to the new concept,
and it was inserted by the drafters between the basic and supplementary insurance.
This will involve obligatory capitalization (on the citizens’ personal accounts) that
should be ensured by the Social Insurance Office and even a supplementary
pension insurance office. The third pillar – optional supplementary pension
insurance – operates based on the employer-employee principle. The basic
difference between pillar III and commercially-based insurance is that in the
supplementary pension (welfare) insurance companies, it is only the insured taking
part in the appreciation, whereby in a commercial insurance company, it is the
shareholder.
TABLE 1: The Pillars of a Future Pension Insurance
Pillar Type of Funding Pension Share in
the Wage
Institutionally Ensured By
I. PAYG 30 to 35 % Social Insurance Office
II. Obligatory
Capitalisation
20 to 25 % Social Insurance Office,
Supplementary Pension Insurance
Offices
III. Optional Supplementary
Insurance
20 to  25 % Supplementary Old-age Insurance
Offices
IV. Individual
Commercially-Based
Insurance
Unlimited Commercial Insurance Companies,
Investment Companies,
Commercial Banks
The amount of coverage of pension claims relative to the gross lifelong income, in percent.
Source: www.employment.gov.sk
The advantage of a PAYG system of funding is the inter-generation
solidarity, which, however, leads to an intertemporal financial redistribution and,
under certain conditions (the decline of the share of  economically active
population), is a growing burden on the economically active population. Among
the risks of the social system may also be the demographic risk which arises if the
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contributor-beneficiary proportion drops below a certain level (as a rule, below
2:1). It is assumed that in the year 2000, this proportion will be 1.4:1, and in 2020,
only 1:1.
The above data corroborate the fact that the reform of pension security has to
be implemented without delay. Arguments about the current alarming economic
situation which is unfavorable for a successful transformation of the system, do not
hold. Realistically, the postponement of the reform would be of a much greater
burden to the social sphere, and, consequently, the entire economy.
TABLE 2: Anticipated Development of the Proportion of an Average Monthly
Number of Economically Active Insureds and an Average Monthly Number of the
Paid-out Benefits
Year 1998 2000 2010 2020 2030
Pesimistic Scenario 1.69 1.38 1.25 1.00 0.86
Optimistic Scenario 1.69 1.40 1.30 1.05 0.90
Source: The social reform concept, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family of the
SR
The advantage of capitalization is that the deposited funds are held on
personal accounts, which enhances the target-oriented nature and convenience of
the system of  creation and disbursement of the funds of the insureds. By pooling
the funds, these are made available for use in long-term investments in the
economy. The disadvantage of the capitalization system of funding is its sensitivity
to the stability of the economic and financial environment and also the time
necessary for the pooling of funds. Another drawback is that the price of the
transformation must be paid – during the transitional period, both systems must be
operated which results in increased costs.
It is envisaged that the transition from pension security to pension insurance
will take some twenty-five years. Despite a gradual transition to a new system, the
architects of this concept are aware of the shortage of funds necessary for paying
out regular old-age pensions. Therefore, to cover these, it is suggested that the
income from privatization (i.e., the Polish example) or the bonds of the National
Property Fund of the SR be used.
8.4 Sickness Insurance
Only recently, discussions were held concerning the transfer of a portion of
the means from the sickness insurance fund into health insurance, or, merging
these two funds. This, in fact, is a scenario that was proposed back in 1994, which
was also a time of serious financial problems for the health sector. This scenario
leans on the experiences of some West-European countries, in which the systems
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of health and sickness insurance are interconnected. The arguments supporting this
merger point to the necessity to meet the condition underlying the eligibility of
benefits (i.e., sickness); hence, treatment costs are correlated with the costs of the
compensation of income in sickness. The proponents reason that once both systems
are interlinked, a motivational factor of a speedy and efficient treatment with an
objective to economize on sickness insurance will be introduced into the system.
The counterarguments of the Social Insurance Office point to a different
nature of these insurance schemes. Social insurance, including sickness insurance,
is based on individual merits, whereby health insurance is based on the principle of
full solidarity. Subordinating sickness insurance to health insurance would result in
a continuous growth of claims upon  insurance funds which would not be limited
merit wise, and in the event of their insolvency, these claims would have to be
honored from the state budget as the guarantor of the Insurance Office.
Independent insurance systems, thanks to a merit-based concept of sickness
insurance, exert some pressure on a more cost-efficient use of health insurance
funds. By merging the funds, money would be simply be transferred from one fund
to another.
A new concept of social insurance gives a clearer picture of the direction of
the sickness insurance reform. Sickness insurance makes a distinction between a
short-term (initial) disability and a long-term disability. The short-term (initial)
disability (within the 15th, or, 8th day) will be compensated by the employer,
whereby the rate (percentage) of the payments of the contributions to sickness
insurance will be proportionally reduced. After implementing the social insurance
reform, this portion of the present sickness insurance will no longer be part of
social insurance. The insurance of long-term disability (from the 15th, or, 8th day
onwards) will be part of the system of short-term benefits within the framework of
social insurance. It will be implemented through the obligatory pillar No. I of
short-term benefits and funded from the contributions of employers, employees,
and self-employed professionals; it will be administered by the Social Insurance
Office. The State will regulate the system and guarantee its funding.
8.5 The Creation of the Social Security Resources
The management of  pension security and sickness insurance funds falls
under the authority of the Slovak Insurance Office as a public institution. Its
income is derived from the payments of insurance contributions by employees,
employers, and self-employed professionals. The National Labour Office (NLO)
pays contributions instead of the unemployed kept on the records of labor offices,
and the State pays contributions in favor of  selected groups of citizens (children,
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soldiers, students, etc.).120 According to statistical data, the average number of the
insureds in the Social Insurance Office(1997) was reported to be 3,063,706 persons
in sickness insurance, and 3,159,891 in pension security.
TABLE 3: The Management of Funds by the Social Insurance Office in the Years
1996-1998, (in billions of SKK)
1996 1997 1998
Current Income 58.96 62.06 67.93
- Sickness Insurance Fund   7.31   9.58  9.82
- Pension Trust 50,93 51,5 56.3
- Other Income   0.72   0.98   1.81
Current Expenses 54.95 61.40 68.17
- Sickness Insurance Fund   7.39   8.12   8.98
- Pension Trust 46.09 51.00 55.88
- Administrative Fund   1.47   2.28  2.31
Fiscal Deficit   4.01   0.66 -0.24
Source: Suda, 1998
Back in 1998, the Social Insurance Office had a higher fiscal deficit than was
anticipated in the 1998 budget draft. The original budget assumed a deficit of SKK
0.08 billion, and, effectively, a deficit of SKK 0.24 billion was reported. For 1999,
a deficit of SKK 4.08 billion was projected, including expenses in which the
raising of old-age pensions was not reflected.
There are several factors that put the income side of the Social Insurance
Office at risk. A notorious, recurring example are insufficient payments of the
State in favor of  selected groups of citizens that are not transferred in amounts set
forth in the law; on the contrary, annually, the State Budget Act sets ever-lower
contributions. Other outstanding liabilities to the Social Insurance Office are due to
the drafting of the rehabilitation act. Companies, lured by a vision of being
included in the rehabilitation regime, cut payments into public funds. Another risk
is the ever-growing  unemployment (refer to the chapter on the labor market).
 In 1997, the Social Insurance Office receivables totaled SKK 18.2 billion,
and in 1998, SKK 37 billion. Among the biggest debtors are transformed state
enterprises, medical facilities, and agricultural cooperatives.
8.6 Social Security Expenditures
Until January 1994, social security had been funded from the state budget. By
introducing social insurance, the funding of social security was separated from the
state budget and transferred to the Social Insurance Office. The major objective of
                                                                
120 Section 14 of the Act No. 274/1994, as amended.
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this separation from the state budget was to narrow down the dependence of the
running of social insurance on political decision-making, and increase the
transparency of its management. At the same time, health insurance was separated
from the state budget for similar reasons. However, social insurance, despite this
separation from the state budget, as well as health insurance, continues to be
largely dependent on it. This is largely due to the already mentioned payments of
insurance premium by the State in favor of selected groups of citizens.
8.6.1 The Running of  the Pension Fund
Over the past ten years, social expenditures have gone up in nominal terms;
for instance, the sum of pension security benefits was SKK 19.05 billion in 1990;
in nine-years time, in 1998, it almost tripled to SKK 57.4 billion. In spite of that,
the actual value of paid-out benefits did not reach the 1989 level.
TABLE 4a: Pension Security Benefits (in millions of SKK), Current Prices
1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998*
Paid-out Benefits, Total 11.560 19.051 28.013 37.145 47.391 57,421
Of Which: - Old-age Benefits  6.059 11.610 17.499 23.051 30.034 37,554
 - Disability Benefits  2.864 4.116 6.035 7.889 9.761 12,084
 - Widow’s/Widower’s
Benefits
 2.158 2 .957 4.170 5.156 6.546 7,206
TABLE 4b: Pension Security Benefits (in millions of SKK) 1990 Fixed Prices
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998*
Paid-out Benefits, Total 19,051 16,220 15,392 17,380 18,742
Of Which: -Old-age Benefits 11,610 10,132   9,552 11,014 12,257
 - Disability Benefits   4,116   3,494   3,269   3,580   3,944
 - Widow’s/Widower’s benefits  2,957   2,415   2,136   2,401   2,352
Source: 1995, 1998, statistical yearbooks, Statistical Office of the SR * - Ministry of
Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family of the SR
Several reasons account for the nominal (and partly real) growth of social
security expenditures; in addition to inflation and a dramatic drop in the standard
of living in the first transformation stage, it is the emergence of new situations that
call for social protection, specifically unemployment. The fact that up until
recently, the criteria for the eligibility to social benefits had been fairly soft,
resulting in a higher number of ill-founded claims, and, consequently, in an
increase of social security expenditures.
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CHART  1: Paid-out Pension Security Benefits.
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998*
Paid-out benefits, total Old age Disability Widow( er)’s
1990 Fixed Prices, (in millions of SKK). Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Statistical
Office of the SR
The largest portion of Social Insurance Office expenditures are pensions. In
1998, pensions accounted for eighty-two percent of the overall current expenditure
of the Social Insurance Office. By late 1998, pensioners had accounted for 21.1
percent of the population, whereby the share of old-age pensioners was 13.7
percent. In the past ten years, the number of pensioners has been steadily growing;
however, considering the size of the population, one cannot speak of a dramatic
increase in the number of pensioners. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that an
increase in the number of pension beneficiaries accounted for an overall increase in
the amount of the paid-out pension security benefits. Despite this, it should be
noted that there exists an extensive group of disabled pensioners which has been
reporting a moderate increase.
It is clear from Table 6 that the degree of demographic dependence (the
proportion of the number of the post-working age population and the working-age
population)  in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is comparable with the
OECD countries (this indicator, in fact, is somewhat more favorable in the former
group of countries than the latter). A statistically more favorable situation in the
countries of Latin America and Asia has been conditioned by long-term
demographic trends that vary dramatically from the demographic development in
the majority of advanced economies. The indicator of social tolerability of the
pension system (i.e., the degree of the system dependence) is  rather unfavorable for
the Slovak Republic, and the development in the past years has burdened the
system tolerability even more.
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TABLE  5: Number of Pension Beneficiaries, Number of the SR Inhabitants
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998*
Number of Pension Beneficiaries, Total (thous.) 1,087 1,156 1,178 1,173 1,140
Of Which – Old-age Benefits   506    548    556    561    741
Disability Benefits   223    243    256    249    279
Widow’s/Widower’s Benefits   275    283    288    292
Number of  Inhabitants (thousands.) 5,311 5,314 5,356 5,379 5,393
No. of Pension Beneficiaries to No. of
Inhabitants in   %
20.46 21.75 22.0 21.8 21.1
Old-age Pension Beneficiaries, in  % 9,5 10,3 10,4 10,43 13,74
Source: 1995, 1998 statistical yearbooks, Statistical Office of the SR* - Ministry of Labour,
Social Affairs, and the Family of the SR
TABLE 6: The Old-Age Pension System (1stand 2nd  obligatory levels) in
Transitional Economies and Selected Economies
Country Retirement Age
For Men1
Degree of
Demographic
Dependence2
(%)
Degree of the
System
Dependence³
Old-age Pension
Expenditures as a
Percentage of GDP in
the Relevant Year
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Rumania
Russian Federation
Slovakia
Slovenia
Ukraine
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
37
32
32
36
33
30
26
28
29
31
32
29
36
87
42
52
59
51
53
-
49
62
46
42
54
-
  8.0 – 1995
  9.1 – 1995
  6.7 – 1995
10.3 – 1994
  9.8 – 1995
  4.8 – 1994
  4.1 – 1994
14.6 – 1995
  6.5 – 1993
  5.5 – 1993
  9.9 – 1995
13.7 – 1994
  8.0 – 1995
Eastern Europe, the
Baltic States, CIS
Asia
Latin America
OECD countries
60
55.5
60.8
64.4
30.
15.3
14.9
32.9
48.3
11.4
21.0
39.2
             7.3
             1.9
             2.0
             9.2
¹ 1991 data. ² Proportion of the size of the post-working age population and the working-age
population. 1990 data. ³ Proportion of the number of the pension system payers to the
pension beneficiaries. 1990 data.
Source: Transition Report 1996, EBRD
By comparing the development of the pension security benefits and the
demographic development, the following may be stated:
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·  the share of the number of pension beneficiaries in the total population has
not reported any marked changes (moderate increase); however, the paid-out
pension security benefits in the monitored period dropped in real terms (the
growth of nominal benefits did not offset inflation) and the benefits did not
reach the 1990 (1989) level;
· after an initial drop in the years 1990-1992, but since 1993, there has been a
growing trend in the paid-out benefits (overall, as well as monthly benefits
per person);
· the most significant growth was reported in the number of old-age  pension
beneficiaries (they accounted for 13.7 percent share in the population in 1998
as opposed to 9.5 percent in 1990), whereby the total old-age pension benefits
reported the most dynamic increase among the selected indicators (the real
1998/1990 index is 105.6 percent).
TABLE 7:  Average Monthly Pension and Average Monthly Wages in the National
Economy
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998*
Old-age Pension 1,550 2,058 2,852 3,479 4,490
Disability Pension 1,413 1,940 2,714 3,305 4,132
Widow’s/Widower’s Pension    825 1,118 1,431 1,734 3,142
Average Monthly Wages 3,281 4,543 6,294 8,154 10,003
Proportion  of  the Average Old-age Pension
and the Average Wages in the National
Economy (in percent)
47.24 45.3 45.3 42.66 44.88
SKK, current prices. Source: 1998 Statistical Yearbook, Statistical Office of the SR
* Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family of the SR
TABLE 8: Average Monthly Pension and Average Monthly Wages in the National
Economy
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998*
Old-age Pension 1,550 1,192 1,182 1,276 1,466
Disability Pension 1,413 1,123 1,125 1,212 1,349
Widow’s/Widower’s Pension    825    647    593    636 1,026
Average Monthly Wages 3,281 2,630 2,608 2,990 3,265
SKK, 1990 fixed prices. Source: 1998 Statistical Yearbook, Statistical Office of the SR
*Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family of the SR
221
TABLE 9:  Average Monthly Pensions and Average Monthly Wages in the
National Economy
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998*
Old-age Pension 100.00 76.88 76.24 82.31 94.55
Disability Pension 100.00 79.50 79.59 85.78 95.45
Widow’s/Widower’s Pension 100.00 78.47 71.87 77.08 124.31
Average Monthly Wage 100.00 80.17 79.49 91.14 99.51
Indices, 1990 = 100. Source: 1998 Statistical Yearbook, Statistical Office of the SR
*Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family of the SR
In 1998, real pensions, similarly to real wages, did not reach the level of 1990
pensions, save for widow’s/widower’s pensions in which a significant increase was
reported in 1998. During the transformation stage, the proportion of the average
wages and old-age pension reported a stepwise decline at the expense of pensions.
CHART  2: Increase of the Average Monthly Pensions and Average Wages in the
National Economy (in SKK, current prices).
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998*
Sk
Old–age pension Disability pension
Widow’s/ widower’s pension Average wages
Source: 1998 Statistical Yearbook,  Statistical Office of the SR and Ministry of Labour,
Social Affairs, and the Family of the SR
Chart 2 indicates the “opening up of scissors” between the average monthly
pensions and the average monthly wages. While in 1990, the proportion of the
average old-age pension and average wages was 47.2 percent, in 1996, it was only
42.6 percent. In 1998, this proportion improved to 44.8 percent due to cost of
living adjustments.
The real level of pensions has reported a dramatic drop in almost all countries
undergoing transition. In the Czech Republic, the proportion of the old-age pension
and gross wages was 50.4 percent in 1989; in 1996, 43.5 percent; in 1997, 45.3
percent.  The proportion of old-age pension and net wages was 63.8 percent in
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1989; in 1996, 56 percent; in 1997, 58 percent. In Croatia, the average pension
dropped relative to average wages from 64 percent in January 1992, to 49 percent
in December 1996. In Hungary, where old-age pensions are subject to taxation in
the event a pensioner is employed, and, hence, disposes of a supplementary income
on top of old-age pension, the average old-age pension was 59 percent of the net
average income, and 39 percent of gross average income in 1996.121
  Likewise, the data for the Czech Republic indicate a growing wage
differentiation (from 34.2 percent in 1989 to 57.6 percent in 1996), while the
differentiation  in old-age  pension  deteriorated (a decline from 28.7 percent in
1990 to 17.6 percent in 1997). Although similar data are not available for the
Slovak Republic, the above figures may serve as an indicator of global
development trends. In the past, it was income that was dramatically leveled off.
Currently, the trend is just the opposite – differentiation of wages and the leveling-
off of pensions.
At the 1st  and 2nd  levels of pension insurance, the new concept of social
insurance assumes coverage of pension claims equivalent to 50-55 percent of the
real gross lifelong monthly wages. The third level is be conceived in such a fashion
that the coverage of pension claims reaches 20-25 percent of the lifelong monthly
wages.
 If, according to the Statistical Office, the cost of living has increased by no
less than ten percent, or, the average wages in the economy have gone up by no
less than five percent no later than three months of the date of the last increase of
pensions, pensions can increase.  The word “can” is used deliberately, as pensions
increase will take place only if the financial position of the Social Insurance Office
allows for it. The pensions increase is set by a fixed amount with regard to cost of
living increases, and percentage wise with regard to the increase of the average
monthly wages in the economy of the SR. Pensions went up by twelve percent in
1996, ten percent in 1997, and eight percent in 1998.
TABLE 10: Increase of the Consumer Price Index, Increase of the Average
Monthly Wages, and Pension Adjustments, Annual Changes (in percent)
1995 1996 1997 1998
Increase of Consumer Price Index   9.9  5.8   6.1 6.7
Increase of Average Monthly Wages 14.3 13.3 13.1 8.4
Pension Cost of Living Adjustments 12 10 8
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Statistical Office of the  SR
                                                                
121Source: Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS,
Chapter V: Alternative Social Policies, UNDP, 1999, p. 52-65
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8.6.2 The Management of the Sickness Insurance Fund
Over the past ten years, sickness insurance, similarly to pension security, has
reported a dramatic increase in terms of the paid-out benefits. The expenditures of
the sickness insurance benefits totalled SKK 8.973 billion in 1998 (Table 3), which
accounted for a 10.6 percent increase as opposed to the year before. Sickness
benefits accounted for the largest portion of expenditures, 82.6 percent.
The growth of sickness insurance expenditures recorded in 1998 was due to
both the increase in the number of the beneficiaries of sickenss benefits and an
increase in the amount of this benefit. In June 1998, the daily sickness benefit
increased from SKK 300 to 350 in employees. In 1999, the maximum daily
sickness benefit dropped to SKK 275, the objective being an improvement of the
management of sickness insurance funds.
TABLE 11: Social Insurance Benefits (in millions of SKK, current prices)
1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1997
Total 2,783 4,352 4,922 5,652 7,379 8,113
Of Which – Sickness Benefits 1,899 3,147 3,823 4,368 6,043 6,685
Family Care
Benefits*
  195    441    321   314   366   388
Maternity**   689    764    778   958   970 1,040
*Benefit associated with the care of a family member. ** Pecuniary assistance in maternity.
Source: 1995 and 1998 Statistical Yearbooks, Statistical Office of the SR
TABLE 12: The Development of the Correlation between the Average Daily
Sickness Benefit and the Average Daily Wages
Year Average
Monthly Wages,
SKK
Average Daily
Wages, SKK
Average Daily
Sickness
Benefits in SKK
Correlation between
Average Daily Sickness
Benefit and Average
Daily Wages, in  %
1989 3,141 103 - -
1990 3,278 107  72 67
1991 3,770 124  77 62
1992 4,543 149  92 62
1993 5,379 176 101 57
1994 6,294 206 122 59
1995 7,195 236 122 52
1996 8,154 267 149 56
1997 9,226 302 162 54
Source: Social Policy, 1998
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Ever since 1989, the  proportion of the average daily wages and the average
sickness benefit has been deteriorating, at the expense of the sickness insurance
benefit. In the future, the situation should be remedied by a new structure of
sickness insurance which is presented in the Social Insurance  Reform Concept of
the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family of the SR.
8.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an overview of the system of funding and
functioning of the social security system. The authors have demonstrated that
within the framework of the entire social security system, its deficit is growing due
to the deteriorating demographic conditions(i.e., a drop in the share of the working-
age population, increase of the share of the post-working age population, and high
unemployment). The paid-out pension and sickness benefits disregard the
insurance system of their collection (i.e., benefits do not correspond with the
insured’s contributions); hence, the entire obligatory public system has been
actually changed to a kind of additional taxation. This system is both unequivocal,
given the deteriorating demographic situation, and no longer sustainable.
For reasons mentioned above, the social system in Slovakia is expected to go
through sweeping concept changes in the near future. Postponing social system
reform may have a very negative impact upon the country’s economy, as it may
disturb the social and political balance. In addition, a well-functioning social
system is among the preconditions of long-term sustainable development in the
quality of living for inhabitants.
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8.9 Supplements
TABLE 13: Size of Economically Active Population, Number of the Unemployed,
Average Wages and Old-age Pensions, 1989-1995
Indicators 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Size of Population 5,287.663 5.310,711 5,295,877 5,306,539 5,336,455 5,336,207 5,363,600
Economically
Active Population. 2,102,529 2,118,808 2,047,106 2,045,000 2,430,840
Unemployed 39,603 301,951 260,274 368,095 371,481 365,316
Old-age Pensioners 628,622 654,153 688,637 712,056 724,601 733,048 738,847
Average Monthly
Income     3,089     3,205     3,776     4,490     5,350     6,339    6,600
Average old-age
Pension     1,459     1,578     1,912    2,086     2,395     2,876     2,879
Source: Social Policy of the SR, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and the Family of SR,
Bratislava 1995. Statistical report on the basic development trends in the economy of the SR
in 1995.
TABLE 14: Development of Nominal and Real Wages in 1989-1998
Year Average Nominal Wages in the
Economy of the SR, in SKK
Wage Increase Index
Nominal,  % Real,  %
1989   3,142 100.0 100.0
1990   3,281 104.4   94.4
1991   3,770 120.0   69.6
1992   4,543 144.6   75.7
1993   5,379 171.2   72.8
1994   6,294 200.3   75.0
1995   7,195 229.0   78.2
1996   8,154 259.6   83.8
1997   9,226 298.6   89.2
1998 10,003 318.4
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Statistical Office of the SR, Bratislava
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9 Industrial Policy
Miroslav BEBLAVÝ122
INEKO – Institute for Economic and Social Reforms
This chapter deals with industrial policy in Slovakia during the 1990’s
transition decade. During this period, the government’s official industrial policy
goals were not reached. Many tendencies that the policy makers regarded as
negative were actually strengthened. Some responsibility for this has been due to
institutional aspects of governing the transition, particularly in the frequent policy
changes and the inability of policy-makers to adjust to the changing Slovak
economic environment. The Slovak economic environment can be characterized by
rapidly increasing marketisation and by the effective weakening of the
government's executive branch.
Many objectives included in the policy documents of the time were
contravened indirectly by statements found within the same documents. Many
other major government actions during the decade were not a part of the official
industrial policy framework yet had a significant impact on industrial structure.
This occurred even though they usually contravened the officially proclaimed
objectives and favored tendencies that were officially considered to be negative.
The combination of these factors significantly contributed to economic
developments in the Slovak industry throughout the 1990s.
At the beginning of 1990s, the Slovak environment was extremely distorted
with regard to prices, property rights, internal and external trade, etc. A sequencing
of steps that either removed these distortions or preserved some of them and the
overall macroeconomic policy became the most important tools of the government
in influencing the industrial structure. Slovakia could not avoid having an
industrial policy. It could have had a conscious industrial policy or an industrial
policy by default. It could have had an industrial policy that preserved the past
industrial structure by retaining or increasing existing distortions, or an industrial
policy that removed these distortions and automatically contributed to the change
in the industrial structure. As this chapter shows, most government actions
contributed to the preservation or increase of existing distortions and this helped
preserve the industrial structure that had been created during the communist period.
                                                                
122 The author wishes to thank Professor Felix Fitzroy from the University of St Andrews for
his comments, which significantly contributed to improvement of the chapter.
229
9.1 Introduction
Industrial policy, unlike monetary or fiscal policy, does not have a clear and
unambiguous definition. The term is very recent and nearly all the works on the
subject have been published since 1975. (Zloch-Christy, 1998, p. 188) Many
authors provide no definition and the others do not contrast their definition with
that of other scholars. (Blaise, 1986, p. 3) Disappointment with government
intervention in the economy has recently led many economists and policy-makers,
with Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development at the forefront, to
re-evaluate the usefulness of the very term 'industrial policy' and to push for a new
term with a new content - 'industrial competitiveness policy'. (Gassmann, 1997, p.
37) However, this introduction will argue that in the Slovak context, the use of the
term 'industrial policy' is relevant even when the proponents of 'industrial
competitiveness' reasoning is taken into account.
Definitions of industrial policy range from very broad and ambitious ones to
more narrow ones. The first point to be raised is whether or not the industry in
question means the whole economy, a secondary sector of the economy (mining,
energy sector and manufacturing) or manufacturing itself. There are examples
available for all three definitions, (e.g., Watson, 1983, Pinder et al., 1979, Blaise,
1986) but the predominant trend leans toward limiting the definition to
manufacturing. This chapter will focus on manufacturing, but it will also consider
the energy sector and, to a limited extent, mining.
More variety evolves around the definition of what industrial policy’s role is
in relation to industry. Approaches can be divided into two groups. The first group
looks at government policy in general and can be represented by OECD’s
definition of industrial policy in the 1970s: "Industrial policies are (policies)
concerned with promoting industrial growth and efficiency." (OECD, 1975, p. 7)
Most researchers prefer a more focused approach. A good example is one by
Blaise: industrial policy is "the set of selective measures adopted by the state to
alter industrial organization." (Blaise, 1986, p. 4) The latter point of view will also
be used in the chapter, albeit in an altered form. The definition used here will be:
Industrial policy is a set of any measures adopted by state that has a
significant and an uneven impact on various industrial sectors and thus,
knowingly or not, alters industrial organization.
During late 1980s and particularly during the1990s, there was a growing body
of opinion that believed industrial policy, in the form of selective government
intervention, was counterproductive (Gassman, 1997, p. 37). Some scholars,
particularly those specializing in East Asia, (e.g., Ha Joon-Chang, 1996) disagree.
A recent OECD paper argues: "In the past, many OECD governments pursued
policies to expand industrial production in specific sectors in order to foster
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national or regional economic development, expand or protect employment,
improve the balance of payments or stimulate technological innovation. During the
extended period of low economic growth that began in the mid-1970s in most
OECD countries, disenchantment with this traditional approach set in for a number
of reasons." (OECD, 1997, p. 1) Most of the policies were related not only to
globalization, but also to the decreasing faith in the government ability: "Partly
because they often failed, 'government knows best' policies became too costly as
government budgets were squeezed. By and large, governments are not good at
'picking winners'." (ibid.) That is why OECD is promoting the term 'industrial
competitiveness policies', and focusing on "improvement of the country's
framework conditions for industry." (Gassman, 1997, p. 37)
This dichotomy is, in some respects, irrelevant for an economy in transition.
Slovakia of the 1990s does not represent cases of governments choosing or not to
selectively interfere in the economy and has little to do with debates on the merits
of government intervention and the distortion of the free market. There was no free
market in Slovakia in 1989, and there was no way to switch to one immediately. In
1989, the government owned the whole economy. The public sector share of GDP
in Czechoslovakia was 99.3 %. (Kornai, 1992) On January 1, 1993, when Slovakia
became independent, the share of private sector in GDP reached only 32.4 %.
(Miklos, 1997, p. 118)
Slovak governments have had to make crucial decisions on both the general
and the sector-specific level in several capacities. As owners, they have had to
decide on whether to privatize or to preserve state ownership. They made the
decision to privatize in the overwhelming majority of cases. They also had to make
decisions, as the privatization agency, on who the future private owners were going
to be, what to sell first, and how to set a price, etc. During the pre-privatization
period, governments needed to make short-term to medium-term managerial
decisions regarding investment decisions of the enterprises prior to the sale. In a
few cases where the decision was to preserve state ownership, they needed to
formulate and implement their long-term plans. As a regulator in a transition
economy, they had to make choices concerning what approach to take to correct
distorted prices and determine priorities. Fourthly, they had to decide as a banker
(owner of the most important banks in the country) on the loan policy to
enterprises. In all of these capacities, governments influenced the developments,
even by their passivity, so there was no truly laissez-faire option. The best example
is their reluctance to liberalize certain socially sensitive prices that preserved some
distortions over the whole decade. Similar arguments are also true for privatization
or solutions to banking sector problems.
Analysis of the Slovak industrial policy has to examine explicit government
industrial policy documents and the programs included in them. A thorough
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analysis also needs to focus on seemingly unrelated government actions. This
chapter aims to show that:
·  The official goals of industrial policy documents were generally not reached;
on the contrary, many tendencies considered negative by policy-makers were
strengthened.
·  Part of the responsibility lies in the institutional aspects of governing the
transition, primarily in frequent policy changes and the inability of policy-
makers to adjust to the changing Slovak economic environment. It was an
environment characterized by rapidly increasing marketisation and by the
effective weakening of the  government's executive branch. Many objectives
in the policy documents were often contravened indirectly within the same
documents.
·  More importantly, other major government actions during the decade, that had
not been a part of the official industrial policy framework, had a significant
impact on industrial structure. These usually contravened by the officially
proclaimed objectives and favored tendencies that were officially considered
to be negative.
9.2 Slovak Industry in 1991
In the April 1991 Program Declaration, the government of Prime Minister Jan
Carnogursky identified the following phenomena as the principal causes of low
Slovak competitiveness: "Analyses have shown that (our industrial) sectors, in
comparison with their counterparts abroad, can be characterized by a high level of
obsoleteness of production assets, low share of final and sophisticated production
and high level of energy inputs and raw materials. They are also presenting
environmental problems." (Carnogursky, 1991, p. 11)
During the 1990s, the individual policy generally stayed within the
framework of the original analysis. To fully understand the industrial policy efforts
of Slovak governments, it is necessary to look at what was meant by Carnogursky
and his successors.
First of all, let us look at two issues that gradually disappeared from the
government‘ s top agenda:
1. Environmental problems. It is not surprising that the industrial pollution was
a priority in the early transition policies (e.g., Vavro, 1992, pp. 19-20 and
Cernak, 1992, pp. 18-28) and a major target of both government and
enterprise expenditure. Closing several of the worst polluters, establishing
new legal standards, and developing extensive environmental programs
resulted in the gradual decline of industrial pollution as a priority agenda
item. There were timetables for solving the remaining major problems. In the
1994 policy document, Magvasi (1994) still mentions what it calls the
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'environmental debt,' but it is evidently no longer a top priority. (Magvasi,
1994, App. 1, pp. 10-12) Industrial policy approved by the government and
the parliament in 1995 mentions only 'respecting requirements for
environmental protection' as a criterion within one area of government
objectives. (Meciar, 1995, p. 4)
2. Obsolete production assets.  Cernak (1992) notes that in 1989, the last year of
the centrally planned economy, the average age of industrial machinery was
10.7 years. (Cernak, 1992, p. 12) As OECD (1991) explains, this was due to a
decreased investment during the 1980s in favor of consumption (OECD,
1991, p. 9). There was also over-investment in the construction part of the
investment. (Cernak, 1992, p. 13)) The former trend continued to worsen
during the early years of transition due to the depression-induced decrease in
investment (ibid., p. 13).This problem did not really disappear. Instead, it
became merged, in the minds of policy-makers, with the general issue of low
industry sophistication and competitiveness. Investment showed an
significant upswing in the second half of 1990s. This meant that it had ceased
to be feasible to make generalizations about the state of machinery and
buildings.
The two remaining issues gradually became the most crucial ones:
3. High level of energy inputs and raw materials.  This issue was directly related
to the problem of undesirable industrial structure that required what the
policy-makers considered to be excessive energy and material inputs. All the
policy documents viewed it as a crucial problem and always mentioned that
decreasing the level of consumption of energy and raw materials by industry
was a top priority within the restructuring framework. (e.g., Vavro, 1992, p.
10, Cernak, 1992, p. 4, Magvasi, 1994, p. 1,  Meciar, 1995, p. 4 and Meciar,
1997, p. 1) This goal was not achieved. On the contrary, it will be seen that
governments made decisions that went directly against this priority. The
reasons and the consequences of such a situation will be explored below.
4. Low level of sophistication and final production.  This has been considered
the most important and persistent problem. It has not been solved over the
period, and has become worse in several aspects. Individual documents
interpret the general term differently - e.g., as a low level of knowledge- and
innovation-intensive production, (Vavro, 1992, p. 3) insufficient
competitiveness on the world markets and consequent low export potential of
the industry (Cernak, 1992, p. 4) and a low share of value added in industrial
production. (Magvasi, 1994, p. 1) What brought them all together was a
realization that the Slovak industry has competed on both the international
and domestic markets primarily with intermediate products based on the
simple processing of raw materials. Their competitiveness was based on low
233
prices, and required a cheap workforce and subsidized energy prices. (as
detailed in Meciar, 1995).
TABLE 1. Structure of Slovak Industry in 1991, in  %
Employment Export Production Sales
Mining 5.1 0.9 2.7 3.3
CA + CB Mining 5.1 0.9 2.7 3.3
Energy 5.8 0.8 9.5 15.4
E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 5.8 0.8 9.5 15.4
Basic Industries 26.7 65.6 44.1 41.9
DE Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper
Products; Publishing and Printing
3.4 11.7 5.9 10
DF Manufacture of Coke, Refined
Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel
1.3 10.2 6.3 5.3
DG Manufacture of Chemicals, Chemical
Products and Manmade Fibers
5.7 4.8 2.8 2.7
DH Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic
Products
2.2 2.5 3.7 3.3
DI Manufacture of other Non-metallic
Mineral Products
5.5 22.2 13.7 11.5
DJ Manufacture of Basic Metals and
Fabricated Metal Products
8.6 14.2 11.7 9.1
Investment Goods 33.3 9.8 12.8 10.7
DK Manufacture of Machinery and
Equipment N.E.C.
18.2 4.3 4.8 4.3
DL Manufacture of Electrical and Optical
Equipment
9.1 3.3 5.9 4.6
DM Manufacture of Transport Equipment 6 2.2 2.1 1.8
Food 8.5 5.7 18.3 17.4
DA Manufacture of Food Products;
Beverages and Tobacco
8.5 5.7 18.3 17.4
Light Industry 20.6 16.4 12.8 10.9
DB Manufacture of Textiles and Textile
Products
9.8 6.8 4.7 3.8
DC Manufacture of Leather and Leather
Products
4 3.7 2.1 1.9
DD Manufacture of Wood and Wood
Products
3 1.5 1.8 1.5
DN Manufacturing N.E.C. 3.8 4.4 4.2 3.7
Source: author’s calculations based on the Statistical Office of SR
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The reasons for this structure can be traced through the communist past of
Slovakia. Before the communist take-over of 1948, the economy had been
dominated by agriculture. During the following forty years of central planning, it
was largely industrialized. As Smith (1998) argues: "This (industrialization)
represented an extensive regime of accumulation - fast growth in output was
secured by the expansion of the forces of production through the forced
industrialization of previously 'backward' agricultural economies." (Smith, 1998, p.
72) Smith goes on to demonstrate that the industrial sectors most favored with
investment during this period in Czechoslovakia and the ones that recorded the
greatest increases in output were oil, energy, engineering, metallurgy, and
chemicals. (Smith, 1998, p. 71) However, engineering was not a market- or
consumer-oriented one; it was associated with armaments production. In the 1980s,
armaments production accounted for 32 % of the total engineering output in
Czechoslovakia. (Financial Times, November 2, 1993, p. 16) Slovakia dominated
the heavy segment (tanks, armored personnel carriers, etc.)  However, it is not the
aim of this chapter to trace the detailed reasons for the policymakers’ struggle with
the industrial structure during 1990s, only to point out that the problems were a
natural result of past policies pursued by communist governments. Let us now look
at more detail regarding the resulting industrial structure
9.3 Structural Issues at the Beginning of Transition
In order to describe the issues facing the Slovak policy-makers, we will begin
with a simple structural analysis of the industry. Table 1 depicts the share of
individual industrial sectors in production, sales, employment, and exports in the
first year of economic reform - 1991. The table shows that in 1991, production of
light industry was of negligible importance. On the other hand, basic industries
dominated, particularly manufacturing of metals, oil products and chemicals. This
structural dependence on heavy industry is particularly pronounced if one looks at
exports, where basic industries had a 65.6 % share. The information from table 1
can be supplemented with information on Slovak export structure and comparative
studies on small Western European economies. This is based on SITC
classification in the following table:
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TABLE 2. Commodity Structure of Exports of Small Western European Countries
and Slovakia, 1993, in  %
Group of Exports (SITC classification)
Country 0+1 2+3+4 5 6+8 7
Austria 3.3 5.2 8.3 43.9 38.9
Sweden 1.6 11.3 9 34.3 42.7
Belgium 10.6 6.1 14.4 37.7 27
Netherlands 20.4 15.1 18.9 23.2 23.7
Spain 14.3 6.4 7.7 27.8 43.1
Portugal 7.1 9.8 4 57.2 21.6
Slovakia 7.6 5.8 12.2 51.9 22.5
Source: Meciar (1995), p. 21, except for Slovakia, where Statistical Office of SR (1994)
The table indicates that even at the beginning of the transition, Slovakia had
to rely primarily on the export of intermediate products and simple final products
(SITC 6+8). The share of more sophisticated manufacturing products (SITC 7) was
significantly less than in other small Western European economies, with the
exception of Portugal and Netherlands. Chemicals (SITC 5) were also very
important. This picture is confirmed if one looks at table 3. It shows the revealed
comparative advantage data for trade with Western Europe in 1991
TABLE 3. Slovakia’s Revealed Comparative Advantage in Trade with Western Europe,
1991
SITC Group 1991
0 Food and Live Animals 3.1
1 Beverages and Tobacco -1.2
2 Crude Materials 2.7
3 Fuels and Related Products 0.9
4 Animal and Plant Oils, Fats and Waxes 0
5 Chemicals and Related Products -1.9
6 Intermediate Manufactured Products 31.9
7 Machinery and Transport Equipment -39.2
8 Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 3.8
9 Other Commodities and Products of Trade 0
Source: author’s calculations, based on the Statistical Office of SR
A more detailed analysis was completed by OECD (1991) and OECD (1996)
and those analyses confirmed that Slovak exports were dominated by intermediate
products primarily from basic industries. The top ten export articles in 1995 were:
steel and non-coated iron, petroleum oils, textile yarn, steel and iron coated, rubber
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tires, simply worked wood, furniture, cement, paper and paperboard, men's
clothing. These products accounted for 31.4 % of exports. (OECD, 1996, p. 86)
Such an analysis is supported by Havlik (1996), who calculated correlation of
x-factor intensities with revealed comparative advantage (RCA) values in trade of
various Central and Eastern European countries with the European Union. This
analysis helped to uncover patterns of emerging trade specialization. In 1993, the
first year for which such calculations were done for Slovakia, it had the highest
correlation of RCA with energy intensity and the smallest correlation with labor
intensity from all the countries surveyed (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania). Slovakia was also the only country to have
a positive correlation of RCA with capital intensity. (Havlik, 1996, p. 33)
There are five principal reasons why this structure of manufacturing,
particularly regarding exports, might be considered a problem and why it was seen
as problematic by Slovak policy-makers:
1. In 1990, Slovakia covered only 70 % of its electricity consumption from
domestic production and had to import most other raw materials for energy
production. (Meciar, 1990, p. C9) Dominant industries, however, were very
energy intensive and energy consumption per unit of GDP was extremely
high - approximately three times as high as in the European Union. (MH SR,
1999, p. 23) Economic growth of these industries’ sustained dominance
further increased this imbalance and required significant investment into the
energy production sector by drawing resources from other sectors of the
economy. It also distorted the economy for reasons detailed below.
2. The low level of sophisticated production meant that approximately half of
Slovak exports consisted of highly price-sensitive products. (OECD, 1996, p.
87, the data is for 1995) Miklos (1996) conducted an analysis of Slovak
exports' competitiveness based on quality vs. price, using Aiginger's
methodology. (see Aiginger, 1995) Export articles are ranked depending on
the extent to which their competition in the world markets is based on price or
quality. Miklos looked at 50 of the most important Slovak export articles.
These comprised 67.1 % of Slovak exports, and he treated them as being
representative of overall Slovak exports. He found that 58.3 % of them are in
the group termed as "low quality competition, high price competition" and
only 17.3 % are in the "high quality competition, low price competition."
(Miklos, 1997, p. 121) Their competitiveness was based on the costs of
inputs, particularly wages and energy. The need to preserve competitiveness
would limit the scope for sustainable medium-term wage growth. This, in
turn, would limit a possible increase in the standard of living.
3. Slovak energy prices have been regulated by government, significantly lower
compared to Western Europe and, in general, lower than those of its Central
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European neighbors. Since the government has owned most of the energy
sector, the amount of actual subsidy this represents is difficult to estimate due
to non-transparency. The government has admitted that this was an important
factor in the competitiveness of Slovak manufacturing. (Meciar, 1995, p. 1)
From the welfare point of view, further investment in the energy
infrastructure would have distorted the situation. There have also been other
indirect government subsidies that were related to other utility prices and
wage regulation.
4. Much of the Slovak export production was subject to dramatic demand
swings in international markets. Calculations by OECD (OECD, 1999, p. 27)
show that import cycles in the OECD area for the major export items of
Slovakia can be quite significant - with annual growth rates varying from -10
% to +30 % within 2 years (this example is from years 1993-1995). Such
variability presents significant problems in achieving sustainable and stable
growth, particularly when one factors in the importance of exports to the
Slovak economy.
5. The structure of the Slovak manufacturing sector was very capital intensive.
From a welfare point of view, preservation of such a Communist legacy was
far from optimal, especially considering Slovakia's high unemployment,
cheap labor and scarce capital.
9.4 Developments in 1990s
9.4.1 General Developments
This analysis examines changes in the structure of Slovak industrial
production, sales, exports, employment and profits from 1991 till 1998 (1997 in the
case of exports and profits). Individual sectors were grouped into the clusters
previously used for the year 1991. Transport equipment is not included in the
analysis due to its distorting statistical influence – reasons are explained in a
separate section dedicated to this sector.
Changes in industrial production and sales show that tendencies considered
negative by policy-makers became even more pronounced after 1991. Basic
industries strengthened their dominant share and the importance of the energy
sector in the economy also increased. Light industry was further weakened, while
investment goods made a gradual turnaround, regaining some ground after losses at
the beginning of the transition period.
Export data shed further light. The picture for investment goods and light
industry is the same as for production and sales. What is more intriguing is that the
export performance of basic industries, after gaining an even more prominent role
during the 1990s and reaching an apex of 66 % share in exports in 1993, sharply
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weakened from 1996 onwards. The reason was a sharp downswing in demand in
OECD countries for these commodities. (OECD, 1999, p. 27) This fact confirms
the danger of relying on these industries for growth and export earnings.  The
export of these sectors decreased not only in relative terms, but also absolutely - by
20 % in 1996 and then stagnated in 1997. On the other hand, the export of
investment goods increased steadily since 1995: by 10.6 % in 1995, 4.6 % in 1996
and 19 % in 1997. The exports of the light industry cluster either stagnated or fell
during the whole 1990s, even though this masked a mediocre performance by some
sectors and a very poor one by others. Another important measurement is the
persistent increase in energy exports.
These swings influenced employment as well. Again, the energy sector and
basic industries kept increasing its share - in 1991, energy, mining and basic
industries accounted for 39.9 % of industrial employment. In 1998, it was 46.5 %.
Share of employment in food industry slightly increased but both investment and
light industry went down. Investment goods were particularly hard-hit in the early
1990s, but the employment has leveled off since 1994.
Analysis of profits in individual industrial clusters complements the picture
by demonstrating that energy and basic industries were able to utilize the
opportunities presented to them by the transition environment. They preserved or
increased their profits. But, industries producing consumer and investment goods
were unable to reap profits even from the economic boom of 1994-1998 period,
and they slipped further and further into the loss. This point is very important
because most of the Slovak industry has been financed from retained earnings. (see
Magvasi, 1994 for analysis)
The point of this aggregate analysis is to show that the structural problems of
the Slovak industry increased throughout the 1990s even though Slovak policy-
makers considered it very negative as early as 1991. The conclusion is that the
industrial policies pursued by various governments failed. The analysis, in the last
part of the chapter, will show how the governments' action actively contributed to
this failure.
9.4.2 Developments in Basic Industries and Investment Goods
Due to their importance, a more detailed analysis of two sectors – basic
industries and investment goods – follows.
9.4.2.1 Basic Industries
These industries experienced a sustained drop in sales in the 1991-93 period
due to the loss of domestic and, in the first years, export markets (in the USSR and
elsewhere in the former CMEA area). In this situation, they resemble other
industrial sectors. They differ from the rest of the economy due to their ability to
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find new export markets during the transition recession and the fact that they
consistently place a higher percentage of their production there. If we exclude the
manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, then basic industries
began the process of transition with less shares of export in sales than sectors
producing investment goods and light industry. However, basic industries were
then able to sharply increase this share and are consistently shown as leading the
other two industries by 6 to 7 percentage points.
A demand crisis in export markets has hit these sectors since 1996. This can
be attributed to the downturn in the OECD area. Two types of industries are
notable  based on their reaction. One - consisting of manufacture of pulp, paper and
paper products, publishing and printing, manufacture of chemicals, chemical
products and manmade fibers and manufacture of rubber and plastic products - was
able to withstand it relatively well, in the sense that their exports stagnated, but did
not fall. On the other hand, manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products and
manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products experienced a sharp
decline in exports since 1996.
It can be said that some of these sectors were reactive in their activities
(particularly the metal and mineral industry) and took advantage of export
possibilities during the upturn. These sectors were unable to use the income stream
from exports to upgrade production or to find further markets. Other industries,
primarily paper and chemical, were not deterred by recession.  These industries
also exhibited higher productivity growth and made more profit than the reactive
industries.
It is worth noting that, with respect to change in employment, this cluster can
be also divided into two groups. One experienced only a mild overall decrease in
employment - industries producing paper, rubber and plastic and metals - ranging
from 4 % to 14.8 %. On the other hand, petrochemicals, chemical industry and
mineral-producing industry went through much sharper employment contractions
of 33.6 % to 40.3 %. This roughly corresponds to divisions based on sales and
profitability - industries with higher sales growth were generally more able to
preserve the previous employment. This was reflected in mixed productivity
growth and lower ability to make profits.
9.4.2.2 Investment Goods
Two sectors that produce investment goods are included in this section. They
present a strikingly divergent picture. On one hand, the machinery and equipment
production sector was unable to transfer its export markets from East to West
because much of the exports were arms (see section on military production). That
sector experienced a sharp decline in sales, an even greater decrease in
employment and huge losses. It was only in the second half of 1990s that it
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managed to switch to export-led growth. That action was accompanied by further
labor-shedding and increased labor productivity. On the other hand, manufacture of
electrical and optical equipment was, after the initial transition recession, among
the industrial sectors that managed to capture new markets, avoid downsizing, and
rapidly increase labor productivity.
Both sectors have been consistently losing money with different magnitudes
of losses. In the manufacture of machinery and equipment, the losses are
paramount and the whole industry is unable to get back into profit. The production
of electrical and optical equipment is a different matter. Based on specific
enterprise data (Trend June 16, 1999, TOP 100 section), it can be inferred that the
latter is a mixture of profitable firms with a certain percentage of sick corporations.
The reasons why these companies are not washed out of the system is that there are
several exit barriers in the Slovak economy (Miklos, 1997)
Borgula (1999) reports that the general competitiveness problems of the
Slovak industry extend to production of machinery and equipment: "The final
production is… below its capacity, and the (sector) is more geared towards
intermediate consumption and… focused on productions dependent on less
sophisticated technologies, productions with a less sophisticated processing, with a
lower value added, lower rate of skilled manpower, and the use of scientific and
technological knowledge. According to some analyses, as much as 70 percent of
the Slovak engineering exports are dependent on the products of such
manufacturing branches." (Borgula, 1999)
9.5 Analysis of Three Specific Sectors
9.5.1 The Volkswagen Factor– Production of Transport Equipment
In analyzing structural changes in the Slovak industry, it is important to keep
in mind the 'Volkswagen factor.' The German carmaker came to Slovakia in the
early 1990s, but its production began to increase rapidly only in the second half of
the decade. In 1998, sales reached SKK 56.7 billion (USD 1.6 billion) and exports
represented 99.5 % of sales. Volkswagen was the second largest corporation in
Slovakia in terms of sales and its largest exporter in 1998. (TREND, June 16, 1999,
TOP 100 section) It was first in both categories in 1999. Therefore, its presence
severely distorts available industrial statistics. The statistics otherwise show a
remarkable shift in Slovak industrial structure in the 1996-1998 period away from
chemical, metal and other heavy industries towards transport equipment
production.
This shift is partially an illusion in the sense that much of it is caused not by
any changes in the Slovak industry, but only by the increases in production, sales
and exports in a single Bratislava plant. Its real importance for the country's
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economy is also overstated by these figures, because much of its operation still
consists of labor-intensive parts of car completion from components imported from
Germany. This is reflected by the fact that while transport equipment accounted for
7.9 % of industrial production in 1997, it accounted only for 4.4 % of the value
added. On the contrary, in 1994, when Volkswagen was a minor player, the two
values were much closer - 3.7 % in value added and 3.9 % in production.
The Volkswagen plant has also been, to a large extent, an export enclave
resembling Mexican maquiladora, with very limited local linkages. Its import
content is reportedly above 80  %. Despite its impressive rise during the decade (in
1998, it accounted for 75 % of sales in its sector and 11.3 % of manufacturing
sales), it employs only 5250 workers, 19.9 % of employment in its sector and 1.3
% of manufacturing employment.
During 1999, there were signs that the pattern might be altering. Changes
noted was the opening of new workshop producing car bodies, planning for an
industrial zone in Bratislava where producers of components would be working,
and planning for the new production of a luxury model in Bratislava.  However, the
point of this analysis is not to criticize or praise Volkswagen, but to show:
·  why it was necessary to exclude transport equipment from our previous
analysis;
·  why the remarkable rise of Volkswagen has not yet exercised such a change
in the state of Slovak industry as some statistics would lead us to believe.
9.5.2 Energy
Due to industrialization patterns in Slovakia that preferred energy-intensive
sectors and low efficiency of energy use, Slovakia has one of the most energy
intensive economies in Europe. Its energy consumption per unit of GDP
(purchasing parity) has oscillated between values 2.5 and as high as 3 times the
European Union average. It is also important to note that Slovakia has the highest
energy consumption per unit of GDP from the group of Central European countries
- 15-30 % higher than Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. (MHSR, 1999, p. 24)
The energy prices have also been lower compared to these countries. (OECD,
1999, pp. 120-122)
Governments acknowledged that cheap energy prices were an implicit and
important subsidy to some industrial sectors (Meciar, 1995, p. 1) - particularly
those such as metal and chemical industry that were able to bring in export
earnings. In fact, a study by Hughes and Hare (1992) uncovered the fact that in the
presence of world prices, these sectors would not be competitive. They calculated
value added by individual sectors in transition countries in 1988, as if inputs and
outputs were purchased and sold using world prices. It found that in
Czechoslovakia, chemical and oil industry was actually destroying value and
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metallurgy was using enormous resources to produce its value added. (Hughes and
Hare, 1992, pp. 463-464)
Understandably, governments were reluctant to bring energy prices to the
global level and use other instruments to encourage efficient energy use. In the
words of the Ministry of Economy: "Measures taken so far concerning prices in the
energy sector have not motivated the industrial companies… to make a serious
increase in efficiency of energy consumption." (MHSR, 1999, p. 23)
Such a high energy consumption, coupled with a low level of available
domestic energy resources, has resulted in a high level of imports of energy raw
materials, particularly from Russia. In 1990, Slovakia could domestically produce
only 70 % of its electricity consumption. (Meciar, 1990, p. C9) Despite pledges to
decrease consumption, successive governments decided to solve the problem by
finishing nuclear and hydro plants that had been started during the communist
period and to build more new ones. Water dams were constructed along with the
first two blocs of the nuclear plant Mochovce. After the first bloc of Mochovce
was finished in 1998, Slovakia generated sufficient electricity for domestic use.
After the start of the second bloc, Slovakia was expected to become a net exporter
because the production significantly outstripped consumption. (SME Daily, July
29, 1999, p. 16)
This approach was accompanied by persistent government involvement in the
energy sector and the effective preservation of government monopoly and
regulation of prices. These factors prevented any calculation of resource allocation
efficiency. There are indicators of low efficiency of production and a preference
for the creation of new electricity-generating capacity. This was indicated by the
massive investments in large producers. (see Trubiniova, 1996, pp. 129-130) A
significant portion of government resources available for loan guarantees and
industrial restructuring was consciously used in the energy sector, primarily to set
up new electricity production. (see Cernak, 1992, Magvasi, 1994, Meciar, 1995)
The following chart depicts annual change in electricity consumption and GDP in
the 1991-1998 period.
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CHART 1. Year-on-year change in the real GDP and electricity consumption, 1991
– 1998
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Source: IEA, OECD
It shows that for most of the 1990s the electricity consumption closely
followed the GDP. This proves that there were no substantial increases in
efficiency of electricity use. In the last two years - 1997 to 1998, the pattern
changes and electricity consumption stagnated while GDP still grew. On the other
hand, this has only balanced the opposite development at the beginning of the
transition. At that time the  electricity consumption decreased much less than GDP.
In 1998, the electricity consumption was by 3.5 % lower than in 1990, while the
GDP was by 2.2 % higher.
The other part of energy sector, not closely examined here, is the transport
and storage of oil and natural gas that Russia sold to Western Europe. This sector
has also remained state-owned and has undertaken substantial investment. Due to
government control, distorted prices, and cross subsidies, it is not possible to make
a welfare or efficiency analysis. (see Jurzyca, 1998)
Overall, as table 4 demonstrates, the energy sector significantly increased its
sales and profits, however with decreasing labour productivity indicates that
monopoly rents and distorted prices affected this outcome. (see Magvasi, 1994)
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TABLE 4. Some Indicators for the Energy Sector, 1991-1998
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Sales -10.3 -8.1 49.3 13.3 -0.4 -0.4 18.6 61.4
Export 45.8 -32.3 1614.5 1.4 10.4 4.9 1,889.1
Export/sales 1.3 2.1 1.5 17.7 18.3 17.9 18.8 17.5
Employment -1 12.9 2 -2.4 1.2 2.2 3.1 29.4
Lab. productivity 0.3 -18.3 13.7 -0.1 3.6 -3.9 -6.9 -15.6
Profit 9.191 10.172 26.178 23.385 25.651 19.638 15.695 129.910
Source: Statistical Office of Slovak Republic. Note: annual change in  %, except for profits,
where yearly level in millions of SKK
All governments were concerned with the high level of energy consumption
per unit of GDP in Slovakia but the situation has not significantly improved over
the decade. The government has poured enormous resources into building new
electricity production (and into infrastructure for energy transit), while keeping
energy prices below the levels of Western Europe and even neighbouring
countries. Available data indicate that there has been no significant increase in
efficiency of electricity consumption per unit of GDP and that the energy sector
has seen decreasing labour productivity while reaping enormous profits. These
facts, when linked which together with complete government control, indicate that
cross-subsidisation of most of the energy sector is taking place based on transit
rents from oil and natural gas transit to Western Europe. After massive price hikes
in 1999 and 2000 and the announced of privatisation, the situation began to change
substantially. The results have not yet been observed.
9.5.3 Arms Production
During 1980s, Czechoslovakia was one of the top military producers in the
world - 7th in 1987. (This description is based on Smith, 1998) Slovakia dominated
production of heavy weapons, particularly tanks and armoured vehicles. The
principal markets for heavy weapons of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the
Communist equivalent of NATO. The demand for these products declined during
late 1980s due to changes in the geopolitical situation, and this sector gradually lost
its markets. Another cause for this demise stemmed from its specialisation. It was
unable to follow its industrial counterparts in shifting export markets from the East
to the West. Plans were made, even before the fall of the Communist regime in
1989, on how to convert the sector from military to civilian production and
preserve its share in the industry. As the section on industrial development in
1990s demonstrated, these plans did not succeed. The new production lines did not
find markets and the overall output, exports, and employment of the sector
significantly declined.
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'Conversion' programs were part of all industrial policies. They preceded
industrial policies and were coupled with continuing government ownership of the
former arms companies. Significant resources from the Czechoslovak federal
government until 1993 and even by the Slovak government in 1993 and 1994 were
used to fund the conversion switch. The total costs in the transition period of 1991-
1994 were SKK 2.2 billion of direct financial assistance, SKK 3.8 billion in loan
write-off and an unknown level of government loan guarantees for new production
lines. (Meciar, 1997, p. 57) In 1995, a new government-owned holding company,
DMD Holding, jsc., integrated most of the sector’s state-owned enterprises in the
sector and the relationship between the government and enterprises assumed a new
form.
Despite the assistance and integration, most of the enterprises were unable to
recover and continued to produce enormous losses. They lost more than SKK 22
billion during the 1991-1998 period for the whole sector, and this was seen as
development unparalleled in any other sector. This loss indicates the true amount
of government subsidy. The loss and the funds mentioned above resulted in non-
performing loans from state-owned banks. Arrears in payments of taxes and
insurance payments to government agencies were also a result.
The reasons for the failure were threefold. First of all, the speedy
transformation of an arms industry into civilian production is generally a very
difficult task.  The financial resources available to the government were
significantly lower than those planned for the programs. This resulted in the
cancellation of some programs or the under funding of others. (Meciar, 1997, pp.
57-58) This was partially a result of Czechoslovakia’s split and the limited fiscal
options of the independent Slovak government. Most important, the most
significant result were the institutional problems associated with continued state
ownership. Long delays in approval of projects, (ibid.) politically inspired changes,
personal clashes within enterprises, proliferation of rent-seeking activities and the
lack of clear direction all contributed to the ongoing decline of this government-
dominated sector. (Smith, 1998, pp. 317-318)
Borgula (1999) enumerates sub sectors where the engineering is competitive -
these are precisely those that had not been associated with military production:
"According to the revealed comparative advantage, of the twenty-six engineering
production branches, only five production branches are competitive in the
discriminating (OECD) markets in the following order of priority: shipbuilding,
ship and boat repair; bearings manufacture, transmission and control elements,
motor car parts and accessories and motor engines; train locomotives and carriages,
engineering metallurgy."
There has been a clear mismatch between the aims and the results of military
production conversion. The aim of governments was to preserve plants and
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companies previously producing weapons and to restructure them towards civilian
production. The expected result was a preservation significant levels of output and
employment. In reality, the policy results resembled policies towards some of the
'terminally mature' industries in other countries, where government aims to ease
the pain of phasing out industries that are doomed. During 1990s, crucial plants
employing tens of thousands of workers in central Slovakia gradually reduced their
employment until it reached a small fraction of the previous numbers.
 9.6 Industrial Policy Documents
Six documents will be analysed in this section. Five of them bear the name
‘Industrial Policy.’ They were chosen even though only some of them were
officially approved by the government and the parliament. The remaining ones
were also officially submitted by the Ministry of the Economy to the government’s
Economic Council or parliamentary Economic Committee, but they never received
the official government’s and parliamentary consent. The reason was that due to
elections and subsequent changes, they became ‘out of date’ even before the
approval. Many programs were kept from one policy document to the next and
there is a significant measure of continuity. What is more important is that these
policy documents are not used here as a tool of political agenda – in the sense “this
is what government promised and did not keep” - but are used to gain insight into
how policy-makers thought and approached the issue of Slovak industry and its
structural change. With the exception of the third Meciar government that had two
documents, one policy document was chosen for each government in the 1991-
1998 period. The combined documents run over 1000 pages, so this section focuses
strictly on a few chosen aspects:
· What objectives did they set for the industrial policy and what instruments did
they envision to achieve these objectives?
· Were the documents internally consistent?
Vavro (1992) – submitted in April 1992, bears the name of Anton Vavro, the
Carnogursky government’s Deputy Prime Minister for the Economy. That
government was in power from April 1991 to June 1992. It is the only document
that is not called Industrial Policy, but, deriving from the German tradition of
Strukturpolitik, is entitled the “Structural Policy of the Slovak Republic.” This
policy proposal focuses on only a few selected sectors. These are sectors where it
sees a significant government role because they should be either ‘winners’ or
‘losers.’ Within industry, it sets objectives for the energy sector as a “strategic
industry” (p. 10) and for the ‘losers’ – are the mining industry and metal
production:
- the processing of iron ore and non-ferrous metals has only a “limited
comparative advantage” (p. 13) and is import-, energy- and environmentally-
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intensive. (ibid.) A significant portion should be phased out and the rest upgraded
towards more sophisticated products. The preferred tool would be higher prices of
energy and payment of ‘real costs’ for environmental damage and consumed
natural resources.
- in the energy sector, the principal “structural shift will be in consistent
preference of more efficient use of energy to creation of new energy sources.” (p.
10)
In some respects, this is the least specific material because it sets forth only
directions and does not quantify them. However, it should be said that apart from
this, it is the most specific policy document from all presented. It sets the general
structural shift that it wants to achieve (from less sophisticated industries and large
enterprises to more environmentally and energy friendly ones) and then it does not
refrain from saying that it will mean closing down some industries. It also states
that it will use government subsidies and taxes to effect this change. Therefore, it is
not a blanket policy for supporting all industries by all means.
After the June 1992 elections, the new government of Vladimir Meciar
(1992-1994) came into power and gave the new Minister of Economy, Ludovit
Cernak, a task of submitting an industrial policy. Cernak completed this task in
November 1992 (Cernak, 1992). This ‘Industrial Policy of Slovak Republic’ is the
first to contain government plans for all industrial sectors. It also contains short-
term and long-term objectives, (Cernak, 1992, p. 5) which are vague, but consistent
with what was said about desires of Slovak policy-makers: to phase out “non-
efficient” enterprises, decrease energy and raw materials consumption, decrease
steel production and consumption together with environmental damage caused,
increase value added in the industry together with sophisticated and exportable
production. It pinpoints the dominance of heavy industries and the low
sophistication of industrial sectors. (ibid., p. 4)
One might expect significant support towards sectors that fulfil the wishes of
policy-makers. That is not the case, based on Appendix 2 – ‘Proposals for
Government Programs of Industry Development in Slovak Republic,’ which
envisions investment projects for the following decade. The structure of proposed
investment is in table 5, and is calculated on the basis of data provided in the
document.
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TABLE 5. Government Programs of Industrial Development for Selected Sectors,
1992
Selected Industrial Sectors Proposed Investment
(mil. SKK)
Mining 5 066
Light Industry 3 145
DB Manufacture of Textiles and Textile Products 862
DC Manufacture of Leather and Leather Products 383
DD Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products 1 900
Basic Industries 62 055
DE Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Products; Publishing and
Printing
12 970
DF Manufacture of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear
Fuel
13 739
DG Manufacture of Chemicals, Chemical Products and Manmade
Fibres
3 995
DI Manufacture of other Non-metallic Mineral Products 2 111
DJ Manufacture of Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 29 240
Investment Goods 16 917
DK + DM Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment N.E.C.,
Transport Equipment
15 300
DL Manufacture of Electrical and Optical Equipment 1 617
Energy 142 100
Total for Selected Sectors 229 283
TOTAL 251 400
Source: author’s calculations, based on Cernak (1992), Appendix No. 2
Apart from the overwhelming dominance of basic industries and the energy
sector (81.2 % of total), closer analysis of projects within basic industries reveals
that they are in the heavier, less sophisticated part of the spectrum, even though
they usually aim to upgrade or modernise it. In other words, this is a strategy of
preserving the capital- and energy-intensive basic industry by technological
modernisation, rather than a strategy of structural shift.
The next Industrial Policy was proposed by Peter Magvasi (1994), Minister of
Economy in the interim Moravcik government (March – December 1994). It
differs significantly from its predecessor in one respect. Where Cernak included all
investment projects of all enterprises, Magvasi sought to focus the government’s
attention on those areas that he thought should have priority, and where he believed
government should be involved. The overall price tag of the industrial projects is
less than half of Cernak’s, despite a cumulative inflation of approximately 30 %
between the two policy proposals. It also clearly stated how the government would
fund the priorities. The first group are “projects of macroeconomic importance,”
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(Magvasi (1994), App No. 2, p. 7) where the government should take on loan
guarantees. Members of the other group are “restructuring projects of regional and
sector importance,” where the government would also take on loan guarantees
linked with partial reimbursement of interest costs. (ibid., p. 15) The first one deals
primarily with infrastructure investment.. Industrial spending included SKK 24.8
billion for the electricity sector and SKK 32.6 billion for gas and oil industry. The
second group is divided into sectors. Again, basic industry and energy sectors
dominate. Basic industries account for 50.1 % of proposed spending and the energy
sector for 18.3 %. What distinguishes Magvasi’s policy from Cernak’s is that
Magvasi explicitly acknowledges the need for continuing support of basic
industries: “Energy, metal processing and chemical industries… have a high share
in GDP and export that we cannot replace by production of other sectors and if
their products lose competitiveness, insoluble economic problems might arise.”
(Magvasi, 1994, p. 19) The dominance of these industries in the government’s
proposal for restructuring is testimony to the fact that this analysis was to be borne
out in policy-making.
After October 1994 election, the third government of Vladimir Meciar came
into power (1994-1998). It passed and submitted Industrial Policy to parliament in
1995 (Meciar, 1995) and its Revision in 1997 (Meciar, 1997). These documents
can be characterised as ‘all things for all sectors.’ Both policies contain a long list
of micro priorities in individual sectors, strongly reminiscent of old communist
plans (see the section on institutional problems for more detail). As in Magvasi
(1994), there is also a long list of minor policies with negligible impact and
funding. The only major proposals are in sector-specific policies. Again, the
preferred approach is government guarantees for bank loans and the structure of
sector-specific spending favours basic industries. The production of metals and
chemicals accounts for 49.2 % of proposed spending, with light industry and
electrical and optical engineering accounting for 1.8 % and 1.5 % respectively. The
only major change is a financial shift towards engineering – 42.5 %. (all data from
Meciar, 1995, p. 121). Two separate laws passed during this period should also be
regarded as a part of the industrial policy. The Strategic Companies Act and
Revitalisation Act need to be considered because the policy documents relied on
them and they were to be directly involved in the government’s industrial policy.
(More on these laws in the chapter on privatisation and restructuring.) The last
policy, passed by the new government of Mikulas Dzurinda, is described and
analysed in more detail in the conclusion.
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9.7 Analysis of Government Influence on Industrial
Restructuring and Investment
Developments within the industrial structure are closely tied to investment,
particularly since the Slovak industry is relatively capital-intensive. It is not
surprising that a significant part of the explanation of the changing structure of
Slovak industry is related to the availability of investment capital in Slovakia for
individual industries and companies. Government actions that shaped these areas
can be roughly divided into two areas - privatisation and government fiscal and
investment policy. The other part of the explanation as to why industrial policy
failed is related to government’s institutional characteristics, particularly its
inability to adjust to the changing environment and its ineffectiveness attributed to
frequent policy turnarounds.
9.7.1 Privatization
Private vs. public ownership of certain sectors is one of the basic instruments
of the classical industrial policy. In Slovakia, the situation was different from
advanced market democracies, because the state owned the whole economy prior
to transition.  The privatisation of most of the economy was considered one of the
principal aims of the economic reform package approved in 1990 and implemented
in January 1, 1991. (MSPNM SR, 1999, p. 1) (More on the issue in the chapter on
privatisation.) This section will argue that the privatisation method of direct sales
chosen during the 1995-1998 period was important in determining investment and
production structure in the Slovak industry. It gave incentives to large companies
in basic industries that allowed them to invest on a level significantly above their
already high share of industry.
Slovakia has undergone two waves of privatisation of large enterprises. One
was implemented in the 1991-1993 period, the other occurred during the 1993-
1998 period (it should have been officially over by 1996, but some sales continued
even afterwards). The core of large privatisation occurred in 1992 which was
considered the first wave. The 1995-1998 period was considered the second wave.
Sales took place between the two periods, but their book value amounted only to
SKK 25.7 billion out of property with the book value of SKK 226.7 privatised
during the 1991-1998 period in large privatisation. (calculations based on MESA
10, 1999 and Reptova and Polonec, 1999, p. 460)
The voucher method dominated the first wave - enterprises with a book value
of SKK 79.7 billion were privatised through the voucher method and enterprises
worth only SKK 12.7 billion were privatised via direct sales. In the words of one of
the architects of this wave: "(Voucher method was used) because the speed and
extent of privatisation were considered to be crucial and there was lack of available
investment capital." (Miklos, 1996, p. 90) The vouchers were distributed to the
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population and they could then exchange them for shares. This achieved the
objective but there are divergent assessments of its effects on corporate governance
and restructuring. (e.g., Djankov and Pohl, 1997, Meciar, 1997, MSPNM SR,
1999)
On the contrary, during the 1995-1998 period, the voucher privatisation was
cancelled and enterprises with book value of SKK 109.2 billion were sold via
direct sales. (Reptova and Polonec, 1999, p. 460-1) The aim was to sell enterprises
to those 'strategic' buyers who would be able to rejuvenate them - usually
management or domestic investors. However, this method was mired in non-
transparency, allegations of corruption and political cronyism. (e.g., see OECD,
1996, Miklos, 1995, 1998, Miklos and Zitnansky, 1996, 1997, Reptova and
Polonec, 1999, MSPNM SR, 1999). This section will demonstrate that both
methods influenced the industrial structure – the voucher privatisation indirectly
together with expansive fiscal policy and direct sales directly, particularly through
investment requirements that were often a condition of the sale.
First of all, table 6 demonstrates that a highly significant number of large
enterprises, particularly in basic industries, were privatised during the 1995-1998
period. The table is based on data on the 100 largest companies in Slovakia
compiled by the economic weekly Trend for year 1998. It is not surprising that
companies from basic industries and investment goods are over-represented in the
list of large corporations, together with mining. The food industry has also large
firms – 8 are on the list. On the other hand, companies from light industry are
generally not present. What is more interesting is that large enterprises from basic
industries were clearly much more likely to be privatised in the 1995-1998 period
than their counterparts from the sector of investment goods. All large food
companies were either sold before 1995 or are subsidiaries of foreign
multinationals, so none of them were privatised during the period. In addition,
corporations active in basic industries and sold during the 1995-1998 period
generally dominate the overall sales of their respective sectors.
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TABLE 6. Large Enterprises Privatised by Direct Sales in 1995-1998 and Their
Importance for Industry Sales
Sector Companies
in TOP 100
in 1998
Companies in
TOP 100
privatised during
1995-1998
Their share in
sales by TOP
100 companies
in their sector
Their share in
overall sales of
their sector in
1998
Mining CA
+CB
4 4 100 36
Food DA 8 0 0 0
DB 1 0 0 0
DC 0 0 - -
DD 0 0 - -
Light Industry
DN 7 3 51.7 34.1
DE 1 1 100 95.2
DF 11 6 44.2 39.8
DG 2 0 0 0
DH 2 2 100 13.5
DI 7 4 83 54.6
Basic
Industries
DJ 3 1 51.8 15.3
DK 4 1 19.6 6.1
DL 5 2 8.7 7.8
Investment
Goods
DM 0 0 - -
Source: author's calculations based on Trend TOP 100, Privatisation Register from MESA
10 data, Ministry of Privatisation of SR data and Statistical Office of SR data
Consequently, it can be inferred from the table that whatever specific
requirements were set during the privatisation process in the 1995-1998 period
would tend to influence large enterprises in basic industries and their respective
sectors much more than other sectors. There were several peculiarities to the
privatisation process during this period, most relevant being the investment
requirement. Prices for companies were set at a significantly lower level than done
previously – for direct sales in the 1992 – 1993 period, the price was on average
105..9 % and 106..7 % of the accounting value of a company, but it was only 28.2
% and 18 % for the years 1996 and 1997. (MESA 10, 1999) The price was often
made conditional on investment to be carried out in following years or allowed for
such investment to be later written off from the purchase price. This meant that for
every crown that was invested within the limit, a crown was deducted from
payment. Unless the marginal value of investment was a very unlikely zero, it paid
off for new owners to invest even if the investment was not necessary or efficient
from the welfare point of view. (Jurzyca, 1999)
To analyse the incentive structure of investments, we will analyse incomplete
data on direct sales during the 1995-1998 period available in the Privatisation
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Register compiled by a private think tank in Slovakia, MESA 10. If we look at the
35 largest companies in Slovakia by sales in 1998, 9 are private corporations in
services and construction. The remaining 26 are industrial companies or state-
owned utilities. There are 8 state-owned utility companies ranging from the Slovak
Gas, Slovak Electricity through electricity distribution networks to Slovak Rail,
Slovak Telecom, and Slovak Mail. It has already been described how government
channelled investment into these corporations, particularly in the energy sector.
This analysis deals only with the remaining 18 large industrial companies not
completely owned by the state. Out of these 18 enterprises, exactly half were
privatised during the 1995-1998 period and have data on the book value, price, and
investment requirements available. These firms were obliged to invest at least SKK
27.2 billion following the privatisation, which is more than 59.8 % of the total
investment required by the government during the period from privatised
enterprises - SKK 45.8 billion. Shares in these largest firms sold during the period
constituted book value of only SKK 26.1 billion - 23.9 % out of total book value of
enterprises sold during the period.  Thus, government motivated new owners of
these firms into investment spree that was dramatically above their share in the
industry. All of these firms were relative behemoths from basic industries:
petrochemicals, chemicals and metal industry. There is also individual anecdotal
evidence that same condition applied to large enterprise in basic industries sold
shortly before the fall of the second Meciar government in March 1994,
particularly in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry. (Reptova and Polonec,
1999, pp. 460-1)
Consequently, by its choice of which enterprises to privatise by direct sales
and high, but selective investment requirements, the government was providing a
very powerful investment incentive for the largest companies in those sectors that
it officially wanted to lose share in the economy. These were also industries, as
already mentioned, which had been hugely favoured in access to investment during
the communist period. On a sub sector level, these were generally companies in the
more basic and heavy part of their sectors - usually processing oil and ore.
9.7.2 Fiscal and Investment Policy
The government's fiscal and investment policy during 1990s underwent
several dramatic changes, which had an important impact on the structure of
industrial investment in Slovakia. (Those interested in the details of fiscal policy
should refer to chapter 3.) The decade can be roughly divided into three periods.
Until January 1, 1993, it was a fiscal policy of a regional government governing a
region in a deep crisis. From 1993 to 1995, the government had to simultaneously
cope with the additional burden of establishing a new state together with the loss of
previous transfers from the Czech Republic. It managed to do so and still reduced
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the looseness of its fiscal policy.  From 1996 through 1998, the fiscal policy was an
aggressively expansionary one, aimed particularly at infrastructure construction.
1991 and 1992 can be characterised by the emergence of hard budget
constraints for enterprises and the loss of government subsidies. The general
government's overall fiscal policy was relatively restrictive to prevent the
emergence of a Polish-style hyperinflation. The tight stance was based on the need
to stave off inflation pressures arising from the liberalisation of prices, devaluation
and other external shocks. It was successful – after growing by 61.2 % in 1991,
inflation declined to just 10 % in 1992, the lowest level in all transition countries.
Data available for Slovakia since 1993 paint a picture of a consistently
conservative monetary policy, which meant that Slovakia has enjoyed the lowest
inflation among transition countries, together with the Czech Republic. This meant
that a crowding-out effect occurs quite easily in the Slovak domestic loan market
as there has been no great credit expansion. As consumer loans have not played a
significant role so far, the interplay is generally between government and enterprise
credit. Chart 2 depicts development of credit to government and enterprises with
January 1, 1993 as the starting point.
CHART 2. Net Credit to Government and Enterprises, 1993 – 1998
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CHART 3. Net Credit to Government/Net Credit to Enterprises, 1993 - 1998,  %
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Chart 3 supplements the picture by showing the ratio between domestic credit
to government and to enterprises from 1993 until 1998. Three phases can be easily
discerned. During the first year, loss of Czech transfers, continuing economic
downturn, expenses of building a new state together with a relative lack of fiscal
discipline meant a high budget deficit accompanied by an increase in the
government borrowing at the expense of enterprises. In 1994, economic growth
and increased fiscal discipline meant that government borrowing stagnated and
began to decrease. Enterprises finally gained more access to loans and the fast
growth in their debts lasted until end of 1995. In 1996, two developments
coincided. The government began an ambitious infrastructure spending, while the
central bank, afraid of overheating the economy and mounting current account
deficit, tightened the monetary policy. From 1996 to 1998, the government made
huge investments in energy‘ infrastructure and road construction. The result was
that it went on borrowing and significantly crowded out private investment for the
remaining 3 years. (Note: the sharp fall in government credit at the end of 1996
was a result of an accounting change, which wrote off the controversial debt of the
Slovak government to the Czech Republic. Without this change, the sustained
increase in government borrowing can be observed from mid-1996 on.)
Without available domestic credits, enterprises began to increasingly turn
abroad, particularly as the stability of Slovak crown seemed to indicate the
advantages of low-interest deutschmark or dollar loans. Due to the strong growth
of the Slovak economy, international lenders were now more willing to lend to
Slovak companies. (OECD, 1999, p. 9) The result - shown in Chart 4 – has been a
strong growth in foreign loans versus domestic loans since 1995. At the end of
1995, foreign loans to enterprises were only 29.6 % of domestic loans to
enterprises. In November 1996, it was still only 33.2 %. During the following two
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years this ratio more than doubled to 74.6 % by December 31, 1998. This
development is important for industrial structure for three reasons.
CHART 4. Foreign and Domestic Enterprise Debt, 1993 - 1998
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First of all, a significant proportion of these loans were government-
guaranteed credits to state companies building the nuclear plant in Mochovce and
water dams in Gabcikovo and Zilina. The government credit guarantees amounted
to SKK 100.4 billion by the end of 1998 and were generally taken during year
1995-1998. (OECD, 1999, p. 9) What is more important, only large companies
could, for obvious reasons, tap international financial markets and secure foreign
loans. This seems to be reflected in the investment patterns of 1996 and 1997,
when large enterprises had a hugely disproportionate share in investment compared
to value added, as table 7 demonstrates.
The form of privatisation chosen in the previous period (voucher
privatisation) caused that even enterprises already privatised required a significant
volume of capital for investment as the privatisation itself had not brought any.
This only reinforced the consequences of the fiscal and investment policy of the
government in the 1996 – 1998 period (see also chapters on privatisation and
restructuring).
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TABLE 7: Breakdown of Value and Investment in the Economy, by Size
Value Added Investment
1996 1997 1996 1997
Enterprises by Number of Employees
 0 – 9 13.2 14.5 11.3 8.6
10 – 19 3.6 3.8 3.0 2.3
20 – 49 4.7 5.2 4.4 4.4
50 – 249 13.2 14.7 17.9 23.0
250 and more 46.8 42.0 63.4 61.7
Tradesmen 18.5 19.8 - -
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Statistical Office of SR. Note: tradesmen not included in investment statistics
The last important factor is the development of foreign investment,
particularly FDI. The inflow had been very low for the whole decade and was
considered highly unsatisfactory by all policy-makers. Successive governments
held key to two principal reasons for the low inflow. First of all, they decided to
privatise in favour of domestic buyers, either through voucher privatisation or
direct sales even though privatisation has proven to be one of the best and the
fastest ways to attract FDI to a transition country. In case of voucher privatisation,
this is only a part of the truth, as many industrial enterprises in which a foreign
investor was interested were excluded from it and sold to the foreign bidder
instead. As already noted, foreigners were completely excluded from privatisation
in the 1995-1998 period. The other principal reason for low influx of capital was
low stability, nationalist stance and negative perception abroad of most Slovak
governments headed by Vladimir Meciar.
The result of this policy mix was high investment in the state-controlled
sector (dominated by energy) and in large private enterprise, particularly those in
basic industries. The government actions reinforced industrial structure identified
by official government policies as negative.
9.7.3 Inability to Adapt to the Changing Environment
Another group of reasons, why the government industrial policy targets were
not achieved and why the government policy was not effective, is the inability of
institutions to adjust to the new post-communist environment, which has been
undergoing rapid change ever since 1989.
The best example of the inability of bureaucracy and policy-makers to adapt
to the new environment is the continuing inclusion of a sweeping range of both
specific projects and vague pronouncements into the industrial policy documents.
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In the case of the former, it was understandable in 1992, if one part of the proposed
Industrial Policy was dedicated to "Proposals for government programs to develop
industry in the Slovak Republic." (Cernak, 1992, App. No. 2) It is a 29-page long
document containing a list of 120 projects to be supported by the government,
ranging from finishing the construction of a nuclear plant to production of
microwave appliances. (ibid., pp. 1 and 8) Even though such a list could be
rightfully criticized as mechanical continuance of communist planning, it had a
logic stemming from the fact that the government was still owner of at least
controlling stake in enterprises considered in the proposal. The same logic applies
to vague pronouncements liberally sprinkled through the policy paper about
"increasing efficiency of production, savings in fuels and energy sources,
increasing sophistication and quality of production." (Cernak, 1992, p. 11) This
example is about the metal industry and the government still owned the metal
industry in 1992. Consequently, such pronouncements, which, together with
specific projects, make up a large part of the policy documents, can be perceived as
showing direction in which the owner - government - is going to move.
However, as more and more of the industry were privatised, it became less
and less understandable, why should such proposals be part of an industrial policy,
but they continued to be included. Finally, the last industrial policy ("Revision of
Industrial Policy in the Slovak Republic"), submitted to the government and to the
parliament in the second half of 1997, still contained a list of what it called
"development projects." (Meciar, 1997, p. 60) This similarly worded mixture of
vague pronouncements and specific investment projects was ridiculous because it
concerned largely private companies without specifying how the government
proposed to influence or support such activities (e.g., "production of ammoniac in
Duslo Sala, jsc." (ibid., p. 66), a company where the government did not hold a
share any more). This is not an exception - in 1997 - 73 % of Slovak industrial
output was produced by the private sector (Miklos, 1998, p. 336) and if
government ownership of the energy sector is discounted, the figure would be even
higher. Going through the list, one sees one fully private company after another.
The truth is that the companies reported innovation and restructuring projects they
were going to implement or hoped to implement and the Ministry of Economy
proudly included them into the policy document to have a list of activities, which it
did not have to financially support.
Two other examples of government inability to adapt are the act on strategic
companies and revitalisation act. The first one, passed in 1995, was supposed to
preserve government share and influence in key enterprises. The second one,
passed in 1997, was supposed to aid in revitalisation of viable companies by
stopping the usual debt collection and bankruptcy proceedings. Neither of them
really worked – many companies that were not supposed to be privatised under the
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former law, were sold and no company ever went through revitalisation. Both laws
are analysed in more detail in chapters on privatisation and restructuring, so let us
only briefly look at reasons for their failure.
The reason why the government strategy failed seems to be its inability to
adjust to the new environment. Slovakia, over the 1990s, can be characterized by
the creation of a market economy, rule of law and democratic political system,
which mean, inter alia, that the effective power of state and particularly the
executive to influence the economy becomes much more limited. Limitations are
caused not only by the division of power within the state (both laws were
pronounced unconstitutional at least in their parts by the Constitutional Court), but
also by the fact that the new environment is based on universal rules, which even
the government can bend only at its peril and where the government is only one of
many actors in the economic arena. In the previous regime, the government
effectively had no equals, only subordinates. In the new reality, refusal of other
actors effectively meant end of a policy. The government and particularly the
executive branch were also unable to take fiscal limitations into account in their
planning, so many plans could not have been implemented.
9.8 Conclusion
This chapter dealt with industrial policy in Slovakia during the transition
decade of 1990s, concentrating on years from 1991 to 1998. In this period, official
targets set out by government documents on industrial policy were not reached. On
the contrary, many tendencies considered negative by policy-makers had been
strengthened. Part of the responsibility lies in institutional aspects of governing the
transition, primarily in frequent policy changes and the inability of policy-makers
to adjust to the changing Slovak economic environment, which can be
characterised by rapidly increasing marketisation and by effective weakening of
the power of the executive branch of the government. Many objectives included in
the policy documents were often contravened indirectly within the same
documents.
Many other major government actions during the decade, which had not been
a part of the official industrial policy framework, had a significant impact on
industrial structure, but usually contravened the officially proclaimed objectives
and favoured the tendencies officially considered to be negative. A combination of
these factors significantly contributed to developments in Slovak industry over
1990s.
It should be stressed that the Slovak environment at the beginning of 1990s
was extremely distorted with regard to prices, property rights, internal and external
trade etc. It was the sequencing of steps that removed these distortions (or by a
decision to preserve some of them) and the overall macroeconomic policy that
260
became the government’s most important tools in influencing the industrial
structure. Therefore, Slovakia could not avoid having an industrial policy, it could
only have had a conscious industrial policy or an industrial policy by default, it
could have had an industrial policy preserving the past industrial structure through
retaining existing distortions or their deepening, or it could have had an industrial
policy removing these distortions thus automatically contributing to the change in
the industrial structure. As this chapter shows, actions of most governments
contributed to preservation of existing distortions or even their deepening and thus
helped preserved industrial structure created during the communist period.
In October 1998, the new government of Mikulas Dzurinda came to power
and passed a new industrial policy document (MH SR, 1999b). This policy differs
from its predecessor by explicitly emphasising the following principles:
· moving from isolationism to openness;
· moving from selective interventions towards systematic improvement of the
economic environment;
· moving from making declarations to real actions;
· moving from support of the weak and punishment of the efficient towards the
creation of an environment that supports the efficient and pushes out the
enterprises with long-term lack of efficiency (ibid., pp. 10-11).
The policy concentrates on the creation of an environment conducive to
economic development and explicitly identifies as key issues some of the
distortions caused by the government that this chapter analysed as well. Despite
these changes for the better, the policy involves two principal risks:
Excessive reform ambitions. The previous policies have been too ambitious
regarding the extent of support programs, the fiscal resources available and
institutional capabilities of the state. This policy has a different problem – it
proposes a set of reforms, about which there is no consensus within the
government or society or which require conditions that the state cannot guarantee.
An example of the former can be the declared tendency to radically increase labour
market flexibility (ibid., p. 37) or to decrease the corporate income tax to 20  %.
(ibid., p. 36). An example of the latter is the required cooperation of the private
agents in the program of data collection on quality of assets and liabilities without
making clear what should lead private agents to cooperate in this venture. (ibid., p.
30)
Insufficient change in the ministry itself. Even though this policy makes clear
that its writing was overseen by people with reform ambitions, its content indicates
that this was not necessarily shared by all authors. The policy contains a significant
volume of redundant information and remnants of previous policies, which
indicates that individual writers of the policy continue in their old way of thinking.
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The new government, however, made a series of bold steps in 1999 and early
2000 that will undoubtedly influence the industrial structure. Swift price
deregulation, particularly regarding utilities, and the preparation for privatisation of
utilities began to remove some of the accumulated distortions. Lowering of the
fiscal deficit and preparation for bank and enterprise restructuring began to create
conditions under which not only large enterprises can find debt sources of
financing. The data for 1999 indicate that the industrial structure began to
gradually change. Real results, however, will begin to show only in the early years
of the 21st century.
9.9 References
Aiginger, K. (1995), „The use of unit values for evaluating the competitiveness of
nations.“ WIFO Institute, Vienna.
Blaise, A. (1986), „Industrial Policy in Advanced Capitalist Democracies“, in
Blaise, A (ed.), “Industrial Policy”, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
Borgula, J. (1999), „Strojársky priemysel“, in “Sluby a realita - slovenská
ekonomika 1995-1998”, MESA 10, Bratislava.
Carnogurský, J. (1991), „Programové vyhlásenie vlády Slovenskej republiky“,
Úrad vlády SR, Bratislava.
Cernák, L. (1992), „Návrh priemyselnej politiky Slovenskej republiky“,
Ministerstvo hospodárstva SR, Bratislava.
Chang, Ha-Joon (1996), „The Political Economy of Industrial Policy“, Macmillan,
London.
Djankov, S. and Pohl, G. (1997), „Restructuring of Large Firms in Slovakia“,
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Gassman, H. (1997), “Industrial Competitiveness Policies in OECD Countries”, in
“The Economic Dimension of Future Enlargement of the European Union”,
Papers presented at the international conference in Prague, November 13-14,
1997.
Havlík, P. (1997), “Competitiveness of CEECs”, in “The Economic Dimension of
Future Enlargement of the European Union”, Papers presented at the
international conference in Prague, November 13-14, 1997.
Hughes, G. and P. Hare (1992), “Industrial Policy and Restructuring in Eastern
Europe”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 8, pp. 82-104.
IMF (1998), “Slovak Republic - Recent Economic Developments”, IMF,
Washington, D.C.
Jakoby, M. (1999) Výkonnost a konkurencieschopnost priemyslu, in “Sluby a
realita - slovenská ekonomika 1995-1998”, MESA 10, Bratislava.
Jurzyca, E. (1998), “Prirodzené monopoly”, in Bútora M. and M. Ivantyšyn (eds.),
“Slovensko 1997”, Inštitút pre verejné otázky, Bratislava.
262
Jurzyca, E. (1999) Interview with Eugen Jurzyca, chairman of the Center for
Economic Development, June 10.
Jurzyca, E., M. Jakoby and P. Pažitný (1999), “Celkový ekonomický vývoj”, in
Mesežnikov, G. and M. Ivantyšyn (eds.), “Slovensko 1998-1999, Súhrnná
správa o stave spolocnosti”, Inštitút pre verejné otázky, Bratislava.
Kornai, J. (1992), “The Socialist System”, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Magvaši, P. (1994), “Návrh priemyselnej politiky Slovenskej republiky”,
Ministerstvo hospodárstva SR, Bratislava.
Meciar, V. (1990), “Programové vyhlásenie vlády Slovenskej republiky”, Úrad
vlády SR, Bratislava.
Meciar, V. (1995), “Priemyselná politika Slovenskej republiky”, Úrad vlady SR,
Bratislava.
Meciar, V. (1997), “Aktualizácia Priemyselnej politiky SR na obdobie rokov 1998-
2005”, Úrad vlady SR, Bratislava.
MESA 10 (1999), “Privatizácia”, in “Sluby a realita - slovenská ekonomika 1995-
1998”, MESA 10, Bratislava.
MH SR (1999a), “Energetická politika SR”, Ministerstvo hospodarstva SR,
Bratislava.
MH SR (1999b), “Rozpracovanie princípov priemyselnej politiky EU na
podmienky Slovenska”, Ministerstvo hospodarstva SR, Bratislava.
Mikloš, I. (1995), “Riziko korupcie v procese privatizácie”, Windsor Club,
Bratislava.
Mikloš, I. (1998), “Celkový ekonomický vývoj”, in Bútora M. and M. Ivantyšyn
(eds.), “Slovensko 1997”, Inštitút pre verejné otázky, Bratislava.
Mikloš, I. and Žitnanský, E. (1996), “Ekonomika”, in M. Bútora and P. Huncík
(eds.), “Slovensko 1995”, Nadácia Sandora Maraia, Bratislava.
Mikloš, I. and Žitnanský, E. (1997), “Ekonomika”, in M. Bútora (ed.), “Slovensko
1996”, Inštitút pre verejné otázky, Bratislava.
MSPNM SR (1999), “Analýza procesu privatizácie”, Ministerstvo pre správu a
privatizáciu národneho majetku SR, Bratislava.
OECD (1975), “Objectifs et instruments des politiques industrielles: une étude
comparative”, OECD, Paris.
OECD (1991), “OECD Economic Surveys - Czech and Slovak Federative
Republic”, OECD, Paris.
OECD (1996), “OECD Economic Surveys - Slovak Republic”, OECD, Paris.
OECD (1997), “New Directions for Industrial Policy”, OECD Policy Brief No.
3/1997; pristup na http://www.oecd.org/publications/Polbrief/9703pol.htm.
OECD (1999), “OECD Economic Surveys – Slovak Republic, OECD, Paris.
Pinder, J., Takashi, H. and Diebold, W. (1979), “Industrial Policy and the
International Economy”, Croom Helm, London.
263
Reptová, O. and Polonec, I. (1999), “Privatizácia”, in Mesežnikov, G. and
Ivantyšyn, M. (eds.), “Slovensko 1998-1999, Súhrnná správa o stave
spolocnosti”, Inštitút pre verejné otázky, Bratislava.
Smith, A. (1998), “Reconstructing the Regional Economy - Industrial
Transformation and Regional Development in Slovakia”, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham.
Štatistický úrad (1993), “Štatistická rocenka Slovenskej republiky 1992”,
Štatistický úrad SR, Bratislava.
Štatistický úrad (1994), “Štatistická rocenka Slovenskej republiky 1993”,
Štatistický úrad SR, Bratislava.
Štatistický úrad (1995), “Štatistická rocenka Slovenskej republiky 1994”,
Štatistický úrad SR, Bratislava.
Štatistický úrad (1996), “Štatistická rocenka Slovenskej republiky 1995”,
Štatistický úrad SR, Bratislava.
Štatistický úrad (1997), “Štatistická rocenka Slovenskej republiky 1996”,
Štatistický úrad SR, Bratislava.
Štatistický úrad (1999), “Vybrané ukazovatele priemyselných organizácií
12/1998”, Štatistický úrad SR, Bratislava.
Trubíniová L. (1996), “Jadrová energetika na Slovensku v roku 1995 ocami jej
kritikov”, in Bútora, M. and Huncík, P. (eds.), “Slovensko 1995”, Nadácia
Sandora Maraia, Bratislava.
Vavro, A. (1992), “Návrh štrukturálnej politiky vlády Slovenskej republiky”,
Hospodárska rada Vlády SR, Bratislava.
Watson, W (1983), “A Primer on the Economics of Industrial Policy”, Ontario
Economic Council, Toronto.
Žiak, M. (1998), “Slovensko: od napredovania k úpadku”, published by author,
Bratislava.
Zloch-Christy, I. (1998), “Industrial Policy: Does Eastern Europe Need One”, in
Zloch-Christy, I. (ed.), “Eastern Europe and the World Economy - Challenges of
Transition and Globalisation”, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
264
10 Economic Competition
Daniela ZEMANOVICOVÁ
INEKO - Institute for Economic and Social Reforms
Competition policy pursues goals that do not have a universal understanding,
much like the modes used to meet them. In transitional economies, competition
policy is a very broad and complex problem. In addition to standard legislation
(The Act on the Protection of Economic Competition) and institutional backup,
other legislative norms are needed to achieve the equality of opportunities (e.g.,
public procurement, license-granting, natural monopolies regulation, state aid).
There is also a need for active participation in eliminating regulatory barriers to
competition. The independence of an antimonopoly authority and its status need to
have a solid legal and financial backing.
An antimonopoly institution is expected to be active in areas where
competition can be distorted by the Government. It also needs to be more active in
public advocacy of competition policy. An anti-monopoly institution needs to
present itself as an independent, competent institution that uses quality analytical
tools. In addition to a formal framework, informal rules, i.e. competition advocacy,
also have a profound effect.
The mutual influence of formal and informal rules, coupled with a
combination of internal and external pressures, will determine the future of
competition policy and competition conditions in the Slovak Republic. The future
development of competition policy and its enforcement will be directed towards a
greater flexibility of rules and strengthening their multinational nature. It will also
be marked by a shift from control of “conventional” anticompetitive practices to
the control of the regulatory intervention of public administration, state aid, and the
enhancement of the strength and influence of informal rules.
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10.1 Introduction
Generally speaking, the goal of competition policy is to protect  economic
competition. There have been debates going on, as to what the economic
competition should serve, that is, the decomposition of this general objective.  Is it
economic efficiency in its static or dynamic meaning, consumer welfare, or other
than economic goals - social, for instance?  This question leads to the problem of
mutual compatibility of these partial goals. Another issue that remains open is how
the goals are to be met. In conjunction with this, debates arise on the degree of the
prescriptiveness needed from rules. One option is to lay down clear-cut and
straightforward rules, which calls for an ex ante formulation of all the current and
prospective situations acting against competition, or, to maintain the flexibility of
rules. In this case, it will be necessary to analyze and evaluate each and every case
individually. This presupposes quality in an entity enforcing the rules. Another
problem concerns the incorporation of competition policy into the context of an
overall economic policy, which may conflict with commercial and industrial
policies. Initially, competition rules were intended to protect competition on the
part of entrepreneurs. Later, it became apparent that competition could also be
restricted by the State. This creates a problem in determining who can intervene in
such cases and in choosing the method of intervention. This is  related to the
informal rules and an overall competition culture. The globalization of business
relations calls for the harmonization of competition rules and procedures at a
multinational level, hence, its leading trends are conceived in the EU and the
OECD.
10.2 The Context
10.2.1 The Substance and Goals of Competition Policy
Opinions on what the goals of the competition protection policy should be
have been shaped by the economic development, theoretical views, and
experiences with the antitrust implementation.122 Goals may be identified either by
researching the history of countries where antitrust legislation has been enforced
(historical method 123), or by analyzing the law texts and observing the changes and
                                                                
122 The concept of antitrust is used in the USA; in Europe, it is competition policy. In the
presented study, the concepts are used synonymously.
123 The early competition rules were established over a hundred years ago in Canada and the
USA. After World War II, they were exported to Western Europe, followed by the rest of
the world. Currently, competition laws and institutions exist in all the advanced market and
transitional economies.
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trends in legislation (analytical method). Initially, understanding competition
policy from the point of view of law, predominated. It was judged whether the
practice corresponded with the practice prohibited under law. Economists became
interested in this area later on. 124
In the process of antitrust legislation enforcement, there have been several
interpretations attempting to define the goal of competition protection. An increase
in the economic efficiency, the elimination of the transfers between the buyers and
sellers, or between companies having market power and consumers, and support of
small and medium-sized enterprises are all examples of  various interpretations.
The enforcement of competition policy was also marked by political influences and
motifs based on the idea that maintaining a fragmented structure was also a way of
maintaining a democratic form of  rule. Efforts were made to eliminate risks
caused by economic concentration, which, as a rule, was conducive to political
power. The goals of competition policy were to prevent economic power from
being abused, and to protect consumer and producer interests At times, the issue of
plurality was overemphasized and resulted in the protection of small enterprises. In
this context, a goal formulated in this fashion would be contradictory to economic
efficiency and consumer welfare.
There are countries where legislation has not explicitly contained the issue of
goals in the competition law. In others, the issue has been stipulated in broader
terms or covered with several  specific goals. The more recent legal norms attempt
to stipulate the goals of economic competition. The most frequent goal listed is the
preservation (or, protection, promotion) of competition (or, free/efficient
competition). Some legal provisions contain more than just economic goals. For
instance, competition policy in Great Britain is linked with the concept of public
interest.
                                                                
124 In the 1950s, especially the Industrial Organization School, the development was
markedly influenced by R.H. Coase’s famous article entitled The Problem of Social Cost.
The economists began to analyze the economic relations and influence antitrust laws. G.
Stigler introduced the concept of efficiency, i.e., welfare economics, which had a profound
effect upon the nature of competition policy. R. Bork claimed that in the 100-year history of
the enforcement of antitrust in the USA, its enforcement had been impacted by the non-
specification of the goals of competition policy. This resulted in the courts prohibiting
numerous beneficial market structures and practices. Especially detrimental was
“egalitarianism”, market fragmentation, and the protection of small enterprises. Bork
outlined the objectives of competition policy as follows: “The role of antitrust may be
summarized as an effort to improve the allocation efficiency without lowering production
efficiency so as not to lower consumer welfare.”  Defining several  goals entails a problem
of their mutual consistency or hierarchization. L. White identifies three possible goals of
competition policy: economic efficiency, fairness for entrepreneurs, and the control of
economic concentration.
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In the past few years, the goal of competition policy has been identified with
the achievement of economic efficiency. This is defined as a support to the
allocation efficiency manifested by low costs, technological changes, and
innovations. As a rule, the ultimate goal is the enhancement of consumer welfare.
Globalization introduces the problem of national, or, multinational dimension of
consumer welfare.125 The issue of the so-called efficiency defense introduces the
principle of balance in antitrust. The more recent laws explicitly contain this
principle,126 in others the balance method is manifested through their enforcement.
The selection of  goals is  a political decision. Previous experiences abroad have
shown that competition policy ought to be more focused on consumer welfare and
economic efficiency rather than on the protection of individual competitors and the
control of large, dominant companies.
Antimonopoly rules are a form of regulation. Even so, there  are constraints
to these interventions in a market environment. From a long-term point of view,
the market would be able to cope with market failures that result from restriction of
competition. The question that needs to be answered is whether a regulatory
intervention can introduce balance more quickly. In my opinion, there is a need for
such an intervention in transitional economies because intervention may accelerate
the establishment of market conditions. A long-term viewpoint would suggest that
the abandonment of such a form of regulation  ought to be considered. The context
described above is vital for understanding the competition policy in the SR.
The goal of competition policy was not stipulated in the Act No. 63/1991.
Some legal formulations of the Act allowed for a contravening interpretation,
which complicated the enforcement of the Act. In the Act No. 188/1994, the goal
of the protection of economic competition is expressly stipulated in Article 1: “The
purpose of this Act is to protect economic competition in the markets of products
and services (hereinafter only “goods”) against prevention, restriction or
distortion (hereinafter only “restriction on competition”), as well as create
conditions for its further development, in order to promote economic  development
and consumer welfare.”
                                                                
125 For instance, E. Fox and J. Ordover (1996), refer to the world welfare concept (an
aggregate level of consumer benefit and producer profit in all countries).
126  Canada (the Act of 1980) and France (1986) may serve as examples of countries in
which the principle is laid down in their respective legislation. Initially, an opinion prevailed
in France that anticompetitive agreements were bound to be negative because eventually
they resulted in higher prices and inflation. Later on, the opinion was changed, and the 1986
Act contained the principle of balance (in anticompetitive agreements, abuse of a dominant
position, and concentration control), whereby the possibility of outweighing the impacts on
the competition by economic effects is contingent on the consumers’ participation in
welfare.
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An objective formulated in this fashion reflects more recent trends according
to which economic competition is increasingly understood as a means of achieving
economic goals, especially economic efficiency and consumer welfare, rather than
a goal in itself. Economic competition also directs attention to the establishment of
competition  conditions.
In the SR, the Act is based on the protection of efficient competition and the
principle of balance. The protection of economic competition is not an end in itself
and cannot be enforced in absolute terms. It is directed towards establishing
economic conditions that will have a favorable impact on the consumer.
10.3 Achieving the Goals
10.3.1 Per se  Versus Rule of Reason
There is frequent conflict between legal and economic approaches in regard
to how the  goals of competition policy are to be met. The disputes between
lawyers and economists on antitrust have been around for some time.127 Basically,
one may speak of two camps: 1) the authors who wish to safeguard the prescriptive
nature of competition rules and approach economic competition as a goal. They
clamor for univocal prohibitions and detailed rules; 2) the authors who underscore
the results and effects and approach economic competition as a way of ensuring an
efficient economic development. They lay emphasis on the analytical nature of
rules and advocate individual evaluation of each case.
The development of competition rules enforcement was initially based on the
evaluation of individual cases based upon their legal merits. Experience led to
setting up groups of similar cases and then imposing a blanket ban.  Later on, there
was a shift from the per se rule (where it suffices to give a proof of the case
corresponding with the prohibition stipulated in the Act) to the rule of reason
principle (which accentuates economic consequences, i.e., it does not suffice to
establish that a practice is prohibited, it, too, must have a negative impact on the
economy).128
                                                                
127 In the SR, in the magazine Právny obzor (Legal Horizons), in 1996 and 1997.
128 In the USA, a shift from linguistic interpretation of Sherman’s law to economic
interpretation is evident. The precedent of per se rule was established; it sufficed to establish
that the activities monitored clearly corresponded with prohibited practices, irrespective of
their economic impacts. In 1911, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court compelled the
majority of experts that the Act needed to be interpreted in a “reasonable ” fashion, and
introduced the so-called rule of reason which was based on the assumption that the legislator
could not systematically condemn all the practices prohibited under law and instead, they
were to be viewed within the context of their consequences. A distinction was made
between the so-called good and bad deals restricting competition (Clayton’s Act of 1948).
Later on, this approach was transposed to the national legislation of France and the EC, for
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The Slovak law concept of economic competition protection is based heavily
on the rule of reason. Economically, this concept is very acceptable, but is very
demanding in terms of  its enforcement. This concept calls for quality economic
analyses of the individual cases and a sensitive weighing of their impacts.  In
transitional economies, and the SR is no exception, the above concept  is
confronted with the quality of  human resources charged with the enforcement of
the Act.
10.3.2 Where to Intervene
Competition policy is a type of regulation and its role is to correct market
failures. A question arises whether it is expedient to correct these failures by virtue
of intervention into the structure, or to intervene by conduct.129 In the early days of
antitrust, the structural approach predominated130 and it was embodied in a ban on
monopolization. It was later that attention was directed towards defining the
prohibited conduct of entrepreneurs (agreements restricting competition, abuse of a
dominant position). Rules controlling economic concentration (mergers,
acquisitions) were adopted because it became apparent that the impact of the
market structure on the conditions of competition was significant, and structure
intervention allowed for some prevention.131  At the same time, it should be noted
that the entrepreneurs responded to the uncompromising sanctions imposed upon
cartel agreements by establishing concentrations with looser control. A question
may be posed as to whether or not this is not abandoning a stringent
implementation of anticompetition legislation.
In principle, three areas concerning the instruments of competition policy
were established:  1) concentration control; 2) prohibition of anticompetitive
practices; 3) state aid control. The difference among them is that concentrations are
not prohibited;132 they are only subject to the control of antimonopoly institutions.
On the other hand, anticompetitive practices are prohibited and sanctioned.
Economic competition may also be distorted by the interventions of public
administration, and this has resulted in seeking the instruments of response to
them.  In the EU, regulations on the state aid control have been introduced, and this
area has recently become dominant in the EU.
                                                                                                                                                     
instance.
129 Based on the S-C-P paradigm of J.M. Clark. Refer to Sherer and Ross (1990).
130 Well-known are cases of Standard Oil Co. (1911), American Tobacco (1911), Alcoa and
AT&T.
131  In the EU, since 1990 (Regulation No. 4064/1989).
132 This would be an action against an efficient development of companies via their external
growth.
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 In the SR, the legislation covers the above areas, i.e., it stipulates the control
of concentrations, anticompetitive practices, and it even provides some limited
room for a response to competition restriction on the part of public administration
(Article 18 of the Act). The issues related to the state aid control need to be
addressed separately. In 1999, the State Aid Control Office was established, and in
September 1999, the Act on State Aid was passed (Act No. 231/1998 Coll.). The
latter went into effect on January 1, 2000.
10.4 Formal Rules
In line with a new institutional economics, institutions need to establish
formal rules (legislation, institutions) and informal rules (attitudes, customs, ethics,
behavioral patterns). In the SR, the protection of economic competition had a
sound basis. In the early years of economic transformation, a fundamental
legislative and institutional framework was established in order to protect
economic competition.
10.4.1 Legislative Framework of Economic Competition
The Act No. 63/1991 on the Protection of Economic Competition introduced
the rules of competition protection to the Slovak legal system.133  The earliest
amendment of the Act took place after it had been in force for over a year. The Act
No. 495/1992 Coll. was especially focused on the sweeping state and legislative
changes that were under way. It reflected the abolishment of the Federal Office for
Economic Competition and transferred powers to national offices.
After the independent republic was established, the protection of economic
competition was even enshrined in the Constitution (Article 155, Para. 2 of the
Constitution of the SR). Despite that effort, enforcement of an economic policy
distorted equality of opportunities in a number of ways.
A new Act No. 188/1994 Coll. on the Protection of Economic Competition
was passed, because several weak points were found in the legal provision  of the
1991 Act (the purpose of the act was not stipulated clearly enough, the scope of  its
jurisdiction was too narrow,  vague substantive clauses on cartel agreements along
with a dual regime of their judgement, inadequate definition of mergers, excess
reporting duty of entrepreneurs at acquiring a monopoly or dominant position in
the market, insufficient powers of the Antimonopoly Office (the Office) in
gathering necessary materials and information, unsatisfactory legal provisions
pertaining to administrative proceedings before the court, inaccuracies in
                                                                
133  In the past, the Act No. 141/1933 Coll. on Cartels and Private Monopolies was passed in
the Czecho-Slovak Republic in 1933. Later on, within the framework of a centrally planned
economy, it was no longer viable.
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terminology, a need to take account of the laws passed at a later date). The Act was
focused on harmonizing the national law with the EU rules of economic
competition. It was preceded by an extensive comparative analysis and a
discussion with numerous foreign experts. In fact, it was among the earliest laws
passed in the SR to be harmonized with the EU legislation and up until now, it has
not caused any serious problems.
In accordance with the international commitments (Euroagreement effective
as of February 1, 1995), implementing rules for the enforcement of competition
provisions were adopted and became effective in 1997. Harmonization of
legislation caused no specific objections concerning economic competition. The
control of state aid and public procurement is of greater concern. Competition
policy is still in the process of development, and the rules are being changed in the
EU. This makes it important to monitor and analyze this development and respond
to it appropriately.
Through the Act No. 240/1998 Coll. on Agriculture, an indirect amendment
was forced through to grant an exemption for anticompetition agreements of
entrepreneurs in agriculture.134 The Antimonopoly Office of the SR was not given
a chance to express its opinion on this bill. This is an example of how the
government of that time disregarded the principles of competition. The Office
submitted a legislative draft of the so-called little amendment of the Act that was
intended to restore the original  state of affairs. The draft was debated in the
National Council of the SR in November 1999 and it was declined.135 It is likely
that this will induce a negative response on the part of the  EU.
 The Act on the Protection of Economic Competition can be listed as one of
the crucial economic laws that, when enforced, assists entrepreneurs. In other
countries, it is common practice to work with guidebooks. That was the idea
behind passing the Act in 1994. The Act assumed the responsibility for publishing
a generally binding provision in which the conditions of the Article 5 of the Act
would be stipulated in  greater detail.136 This would assist the entrepreneurs with its
enforcement. To date, such a provision has not been adopted. Instead, guidelines
applicable to concentrations and agreements restricting competition were drafted.
The Office drafted some internal methodologies, but failed to issue any generally
binding provision or any guidelines.
                                                                
134 Concerning milk, slaughter animals, oilseeds, cereals, sugar beet, vegetables, fruits, and
potatoes.
135  It was passed in the Parliament and was to come into force in 2003. On the initiative of
the Antimonopoly Office of the SR, President of the SR did not sign it and referred it back
to the Parliament.
136 Compliance with the conditions under which the prohibition is not applicable  to
agreements restricting competition.
272
Currently, the Antimonopoly Office of the SR has drafted the so-called little
amendment which is to introduce de minimis 137 doctrine, negative attest,138
individual and group exemptions.139 It has also invalidated the exemption of
agricultural agreements from the jurisdiction of the Act. The Antimonopoly Office
of the SR drafted the Legislative Plan of a New Act on the Protection of Economic
Competition. The draft was approved by the Government on November 17, 1999.
The proposed changes concern procedural and substantive aspects and these
changes address the previous enforcement of the Act and the development of the
EU competition rules. Efforts to enhance the prescriptive nature of the rules140 and
solidify the position of the Chairman of the Antimonopoly Office141 are apparent. It
would be most  advisable to present this draft for a wider discussion.
10.4.2 An Overall Legislative Framework
The legislative framework of economic competition is also composed of other
laws that ensure equality of opportunities in enterprise (for instance, access to
essential facilities, state aid, public procurement, capital market regulation,
banking supervision, the system of license-granting, ineffective bankruptcies). The
lack of clear rules in the above areas allows for the competition distortion.
It is advisable to give an antimonopoly institution an opportunity to respond
to drafting or amending such laws (ex post and ex ante). The Antimonopoly Office
took active part in this process in the early period of its activity, but it was later
assigned a more passive role. The Office is expected to review bills and other legal
regulations. Its involvement in the legislative process is designed to prevent an
uncontrolled adoption of new norms that may have a detrimental impact on
competition. The position of the Office is not very solid. In passive legislation, the
comments made by the Office on bills submitted by other ministries were only
occasionally taken into account.142
                                                                
137 The limits of unsubstantial restriction of competition which cannot appreciably affect
competition conditions in the markets.
138The Antimonopoly Office opinion  that the agreement of entrepreneurs does not fall under
the prohibition within the meaning of this Act.
139 Exemption from a prohibition of such agreements restricting competition that meet the
criteria set forth in the Act and are deemed necessary for achieving efficiency. In addition to
an individual exemption, there may also be a group of agreements that meet the criteria
stipulated in the relevant legislative norm, for instance, agreements on specialization,
research and development, if these agreements meet specified conditions.
140  In our opinion, this contravenes the requirement for the flexibility of rules and it would
be advisable to adopt guidelines, or, a generally binding provision, to stipulate these changes
in greater detail.
141 A requirement to enhance the independence of the Office is justifiable, however, it
should be initially aimed at the enhancement of a collective decision-making.
142 For instance, adverse opinion of the Office on the Act on Prices halted their adoption.
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10.4.3 Aiding Economic Transformation
 The Slovak economy is undergoing a stage of economic transformation that
envisages the competition mechanism as a replacement for the administrative
interventions of the State. Competition mechanism may be considered the most
efficient instrument of market regulation; therefore, in this stage, an antimonopoly
institution is required to enforce the following:143
·  diminish administrative interventions of the State and enlarge areas exposed to
competition pressure;
· intervene into the structure via privatization;
· allow free access to the market and the liberalization of foreign trade;
· make up for competition restriction on the part of public administration;
· encourage active competition advocacy.
Ever since it was established, the Antimonopoly Office has been actively
enforcing the restriction of regulation and widening up the scope of competition
conditions across the individual sectors of the economy. In the early years of its
operation, the Office was an active vehicle of reform-oriented changes and was
considered ahead of its time, to some extent. 144 For instance:
· It submitted a Bill that invalidated state monopoly in tobacco and salt
enterprise. (The Act No. 63/1950). The Bill was carried in 1994. The Act
established conditions for economic competition in the areas concerned.
· In order to introduce a competitive environment into the areas of products and
services  funded from the state budget, the Office initiated the adoption of the
Resolution of the Government No. 640/1991 on  Public Procurement. This
was the first initiative of its kind in transitional  countries.
· It repeatedly submitted a bill on the regulation of natural monopolies. To
date, this bill has not been carried. The adoption of this norm is considered an
essential precondition of a successful privatization and a constituent part of
the restructuring of these areas of enterprise. Regrettably, the work on the
regulation of natural monopolies was discontinued, and only lately, the
problem has only recently been addressed anew.
· It submitted a draft of rules (as early as 1994), followed by a Bill on
competitive license-granting. This Bill was turned down. Scandals, that have
recently arisen in conjunction with license-granting in almost all the areas,
indicate an urgent need to adopt such rules.
                                                                
143 This is a more active position that is more prone to conflicts than the enforcement of the
“conventional” antimonopoly policy on the part of antimonopoly institutions in advanced
market economies.
144  Considering the then period, the proposals made by the Office were much too advanced,
and were not received positively.
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· It made a proposal geared towards the improvement of the condition of
competitive environment (by the Office taking part in the privatization
process, identification and a continuous elimination of institutional,
economic, and legislative barriers restricting economic competition,
conducting analyses of the impact of system measures on competition).
In the years that followed, the Antimonopoly Office began to lose its position
as an active market-oriented entity and was increasingly assigned a passive role.
This role prevented its ability to dramatically affect the adopted measures of the
economic policy. It did not even voice its opinion145 on such relevant steps as the
distorting of the principle of equality of opportunities in the Recovery Act, tax
allowances for privatizing entities,146 the exemption of some entities from the
jurisdiction of the Act on Bankruptcy and Composition (for instance, strategic and
rehabilitated enterprises), discharge of penalties for some entrepreneurs that
defaulted on their tax liabilities, the introduction of import restrictions, or wage
regulation. The Office declared an effort to partake in these processes more
actively after the elections in 1998. However, too short a period of time has lapsed
to judge whether or not these efforts have been achieved. This is also true of the
Government’s commitment to observe the principles of equality of opportunities
and competition in the economic policy.
The privatization process also offered an opportunity to intervene in the
establishment of competitive structures. The Office voiced its opinion on the
concepts of the privatization of various sectors of the economy and the
privatization projects of individual enterprises. The privatization process offered a
unique chance, not only to create a favorable ownership, but also to create an
organizational structure. The objective of expedient de-concentration and de-
monopolization was to establish a competitive environment.147 According to
Article 19 of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition, the Office is
obligated to evaluate the drafts of a privatization project submitted by the founder
pursuant to the Act No. 92/1991 Coll. on the Conditions of the Transfer of State
Assets to Other Persons.148 Later on, the privatization process became less
                                                                
145  Or, it did not make a public statement or use arguments to influence public opinion.
146  Discharge of  income tax, discharge of the portion of the purchase price by the National
Property Fund of the SR.
147 The legislative framework of the powers of the Antimonopoly Office of the SR in the
privatization process was composed of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition
and the Act No. 92/1991 Coll. on the Conditions of the Transfer of  State Assets to Other
Persons (the so-called Act on Big Privatization), as amended. According to these, the Office
voiced its opinions on the drafts of  a privatization project submitted by the founder from the
point of view of the criteria of expedient deconcentration.
148 For instance, in 1998, the Office issued decrees concerning 52 drafts of privatization
projects.
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transparent as public biddings were abandoned, and the equality of opportunities
was distorted. The goal of competition policy is to establish competitive market
structures, and this requires a close link with the industrial policy of the State.
Conflicts occasionally may arise between them, usually revolving around the short-
term effects. For instance, restricting import may balance-up the deficit of trade
balance in the short-term, but also establish barriers to competition, lead to the
deterioration of consumer welfare, and postpone the adaptation of enterprises to
market conditions. Foreign competition is often the only one to exert competition
pressure on domestic producers due to the size of the Slovak market.149 Therefore,
when protectionist measures were adopted (surcharge on import and extension of
its effect), the Antimonopoly Office of the SR voiced a negative opinion. Although
its view was usually disregarded, a debate on the medium- and long-term effects of
such measures was invited and the pressure of domestic producers at the expense
of consumers was at least partially outweighed.
10.4.4 The Antimonopoly Office of the SR, Its Status and Powers
The Antimonopoly Office of the SR is a central state administration body. It
was established under the Act of the National Council of the SR in 1990. The
Prime Minister appoints the Chairman of the Antimonopoly Office. In economic
competition, the SR enjoyed a good starting position, and the Slovak
Antimonopoly Office had been established prior to the Federal Office and the
Czech antimonopoly institution.
Ever since it was founded in 1991, the Antimonopoly Office of the SR has
gained recognition locally and internationally. Foreign contacts at bilateral and
multinational levels were established (DG IV for economic competition in the EU,
OECD, UNO). Later on, the situation was changed, and several foreign institutions
began to refer to the strengths of this institution in the past tense.
The status of the antimonopoly institution was weakened largely due to the
frequent recalling  of its chairmen. At the same time, qualification criteria were
lessened in favor of political criteria. The SR ranked first in the number of
chairmen of the Antimonopoly Office in the Central European region. While in the
CR, during the entire period of this institution’s existence, there have been two
chairmen, one in Hungary and two in Poland, the SR boasts a record of six
                                                                
149 For instance, the analysis of the price development in selected groups of products
conducted by the Office in 1994, indicated that the most rapid price increase was reported in
sectors that were not exposed to the pressure of domestic competition and were protected
from import (passenger cars, cigarettes, some groceries). On the other hand, a minimum
price increase (below the inflation rate) was recorded in highly competitive sectors with
non-existent import protection (textile and clothing, consumer machinery and electrical
appliances).
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chairmen. It was apparent that failure to ensure independent position was
responsible for the frequent recalling of its chairmen.150 The objective was to
prevent any initiation of delicate cases and also to have the Office actively
intervene into the privatization process through the control of concentrations.
Failure to understand the significance of competition principles in the
economy resulted in approaching the Antimonopoly Office of  the SR as a
marginal institution under political control. Economic transformation calls for
entering the economic policy in a much more active and go-ahead manner,
therefore, this position needs to be void of any political and lobby group pressures.
This method will establish a balance between the short- and long-term economic
interests.
In fact, the establishment of a legislative and institutional framework is just
the first step toward achieving efficient competition policy. The enforcement of the
Act is contingent on the quality of human resources. A sensitive and economically
justified entry into the economic environment of entrepreneurs and the ability to
address the arguments used to set upon the anti-competition measures of the
Government, calls for a quality and solid backup. After the initial excitement and
numerous training courses held abroad, as well as conferences and workshops,
preconditions were established to assure this institution’s sound performance.
Later on, filling in the post of chairman was politicized and an overall situation in
the society resulted in numerous specialists leaving the Office. There is a marked
shortage of specialists with a legal and academic background. Currently, the
question is whether or not another group of experts on economic competition can
be recreated. As a rule, it is easier to build an institution from the ground floor than
to reorganize it later on.
10.5 The Implementation of Competition Policy
10.5.1 The Scope of Cases Reviewed and Decisions Adopted
Since the Office’s establishment in 1998, it has issued 223 decisions on
anticompetitive practices, of which 168 were cases of abuse of a dominant position
in the relevant market, 55 were agreements restricting competition, and 135 were
decisions on concentrations. According to the Act on the Protection of Economic
Competition, the Office also reviewed other forms of competition restriction that
were resolved by issuing a decree, or by ordering the relevant authority to remedy
the  state of affairs (46 cases of the enforcement of Article 18).
                                                                
150 In 1994, the proposal to appoint the chairman of the Antimonopoly Office by the
president of the republic for a term exceeding the four-year election term, was turned down.
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Since 1991, the Supreme Court of the SR (SC SR) has reviewed 16 cases
concerning the violation of the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition in
total, e.g., ÖMV-Benzinol, Incheba, Slovnaft-Benzinol, cartel agreement of the
Slovak cement producers. In ten cases, the Court upheld the decision of the
Office.151 Fines totaling over SKK 50 million were imposed. In the early years of
its activity, the Office did not impose stringent sanctions because of the novel
nature of this area, but rather focused on the clarification of competition protection
to entrepreneurs. Later, sanctions were made much more stringent. To date, the
highest fine has been SKK 100 million, and it was imposed on Slovnaft Inc. for
abuse of a dominant position.
TABLE  1: Decisions of the Antimonopoly Office Issued in Individual Years152
Year ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Abuse of a Dominant
Position
45 18 27 12 14 21 15 16 168
Agreements Restricting
Competition
6 6 7 7 6 7 6 10  55
Anticompetitive
Practices, total
51 24 34 19 20 28 21 26 223
Concentrations 11 8 8 6 9 27 17 49 135
Public Administration
Measures, Article 18
- - - 8 19 2 7 10 46
Reviewing by Supreme
Court
- - - - - 2 1 5 8
Fines, in thousands of
SKK
- - - 21,937 2,180 5,287 6,510 14,142 50,056
Source: Statistics of the Antimonopoly Office of the SR, 1999
10.5.2 Anticompetitive Practices and Concentration Review
By law, the Office shall sanction anticompetitive practices (agreements
restricting competition, abuse of a dominant position), control  the process of
                                                                
151  In 1999, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Office in 5 cases.
152 In our opinion, the figures give an idea of the overall scope of the activity of the Office,
however, no trends, or, priorities of the Office may be projected on their basis. The number
of cases across the individual categories was impacted by an overall economic policy (for
instance, in concentrations), and the number of entities towards which the proceedings were
directed may distort the figure. For instance, in 1998, of the total number of 16 decisions
concerning abuse of a dominant position, in as few as 5 cases the Office decided that the
dominant position in the market was abused.
278
economic concentration, and guarantee the establishment of competition
conditions. The Office has carried out several investigations and adopted decisions
prohibiting agreements and abuse of a dominant position.
10.5.2.1 Abuse of a Dominant Position
Pursuant to the Act No. 188/1994 Coll. on the Protection of Economic
Competition, assuming the dominant position in the market is not prohibited,
however, it shall not be abused. Abuse of a dominant position in the market may
have several forms, namely: 1) enforcing disproportionate conditions in contracts;
2) tying contracts; 3) applying different conditions to equal or comparable
transactions in individual entrepreneurs (discrimination).
In the event the Office is suspicious of abuse of a dominant position, it shall
first define the relevant market (from the material, geographic, and even temporal
point of views), determine if the entity concerned disposes of market strength, and
demonstrate that abuse has occurred.  If abuse is established, the Office shall issue
a decree prohibiting such conduct of the entrepreneurs, and it may impose a fine
equivalent to 10 percent of their turnover, even on a repetitive basis.
The politically sensitive nature of the cases is evidenced by the abuse of a
dominant position by Slovnaft Inc. In 1998, the Office issued a decree in which the
non-renewal of fuel purchase agreements with some entrepreneurs153 was qualified
as abuse of a dominant position in the relevant market, and the company was
imposed a fine of SKK 100 million and ordered to remedy the state of affairs.
Slovnaft appealed the Office’s decision after the time for appealing had lapsed. In a
special appellate procedure, the former chairman of the Office invalidated the
original decision. In view of the fact that, according to the opinion of the Office
staff, Slovnaft violated the law, the new chairman filed a petition with the Office of
the Public Prosecution.  In December 1999, the Office was served with a protest
from the Chief Prosecutor of the SR. It was against the decision of the former
chairman of the Office and the original decision was made void. The case is to be
reviewed soon.154
10.5.2.2 Agreements Restricting  Competition
Agreements, concerted practices of entrepreneurs, and the decisions of
entrepreneurs’ associations that result in competition restriction are prohibited
because, through these means, the decision-making autonomy of entrepreneurs is
restricted from gaining advantages at the expense of other entrepreneurs or
consumers. These may be agreements between competitors (horizontal
                                                                
153 Slovnaft refused to renew agreements on direct deliveries of fuels to some companies.
Eight companies filed a petition with the Antimonopoly Office of the SR.
154 After the time-limit for appealing, Pravda daily, November 20, 1999.
279
agreements), or between entrepreneurs that operate in ancillary markets (vertical
agreements). In addition to written and verbal agreements of entrepreneurs,
concerted practices are also prohibited, i.e., deliberate coordination of the conduct
of entrepreneurs in the market cannot be referred to as a natural following of the
competitor’s procedures.
In accordance with the concept of an efficient competition protection, the
applicable legal provision is not based on a universal prohibition of every
agreement that restricts competition. It would be futile to prohibit agreements
having  no substantial influence upon competition (for instance, petty cartels), and
also agreements that simultaneously restrict in-brand competition and promote out-
brand competition (e.g., some distribution agreements). Therefore, the principle of
balance is also introduced in agreements. To avoid any bureaucratization of this
procedure, an increase of the entrepreneur’s transaction costs, and tying the Office
staff, mandatory notification of anticompetitive agreements was lifted.155  This
provided space for the Office to seek and review cases that are harmful  to
competition rather than just formally approving agreements that have no marked
negative effects. The Office must take the initiative in finding leads to competition
restriction. Generally speaking, this assumes quality analytical tools.
Among the most successful cases was a cartel agreement among the Slovak
cement producers. This was examined by the Office in 1994 and resulted in a
decision for prohibition and a fine of almost SKK 20 million.
10.5.2.3 Concentration Control
Reviewing concentrations is a prevention and an intervention into the market
structure used to prevent the emergence of entities capable of enjoying a powerful,
dominant position through an external growth of companies. Concentration is a
process by which an economic  grouping of entrepreneurs is created through a
merger, or amalgamation of previously independent entrepreneurs capable of
assuming control over another entity. Assuming control is understood as the
possibility to exercise decisive influence over an activity of another entrepreneur
via ownership and user rights related to the enterprise. Especially important is the
creation of influence over the set-up, voting and decision-making of the
entrepreneur’s bodies.
                                                                
155 According to the previous provision, the Office was to be notified of all agreements, even
those that had a minimal restrictive effect upon competition. These agreements were either
approved or granted an exception. The only difference was that the approvals concerned less
dangerous agreements and contained non-voicing of the opinion of the Office
(acquiescence). Experience showed that entrepreneurs did not meet their obligations to
notify the Office of the agreements to be approved. However, the enforcement of this
obligation would not be advisable because they often may positively impact the economy
and they would be approved by the Office upon notification.
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Concentration is subject to the Office control, in the event: 1) the joint turnover
of the parties to concentration is at least SKK 300 million, and at least two parties to
concentration report a turnover of SKK 100 million respectively for the previous
accounting period, or, 2) the joint share of the parties to concentration exceeds 20
percent of the total turnover in identical or substitute goods in the market of the SR.
In accordance with the concept of an efficient competition protection, the
economic balance, i.e., judgement whether the harm to economic competition will
be outweighed by the  positive effects of concentration, is a vital criterion
underlying the decision of the Office on concentration. Based on this concept, the
Office may issue a decree on the concentration approval, prohibition, or tie its
implementation to meeting some conditions. This allows for an economically
prudent decision. However, some freedom in decision-making may be used for a
politically-motivated decision.156
Concentration control is considered a sensitive area in the SR. The non-
transparent privatization process has established vague ownership and capital  ties
that may result in an uncompetitive market structure. The entrepreneurs were
obligated to notify the Office of a concentration exceeding the set limit. By law,
the Office has the right to request all the relevant information in order to review
economic ties and analyze their impacts on the competition conditions in
individual markets. Pursuant to Article 10, Para. 2, the Office was authorized to
prohibit a concentration which establishes or solidifies a dominant market position
in the event that the parties to concentration fail to demonstrate that the harm to
economic competition will be outweighed by nationwide positive economic effects
of concentration. The Office may impose such a prohibition retroactively. It may
also require that all things be restored to the original state.  In several cases,
notification duty was disregarded by entrepreneurs, fines in a few cases for failure
to notify were imposed by the Office. In most cases, the Office consented to a
concentration,157 and in some cases, to the conditions of concentration  (for
instance, in Slovnaft – Benzinol case). The Office decided on the prohibition of
one concentration in the case of vertical concentration between a dominant press
publisher (Danubiaprint company) and a dominant press distributor (PNS
company).
                                                                
156 The question is whether a clear-cut formulation of this criterion would help, or if other
ways of issuing a decision in line with the political requirements would be sought (e.g., via
defining relevant markets). The enforcement of the Competition Act requires culture,
observance of laws, and identification with the goals of this policy.
157 It should be noted that the situation is similar abroad, e.g., in the EU. In the EU, however,
concentration is much more extensively discussed with the DG IV staff well in advance so
as to avoid a decision on the prohibition, and to prevent the parties to concentration from
altering the operation to make it acceptable for the Commission.
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The Legislative Plan of  a new bill considers the introduction of the so-called
concentration prenotification. This action is common in the EU and foreign
investors are accustomed to it. Prenotification would allow the entrepreneurs to
familiarize themselves with the opinion of the antimonopoly institution in the
concentration plan’s early stage. The investment risk of foreign investors, who
have little trust in the enforcement and observance of the laws in our country,
would be reduced. The potential risk of a prohibition of an operation in which their
capital has been invested would be avoided.
The politically delicate nature is also evidenced by some decisions (for
instance, in Slovnaft-Benzinol case) and the fact that a failure to notify
concentration served as an argument for the invalidation of the agreements with the
National Property Fund of the SR (e.g., Istrochem case158). Through
concentrations, the enforcement of the Act on the Protection of Economic
Competition  may turn into an instrument of a retroactive revision of privatization
decisions.
10.5.3 The Jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Public Administration
According to Article 18 of the Act No. 188/1994 Coll. on the Protection of
Economic Competition: 1) state administrative bodies and municipalities shall not,
by their own decisions, apparent support, or in any other way, restrict competition;
2) the Office shall conduct oversight of the observance of Paragraph (1). Article
11, Para. 2 shall apply as appropriate;159 3) based on evidence and analyses, the
Office may request the state administration bodies and municipalities to remedy
the state of affairs.
The majority of cases reviewed concerned discriminatory action of the
municipalities that observed the decrees of the Office as a way to remedy the state
of affairs. A more complex and politically delicate situation arises if competition
restriction is an outcome of a decision made by the central state administration
body (for instance, a ministry). The table shows that the Office rarely intervened
                                                                
158 In 1996, the Bratislava Chemical Works (CHZB) acquired 67 percent of Istrochem shares
from the National Property Fund of the SR, for SKK 300 million, although their value was
SKK 2.8 billion. In 1999, the National Property Fund of the SR withdrew from the
agreement, and the argument it used was that CHZB did not notify the Antimonopoly Office
of the SR of a concentration, and, hence, the privatization agreement was breached. The
Antimonopoly Office of the SR, in its decision of November 18, 1999, corroborated the fact
that CHZB did not violate the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition and the
concentration was approved.
159 Provision that entitles the Office to require background materials and information from
entrepreneurs that are necessary for the operation of the Office.
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into such cases, even though there have been numerous distortions of competition
conditions occurring in recent years. The success rate of these cases was low.160
TABLE 2: Number of Reviewed Cases Pursuant to Article 18
YEAR 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
No. of Cases 4 4 39 54 37 27 15 (7)*
( )*- number of applications filed to effectuate redress. Source: Nižnanský (1998)
According to the chairman of the Antimonopoly Office of the SR,161 the state
is considered satisfactory in the case of municipalities.  In almost all the cases, the
municipalities responded positively to the findings of the Office. The decrees to
eliminate the deficiency and remedy the state of affairs are observed. The situation
is less satisfactory in cases where the central state administration bodies have been
ordered to remedy the state of affairs. In several cases, the heads of these bodies
did not even respond to the Office’s warnings that the decisions issued violated the
Act on the Protection of Economic Competition.
  Regulatory barriers may be considered a big problem in transitional
countries. These interventions, e.g., regulatory decisions on prices, wages,
favoritism, administrative restriction  of  the market entry, exclusive rights,
certificates, licenses, and other permits for enterprise, and also the non-existence of
rules, selective access to information, may all impede or postpone the market entry
and distort the principle of equality of opportunities. These interventions are
distinct from the anticompetitive practices of entrepreneurs, but have not been
thoroughly addressed. The basic characteristics of regulatory barriers are shown in
Chart 1.
             The chart illustrates that these are the decisions made by public
administration, and that these decisions have an impact on the economy and the
conditions of competition. Let us further assume that the intervention of the State
in the economic environment is expedient only in cases of market failures. Market
failures may be characterized by the market system’s inability to ensure market
                                                                
160 For instance, the allocation of the funds of Pro Slovakia Fund which was given a broad
mass media coverage. A Divisional director of the Antimonopoly Office of the SR was
recalled from his position after he had instructed the culture minister to remedy the state of
affairs pursuant to Article 18 of the Act No. 188/1994 Coll. on the Protection of Economic
Competition, i.e., to stop the ministry from allocating funds from the Pro Slovakia State
Fund to two periodicals (Slovenská Republika, Hlas ludu), to fund their supplements
intended for national minorities because that created unequal competition conditions.  The
press made ironical comments on the non-transparency of the fund allocation as follows:
“The funds of Pro Slovakia are a greater secret than defense spending”.
161 Nižnanský (1998).
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assets. This can be caused by the market’s unfitness, non-existence, or
underdevelopment.162 Regulatory barriers may be interpreted in active and passive
meanings. Active failure means that the Government intervenes when it should not,
or it intervenes in an inappropriate fashion. Passive failures means that the
government does not intervene in areas where intervention is needed.
CHART  1: Regulatory Barriers
The Legislative Plan of a new bill contemplates the possibility of sanctioning
the state administration bodies and municipalities for the non-observance of the
Office’s decree to remedy the state of affairs pursuant to Article 18. This, however,
invites questions related to the status of the individual state administration bodies
and their mutual subordination, and the responsibility of the Government for the
enforced economic policy. In my opinion, it is more likely that the standard of
informal rules that can resolve the problem.
                                                                
162 As a rule, the concept of market failure is used to describe situations in which the market
output does not reach efficiency according to Pareto or Marshall. Ref. to Stiglitz (1197),
Nemcová and Žák (1997).
Economy-related Decisions of Public
Administration
Restricting Economic
competition
Non-restrictive on ec. competition
Existent Market failures Non-existent Market failures
Not - reacting to Market Failures
Inefficient
Reacting to Market Failures
Efficient
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10.6 Comparing with the Situations in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and  Poland
  A questionnaire-based survey,163 conducted in 1997, was focused on the
perception of regulatory barriers by entrepreneurs in four transitional economies
(CR, Hungary, Poland, and the SR). Comparison of the results indicated that the
entrepreneurs in the SR were confronted with more restrictions in the area of
public administration. Such a situation has numerous negative impacts on the
economy:
· regulatory barriers may incur sunk costs in entrepreneurs;
· transaction costs of entrepreneurs rise;
· allocation efficiency, consumer welfare deteriorates;
· state interventions worsen the competitiveness of enterprises;
· entrepreneurs are focused on rent-seeking rather than profit-seeking.
Among the most detrimental regulatory barriers identified by Slovak
entrepreneurs were the unequal privatization conditions, the protection of
inefficient companies, and state restructuring aid. This indicates that in transitional
economies, specific regulatory barriers are established that create unequal
conditions for entrepreneurs. On the other hand, Slovak entrepreneurs were lenient
with the discrimination of foreign entrepreneurs, and import restrictions. This
alludes to a poor preparedness for globalization processes. The order of
harmfulness is shown in table 3.
10.7 Informal Rules
The perception of economic competition and equality of opportunities was
influenced by the novel nature of this area. In the early years of its existence, the
Office was active in clarifying competition objectives and rules. In addition to the
publishing of articles, workshops for entrepreneurs and lectures at universities
were organized. Gradually, the entrepreneurs got used to the existence of
competition rules, although one cannot speak of their full observance (e.g., the
non-observance of notification duty at concentrations).
Selective policy on the part of the government, clientelism in privatization,
public procurement, and license granting have all had negative effects. This effect
was reflected in the perception of successful behavioral pattern. The process of
remedying this situation will be both difficult and lengthy.
To date, few arguments have been used in favor of competition expansion on
the part of consumers and their associations. For example, in the case of import
restrictions, the effect upon domestic consumers is higher prices, and de facto
                                                                
163 Conducted in 1997, on a sample of 155 respondents, refer to Zemanovicová (1998).
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cross-subsidizing of foreign consumers is an outcome of an artificial export
support. Currently, competition advocacy is non-existent in the SR, i.e., opposing
government restrictions that restrict competition and can have deleterious effects
upon consumer welfare. It cannot be assumed that the economic policy of the
government is totally free from lobbying. This should be outweighed by the solid
status and influence of institutions that advocate the nationwide economic interests
and consumer welfare. The status of these institutions is still weak. This prevents
the exertion of effective counterpressure by powerful and well-established affinity
groups of entrepreneurs.
TABLE 3: The Order of Harmfulness in the SR
Numerical
Order
Question S
1 Unequal Privatization Conditions 285
2 Protection of Inefficient Enterprises 271
3 State Support of Restructuring 262
4 Legislation Enforcement 257
5 Advantages to Certain Companies 256
6 Non-existence of Rules 252
7 Exemption of the Scope of Legislation 252
8 Non-functioning Bankruptcy Legislation 249
9 Public Procurement 248
10 License-granting System 231
11 Allocation of Means from Public Funds 230
12 Price and Wage Control 221
13 Import Restrictions 211
14 Existence of Licenses and Permits 204
15 Limits, Standards, Restrictions 192
16 Discrimination of Foreign Entrepreneurs 189
17 Restrictions in Enterprise 170
Note: If all the respondents regarded the measure as: problem-free, S=100; a barrier to
competition S=200; a significant barrier to competition S=300.
In transitional economies, a functioning legislative framework needs to be
established quickly in order to avoid the distortion of rules in favor of narrow
affinity groups. The transparency of procedures must also be observed, especially
if the procedures are likely to substantially influence equality of opportunities.
In the early years of the Office’s existence, it was common to inform the
entrepreneurs and also the public at large of the Office’s activity and its decisions.
It was among the first public administration authorities to establish a tradition of
annual reports containing an overview of activities and other relevant information.
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This tradition has been kept.164 Organizing press conferences continued, but the
information presented avoided delicate topics and was non-responsive to
government decisions, even when competition was harmed. The general public was
denied information concerning the detrimental impact on competition. The
disclosure of relevant information and the transparency of its activity began to
deteriorate, and its decisions were no longer made official. It is common practice
abroad that decisions of antimonopoly institutions and their commentary and
explanatory notes are commonly made public. The purpose of this is to enable the
entrepreneurs to anticipate the enforceability of the law. This information is also
available on Internet. In the SR, the general public and even the professional public
working in this field (lawyers, economists) were denied access to this information.
A positive change took place after the elections in 1998. The  Office165 now makes
public on a regular basis the information concerning cases under review and the
decisions issued. This information is also accessible on the Internet
(www.antimon.gov.sk).
10.8 Recommendations for the Economic Policy
A legislative and institutional framework has been established for the
competition policy in the SR. Competition policy may be viewed in the light of
costs and effects. It may be stated that the legislative framework has established
preconditions for  non-bureaucratic, economically rational procedures of the
competition policy implementation. However, there is no effective instrument to
halt administrative and regulatory interventions of public administration.  It is these
competition restrictions that may be regarded as relevant in the process of
economic transformation.166 It is advisable to solidify the position of the SR’s
Antimonopoly Office in the legislative process and also facilitate the adoption of
economic policy decisions that restrict competition. Other factors are the initiation
of legislative changes that are to eliminate artificial competition restrictions, or that
will initiate the adoption of rules in this area that are vital from the point of view of
equality of  opportunities (e.g., license-granting). One may also consider the
introduction of an obligation to consult the Office in the event measures are likely
to have a detrimental impact on competition. Should the opinion of the Office be
disregarded, measures need to be taken. An obligation to submit the opinion of the
Office to the Parliament, together with the Bill and the necessity of informing the
public should be set forth in a legal provision.
                                                                
164 Reports on the activity of the Office are published annually in Slovak and English -
accessible on the internet.
165 Regular information of the Antimonopoly Office of the SR in Hospodárske noviny daily.
166 For details, refer to Zemanovicová (1998).
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In addition to the Act on the Protection of Economic Competition, there is a
need to perfect rules in other areas as well, especially those having impact on
equality of opportunities (regulation of natural monopolies, public procurement,
license-granting, and the like).
Sometimes, the intervention of the Office  is complicated by the environment
which has inhibited the reform of some sectors. This situation impedes the
enforcement of market-oriented measures. Therefore, progressing reform (e.g., of
the health, social, and banking sectors, the capital market, natural monopolies) will
continue to expand in areas that operate under competitive pressure. Reducing the
number of redistribution processes will naturally narrow the space for regulatory
interventions of public administration. Likewise, globalization and the
harmonization of rules will be conducive to the establishment of a standard overall
framework for enterprise.
The independence of an antimonopoly institution needs to be guaranteed in
order to fairly implement competition rules and effectively respond to the
implementation of regulatory barriers. The citizens ought to have access to
information regarding the impacts of the restriction of economic competition.
Hence, an antimonopoly institution should enjoy a degree of autonomy that allows
it to present its arguments. If an antimonopoly institution is also expected to act as
a competition solicitor, it must be regarded as a credible and competent institution.
Its activities must be transparent and based on sound arguments and careful
analyses of acclaimed experts viewpoints.167
Quality performance of competition policy is contingent on the quality of
human resources. Given the high staff turnover and foreign experience, it is
envisaged that external staff will be hired for some analyses, or, legislation drafting
(for instance, the regulation of natural monopolies, state aid).
Generally speaking, the protection of economic competition, despite a
successful start, was in a slump, especially in 1994. This was associated with an
overall concept of the economic policy that was based on selectiveness rather than
equality of opportunities.  It may be considered a wasted opportunity that an
institution that was set up with great enthusiasm and conceived in a modern
fashion, was later politicized. After the 1998 elections, the Government stated their
observance of the principle of equality of opportunities and the solidification of the
                                                                
167 Oftentimes, a counterargument is used that attacking anticompetition regulation on the
part of an antimonopoly institution is outside the scope of its powers. However, these are
institutions that are to advocate public interest, and, hence,  regulatory interventions harming
the competition and consumers. For instance, Demsetz, H. (1991) in Efficiency,
Competition and Policy, poses the following question: Why shouldn’t the FTC
(antimonopoly institution in the US) attack the ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission), if it
attacks associations of entrepreneurs?
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autonomy of this institution in its program declaration. The future will show how
much the situation will change. Experience has shown that establishing a
legislative and institutional framework does not alone guarantee effective
implementation of competition policy. Informal rules play a significant role.
Harmony must be established between formal and informal rules. They
cannot bee too diverse or the former will have no vehicle and there will be no
interest to enforce them. This can result in circumvention and distortion. In
transitional economies, the following is necessary:
· active influence upon the public opinion (of professionals and laymen);
· cultivation of competition culture and transparency of rules;
· allies to enforce competition principles, equality of opportunities (the
Government, MPs, entrepreneurs, mass media);
· balancing short-term objectives and medium- and long-term objectives;
· active involvement of an antimonopoly institution in information;
dissemination, explanation of the impacts of the restrictions of economic
competition on the economy and consumers, active response to regulatory
interventions;
· in competition advocacy, independent non-governmental institutions may be
assigned an important role because in contrast to other entities, they do not
identify themselves with narrow sectoral interests in enforcing some
regulatory interventions. On the other hand, they are not part of the
government administration. This fact allows them to enforce independent
professional opinions and to advocate for nationwide interests.
In transitional economies, competition restriction is often the legacy of the
old economic system. The philosophy of equality of opportunities and the act of
enforcing competition principles does not boast a tradition of long standing. It
requires a much more rigorous approach to competition advocacy and also offers
opportunities for the antimonopoly institution to take an active part in the process
of the drafting of legislative rules, and the adoption of the economic policy
measures that restrict economic competition. As a rule, regulation is advantageous
for  certain affinity groups, and, naturally, it has its adherents and lobby. Due to the
limited time of their term in office, the government employees oftentimes are
prone to prioritize solutions with short-term effects (often, via regulatory
interventions). Therefore, it is necessary to override this propensity by for action
conducive to achieving long-term effects upon the economy and consumers.
In view of the fact that a change of informal rules is time-consuming, the
broader context must be taken into account. Political will is a must if a competitive
environment and the observance of equality of opportunities are to be established.
If there is no political will, the legislation designed to address the issue of
competition restriction on the part of public administration will prove ineffective.
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Passage of formal rules is relatively easy, but if they do not have their vehicle and
lobby, they will be ineffective. For instance, such a lobby is naturally represented
by entrepreneurs who are expected to take interest in fair rules.168  In the SR, the
situation is more complex because of past experiences that reinforced a belief that
discrimination (e.g., in privatization, public procurement) is gainful. Hence,
entrepreneurs have focused on advantage winning, i.e., rent-seeking rather than
profit-seeking through competition.
Naturally, successful behavioral patterns and informal rules represent a
broader historical and cultural problem. Such rules and behaviors are extremely
conservative and change is a slow process. Changes to be implemented in formal
and informal rules are shown in Table 4.
In our opinion, the following may be expected to take place in the economic
competition in the future:
· shift to a greater flexibility which will require quality analytical work in
competition policy. Therefore, the establishment of ad hoc analytical groups
to address some situations may be expected;169
· in conjunction with globalization and integration processes, competition
policy will be increasingly conceived at a multinational level. Therefore, it is
necessary to monitor and analyze international trends and get prepared for
them. The experiences of the associated countries in the first group of
candidate countries testify to the complexity of the negotiation process;
· harmonization with the European law will require specialists on the EU
competition law. In legislation, there will be a need to respond to the present
state and changes in the EU, and methodologies will have to be drafted along
with the explanations and guidebooks for entrepreneurs;
· within the national and multinational frameworks, a shift from “conventional
anticompetitive practices” to the control of state aid and regulatory
interventions of public administration is to be expected;
· reinforcing the weight and influence of informal rules and the public opinion
pressure;
· the actions mentioned above will exert external and internal pressures on the
implementation of an economic policy that has respect for equality of
opportunities. The pressure of affinity groups and the weight of their political
influence will act against this trend.
                                                                
168 Cases have been reported abroad when entrepreneurs insisted on the establishment of a
regulatory framework for natural monopolies and competition rules.
169 I believe that the flexibility requirement will be applicable to the whole public
administration and hence, flexible structures will be necessary.
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TABLE 4: Changes in Formal and Informal Rules
Formal Rules Informal rules
 Legislation  Access of the Public to Information
 - monitoring – ex post control  Alliances
 - prevention - ex ante control  Public Opinion-leading
 - remedy the non-existence of rules  Refinement of Competition Culture
 - harmonization of rules  
Institutions
- Antimonopoly Office of the SR: Independence,
Collective Decision-making, Human Resources
 Activities of an Antimonopoly
Institution
 Activities of NGOs
Overall Environment
- laws influencing equality of opportunities
 Activities of Consumer
Associations
 - reform progression  Mass Media Influence
 - law enforceability  
 - integration  
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11 Privatization
Anton MARCINCIN170
Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association
In a transition economy, privatization serves mainly as an inevitable
condition of restructuring. With regard to the non-existing market and the mass of
property to be privatized, the opportunity to apply the experience of developed
economies was rather limited. Privatization was to a great extent an experiment.
Slovakia first relied on voucher privatization without the appropriate
regulation of capital markets, protection of minority shareholders, institutions, and
enforcement of law. Privatization continued with opaque sales to Slovak managers
who lacked the necessary funding and know-how to achieve privatization.
Restructuring was not perceived as the ultimate goal of privatization. At the same
time, no emphasis was placed on privatization revenues, which later failed to
alleviate the social impact of reforms. It was not fully recognized that privatization
is a political process that provides a unique opportunity to acquire property and
political influence.
Slovakia now faces two privatization tasks. First, it has to cope with the
illegal privatization decisions taken in the past. Second, it has to prepare for the
privatization of banks, large natural monopolies and the health care sector, which
will be much more complicated than the bulk of the privatization processes to date.
The government has to focus on acquiring international credibility by pursuing
these two tasks.
In regard to the privatization of natural monopolies, the British rule applies
here - the State must first of all favor competition. It is therefore necessary to
separate monopolistic and potentially competitive activities of companies
(horizontal and vertical dismantlement of monopolies) before privatization and
prepare the regulator. Each sector (telecommunications, gas, electricity and water)
should have its own regulatory authority in order to have a clear definition of
responsibilities and prevent any conflict of interest. Privatization, which in itself is
a technically complicated process, also imposes the need to amend several laws,
e.g., those concerning debt collection.
                                                                
170 The author is grateful to Michal Mejstrík for his comments on the previous draft and for
constructive discussions.
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11.1 Introduction
The second half of the twentieth century is characterized by the privatization
of state-owned companies.171 On one hand, this process is based on the recognition
that private companies perform better than state-owned ones. On the other hand, it
is based on the generally changed perception of the role to be played by
governments. Privatization requires that governments no longer act as
entrepreneurs to develop a favorable business environment, and to monitor the
enforcement of rules.
Low levels of performance, typical for state-owned companies, result from
the conflict of state interests and weak corporate governance.172 The conflict of
interests can be explained by the fact that the State sets the legal definitions, and
often the institutional definitions, for markets where it concurrently acts as an
entrepreneur that competes with private companies. Poor governance is the
consequence. The citizens (the electorate) therefore attach low significance to
specific entrepreneurial activities of the government within the entire range of its
activities. Private ownership then becomes preferred over state ownership because
the shareholders can evaluate managers solely based on the performance of the
respective company.173
The governments of various countries were unable to use their position as
owners to ensure the performance of their companies or to regulate them in a
failing market. Government attempts to conduct business led to a superfluous
bureaucratization, a lack of identifiable responsibilities at different levels of
management, corruption174 and soft budgetary restrictions.175 This resulted in a
deformation of prices and behavior of consumers and companies.
                                                                
171  Cf. Yarrow (1986) and Armstrong et al. (1995).
172 Estrin (1996) differentiates three areas, giving priority to private ownership over state
ownership: goals of the company, market structure, corporate governance.
173 From the extensive empirical studies to be mentioned Claessens et al. (1997) who
showed the positive influence of privatization on productivity growth in seven transition
economies.
174 According to the Financial Times (1996) the opportunity costs of American investors in
1996 amounted to USD 20 billion when the contracts were concluded by other investors due
to corruption. The Economist (1996, July 13-19) mentioned selected cases of corruption and
fraud in France, which in some instances ended with the arrest of former ministers.
175 The terms soft and hard budget restrictions were defined by Kornai. Hard budget
restrictions “... is a synonym for total financial self-reliance of a company and real
bankruptcy risk in case of insolvency. A soft budget describes a situation in which state
bureaucracy helps state companies (for example by subsidies, preferential tax treatment,
soft loans, setting low administrative costs) and in which such companies are shielded from
financial bankruptcy. In such cases the survival and growth of a company depends more on
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Ownership, however, does not guarantee improved efficiency if there is not
detailed legal frameworks guaranteeing the rights of owner control and courts
willing to enforce laws.176 Moreover, private ownership cannot significantly
enhance the performance of companies if soft budgetary restrictions prevail and the
new owners hamper access to more competitive external funding.
In this paper, we focus on the development of privatization in Slovakia and
analyze its causes. The structure of this chapter identifies the failures and successes
of privatization in Slovakia and gives recommendations for further privatization
policy. The second section summarizes the dilemmas faced by the government at
the outset of the privatization process. The third section describes in chronological
order the policies pursued by individual governments while analyzing the main
expressions and consequences. The fourth section contains a summary and
recommendations.
11.2 Privatization Dilemmas
Privatization in transition economies is aimed to achieve multiple goals.
First, it seeks a change of ownership as an inevitable condition for adapting
companies to market mechanisms. Second, it seeks to protect against a reversion of
the reform process. Third, it must provide a signal to gain credibility for the new
economic policy. Specific problems related to achieving these privatization goals
can be summarized in the following basic points:
· Speed of privatization. Fast privatization177 is synonymous with the success
and irreversibility of the reforms. Simultaneously, the period in which both
new private companies and strong state-owned companies interact on the
                                                                                                                                                     
its ties with bureaucracy than on market success.” (1990, p. 140).
176 Yarrow (1986) argues that an environment of competition and regulation is more
important for efficient operation of the companies than the very change of ownership form.
Brom (1997) documented clearly that the transfer of ownership in transition economies does
not always guarantee a corresponding transfer of control. The description of corporate
governance in socialism is cited by Brada (1996). Managerial bonuses depended on the
completion of tasks set by a central plan, but the plan itself was formed according to the
information of the managers. Apart from the founding Ministry, which replaced the owner,
other stakeholders interfered with the activity of managers, for example the Communist
party and local authorities.
177  Cf. theoretical reasoning for a direct relation between the privatization speed and success
of the reform in Aghion (1993) and van Wijnbergen (1992). The opposite was claimed by
Dewatripont and Roland (1992). According to Collin and Rodrik (1991), potential foreign
investors considered political instability, uncertainty related to economic policies and lack of
legal protection of private property the most important restrictions to investment in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union. A fast privatization was to convince them that the
countries are capable to guarantee enhancement in all three areas.
295
market is reduced.178 To achieve irreversibility of the reforms, a critical
number of companies have to be privatized.179
· Privatization methods.180 Mass privatization enables fast privatization.
However, creating diffused ownership without defining protection for
minority owners does not lead to fast restructuring. Restitution is the least
problematic issue from the point of view of change in ownership. Lengthy
litigations that hamper the manipulation of property is a problem.  Public
auctions are applicable only to sales of smaller companies or specific assets.
Public tenders and direct sales require a costly assessment of asset market
value and significantly slow down privatization. However, they result in
concentrated ownership that will more likely lead to better company
management. Sales to foreign investors appear to be the best form of
privatization.181
· Impact on unemployment growth. Privatization should result in restructuring
that addresses excessive and redundant labor. Even so, the development of
privatized companies should inevitably create new jobs. A government goal
to keep unemployment below a set rate can therefore substantially slow down
privatization.
· Privatization sequence. Privatization of natural monopolies is more
complicated than the privatization of companies in competitive industries.
This factor can therefore delay privatization and risk the need to maintain
distorted prices that may significantly impact all other prices in the
country.182 At the same time, it encourages the government to use natural
monopolies that are inefficient, that increase costs for consumers, and hinder
the development of the monopolies themselves. For example, privatization of
banks is a complex and sensitive issue. Maintaining state ownership there
could result in soft budgetary restrictions for non-performing companies.
· Privatization restructuring. The experience of developed economies183 shows
that the horizontal or vertical dismantlement of monopolies and oligopolies is
much easier and less expensive, as long as these are in state ownership. The
                                                                
178 Murphy et al. (1992) explained with the model of supply and demand the collapse of
production in Russia as a consequence of partial reforms, which did not do away with the
restrictions of state companies and thus lead to an asymmetrical competition between state
and private companies.
179 Roland and Verdier (1992).
180  Shafik (1994) mentions an excellent description of methods applied in the Czechoslovak
privatization.
181 Cf. e.g., Transition report (1995).
182 At the same time poor quality of services and products might result.
183 Tirole (1991), Vickers and Yarrow (1991).
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privatization of local monopolies is easy and quick; however, without
regulation it will reduce public welfare.
· Transparency. The voucher method is generally considered the most
transparent method of privatization. It requires government direct sale
approval processes to prevent corruption and arbitrary decisions of some
clerks.
· Political benefit. Privatization is a political process, where the transfers of
immense assets are followed by shifts in political power. Political parties
have a unique opportunity to use the privatized property for obtaining the
support of the business community.
· Public involvement. The involvement of the public in the privatization
process can help to ensure the irreversibility of the reforms. There could be
fears of transferring a majority of property to foreign investors. These fears
are based more on political arguments than economic arguments. The
government can win support for a privatization policy by involving people
that have a personal interest in the reform and the new order..
· The use of privatization revenues. A precondition for privatization is the use
of government revenues for the compensation of inevitable reform-related
costs. For example, government revenues will likely be required for retraining
the unemployed or for developing the missing infrastructure.
· Inadequate national funds. The lack of national funds can be handled in two
ways - offering assets to foreign investors, and free transfer of property
(voucher privatization).
11.3 Privatization Development
Until January 1993, privatization in Slovakia was almost identical with
privatization in the Czech Republic. Since the speed of privatization was an
important goal of the federal government, the voucher method was used. A
substantial disadvantage of this method was that it generated an excessively
diffused ownership structure.
The privatization process in Slovakia began to deviate from the federal
pattern. Privatization was significantly influenced by frequent changes in the
government and the ministers of privatization. Since November 1989, there have
been seven governments with differing approaches to privatization. The emphasis
therefore began to shift towards creating a Slovak business community. This
resulted in minimal privatization revenues for the government, delays in
restructuring, and mingled political and economic power. The current government
should efficiently privatize some natural monopolies and banks to enhance
international credibility, and to obtain important funds.
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11.3.1 The First Three Governments: 1989-92
The first government was formed by Milan Cic. He took office on December
12, 1989, to replace the last communist government and to prepare the first free
parliamentary elections.
In the 1990 elections, a broad movement "Public against Violence" obtained
the majority of votes cast and asked Vladimír Meciar to form the second post-
revolution government. Meciar took office on June 27, 1990. Mr. Augustín Marián
Húska was appointed President of the Office for the Administration and
Privatization of National Property. The government of Vladimír Meciar was
recalled in April 1991. The third government was headed by Ján Carnogurský
during the period of April 23, 1991 to June 24, 1992. The Ministry of Privatization
was established based on the Act No. 347 Coll. of August 28, 1990.184 Mr. Ivan
Mikloš was appointed the first Minister of Privatization.
Privatization in 1990 was a revolutionary idea since 41 % of the population
preferred the socialist regime, while only 3 % preferred capitalism and 52 %
favored something between these two.185 Dissatisfaction with the reforms grew
mainly due to the first signs of liberalization of food prices and a factual
devaluation of the currency.186 Only 32 % of the population in 1991 considered the
system better than the communist one.187 The government initiated the small-scale
privatization and began to prepare the first phase of large-scale privatization that
were both based on federal legislation. The government hoped to win the support
of the public with the voucher privatization, which started in May 1992 after the
registration of the citizens and the investment funds in late 1991 and early 1992.
This phase was concluded in December 1992 and the shares could have been
distributed in February and March 1993. Finally, due to the split of the
Czechoslovak federation, the shares were distributed as late as in May 1993.
11.3.1.1  The National Property Fund
The National Property Fund (NPF) was established in 1991 according to Act
No. 253/1991 as a legal entity. Its purpose was to assist the privatization of
national property and clearly separate the administration of companies targeted for
privatization and the privatization revenues from the government. The NPF
consists of a Presidium and an Executive Committee that are supervised by a
Supervisory Board. The Executive Committee is responsible for individual
                                                                
184 The formal name of the Ministry of Privatization is Ministry for the Administration and
Privatization of the National Property of the Slovak Republic.
185 Source: Public Opinion Research Institute, Bratislava (1990).
186 Valtr Komárek, main adversary of the reform, claimed: “What is going on here is not an
economic reform, but a cocktail of American recommendations for developing countries .”
187 Source: Výber (1991), No.32, p.19
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sections. The Presidium has nine members elected by the Parliament. The
Presidium decides, for example, on the sale of company shares and the property
acquired through a withdrawal from a privatization contract. The Executive
Committee has eleven members. The Supervisory Board has six members elected
by the Parliament. The NPF assumes ownership of state property and, based on the
individual privatization decisions, transfers this property to private persons. The
NPF holds company shares, the resulting profits, and the privatization revenues.
The use of the NPF-held property is decided upon by the Parliament. The NPF is
politicized and very often operated with no control by the State.189 Many sales
were absolutely disadvantageous for the State.190
The largest liability of the NPF is the bonds191 that replaced the second phase
of the voucher privatization. Due to a lack of liquidity, the NPF had to borrow
SKK 2.25 billion in 1998 to pay out the bonds to persons older than 70 years. At
the same time, it did not pay its liabilities amounting to SKK 2.3 billion. The NPF-
held property was used as collateral to guarantee its liabilities.
By the end of 1998, the NPF had assumed 1,487 privatization projects that
included 2,625 proposals for privatization outputs amounting to a property book
value of SKK 349.4 billion.192 The NPF holds majority stakes and exercises the
related rights, e.g., in Slovenská poistovna (insurance house), Slovenská sporitelna
(savings bank) and Slovenské elektrárne (electrical energy); it also holds a
significant stake in Všeobecná úverová banka (refer to Table 1).
At the end of 1998, the NPF received revenues from the sales of shares and
assets amounting to almost SKK 48 billion. It has a realistic chance to collect
further receivables in amount of SKK 18 billion (refer to Table 2). The total
revenues of the NPF amounted to SKK 71 billion (refer to Table 3), however the
loan of SKK 2 billion and the value of the bonds of SKK 8 billion have to be
subtracted from this figure, since they are at the same time expenditures. The real
revenues thus amount to SKK 61 billion.
                                                                
189According to the information of P67value of March 29,1997, Brigita Schmögnerová said:
“Thus we came to a point where not only there are no external control mechanisms, because
the Supreme Control Office is not allowed to control the NPF and actually the Parliament
(NC SR) is not controlling the NPF either, but there are also no efficient mechanisms of
internal control of the NPF.”   
190 In early 1997, the NPF sold Slovnaft shares for SKK 230 million which is less than 25 %
of their market value. P67value, April 14, 1997. The NPF approved the sale of 10.23 % of
Slovnaft shares on February 19, 1998 with a loss of almost SKK 895 million compared with
the market value. P67value, March 9,1998.
191 A total of 3,326,639 bonds were issues with a nominal value of SKK 33.3 billion. NPF
(1999).
192 The annual report of the NPF for 1998 states these figures, but the NPF (1999) reports
the transfer of 1,531 state owned companies worth SKK 365.5 billion.
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11.3.1.2  Small-Scale Privatization
The small-scale privatization based on the Act No.427/1990 began in
February 1991 and ended in March 1994. The small-scale privatization allowed
public auctions to sell or rent out small service facilities (e.g., hotels and
restaurants), and small shops or industrial units were freed from old debt. A total of
9,500 business entities with a book value of SKK 12.3 billion were auctioned off at
almost SKK 14 billion. SKK 12.1 billion of these non-budget revenues were
transferred to the NPF according to the Act No.474/1990 and the rest was divided
between the Slovenská zárucná banka (Slovak Guarantee Bank) and the
municipalities.193 Foreign investors were not allowed to participate in the first
round of the auctions.
11.3.1.3  First Phase of Large-Scale Privatization
Larger companies were privatized according to the Act No.92/1991194 in two
phases. The government adopted in its resolution No.443 of August 13, 1991 that
listed the companies to be privatized. The first phase of privatization in the period
of 1991-1993 saw the (partial) denationalization of property of 678 state-owned
companies worth SKK 169 billion, mainly in the area of industry and services.195
Some 1,500 projects were submitted for privatization. According to the Act, the
government approved direct sales while other methods of privatization were to be
approved by the Minister of Privatization.
Of the total privatized value, 48 % was privatized through vouchers, 28 %
remained with the NPF, 12 % constituted the reserve fund and other funds, and
only 7 % was sold directly (refer to Table 4). Here it is necessary to be aware of
the fact that the market value of the assets differed from the book value. Therefore,
it could be assumed that the share of direct sales was probably more significant
than 7 percent.
11.3.1.4  Privatization Through Foreign Investors
In 1992, the government sold companies with a book value of SKK 0.8
billion for SKK 2.2 billion to ten buyers (refer to Table 5). From the point of view
of the sales price, this was the richest year. In regard to the share in the book value
of assets sold to foreigners between 1992 and 1998, the years 1994 and 1993 were
most productive. In total, companies worth SKK 4.7 billion were sold to foreign
investors for a sales price of SKK 7.7 billion.196
                                                                
193  Source: Ministry of Privatization (1999a).
194  This act was later amended 19 times.
195  Source: Ministry of Privatization (1999a) and National Property Fund (1999).
196 Author’s calculations based on the public database of the Ministry of Privatization
(1999b).
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11.3.1.5  First Phase of Voucher Privatization
The voucher privatization was basically a free distribution of property using a
simple procedure where the voucher prices - initially equal for all shares -
progressively approach equilibrium prices due to the changing ratio between
supply and demand. Each interaction reduced the total demand and the total supply
of shares by shares with a balanced demand and supply. The volume on the supply
side was given by the number of shares of companies to be privatized, while the
number of unused vouchers determined the volume on the demand side. Five
interactions were sufficient to achieve equilibrium.197
Based on the approved privatization projects, the shares of 503 joint stock
companies with a total book value of SKK 86.9 billion (ca. USD 2.6 billion) were
offered for the first phase of voucher privatization. In the individual rounds of this
phase, the Fund sold shares worth SKK 79.8 billion of the above mentioned offer.
SKK 7.1 billion worth of unsold shares were progressively sold by the Fund using
standard methods. 2.6 million of Slovak citizens participated in the voucher
method of privatization.
In comparison with the Czech scheme, the Slovak voucher scheme offered
less property and property of poorer quality. The ratio of Slovak to Czech property
was only 35:100 even though, according to the size of the economies, it should
have been 50:100. On the contrary, the ratio of property to be actually privatized
through vouchers was higher, 41:100.198 Slovak companies were therefore
privatized more through vouchers than through other methods. The weighted share
of voucher ownership in a Slovak company was 74 % while it was only 64 % in a
Czech company. The role of investment and privatization funds in Slovak
companies was actually stronger when compared to the role of their Czech
counterparts. The interest in Slovak companies, however, was generally smaller
than in Czech companies. The ratio of used investment points for Slovak and
Czech companies was only 27:100, even though Slovak companies were on
average cheaper then Czech companies. The ratio was 23:34 investment points. In
the last year before privatization, the ratio of total profits was only 23:100; the ratio
of total debt was 31:100; the ratio of employees was 39:100.199
                                                                
197 A more detailed description of the scheme is given, e.g., by van Wijnbergen and
Marcincin (1995).
198 Author’s calculations according to the data of the Center for Voucher Privatization in
Prague. There is a difference between the assets of companies included into voucher
privatization (100 % shares), and the assets that were actually offered for exchange against
vouchers (e.g., 80 % of shares). The difference was, e.g., sold to external investors even
before the very voucher privatization, or it remained with the National Property Fund.
199 Author’s calculations according to generally accessible data from the Center for Voucher
Privatization, Prague, 1993.
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The major problem with the voucher method was that it created a too diffused
ownership. Studies have analyzed the influence of voucher privatization on the
price of company shares soon after their placement on the market. The studies
actually established that a concentration of ownership improves the capital costs
and performance of the companies.200 Investment funds also acted as a major issue
because dominant owners, due to missing legislation (protection of minority
owners, definition of capital market and control), abused their position to
expropriate minority owners. Marcincin and van Wijnbergen (1997) found out that
after purifying the data of the selection bias, the investment funds appeared to be
even worse issue than previously assumed.
11.3.2 Fourth Government: 1992-94
The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) won the parliamentary
elections in June 1992,201 and the government of Vladimír Meciar took office on
June 24, 1992. For almost one year, Mr. Lubomír Dolgoš202 was the Minister of
Privatization. His ministry was managed by Prime Minister Vladimír Meciar. This
government then changed the approach to privatization in the fall and emphasized
the standard methods. The significant change was that the authority to decide on
privatization was transferred back to the sectoral ministries. The privatization
process then almost came to a halt. Act No. 60/1994, in force as of March 24,
1994, separated the functions of the President of the NPF and the Minister of
Privatization. The President, Vice President, and members of the NPF board were
elected by the Parliament. The amendment to the act also stipulated that the
property held by NPF is not the property of the State, even though the use of this
property is regulated by the respective privatization legislation.
The revival of privatization came during the period of February 15 to March
11 1994, when the NPF approved 44 privatization projects under the threat that the
government would be recalled. The government of Vladimír Meciar was recalled
in March 1994.
The atmosphere in society is documented by an opinion poll from that year.
Forty-seven percent of the citizens considered the current system a better one than
the communist one while 42 % claimed the exact opposite. Seventy-two percent
said that democracy did not meet their expectations, while only 23 % claimed the
opposite. The then current economic situation, compared with the communist one,
was better for 22 %, but worse for as much as 71 % of the population. Finally, 39
                                                                
200 Cf. e.g., Laštovicka et al. (1995), Claessens (1995), Marcincin (1995), and van
Wijnbergen and Marcincin (1995).
201 HZDS obtained 37.3 % of votes and 74 of 150 chairs in the Slovak National Council
202 From June 24, 1992 to June 22, 1993. Lubomír Dolgoš was recalled after criticizing the
government for its unwillingness to continue with the privatization.
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% preferred private ownership to state control of a majority of companies, while 53
% claimed the opposite.203
11.3.2.1  Investment Privatization Funds
The participants of voucher privatization placed their investment points
independently into joint stock companies or into 429 investment privatization
funds (IPF)204 of which 169 were Slovak entities. While small investors acquired
majority stakes in 244 Slovak companies (refer to Table 6), IPF acquired majority
in 173 companies. As long as four IPF voted in conformity, they were able to
control 110 companies (22 %) with a simple majority stake, or as many as 367
companies (73 %) with a real majority stake.205 In comparison with the IPF, all
other stakeholders in companies privatized through vouchers were negligible (refer
to Table 7 with shares of non-voucher investors). Moreover, the IPF shares were in
the portfolios of only a few investment companies. Seven largest companies owned
61 % of companies privatized through vouchers in Slovakia (refer to Table 8).
The number of IPF grew in 1994 to 311 due to the planned second phase of
the voucher privatization that was never completed. In 1996, the IPF number fell to
36.206 The IPF escaped the supervision of the Ministry of Finance through a re-
registration as joint stock companies. Their shares often were not publicly traded.
The IPF were in the position of a strong shareholder and also, at the same
time, a supervisor that was without supervision himself. Their shareholders, like
small shareholders of the companies, did not have any chance to control and
influence the management of the IPF. In an unregulated environment, the IPF
managers were free to abuse their positions for enriching themselves at the expense
of the shareholders.207 Their position as owners in companies was complicated in
1995, when the authorized share of one IPF (and one investment company) in one
company was reduced from 20 % to 10 %.
The IPF, in an unregulated environment, devalued the vouchers and also the
shares of a majority of the participants in voucher privatization. Moreover, they
undermined the Slovakian trust in collective investment. According to our
                                                                
203  Source: Opinion poll organized by the United States Information Agency in 1993 in
various countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Economic Reform Today 1/1994, p.10-13,
31.
204 According to data of the Center for Voucher Privatization, the IPF acquired 72 % of all
vouchers. Out of that IPF registered in the Czech Republic obtained 73 % and IPF registered
in Slovakia 27 %.
205 A precise calculation in Lastovicka et al. (1995). With real majority we mean the
situation (simplified), where small investors are unable to unite their votes thus the minority
owner of a stake can behave as a majority owner.
206 More detailed paper on IPF by Olsson (1999).
207 Anderson (1994) and Coffee (1994).
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knowledge, there is no comprehensive study in Slovakia that has calculated the
loss caused by the funds.
11.3.2.2  Second Phase of Large-Scale Privatization
The second phase began in September 1993. The difference from the first
phase lies in the emphasis put on standard methods (mainly direct sales) favoring
Slovak managers, abandoning the voucher methods, and transferring privatization
decisions from the government to the NPF. Fifty-eight percent of the total assets
amounting to SKK 137 billion were privatized through direct sales (refer to direct
sales of assets and shares in Table 9) and only 5 % were privatized through public
tenders. According to economic theory, opaque direct sales and the advantaging of
managers lead to delays in restructuring.208
11.3.2.3  Examples of Privatization Abuse
On February 8, 1994, Matica slovenská signed a contract on the privatization
of Neografia, valued at SKK 600 million for a symbolic SKK 1, against the
promise to support HZDS.209 The company Manager was founded on March 11,
1994 by the managers of Východoslovenské železiarne (VSŽ), on the day of the no
confidence vote to the government of Vladimír Meciar. Three days after its
foundation, it obtained approval for the privatization of 9.53 % of VSŽ´s shares at
SKK 200 per share, even though the market value at that time was three times
higher.210
11.3.3 Fifth Government : 1994
The government of Jozef Moravcík assumed office on March 15, 1994. Its
task was to prepare for early parliamentary elections. Milan Janicina was appointed
Minister of Privatization. The government planned the privatization of 174
companies with total book value of SKK 176 billion, out of which SKK 80 billion
were to be privatized through vouchers. The total assets planned for the voucher
privatization should have been higher, SKK 100 billion, since additional assets
held by the NPF in the amount of SKK 20 billion were offered. These were not
sold in the first phase of the voucher privatization. The government started to issue
new voucher books and some 3.4 million people had their books registered at the
end of November. That represented 92 % of the eligible citizens. The zero round
was expected for early 1995. Thirteen approved privatization projects of the
previous government were cancelled.
                                                                
208 Aghion (1995), Blanchard and Aghion (1995), and Carlin et al. (1994).
209 Sme, April 19,1996, p.5.
210 Trend, Oct.11,.1995.
304
11.3.4 The Sixth Government: 1994-98
The government of Vladimír Meciar assumed office on December 13, 1994,
and Peter Bisák became its  Privatization Minister. The first change in privatization
was signaled by the adoption of Act no. 369/1994 with an effective date of
December 21, 1994. That vested the NPF Presidium with the right to issue
privatization decisions initiated by the Privatization Ministry or the NPF Executive
Committee. Privatization decision-making powers held by the State were
essentially assigned to a legal entity.211 On November 4, 1994, the new Parliament
passed Act no. 370/1994 intended to revoke 50 privatization projects approved by
the previous government. On the basis of this law, actually twenty of these projects
were repealed in December 1994, while the remaining thirty projects were repealed
pursuant to a direct resolution of the government in February 1995. Act no.
370/1994 was repelled in May 1995 based on an adjudication of the Constitutional
Court; nevertheless, in late November 1995, NPF continued in the privatization
process of 27 companies.212
In its Policy Statement dated January 10, 1995, the government committed
itself to develop new privatization techniques. Emphasis was supposed to be put on
competitive forms of selling property to domestic investors213 and payments for the
purchased property was to be spread over a period of ten to fifteen years. The first
payments usually were for 20 % of the agreed sales price.214 NPF stopped
providing information on privatization projects and selection criteria. In general, up
to 50 % of the sales price could be waived, as compensation for the acquirer’s
investments, and concurrently be subject to favorable taxation terms.215 The
                                                                
211 Subsequently, the Supreme Audit Office declared that it cannot oversee privatization as
according to this Act the government’s role in privatization had been limited to entering the
companies in the list of companies identified for privatization and to deciding upon
applicable privatization methods. However, the government cannot be held responsible for
privatization as such because the NPF alone decides upon the buyer, price and payment
schedule. The Parliament could have had control over NPF but its majority was against it.
Národná obroda, May 7,1996, pg.1; Práca, March 4,1996, pg.5; Sme, June 30,1995, pg.4.
212  Trend, Dec.13,1995, pg.6B.
213 The NPF Presidium Chairman Štefan Gavorník underscored that NPF´s goal was to
create a strong community of domestic businessmen. The only thing that mattered was
“whom to will Slovakia belong” regardless of the sales price. Hospodárske noviny,
Oct.24,1995, pg.4.
214 Hospodárske noviny, February 1996, pg.12 a 13; Trend, Nov.15,1995, pg.6B a 8B. In the
period from January through November 1995, NPF received SKK 6.7 billion out of the total
agreed sales prices amount of SKK 35.2 billion representing some 20 %. Weighted average
was approximately 15 % (author’s calculations).
215 Pursuant to the Tax Act amendment dated March 1996 acquirers are exempt from paying
tax on the income incurred by them as a result of the waived payment for the acquired
property.
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voucher method was superseded by the bond method pursuant to Act no. 190/1995.
The same Act empowered NPF to issue privatization decisions based on
a recommendation of its Executive Committee instead of a recommendation of the
Ministry, as used to be the case. On October 20, 1995, Vladimír Meciar declared
that privatization would be completed within eight months.216 In June 1996, he
stated that privatization came to a halt in December 1995 due to tension amongst
coalition partners.217 Act no. 210/1997 was the Parliament’s reaction to the finding
of the Constitutional Court. This Act gave the decision-making powers for direct
sales back to the government. However, real possibilities of handling property at its
discretion remained in the hands of NPF. In the period 1994-1996, the
governments of Moravcík and Meciar privatized 67 % of the property in terms of
the sales price amount (refer to Table 10).
According to a 1995218 opinion poll, only 29 % of Slovak citizens approved
the government’s privatization policy while an impressive 61 % disapproved of it.
Direct sales were rejected by 61 % of the population, while merely 3 % found them
to be just, and 12 % of the population could not decide.  Existence of corruption, in
the case of direct sales, was conceded by 69 % while only 8 % believed the
opposite. A mere 11 % endorsed the statement that everyone would profit from the
current privatization policy while 61 % disagreed. Only 14 % believed that the
ruling coalition altered the privatization scheme for reasons other than
strengthening their own political power.
11.3.4.1  Bond Privatization 219
The bond method of privatization replaced the second phase of voucher
privatization. The Privatization Ministry first withdrew licenses from certain large
investment companies.220 The Vice-Chairman of the government and Finance
Minister, Sergej Kozlík, then made the statement, “the chaps [meaning the
investment funds] wanted to control hundreds of companies.” The new Act no.
190/1995 amended the Privatization Act no. 92/1991 to supersede vouchers with
bonds. In principle, the Constitutional Court sustained this Act in January 1996
Applicable enforcement provisions no. 134/1996 were promulgated by the
government in March, and bond trading was launched in August.
                                                                
216 Sme, Oct.21,1995, pg.2.
217 Sme, June 28,1996, pg.5.
218  Focus (1995).
219  Source: Hospodárske noviny, April 18,1996, pg.D1-4; Pravda, June 3,1996, pg.2, June
6,1996, pg.2; Profit, June 1,1996, pg.1 a 2; Sme, June 27,1995, pg.4, Jan. 9,1996, pg.4;
Trend, August 16,1995, pg.5B, May 15,1996, pg.17B, June 5,1996, pg.18B.
220 The Ministry terminated trading in shares of VÚB Kupón (assets worth SKK 12.5
billion) on January 23,1995, and of  PSIS Bratislava (assets worth SKK 7 billion ) at the end
of March 1995. Source: Sme, July 18,1995, pg.4.
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The essence of the actual procedure was that persons registered in voucher
privatization received a bond with nominal value of SKK 10,000 221 maturing on
December 31, 2000, and an interest rate equal to the discount rate of the National
Bank of Slovakia. Prior to their maturity date, the bonds were to be used the
following ways:
1) Any citizen could:
1a)    sell or donate his/her bond to a company that was a debtor of NPF;
1b) sell his/her bond to banks selected by the government for restructuring;
1c) use his/her bond for pension or health co-insurance;
1d) in special cases use his/her bond for the purchase of an apartment;
1e) use his/her bond for the purchase of shares available in NPF´s portfolio for
this purpose.
2)  Selected acquirers of property could buy bonds from bond holders and use
them for settling their debts with NPF at their nominal value.
3)  Owners of apartments, communities as well as pension and health insurance
houses and selected banks could buy bonds from bond holders and demand
from NPF their payment prior to year 2000. These bonds may be redeemed
by NPF, should it choose to do so, in volumes at its discretion. As bond
demand was minimal, their price plummeted. Therefore, in March 1996, the
government set “an average bond price” at above 75 % of the nominal value
plus cumulative earnings.
Bonds constituted a potential problem both for NPF and the state budget. On
one hand, NPF promised to pay SKK 33.3 billion plus yields. On the other hand, it
sold assets at minimal prices, with payment schedules spread over ten up to fifteen
years. Even in such cases, instead of cash, it received its bonds back. Should the
liability of NPF not be considered a commitment of the State, it would be rather
hard to imagine that the government did not implicitly guarantee NPF´s liability.
By December 31, 1998, a scant one-third of the bonds were redeemed222,
whereby 68 % of them were used for discharging due amounts of NPF´s debtors223
and 24 % were paid to citizens above 70 years of age.224 Only 5 % were redeemed
for shares of privatized companies.
                                                                
221 That resulted in a shrinkage of the book value of the property earmarked by the
government of Jozef Moravcík for the second phase of voucher privatization from SKK 100
billion to SKK 33.3 billion.
222 FNM (1999): precisely 1,077,148 pieces of bonds were redeemed.
223 Bonds could be used for discharging debts until the day on which the finding of the
Constitutional Court dated June 24, 1998, was issued in the Collection of Laws – July 16,
1998.
224 Pursuant to Act no. 322/1996 as of December 31,1997.
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11.3.4.2  Strategic Companies
The Act on Strategic Companies no. 192, dated July 13, 1995, deferred the
privatization of selected companies with total assets value of  SKK 150 billion.225
It made them subject to a special privatization scheme that failed to be defined.
This was a non-systemic step in the reform process as it facilitated the ownership
rights of sectoral Ministries. The Act contained numerous unclear formulations that
hampered its enforcement and induced a situation full of uncertainty.226 The list of
strategic companies included the following:
1) State enterprises operating in gas, power, post, telecommunications, heavy
engineering industries, pharmaceutical production, transportation, agriculture,
forest and water management, and stakes held by the State in the companies
Transpetrol and Slovenské elektrárne. According to the Act, these entities
were to be privatized based on special legislation.
2) Companies partially privatized in which the State wanted to maintain
a special position. This category covered companies operating in oil
production, mining and metallurgy, processing non-ore raw materials,
machine engineering industries, chemical and consumer goods industry,
transportation, agriculture and water management, pharmaceutical production
and construction industry.
Arguments in favor of the Act adoption are summarized below:
1) The companies concerned were golden eggs. According to the Slovak
Statistics Office, they generated 90  % of the total profits of the non-financial
sector in 1994, i.e., one year before the adoption of the Act;
2) Postponement of privatization in the anticipation of better sales prices in the
future;
3) Creating minimum profit chains. State control over vertically interconnected
companies was expected to reduce output costs and provide funds earmarked
for state development schemes;
4) Public usefulness of the companies;
5) Natural monopolies.
The first four arguments support the role of the State in an economy
particularly during an ongoing economic reform - the objective of which is just the
                                                                
225 That represents about 40  % of the size of privatized assets in Slovakia. Refer to
Marcincin (1997) as well.
226 The General Assembly of Slovnaft voted on the introduction of a golden share held by
the State but NPF itself voted against it due to, as it claimed, an unclear definition in the
respective Act. The wording in the Act that it referred to concerned the assembly of the
shareholders that pursuant to this Act could not take decisions on matters “that impact or
may impact the strategic interests of the State.” Source: Trend, Nov.29,1995, pg.3B. Quote
from Act no. 192/1995,  §6, section1b.
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opposite. The last argument is sensible insofar that privatization of natural
monopolies necessitates special attention of the government. Instead of
underscoring this fact in the Act, the government could have invested more effort
in preparing these monopolies for privatization. The Act was repealed in 1999.
11.3.4.3  Examples of Privatization Abuse
On August 23, 1995, NPF sold 39 % of the Slovnaft refinery to the joint-
stock company Slovintegra that was owned by Slovnaft´s managers. The book
value of the stake was SKK 6.4 billion, the actual total sales price was SKK 1
billion with the first installment SKK 100 million (1.6 % of the book value) and the
remaining payments of SKK 900 million were spread over a period of ten years.
The agreed price per share amounted to SKK 156 while the market share price
exceeded SKK 800. Based on the market price of a share, the stake was worth
SKK 5.1 billion and  the State lost several billions of Slovak crowns. Slovintegra
privatized additional 15 % of Slovnaft shares at a sales price of SKK 385 million
on July 31, 1997.227
11.3.5 The Seventh Government: 1998-
The government of Mikuláš Dzurinda assumed its office on October 30,
1998, and Mária Machová became its Privatization Minister. This government’s
premise was that “two phases of privatization failed to provide for sound and
effective company ownership.”228 In its Policy Statement, the government voiced
its intention to privatize banks in order to lower interest rates,229 conduct a court
review of privatization decisions, pursue privatization by applying tender methods,
redeem at least those bonds held by senior citizens aged sixty and above, foster
bond trading in capital markets, ensure that the ownership rights of the State are
exercised, and create conditions attracting foreign investors into the privatization
process. What was unusual was its commitment to abolish bearer shares in order to
facilitate transparency in the ownership of privatized property, to refrain from
direct intervention in the operations of state natural monopolies, as well as its
statement “If the new owners of privatized companies fail to provide for the
                                                                
227 Trend, March 27,1996, and author’s calculations based on data of the Privatization
Ministry (1999b).
228  “The first phase of privatization (voucher privatization in particular) was not supported
by strong capital market regulations (strong protection of minority shareholder rights, rules
on the provision of information and efficient supervision) and led to frequent stripping of
assets (tunnelling). Similarly, results of the second phase of privatization ( through direct
sales in particular) were no better as most of the sales were driven by political interests .”
Office of the Government (1999c) and the World Bank (1999).
229 Policy Statement of the Government (1998). Cast Podpora podnikania a priemyselná
politika.
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prosperity of these companies for a number of years, for whatsoever reasons, the
government shall seek the adoption of such measures that facilitate the recovery
and restructuring of the companies.”
The government began an effort to cut costs in strategic companies and to
minimize corruption exposure and lack of transparency. It was considering “to hire
reputable managers and put them in charge of the management of these companies
whereby their precisely defined compensation package would be derived from the
achieved cost cuts, to privatize minority stakes with the company management
rights [and] to sell majority stakes.” The government was considering immediate
“commencement of the restructuring and privatization of Všeobecná úverová
banka, Slovenská sporitelna, Investicná a rozvojová banka and Banka Slovakia
and [completion of] the process of privatization control as well as clear
declaration of those companies the sale/purchase contracts of which shall be
subject to a review.”230 Privatization is not mentioned among the short-term
priorities of the government, probably by mistake,231 because in the Government’s
Set of Economic Austerity Measures (1999) are paid due regard.
The government’s effort to increase the transparency and effectiveness of
privatization generated positive international recognition. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF, 1998) stressed that “Accelerated privatization of
telecommunications and of other companies held by the State would convey an
important message about the new government’s open attitude to foreign investors
as well as it would boost the balance of payment...” Concurrently, IMF
recommended that prior to the privatization of the companies the state authorities
“closely monitor the financial performance and curtail their access to credits.”
According to the Office of the Slovak Government (1999c), the government
planned to privatize 1) the largest banks in 2000-2001, 2) power companies
Slovenský plynárenský priemysel (gas), Slovenské elektrárne a rozvodné závody
(electrical energy) – separating transmission and distribution – following the
adoption of a number of acts after 2001, 3) Slovenské telekomunikácie
(telecommunications) in the first half of 2000 whereby the proceeds would be used
for the redemption of part of the bonds,232 4) health service facilities in 1999-2000,
business units of Slovenská automobilová doprava (coach transport) by their
concentration into seventeen business units in the second half of 2000, Vodárne
a kanalizácie (water supply and sewage), and 5) state companies and residual
interests in the sectors of agriculture, economy, construction and public works and
environment by the first quarter of 2000 (refer also to Table 11).
                                                                
230 Office of the Slovak Government (1999a).
231 Office of the Slovak Government (1999b).
232 Cf. recommendations of the World Bank (1999).
310
The government estimated that privatization would generate revenue streams
of SKK 1.2 billion in 1999, SKK 27.5 billion in 2000, and SKK 70.8 billion in
subsequent years. Concurrently, the Parliament repealed the Act on Strategic
Companies no.192/1995 on September 16, 1999. An Act on natural monopolies is
planned to be passed and an independent regulatory body is to be established prior
to the actual privatization of natural monopolies.
11.4 Conclusion
Privatization of state companies in a transition economy is a primary
prerequisite of restructuring. The associated incomes for the state budget are
important during the transition period but not the most import aspect. Due to the
absence of a market and the mass of privatized assets, the application of
experiences of developed countries was rather limited. Privatization was to a great
extent an experiment.
Slovakia’s approach to privatization proved to be not very lucky. Voucher
privatization was not supported with subsequent appropriate regulation of capital
markets, protection of minority shareholders, institutions, and enforcement of law.
Subsequent favouring of opaque sales to local managers lacked the necessary funds
and know-how. In our opinion, restructuring was not perceived as the actual
intended objective of Slovak privatization. At the same time, the emphasis not on
privatization revenues failed to accummulate funds to alleviate social impacts of
the reform process. Privatization is political because it represents a unique
opportunity to acquire both property and political influence.
Slovakia is facing two privatization tasks. First, it must come to terms with
past unlawful privatizations. Second, it must prepare for the privatization of banks,
large natural monopolies and the health care sector. Such privatization is a much
more complex exercise than prior privatizations. In the process of privatization, the
government must bear in mind the need to build its international credibility.
Coming to terms with unlawful privatizations with the support of Slovak
courts, in our opinion, can only be perceived as hypocritical. The tardiness of
Slovak courts and corruption are well-known phenomena. Therefore, taking this
avenue would be fueling nothing else than an accelerated stripping of privatized
companies. An idea that appears worth while is a form of nationalization with an
underlying obligation of prompt and transparent privatization.
In respect to the privatization of natural monopolies, a lesson can be drawn
from Great Britain’s experience that the State must first of all give its preference to
competition. Only in areas clearly dominated by monopolies should an
independent institution exercise regulatory control. This implies that, prior to
privatization, monopolistic activities of companies needs to be divided from their
potentially competitive activities (horizontal and vertical dismantlement of
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monopolies).  It also implies that every sector (telecommunications, gas, electrical
power, water) has its own regulatory authority to ensure that responsibilities are
clearly defined and to prevent any conflict of interest. Privatization, technically
complex as it is, necessitates an amendment of many acts, for example, those
concerning debt collection. Slovakia would benefit from selections of buyers not
tainted by scandals and buyers that are well-known foreign companies.
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11.6 Appendix
TABLE 1. NPF: Shares of Companies with Basic Equity > SKK 1 billion
Business
ID
Name
Basic
Equity
Property
Participation
(%)
34129421 DMD holding, Trencín 4,949 1.65
31695426 CHEMES, Humenné 1,287 38.30
31318916 Investicná a rozvojová banka, Bratislava 3,000 11.71
31403450 Istrochem, Bratislava 4,279 24.63
31349111 Reštitucný investicný fond, Bratislava 2,047 1.05
34144790 Slovenské liecebné kúpele Pieštany 1,510 24.16
35705671 Slovenská plavba a prístavy Bratislava 2,545 48.72
151700 Slovenská poistovna, Bratislava 1,500 50.56
151653 Slovenská sporitelna, Bratislava 2,074 91.33
31380751 Slovenské elektrárne, Bratislava 41,804 95.72
31412742 Trnavské automobilové závody under liquidation 1,270 33.32
2216 VSS under bankruptcy proceedings, Košice 1,005 4.97
31320155 VÚB, Bratislava 4,078 34.86
30222524 Závod SNP, Žiar nad Hronom 5,789 29.71
31561187 ZVL Kysucké Nové Mesto under bankruptcy proceedings 1,104 2.73
Basic equity, in millions SKK. Source: National Property Fund (1999)
TABLE 2. NPF Collections Status as of  December 31,1998
Type of Receivables
Nbr. of
Contracts
Sales Price
Including
Investments
Paid
Unpaid Part
of Sales
Prices
Sale of Shares 670 39,257 26,544 12,713
Sale of Property 735 38,434 21,197 17,237
Other 1,785
Total 77,691 47,741 31,735
Created Provisions for Receivables 13,890
Net Receivables 17,846
Prices, in millions SKK. Source: National Property Fund (1998)
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TABLE 3. Revenues of NPF as of December 31,1998
Revenues 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
From Sales of Assets 5,971 4,040 7,484 8,817 7,954 3,419 4,534 42,219
From Dividends 21 412 602 368 246 172 1,821
Transfer from MP 7,000 1,000 3,000 500 600 12,100
Loans 2,245 2,245
Other Income 50 599 1,884 425 729 574 474 4,735
Financial Revenues 6,021 11,660 9,780 10,844 12,051 4,739 63,120
Income in Bonds 2,211 4,560 1,402 8,173
Total Revenues 6,021 11,660 9,780 10,844 14,262 9,299 9,427 71,293
Amounts, in millions SKK. Source: 1998 Annual Report of NPF
TABLE 4. Property in the First Phase of Privatization
Item Nbr
Assets
(mn SKK)
Assets
  (%)
A Companies Identified for Privatization 678 169,097 -
B Privatized Companies by 1,010 169,097 100
B1 - Sale of Assets 330 12,428 7
B2 - Free Transfers 116 2,086 1
B3 - Restitutions 7 19 0
B4 - Assets Deposit in to Joint-stock Company 557 154,564 -
B41 - Own Equity of Joint-stock Company - 154,564 -
B411 - Basic Equity - 134,705 -
B4111 - Sold Using Standard Methods - 3,419 2
B4112 - Sold in Voucher Privatization - 79,752 48
B4113 - Contribution into the Restit. Inv. F. - 3,797 2
B4114 - Remaining in NPF´s Ownership - 47,737 28
B412 - Reserve and Other Funds - 19,859 12
Source: Ministry of Privatization (1999a) and author’s calculations
TABLE 5. Privatization by Foreign Investors
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Book Value (mn SKK) 806 1,163 1,314 522 78 61 724 4,668
Sales Price (mn SKK) 2,151 1,868 1,596 1,220 34 15 820 7,704
Sales Price/Book Value  (%) 267 161 121 234 44 25 113 165
Number of Buyers 10 6 2 5 2 1 1 27
Book Value  (%) 17 25 28 11 2 1 16 100
Sales Price  (%) 28 24 21 16 0 0 11 100
Source: Ministry of Privatization (1999b) and author’s calculations
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TABLE 6. Ownership Interests of Voucher Investors
Czech Companies Slovak Companies
Investor 50 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 50 % 30 % 20 % 10 %
Small Ind. Invest. 272 559 739 911 244 381 438 494
Investment Funds 334 631 787 876 173 305 365 406
Single Largest F. 0 9 102 747 4 27 81 363
Second Largest F. 0 7 482 0 3 203
Third Largest F. 0 217 0 81
3 Largest Funds 85 543 753 870 55 255 339 401
4 Largest Funds 196 605 769 873 110 276 349 402
5 Largest Funds 272 622 782 875 145 290 351 402
Total Vouchers 842 920 939 946 468 489 499 503
Notes: Data on a sample of 949 Czech companies are from 1993, while data on Slovak companies are
from 1992. Table specifies the number of companies in which the respective type of investor holds
more than x percent. The categories of largest funds specify the interests of n the largest funds, meaning
largest stakes among funds in the given company. Source: Marcincin (1995)
TABLE 7. Ownership Interests of Non-voucher Investors
Czech Companies Slovak Companies
Investor 50 % 30 % 20 % 0 50 % 30 % 20 % 0
Foreign 19 34 38 51 3 6 8 10
Domestic 16 28 38 58 11 14 22 31
NPF-tempor. 21 50 108 293 4 13 33 51
NPF-perman. 2 7 9 21 6 17 23 26
Banks 2 15 24 61 0
Restituents 2 5 7 52 0 8
Communities 1 1 4 181 0
Notes: Data on a sample of 949 Czech companies are from 1993, while data on Slovak companies are
from 1992. Table specifies the number of companies in which the respective type of investor holds
more than x percent. Data under ”0” specify the number of companies in which the respective type of
investor is present. For example, foreign investors hold stakes in 51 Czech companies out of which in
19 companies they represent majority shareholders. Source: Marcincin (1995)
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TABLE 8. Seven Largest Groups of Funds by Republic
Slovak Republic Czech Republic Federation
F.group Nbr. of
Shares
F.group Nbr. of
Shares
F.group Nbr. of
Shares
Nbr. of Points  % Points
SSK 6,008 CSP 20,210 CSP 21,376 950 15.6
SIB 5,541 IB 13,157 HCC 15,225 639 10.5
VUB 5,375 HCC 12,003 IB 13,594 724 11.9
SLP 3,995 KB 11,358 VUB 11,985 501 8.2
HCC 3,222 CP 7,623 KB 11,932 466 7.6
DI 2,249 VUB 6,611 SIB 10,987 333 5.5
CSP 1,166 SIB 5,446 SSK 7,708 169 2.8
7 IPS 27,556 7 IPS 76,408 7 IPS 92,807 3,782 62.1
" IPS 44,943 " IPS 131,037 " IPS 175 980 6 135 100.0
Notes: The groups of funds defined by founder, according to Mládek, Mejstrík and Marcincin. Number
of shares quantified in thousands and specifies the number of shares gained by the fund in voucher
privatization. Number of points quantified in millions. Data on the number of points spent by a fund for
a company in individual republics were not available to us. The point percentages are calculated relative
to points gained by all funds. The last line quantifies the total for all funds in voucher privatization.
Source: Marcincin (1995)
TABLE 9. Property in the Second Phase of Privatization
Item Number
Assets
(mn SKK)
Assets
  (%)
A Companies Identified for Privatization 610 136,804 -
B Privatized Companies by 1,366 136,804 100
B1 - Sale of Assets 813 52,226 -
B11 - Direct Sale 645 45,072 33
B12 - Public Tender 155 7,140 5
B13 - Public Auction 13 14 0
B2 - Free Transfers 303 2,822 2
B3 - Restitution 16 22 0
B4 - Assets Deposit into Joint-stock C. 234 81,734 -
B411 - Basic Equity of Joint-stock C. - 70,933 -
B4111 - Sold Using Standard Methods - 36,041 -
B41111 - Direct Sale - 34,801 25
B41112 - Public Tender - 1,240 1
B4112 - Free Transfer of Shares - 2,414 2
B4113 - Contribution into the Restit. Inv. F. - 2,161 2
B4114 - Remaining in NPF´s Ownership - 30,317 22
Difference between assets deposit into a joint-stock company and the basic equity of a joint-stock
company represents 8  % of the total privatized property. Source: Ministry of Privatization (1999a) and
author’s calculations
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TABLE 10. Privatization Pursuant to the Register of Privatized Property
Year
Sales Price
(mn SKK)
Sales Price
 (%)
Number of
New Units
Average Sales Price
Per Unit
1992 12,688 17 218 58
1993 4,062 5 69 59
1994 15,699 21 189 83
1995 18,617 25 480 39
1996 16,027 21 383 42
1997 3,839 5 168 23
1998 3,929 5 73 54
1999 14 0 2 7
1992-99 74,875 100 1,582 47
Data on 1,062 original companies. Source: Ministry of Privatization (1999b) and author’s calculations
TABLE 11. Number of Companies Identified for Transformation and Privatization
Founder
Number of
Companies
Book
Value
Number of
Employees
Ministry of Transport, Post and
Telecommunications
44 4,215 14,164
Ministry of Economy 5 247 649
Ministry of Land Management 17 37,401 10,729
Ministry of Environment 1 19 24
Ministry of Construction and Public Works 1 133 41
Total 68 42,015 25,607
Ministry of Transport lists companies (business units) of the Slovak Bus Transport. Vodárne a
kanalizácie (water supply and sewage) are included among the companies listed under the Ministry of
Land Management. Book value as of December 31,1998, in millions SKK. Source: Ministry of
Privatization (1999a)
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12 Enterprise Restructuring
Anton MARCINCIN
Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association
The Slovak economy has been a puzzle. Its growth with low inflation and
stable exchange rate has been followed by weak interest of foreign investors and a
high unemployment rate. Later, it was shown that the Slovak growth was
connected to the delay in price liberalization and structural reforms. The country
was not able to adequately protect private ownership or enforce ownership rights
through a corporate governance system and hard budget constraints. These were
the reasons for the slow down in enterprise restructuring. New owners, in coalition
with political parties, often robbed enterprises and searched for rents.
The Slovak government, since 1999, has had no clear vision of an enterprise-
restructuring program. According to the report of the World Bank mission (1999),
a restructuring program must contain four elements:
1. Restructuring and privatization of state banks. Private banks make budget
constraints of enterprises strict enough to generate many changes in enterprise
ownership.
2. Restructuring of bad loans in banks. Once again, ownership changes should
be expected.
3. Improvement of the legal framework (bankruptcy act, commercial code, civic
code, bank act and tax laws) and the judicial infrastructure.
4. Regulation and privatization of publicly beneficial enterprises. This primarily
affects the top fifteen enterprises.
It is probable that the government will choose a de-centralized approach to
enterprise restructuring. That method will allow creditors with the largest interest
to recover their receivables, and to decide if the value of a bankrupted enterprise is
higher through its restructuring or liquidation. This approach, however, assumes a
significant change in the bankruptcy act and other legislation.
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12.1 Introduction
Restructuring in a transition economy is usually implicitly understood as an
act of adjusting enterprises to new market conditions. In literature, one can see
different classifications of restructuring changes. Philippe Aghion’s  1995
Transition report gives the best characterization of restructuring by using the terms
reactive, strategic and deep restructuring. Reactive restructuring is a synonym for
immediate changes extorted by external forces. An example would be a decrease in
the labor force. Strategic restructuring denotes a change in markets, whether
extorted by a split of CMEA, or by some new entrepreneurial activities of an
enterprise. A deep restructuring describes changes connected to new investments
that will significantly influence the future of enterprises.
Claessens et al. (1997) compared enterprise restructuring among various
countries by applying three criteria. The first is sector-specific factors, which
considers the initial level of productivity and inherited loans. The second is
enterprise-specific factors, which considers structure of ownership rights, existence
of external owners, progress made in the privatization of the economy, corporate
governance, skills and motivation of managers to find foreign partners and new
technologies, quality of banking services, and financial discipline. The third is
external environment factors, which considers the rate of liberalization,
macroeconomic stability, the financial system’s viability, competition through
imports, and the strength of the trade unions.
Companies typically undergo ongoing  restructuring because they simply
need to adapt themselves to immediate and projected market situations. When
reforms of an economy do not proceed in  the desired direction, i.e., towards
creating the foundations for a market economy, the efforts of companies to adapt
themselves is a waste of resources. Meaningful restructuring requires that the
country focus on the goal of creating four basic pillars of a market economy.
Mochrie et al (1998, p.2) states that they are: 1) Private ownership; 2) Clearly
defined ownership rights that can be traded in and used to secure liabilities; 3)
Legislation on contracts and bankruptcies, allowing rapid enforcement of
agreements; and 4) A Commercial Code that requires companies to publish full and
correct data on their financial state. These four basic pillars allow the acquisition of
capital and the conduct of market-based business relations.
The restructuring of Slovak companies will be determined by the method of
privatization and by the strong mingling of political with economic powers. The
political situation must still address how to create a broad framework for corporate
governance, how to cope with a lack of funding in soft budgetary conditions for
selected companies, how to deal with non-performing loans in banks, how to deal
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with the mutual debt of companies, and how to pursue the survival of loss-making
companies.
In this chapter we focus on theoretical issues of restructuring and findings of
important empirical studies. In the third section we consider studies on company
restructuring in Slovakia that led to incorrect conclusions. The fourth section
covers the main characteristics and elements of restructuring policies of various
Slovak governments. The fifth section analyzes sector and selected company data.
Foreign direct investment is analyzed in the sixth section. The seventh section
contains conclusions and recommendations concerning inevitable changes in the
economic policy of Slovakia and in the approach of the government’s approach to
the business sector.
12.2 Restructuring Issues
In general, the restructuring of companies is not possible without a market
economy, which again is not possible without private ownership. However, private
ownership alone is not a sufficient guarantee for restructuring. Its successful
adaptation of companies to global market conditions requires both private
ownership combined with a good framework for corporate governance.
12.2.1 Privatization
Privatization programs have provided the core of reforms in past transition
economies. The final form of privatization was shaped by the interests of old
managers, trade unions, political parties and bureaucrats in public administration. It
was assumed that privatization would be a compromise between efficiency and
satisfying the interests of these influential groups (e.g., Boycko and Shleifer,
1996). The consequent result of such assumptions was that privatization had to
satisfy influential groups so that the government could receive sufficient support to
enforce market reforms. A less efficient privatization would therefore result for the
necessary restructuring. Thus, ownership and interest structures were created that
negatively influenced the reforms and corporate governance. The support of old
managers can be most easily acquired through their direct share in the
privatization. A significant problem of such a privatization is the probable inability
of old managers to manage companies in new circumstances and the impact of
their reluctance to share control for obtaining new capital. Research papers do not
favor managerial ownership due to a conflict of interest between the owner and the
manager. Blanchard and Aghion (1995) assumed that the value of the company is
not the same for the managers and external investors. They showed that managerial
ownership could result in a sub-optimal level of restructuring and delay the process
of selling the company to another investor. A high rate of unemployment increases
the probability of such action because managers value their current positions. The
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Transition Report 1995 documented that companies privatized by managers
achieved worse results than companies privatized by external investors. This is
explained by the managers’ motivation to resist changes where there is no market
for managers and the budgetary restrictions are rather soft. McMillan (1995) based
his analysis on the model of a moral hazard, where the private cost of a manager to
create company profit p are C(p,t ), where t stands for skills or type of manager.
The owner can motivate the manager by offering a share in the created profit.
McMillan also documented, with empirical studies from Russia and Poland, that
motivation and skills are complementary. As a result, replacing managers hired on
skills instead of political criteria is an important condition of restructuring. Carlin
et al. (1994) analyzed Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Polish and Russian companies.
Several obstacles to restructuring were found:
1. Opposition of employees, depending on their formal power and rate of
unemployment in the country.
2. Lack of funds for investment.
3. High uncertainty of future revenues from restructuring given by the overall
reform (e.g., the change in relative prices) and insufficient credibility of the
government program.
4. Absence of competition policy and maintenance of monopoly power, which
leads to artificially high prices and low production
5. Establishment of holding structures protecting the power of old managers.
6. Lack of a market with qualified managers and insufficient transferability of
human capital, given by the informality of networks of company suppliers and
customers and state institutions.
All the obstacles above were present in Slovakia. This study also points out
that enhanced performance of large monopolies is partially caused by the
preservation of monopoly power and the dismissal of redundant labor. Roland
(1996) divided managers into several categories, to simplify the whole matter we
use only two broad categories - bad and good managers. Bad managers will not
support restructuring, since they would be its first victims. They will mobilize the
employees to oppose restructuring. If the company is a monopoly, they will invest
a large amount of profits into developing empires. Good managers are those who
expect profits from profound restructuring. Roland pointed out that one of the
goals of restructuring is the replacement of bad managers.
Privatization and the pressure for restructuring are both political goals.
Privatization presents politicians a unique opportunity to acquire property and
power. According to Canning and Hare (1996): „...[privatization] is about the
longer-term distribution of economic and political power. […]  Policy
misjudgments or mismanagement could have grave consequences for social
cohesion, threaten the consensus for reform as a whole and seriously undermine
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the country's political stability. Privatization thus brings a myriad of interest
groups to the fore and into confrontation with each other. […] The state itself must
be regarded as a conglomeration of different interest groups, comprising the
political forces in power. “233 In our view, this applies not only to privatization but
also to restructuring. Restructuring problems can be overcome by applying the
policy of divide et impera‘ (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992). Restructuring is
inconceivable without the credibility of important reforms, because "…lack of
credibility could be serious enough to force even the best-intentioned government
to abort the reform process, therefore validating the suspicions of the private
sector.“ (Rodrik, 1989, p.756) The credibility of a reform is proportionate to its
magnitude and pace. When analyzing corruption, privatization, and the
commercialization of relationships between politicians and companies, Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) proceeded from the assumptions that politicians require
managers to employ excessive labor, thus ensuring them political advantages. As a
result, compliant managers then obtain various privileges from the state. Grossman
and Helpman (1996) predicted faster growth in sectors that are more resistant to
the pressure of interest groups and pointed out the critical importance of political
institutions in relation to economic growth.
Roland (1996) also perceived de-monopolization as a political problem.
Restructuring is related to competition of product, labor and capital markets. If
competition of product markets is missing, the de-monopolization of companies is
necessary to achieve efficiency. In order for the companies to gain access to
external funding, it is necessary to overcome the reluctance of managers towards
external controls and developing their empires.
Privatization is a political tool. If governments concede too much to interest
groups, they will not obtain the support of these groups in enforcing strict market
rules, a precondition of restructuring. On the contrary, they lose credibility of their
reform program. Old managers that gain a new role of owners then hamper the
restructuring of companies and the adoption of the entire restructuring framework.
12.2.2 Corporate Governance234
The need to concentrate large volumes of capital was the consequence of
economic and technological development as well as of the market globalization.
This led to the establishment of joint stock companies and other companies that
obtain capital through loans and offering stakes in their equity to outsiders. This is
                                                                
233 Cf. Boycko et al. (1995), who warned against the reform being perceived as a unit with
one interest. On the contrary, a reform government is a temporary coalition of players with
differing interests and methods.
234 The paper by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) contains an excellent overview of the issue and
relevant studies.
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how companies separate ownership from control (management). Equity owners are
not remunerated with stable payments, such as interests in case of debt, but they
have legally guaranteed controlling rights over assets. They expect to receive a part
of the distributed profits (dividends) and the residual value in case of company
liquidation.
Owners (shareholders, investors) rely on the system of corporate governance
to ensure return on investment. By Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997, p.737) definition,
“corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” The
OECD (1999a) defines corporate governance more broadly as “a set of
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and
other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those
objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate
governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to
pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and shareholders and
should facilitate effective monitoring, thereby encouraging firms to use resources
more efficiently.” According to Zingales (1997), the system of corporate
governance “[it is] the complex set of constraints that shape ex-post bargaining
over the quasi-rents generated in the course of a relationship.”
The legal protection of investors determines the type of ownership and the
access to funding by companies and countries. Since legal protection in continental
Europe and Japan is weak, corporate governance depends more on large investors
(sometimes families) and banks with longer-term relations with companies. This
system is sometimes referred to as the insider system. On the other hand, the
outsider system is typical for the United States and the United Kingdom. It is
characterized by diffused ownership of equity, large institutional investors,
recognition of the superiority of shareholders' interests in company laws, protection
of minority investors by securities laws, and strict requirements for publishing
information (Nestor and Thompson, 1999). In general, the efficiency of corporate
governance depends on the transparency in publishing and using information, the
protection of legal and contractual rights, and the responsibility of management.
The insider and outsider systems of management converge for several
reasons:
1.    International diversification of a portfolio brings higher revenues with smaller
risk than a purely domestic portfolio.
2.      Companies that issue shares on foreign capital markets can reduce their cost
of capital.
3.    Institutional investors (pension funds, life insurance companies and mutual
funds) require international standards of management.
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4.  Globalization of product markets increases competition and thus forces
companies to apply efficient management (Nestor and Thompson, 1999).
Since globalization intensifies competition for obtaining resources, nationally
produced savings are no longer monopolized by national companies.
Many transition economies failed in their efforts to enhance the performance
of state-owned enterprises through privatization schemes. This stimulated new
owners to maximize property in the short run at the cost of other stakeholders. In
our view, we can differentiate between several types of bad privatization:
1. One form is the legal change of  a state-owned company into a joint stock
company owned by the state without pursuing fast privatization. The control
remained in the hands of politicians and managers. In comparison with the
previous "balanced" political regime, both sides here obtained incentives for a
fast maximization of wealth as a result of the expected short-term position.
The new legal form restricted the rights of government and offered more
freedoms to old managers without increasing the responsibility of managers.
2. Another example is the privatization of assets by large shareholders without
the protection of minority shareholders. This resulted in an expropriation of
profits and assets. Majority shareholders used the legal environment to get rid
of minority owners.235
3.      A third type is the privatization of  mutual funds associated with banks.
Banks in general could have represented the interests of a large investor by
concentrating on monitoring and good management techniques. In reality,
they remained under political control because they lacked the experience in
commercial banking and restructuring. As a result, a large part of their loans
were bad loans. Moreover, the applicable legislation on bankruptcies, taxes,
economic policy, and the delayed restructuring forced the banks to impose
higher interest rates and to continue in bad projects.
4.     Privatization by diffused shareholders, without the possibility to exercise the
right of control or sale of shares, left the old managers without supervision
and motivated them to transfer assets to other companies. The goal of mass
privatization schemes was to achieve fair treatment of all citizens and
protection against property being sold to foreign investors at low prices.
However, these plans did not contain any provisions for protecting
shareholders' rights. Only a small number of people benefited from this
privatization, and the majority of the population remained frustrated with the
worthless shares.
                                                                
235 We do not claim, that privatization by large shareholders is bad in itself. This type of
privatization was basically recommended at the beginning of the reform, e.g., also by
Blanchard et al. (1991) to ensure the efficiency of the program. However the government
should have protected minority shareholders at the same time.
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5. Privatization favored old managers. When managers became sole owners,
they usually lacked the capital and the willingness to share control with
external investors. Very often the managers would rather reduce production
output and bribe bank and government officials in order to obtain new funds
or receive protection of their monopoly position.236 Managers, as owners,
resisted the adoption of rules and the establishment of institutions that are
necessary for corporate governance. Even though their resistance to
transparent management could not be sustainable in the long run, it caused
serious economic and social problems to these economies. The resistance
reduced the volume of investment and deteriorated the efficiency of business
decisions.
Why would a manager - owner prefer private benefits from control
(management) in preference to developing his reputation, which would give him
access to funding in future? The direct explanation is that managers have
monopoly information on the managed companies, which offers them an
immediate opportunity to use that information for financial profit. The
development of reputation can be too costly in terms of lost opportunity. The entire
economic environment was too uncertain.237
Transfer pricing and sale of assets are two ways a manager - owner would
exchange private information for profit. Prior to the privatization, managers of
state owned companies had clear incentives for the transfer of profits or assets to
another company they owned. Usually a state owned loss-making company was
left with a high volume of unsettled bank debt and debt to input suppliers. Its
products were then sold below market price through highly profitable trading
companies. These products were sold to the original customers of the state owned
company. These incentives also prevailed in the post-privatization period because
the owners were too diffused to exercise their owners' rights. In some instances,
new owners basically competed with the managers in looting the companies
The ownership of companies and the individual sales to owners were both
problematic. This applies also to the privatization of small entities in the small-
                                                                
236 Many studies implicitly assume that during a transformation of the economies managers
have only economic tools at their disposal (restructuring, adaptation to consumer
preferences and competition) and ignore political tools (rent seeking). Therefore it is not
true, that they decide between restructuring and bankruptcy (Mochrie et al., 1998); their
decision is only a combination of several tools: restructuring, expropriation, receiving
support for sponsoring political parties and corruption of the bankers and state officials
(customs duties, taxes, licenses); bankruptcy is only the last resort.
237  Moreover: „If markets do not function well, allowing firms to prosper on basis of price
distortions, monopoly power and connections or administrative and bueraucratic favours,
then enterprise performance is unlikely to yield much information about managerial
capabilities in a market environment.“ (Brada, 1996, p.13).
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scale privatization, restitutions, and sale of large companies to external investors
that were usually foreign. We do not take into account the sales to insiders
(original management, employees, trade unions and town governments). These
sales usually did not have sufficient funds to operate the acquired companies and
the real privatization was only delayed. 238
Many transition economies, in a politically motivated privatization,
considered the creation of a framework for corporate governance only a secondary
target. Such delay can be dangerous. Studies of economies in eastern Asia indicate
that the weak management of companies is one of the main reasons for recent
crises in that area (Nam et al., 1999, Jordan, 1999). The business environment
there, similar to that in many transition economies, was based on relationships,
such as ownership, family connections, linked political bargaining companies,
banks, and government. The government implicitly guaranteed soft budgetary
restrictions to companies, but did not allow for it in its budget). National
conglomerates were thus protected from market competition and discipline. This
situation is now temporarily balanced and all players must behave according to the
rules and the behavior of other players. In order to bring about future change, the
rules of the game would have to be changed and the initiator (leader) of the change
identified. This initiator most likely would be the national government and change
would occur with the help of international organizations and other governments.
The studies came to the conclusion that reform in eastern Asia, mainly the
structural reform, will require changes not only in the ownership, but also in the
mobilization of financial resources that are monopolized by dominant business
families. Transition economies, such as Slovakia, have found themselves in a
similar trap. A trap where ownership once dominated by the state was replaced by
ownership dominated by the "oligarchy." This new oligarchy will oppose structural
reforms due to the fact that the success of future reforms significantly depends on
how the government will treat the oligarchy.
12.3 Restructuring in Slovakia
In the early 1990s, the restructuring of Slovakian companies was influenced
mainly by the overall macroeconomic reform. Later influences were legislative
reforms and the fact that institutions began to establish a market environment. The
first liberalization of prices enabled companies to earn profits. This was possible
                                                                
238 Aghion (1995) showed with a sample of data from Hungarian and Polish companies in
the period of 1993/92, that a profound restructuring was carried out mainly in companies
owned by foreign investors. On the other hand Earle and Estrin (1997) claimed that in
Russia, managers had the best influence on restructuring, while market competition did not
play any role. In our view their second argument actually confirms, that managers were
more successful at rent seeking then foreigners.
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due to the difference between the old cheap inputs and new more expensive output.
The temporary growth of profits was also supported by a radical devaluation of the
currency.
Liberalization of foreign trade constituted a compensation for the declined
domestic demand. But, technical and commercial problems left Slovak companies
unprepared to compete with foreign companies.239
The corporate governance system turned out to be a significant problem
because it did not redress the mistakes of privatization. This could have been
accomplished by changing the ownership of loss-making companies and making
funding for their development accessible.
Restructuring of companies in Slovakia is the subject of few expert studies. A
common feature of most papers is the poor quality of both the data and the
specification of the models. Authors sometimes replace individual data with
sectoral data. They then attempt to optically enhance the small number of
observations by multiplying them over several time periods. Fidrmucová for
example (1997) used 21 observations on the entire economy, including agriculture,
industry, trade, construction, transport and tourism. He then multiplied that sum by
four years, claiming that Slovak companies underwent a more consequential
restructuring than Czech companies. Barbone et al. (1996) used 88 observations,
i.e., a three-digit classification of sectors in the processing industry for eight
quarters. By also using variables indicating the size of the companies, he reduced
the number of observations in each regression. Poor specification of models is the
result of the small number of observations or lack of knowledge about modern
econometric techniques.
Three better-known and more expert papers on restructuring in Slovakia came
to positive but incorrect conclusions regarding restructuring in Slovakia. Claessens
et al. (1997) compared company data from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia (883 companies in light industry with 579,000
employees, thus 93 %) and Slovenia in the period of 1992-95. He used labor
productivity (value added per employee), operating profit, and overall productivity
of the factors as indicators of restructuring. Labor productivity indicates the
beginning of restructuring. The dismissal of excessive labor and the decline of real
wages was easier and faster than the modernization of capital and the penetration
of new markets. According to Aghion's classification, this is reactive restructuring.
The operating profit reflects several changes, such as adapting the inputs to new
relative prices and higher quality of output or higher revenues. Operating profit,
unlike net profit, does not include the payments of interest, loans, and depreciation.
These discrepancies could have been due to chance and thedifferent rules that
                                                                
239 Technical reasons are, e.g., outdated technologies, commercial ones, e.g., minimum
experience with marketing.
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apply in different countries. The overall productivity of factors is a complex
computation that includes the efficiency of use of inputs (labor, material and
capital). The authors replaced use of capital with electrical energy consumption.
The study established the best values of labor productivity in the Czech Republic.
The average growth in the monitored period amounted to 6.8 %, followed by
Slovakia 5.1 % and Poland 4.7 %. The lowest growth was recorded in Bulgaria, -
1.6 %, and Romania -1.2 %. The labor productivity growth in Slovakia was linked
with the dismissals of labor, 8.2 % on average, 7.0 % in Poland,  and 5.9 % in the
Czech Republic. Operating profit was highest in Slovakia and followed by the
Czech Republic. The overall productivity of factors was highest in the Czech
Republic. Slovakia, Hungary and Poland recorded the lowest productivity based on
mutually comparable overall factors. According to the study, companies in these
four countries enhanced the use of production factors, unlike companies in
Bulgaria or Romania. The most significant growth in overall productivity of factors
in Slovakia was observed mainly with large companies in sectors of food
processing, polygraphy, and chemical products. The lowest growth was recorded in
the sectors of electrical equipment and the processing of building materials and
glass.
According to Pohl et al. (1996) the most important restructuring of large
companies was carried out in the Czech Republic, followed by Slovakia, Hungary
and Poland. The size of the companies in their study is defined in relative terms.
For example, in the case of Slovakia, they considered the 370 largest industrial
companies that averaged 660 employees per company. According to the study,
Slovak large companies achieved the highest return on capital, more than 30 %,
while the second-ranked Czech large companies achieved "only" a 20 % return.
Djankov and Pohl (1996, p.1) claimed: "… majority of the Slovak large firms
have successfully restructured in the absence of foreign investors and government-
led restructuring programs… We find that privatization to insiders through
management-employee buy-outs did not hamper firm restructuring as the new
owners (old managers) invested heavily in new technology, laid off substantial part
of their workforce, sought foreign partnerships, and were prepared to sell
controlling stakes to outsiders in return for fresh financial resources.”  The authors
documented their statements with 21 case studies.
In order to compare these results, we include a quotation of the IMF (1999,
p.33-34): ):  “... in Hungary and Poland ... Underpinning economic confidence are
strong and well-regulated banking sectors, and the generally advanced state of
corporate restructuring  ... The slowdown in economic activity has been more
severe in the Czech and Slovak Republics, ... The core of the difficulties, however,
is the poor financial condition of much of these countries’ banking sectors and the
slow pace of restructuring in some large industrial enterprises.”
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It is obvious that the studies results could have been correct. However, their
explanations are problematic. As we will show in the next sections of this chapter,
the good results of large Slovak companies reflected more of their successes in rent
seeking activities, their monopoly position in the domestic market, and the ability
to get rid of excessive labor without a profound restructuring.
12.4 Restructuring Policies of the Slovak Governments
The government’s role is to ensure hard budgetary restrictions for companies,
to provide a functional law on bankruptcies and management in state-owned
companies, to clarify the relation of state and private companies, and to develop a
system of corporate governance. The states rely more and more on politically
independent institutions to monitor the regularity of competition.
Very often, only direct state aid (subsidies, favorable public contracts,
guarantees on loans) is considered a soft budgetary restriction even though the
concept is much broader. Soft budgets are also a consequence of the behavior of
the financial sector. Loss-making loans are implicitly guaranteed by the
government. Various state funds collect dues and distribute them on the basis of
opaque rules, a benevolent collection of taxes, and various mandatory payments.
The contracts lose their seriousness without bankruptcies. If concerns regarding
bankruptcies are socially motivated, then one has to be aware of the negative social
impact the surviving companies have on the overall business culture, the
perception of payment, the contracting discipline, and the small supplier inputs.
Another consideration is what threat the delay of bankruptcies represents, i.e., one-
time dismissal of labor. There are many companies in Slovakia protected against
bankruptcy by law. This constitutes moral risk. Large state-owned companies are
monopolies that enjoy privileges beyond those of private companies. They enjoy
various legal concessions that are important to suppliers of inputs and thereby
significantly influence the behavior of all players on the market. Poor management
in these companies correlates with a poor restructuring of the economy.
Bankruptcy is a decentralized procedure based on market mechanisms and
incentives. Bankruptcy is a simple mechanism that enables the creditors of
companies to enforce their accounts receivable - by taking over the assets of the
company, be it a sale as a whole functioning company, or a sale of individual
assets. Bankruptcies are rarely used in transition economies, according to Mochrie
et al. (1998). This is due to the creditors weak motivation to institute bankruptcy
proceedings on the debtors.
They offer five reasons for this weak motivation. The reasons are:
1. Weak legal system, lack of trained lawyers and judges, corruption and non-
existence of the institute of precedent. All of these conditions slow down the
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litigation and reduce the predictability of outcomes. Long bankruptcy
proceedings motivate the managers to transfers of assets.
2. Liquidation value of the company can be too low, because there are many
financially distressed companies and only a small market with the necessary
assets.
3. If the bank institutes bankruptcy proceedings on a company, it reflects a bad
loan in its portfolio. The more companies, the more the bank spreads this
negative information about itself, which it would rather keep secret.
4. Expecting a government buyout of the accounts receivable.
5. Small debt versus high costs of the bankruptcy proceedings. It is usually
easier to agree on the payment of debt informally, out of court.
If the state forgives companies outstanding taxes or dues to various funds,
e.g., for political reasons (revenues from the liquidation of often loss-making
companies are low and political costs of enforcing them high), it then creates soft
budgetary restrictions for the companies. At the same time, the state is the first
creditor to be paid in a successful bankruptcy proceeding. It is not necessarily
worth the trouble for the suppliers and banks to bear the costs of their debtors
bankruptcy proceedings because the revenues will probably be low. Thus, debtors
can survive on the market.
The restructuring policies of the governments in the past ten years can be
chronologically summarized as follows:
1990. Companies influenced by macroeconomic reforms, collapse of
COMECON, liberalization of foreign trade and the possibility of direct access to
foreign markets favored by the devaluation of the currency, the general lack of
experience of the managers to sell their products, liberalization of prices and the
effort to solve company problems at its costs.
1991. Beginning dismissals of excessive labor. Preparation for the
privatization by the forced development of privatization projects. Foreign investors
interested in buying a company negotiate with the management and government.
Spontaneous privatization, many organizational changes. Bankruptcy and
Composition Act (No.328/1991) entered into force in October, but the date of
effect of the act was delayed several times and the contents of it changed, thus the
act basically has remained non-functional to date. Ovecková (1996, p.16) evaluated
the act as follows: „[The act] does not respect the interest of creditors nor the
interest of the debtor, not even the interest of society to conduct bankruptcies as a
tool for the revitalization of the economy .“
1992. Voucher privatization and continuing „pre-privatization agony.“
Settlement of ownership issues. Managers could have tried to keep control in the
original company using diffused ownership and by agreement with foreign investor
(temporary weakening of company performance to achieve low purchase price).
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More sensible from the point of view of security however was the fast transfer of
profits and assets to a new company owned by the managers.
1993. Arrival of new owners and general unwillingness of the managers to
subordinate to new control. Emergence of new political-economic coalitions.
Resistance of old managers to the then applicable approach of reform and the
beginning of the search for a new approach. The establishment of a new state
created also new lobbying opportunities for the old managers.
1994. Change in the privatization strategy, beginning of the re-privatization
of the stakes held by investment funds, demonstration of power of politicians
encouraging the managers to rent seeking. The already initiated second phase of
voucher privatization was canceled to the benefit of company managers.
1995. Significant re-privatization of stakes held by investment funds, Act on
Prices and Act on Strategic Companies. The Act on Prices strengthened the
possibilities of the government to control prices. It contains terms such as
"appropriate prices", "economically justifiable costs" and "appropriate profit". The
law left the actual definition of these terms to the Ministry of Finance. The
companies are obliged to present on control by the Ministry their price and cost
calculations, which normally are confidential documents. Paragraph 12 of the Act
stipulates that the seller and the buyer must not agree on an inappropriate price if
(i) there is a temporary imbalance on the relevant market, (ii) if the imports during
the period of market imbalance have increased, and (iii) if the critical goods are
traded through several mediators. The Act on Strategic Companies delayed the
privatization and provided various advantages to a selected group of companies.
1996. The Foreign Trade Support Fund was established. The resources of the
Fund came from mandatory dues of domestic importers and exporters, amounting
to 0.1 % of the value of exported goods or goods released into circulation on the
domestic market. Funds were used for the promotion of selected companies abroad
etc., though this use was not transparent. The OECD (1996) noted the importance
of company restructuring due to a high concentration of economic activities in
large and partially state-owned companies. „It cannot be expected that the current
competitive advantages of some export articles will continue for ever.“ Moreover,
„concentrated ownership resulting from [managerial] privatization does not
guarantee better trade performance... Unsuccessful companies have to be closed
down... [The privatization program discourages foreign investors.] That can be
costly in terms of backgrounds for company restructuring. The OECD also noted
the change in the economic policy in Slovakia and emphasizes: „Business
decisions of government officials can hardly be an efficient replacement of
decisions made by individual owners, who also assume the corresponding risks...
Legislation was not always consistent with the goal to create clear rules of the
game for the market.“ The warnings of the OECD remained unheard.
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1997. First formal attempts at state restructuring of companies and measures
to restrict imports. The Act on Revitalization allowed selected companies a delay
in their payments of taxes and contributions to funds, as well as penalties and fees,
forgave insurance payments, penalty interests or interests on outstanding taxes and
provided protection against bankruptcy. The criteria of selecting companies for
restructuring were vaguely defined as maintaining or increasing employment and
reviving production. The revitalization commission began its activity in August
and by September it had registered 1,200 company applications, out of which 16
were approved, but never implemented. The act, with its consequences, encouraged
companies to seek rent. The Act on the Export-import Bank of Slovakia, the loan
activities of which (providing export medium-term and long-term loans) were
exempted from the bank supervision. A set of measures to reduce trade deficit
(May 1997), adopted by the government focused on the promotion of Slovak
products on foreign markets, instead of restructuring issues. The goal of the
measures hence was the development of a denser network of trade representation
offices and mixed chambers of commerce, more frequent participation in
exhibitions and lobbying. In May 1997, the draft law of the government designed
to restrict imports was not submitted to Parliament. The act would have allowed
the protection of the domestic market against imports, which ”causes harm or
threatens production, sales conditions, position on the market or otherwise
deteriorates the critical economic indicators of the domestic production branch.“
In July, the government introduced a 7 % import surcharge, which was assumed to
concern as much as 80 % of Slovak imports, including the necessary technologies.
The Ministry of Finance, therefore, started to consider individual applications of
companies to be exempted from the import surcharge. In September a new
certification obligation entered into force. This concerned apparently 50 - 70  % of
Slovak imports. Formal protection of ownership rights also became problematic.240
1998. Permanent marking time and the incapability of the government to
admit the need to restructure. The year of parliamentary elections. Unpredictability
of government policy was reflected in the statements, which in reality did not mean
the beginning of a specific strategy but only expressed the wishes of government
members. Prime Minister Vladimír Meciar said in relation to the financing of the
highway construction: „...we have decided to issue government bonds for Slovak
citizens and foreign nationals. Anybody can buy these government bonds even
those who have money from illegal sources and do not know how to pay taxes on it .
Now we give them a chance.“ 241 The new government saw the economic situation
in a more sober way. The new Minister of Economy Ludovít Cernák said:
                                                                
240 Business Central Europe (Madness, September 1997, p.58) describes how the controlling
stake was "literally stolen"  from the foreign company Inekon by the National Property Fund.
241 Trend May 5,1998, p.12B.
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„Unfortunately I have only to say that those who do honest business are in a really
tough position. The unfair forms of business are well known to everybody.“242 The
new government declared a new economic policy. This policy had three goals:
prevent the collapse of some sectors, stabilize macroeconomy and create
conditions for the restructuring and modernization of the economy.243 The IMF
mission (1998) noted the importance of developing the government program’s
credibility: „... if the market begins to notice that political programs are not in line
with the need … to deal with the weaknesses of the banking and corporate sectors.
The government therefore has to send unequivocal signals of its determination to
deal with these critical issues soon.“
1999. The government abolished the Act on Strategic Companies and the
Revitalization Act and began to prepare some legislative and institutional changes.
Several ministers were suspected of corruption and cronyism, which had a
significant impact on the overall credibility of the government. It was criticized for
not progressing from words to deeds.
IMF (1999) further urged the Slovak government to take the necessary steps:
”For the revitalization of the banking and corporate sectors it is most important to
accelerate their restructuring and privatization. Delayed addressing of these
serious economic issues would undoubtedly threaten the economic stability of
Slovakia and reduce its chances for an early integration into Western Europe.“
OECD (1999a) noted that a large number of companies underwent a first
phase of restructuring, i.e., a reduction of labor and adapting the productivity of
products and markets, but only few companies underwent profound restructuring.
Many large companies ensure regional employment and therefore their
restructuring will be challenging in regard to the maintenance of social peace.
There is an immense imbalance between the export openness of the economy and
the foreign investors’ stakes in domestic companies. „We have to hope that the
current effort to enhance the external image of Slovakia will bring about good
results in the form of funds for company restructuring.“ Moreover serious obstacles
to the application of the Bankruptcy Act prevailed. This was due to its wording and
the overload in the courts.
The government stated that for the first half of its period its priority in office
will be „...the abolishment of causes of the delays in restructuring and the slowing
down in the growth of competitiveness of the Slovak economy, mainly the industry
[and the establishment of a cross-sectoral group] with the participation of domestic
and foreign experts to quickly develop a complex program to enhance efficiency
and flexibility of the courts, mainly the commercial ones.“244  The rationale behind
                                                                
242  Cernák (1998).
243  Policy statement of the government - economic policy, November 1999.
244  Office of the Government (1999a).
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these steps is also important. The government argues, that it is aware of the real
problems of the Slovak economy: „Insufficient enforcement of contracts,
regulations, decrees and acts and the influencability of courts are obviously among
the main reasons for such phenomena, as the expansion of corruption, insolvency,
decline of payment discipline, asset stripping, cronyism etc. All in all this prompts
managers and owners in state-owned as well as private companies to seek short-
term rent by harming and raiding the managed (but also the owned) companies,
instead of attempting at a long-term turnaround and restructuring of these
companies. It is one of the key issues, without the settlement of which all other
measures and projects (mainly amendments to laws and new laws) will be perfectly
inefficient, regardless of how well prepared they may be.“
The measures of the government package are correct, however, if the
government is not able to implement them, their credibility becomes questionable.
Being more specific and having a smaller number of tasks, at least for the given
two-year period would have alleviated this. The measures include: „ ...a set of
measures to reduce the risk of corruption and cronyism, including the
proclamation of the Program of fight against corruption (in cooperation with the
World Bank); b. principal measures to reduce costs in the so-called strategic
companies, minimizing the risk of corruption and opaqueness (by hiring renowned
managers to manage these companies, with a clear definition of remuneration from
the achieved reductions, privatization of minority shares with the right to manage
the company, sale of majority stakes); c. creation of a regulatory framework for
natural monopolies; d. immediate initiation of restructuring and privatization of
VÚB (General Credit Bank), SLSP (Slovak Savings Bank), IRB (Investment and
Development Bank) and Banka Slovakia; e. conclusion of the process of reviewing
privatization decisions and a clear declaration, which companies will be
concerned by the effort to review the purchase contracts; f. priority development of
a set of legislative and institutional changes in the legal framework for the
bankruptcy system, collateral rights and bank acts.“
12.5 Development in Industry
There are two ways of assessing the restructuring in Slovak companies.
According to economic literature, we can expect a slow and insufficient
restructuring due to the ownership structure. This problem was created in the
privatization, and by the links between managers and politicians. In addition, the
creation of such a broad framework of corporate governance discouraged foreign
investors and caused an insufficient inflow of necessary funds. The best
methodology would be to use regression analysis  of individual company data.
Since we do not have access to individual data, we have to rely on sector data and
on the data of the largest companies. These larger companies significantly
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influence all other companies, directly or indirectly, and are good examples of the
restructuring process to date. It is also possible that completely new companies
could emerge; companies that have not been perceived at sector level. Due to their
innovation efforts, these companies would soon be significant in the Slovak
economy and in relation to imports. At the same time we will show the
development of one of the "flagships" of the Slovak economy. “Flagships” is a
term  that journalists and politicians coined to call Východoslovenské Železiarne
(VSŽ - Eastern Slovak Steel Mill). This mill serves as an example of an
unsuccessful and dangerous attempt at privatization and restructuring.
12.5.1 Sector Data
Data on the development of labor, profits, sales and exports in the sectors of
the Slovak industry will help demonstrate whether or not the delays in the creation
of an efficient framework for corporate governance and the delays in the
implementation was the cause of the companies’ poor performance. In regard to
the employment issue, it appears that the sectors were able to rid themselves of
excessive labor by shifting the labor force from the light to the heavy industry.
Companies that were restructured in the past six years should be moderately
profitable. The initial passive resistance to restructuring became apparent in
reduced sales. The following profound restructuring was expected to restore sales
to the original level. Exports are influenced by many factors, such as devaluation
or the overall development of demand on the global market. Exports can be viewed
as an indicator of the companies capability to face stiff competition. We assume
that good export performance reflects a successful company restructuring.
Table 1 clearly indicates a modest decline (6 %) of the total labor employed
in industry during the period of 1993 to 1997. A clear reduction was noted in the
processing of coke and refined oil products, 27 %, in the processing of non-
classified products, 19 % and leather processing, 16 %. Only four sectors increased
the number of employees. The most significant of these was in metal production
(dominated by the VSŽ plant - the main employer in the period of 1993 to 1997),
10 %, and the manufacturing of rubber products, 8 %. The sector production and
distribution of electricity, gas and water, where state monopolies play the main
role, increased the number of employees by 3 % and food production by 1 %. We
can conclude that the total reduction of labor in the four-year period was moderate
mainly due to the expansion of the sectors controlled by the state or by
monopolies, such as VSŽ.
In table 2, we provide data on the gross profit in current prices. It is alarming
that the total profit of the industry has declined substantially. In 1998 it achieved
only 17 % of the profit level achieved in 1993. However, the state-dominated
sector, production and distribution of electricity, gas and water, achieved yearly
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levels of profit approximately cumulatively equal to the entire industry. Exceptions
are for the years 1995 and 1998, when this sector achieved 65 % and 278 %
respectively of the total industry profit. Only six sectors reported positive profits
during the entire period. These were mining, food production, coke, refined oil
products, chemical products, rubber, plastics, and the production and distribution
of electricity, gas and water. Only one of them, the food-producing sector,
increased its profits during the period of 1993 to 1998. Two sectors reported loss in
only one year. Those sectors were the non-metallic minerals and the manufacturing
of products not classified elsewhere. Two sectors were able to achieve profits in
1998 - pulp and paper, almost twelve-fold growth and manufacturing of means of
transport, mainly thank to Volkswagen with a 60 % profit.
The second group of companies is composed of six sectors. These sectors
showed a loss almost permanently. Textiles and clothing recorded moderate profits
in 1995 and since then they have showed a loss. Leather products, wooden
products, and machine and tool production did not report any profit during the
entire period. The latter sector, machine and tools, can be considered to be in a
very bad situation due to a 1998 loss amounting to SKK 10 billion. This loss was
two times higher than the entire industry profits. The sector of metal production
reported significant profits in 1995; however, this cannot balance the losses in the
remaining years. The electrical and optical equipment sector production was
profitable only in 1997.
According to the reported volumes of profits, most of the sectors show poor
performance. The situation is serious. The entire profit in the industry declined to
17 % of the profit level of 1993, at current prices. The industry reports positive
profits only due to the state-controlled sector - production and distribution of
electricity, gas and water. This sector first ensures revenues for the state budget
and only then addresses quality and the range of commercial services. This may be
the reason for the Slovak government’s apprehension about restructuring this
sector. Delaying restructuring is not a solution.
Only four sectors did not increase their sales in the period of 1993-98 (in
fixed prices, cf. Table 3). The sales of the sectors for textiles clothing, and leather
goods recorded the sharpest decline, by 25 %. On the contrary, a steep increase of
sales was recorded in the sectors: manufacturing of means of transport, by 342 %,
manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment, +117 %, pulp and paper, +51 %
and production and distribution of electricity, gas and water, +49 %.
Sales from exports have not grown in the period of 1993-97 in six sectors (cf.
Table 4). The most significant decline in exports were recorded in metal
production, by 48 %, and manufacturing of non-metallic minerals, by 32 %. On the
other hand, the strongest growth was reported for production and distribution of
electricity, gas and water (due to a low level in 1993), manufacturing of means of
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transport, by 147 %, and manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment, +90 %.
The industry sales originating in exports have grown by 22 % in fixed prices over
the monitored period.
In order to measure the dependence between the development of individual
indexes, we calculated correlation indexes for them. The highest correlation was
reported between the development of sales and exports, 0.60. This indicates that
sales on the domestic market were almost as important for sales growth as the
exports. The correlation between the development of the number of employees and
profits was negative as expected, -0.45. Other correlations did not exceed the value
0.20.
Apart from the development of four variables, (number of employees, profit,
sales and exports), it is also interesting to monitor the development of the market
prices. Some sectors were able to optically enhance their performance due to a
faster growth of prices when compared with other sectors (cf. Table 5). We assume
that the growth or decline of prices in these sectors depended on the adaptation of
relative prices, competition between domestic and imported products and state
regulation of markets. The most substantial growth of prices occurred in the food
industry, textiles and clothing and non-metallic minerals. The lowest was recorded
in the sectors leather goods, production and distribution of electricity, gas and
water and manufacturing of coke and refined oil products.
In order to study the dependence between the development of the four
variables and the price environment, we first divided the sectors into four groups
according to the profit index. Table 6 lists the sectors with the strongest growth of
profit, marked with  „++“, then those with lower profit growth, „+“, still lower
growth, „-“ and lowest growth, „--“. The groups for other variables are similarly
marked. If there was a weak dependency between variables, we could expect a
frequent occurrence of "plusses" for the sales and exports and "minuses" for labor
in the upper part of the table and vice versa. It is difficult to predict the dependence
on prices, even though we would like to link the restructured companies with the
"minuses" for prices.
It can be noted that "pluses" for sales, exports and labor in table 6 are located
in the center around the medium values of profit growth. Significant reduction of
labor concerned the critical sectors with lowest growth of profits, sales and
earnings. Sectors with the highest profit growth are linked with a decline of sales
and often with a decline of exports, which is a surprising result. The price changes
are scattered arbitrarily in the table.
12.5.2 The Largest 15 Companies
In tables 7, 8, 9 and 10 we list the sales, pre-tax profits, and number of
employees according to the sales of the fifteen largest Slovak companies. This
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information is regularly published by the Trend weekly. We want to show that the
few largest companies share in the overall industrial sales, profits, and excessive
employment. This represents a danger to the Slovak Republic and also indicates
insufficient structural changes. Concurrently, we want to take a look at the
ownership structure and market position of the largest companies in order to show
whether or not they represent the new private sector, foreign investment or state
monopolies.
By comparing the data in the four tables, we will establish that the
concentration of industrial sales in the fifteen largest companies is significant.
Their share was approximately one half: 43 % in 1995, 52 % in 1996, 54 % in
1997 and 46 % in 1998. Moreover, this share did not show a clearly declining
tendency as might have been expected due to the restructuring of industrial
companies. Because of their immense sales, these few companies are able to
directly influence the majority of Slovak companies and their employees.
The situation is even worse in regard to the development of profits. The
largest companies produced 88 % of the total industry profits in 1995, but in the
following year, their share exceeded 100 %. In 1996, they produced 153 % of the
profits. In 1997, profits were almost unchanged showing 142 % of the profits; and
in 1998, an incredible 317 % of total industry profits was shown. In 1998, selected
largest companies produced not only the entire profits recorded in the industry, but
also produced twice as much to balance off the losses of other companies. That of
course not only has an impact on the state budget revenues, but also strengthens the
position of the company managers in relation to government negotiations..
In regard to employment, the fifteen largest companies employed
approximately 15 % of labor in industry, even though indirectly this number was
much higher. In comparison with the share in sales (48 %) and profits (175 %)245
these companies might appear to be incredibly efficient unless this efficiency is not
determined by their ownership structure or market position. The latter is linked
with successful rent seeking. In 1995, five out of fifteen selected companies were
"state companies" in their legal form, and another three were state companies that
were being prepared for privatization. Nine of the fifteen largest companies were
controlled by the state. Two out of the remaining six were held by foreign
investors. The two largest, VSŽ and Slovnaft, were privatized expressly for
political purposes. Privatization of the remaining companies was opaque.
 However, the privatization of companies does not mean  that the state gave
up substantial stakes. The state remained involved through the NPF, a 35 % stake
in Všeobecná úverová banka (VÚB), 91 % in Slovenská sporitelna and 51 % stake
in Slovenská poistovna.246
                                                                
245  Average values for the entire period
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In regard to the domestic market, VSŽ owned 108 companies in various
sectors in 1998 and can be considered both a monopoly and an empire.247 Their
activities brought the company a permanent threat of cross default in 1998. SPP is
a monopoly that imports and distributes gas. In 1998, this company produced 60 %
of the profit for the fifteen largest companies. Slovnaft, an oil refinery, usually
linked with gasoline, also enjoys a monopoly position on the domestic market. This
position became stronger after it created an alliance with another large company -
Benzina, an owner of a chain of gas stations. Power plants, as well as all regional
distributing energy works and Slovenské telekomunikácie (Slovak telecom) have a
monopoly position by law. In 1998, they produced 23 % of the profits for the
fifteen companies.
We can guess that approximately half of the fifteen largest companies were
under state control or have a monopoly position. Six state monopolies produced as
much as 83 % of the profits of the big fifteen in 1998. Their high productivity was
therefore the result of their favorable position in the market rather than the result of
restructuring.
12.5.3 The VSŽ Case
The VSŽ, eastern Slovak steel mill used to produce 9 % of the Slovak GDP
and 12 % of exports.248 This mill can serve as an example of opaque privatization,
slow restructuring, and the building a managerial empire. During the period
between 1994 –1997, the company recorded annual profits of about SKK 4 bn.249
In 1998, profits were only SKK 21million (cf. Table 11) and the net profit was a
negative SKK 7.2bn. VSŽ's creditors declared cross default. Since this company
employs approximately 25,000 employees, the government initiated negotiations
with the creditors in an effort to prevent mass redundancies. The behavior of VSŽ
owners (cf. Table 12) was similar to blackmailing the government. The owners
refused to agree with company restructuring if it limited their influence. According
to Mathernová (1999), it was not possible for the creditors to apply the Slovak
Bankruptcy and Composition Act for the restructuring of VSŽ. If the creditors
applied the act (sold the company), they would achieve only a portion of their
accounts receivable. This became a stalemate because, even though the
government wanted to insure employment and the creditors want to restructure the
company with a new management, an agreement with the owners could not be
reached. The development of the crisis in VSŽ is an example of the difficulties in
Slovak privatization and in the operation of domestic market monopolies.
                                                                
247  Annual report VSŽ 1998.
248  Data for 1996. P67value, 22.9.1997, „VSŽ“.
249  Average calculated from the data in the table 11.
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In the voucher privatization during the period of 1992-93, 65 % of the
company shares were privatized. The VSŽ managers founded the company,
Manager, on March 11, 1994. On the same day, the parliament voted no
confidence to the government. However, three days later, the government adopted
the sale of 10 % of VSŽ's shares to Manager at a price of SKK 200 per share. That
price was three times lower than the market price. The link between the
government and VSŽ was then constituted by the Minister of Finance and a former
manager of VSŽ, Július Toth. In 1995, Hutník, a company founded by the VSŽ
trade unions, privatized further 10 % of the VSŽ shares at the same price SKK 200
per share, even though the market price at that time was twice as high. The NPF
sold the remaining 15 % of VSŽ shares to Ferrimex, s.r.o in July 1995, at SKK 200
per share. Ferrimex was owned by Hutník (25 %) and another company, ARDS (75
%), was controlled by some of VSŽ’s managers. At that time, Alexander Rezeš,
the most important VSŽ owner and Minister of Transport, Posts and
Telecommunications, was the link with the government. Rezeš obtained favorable
transport prices for VSŽ at the cost of the state owned railway company. Prior to
the parliamentary elections in 1998, he worked as the leader of the election team of
the then ruling HZDS.
With the arrival of new owners in VSŽ, the company progressively expanded
its empire and the number of subsidiaries kept growing. In 1996, the company was
the majority stakeholder in 86 companies and the minority stakeholder (20 - 50 %)
in another 35 companies. The group included the Czech soccer club AC Sparta
Praha, 91 % share of VSŽ, daily newspapers Národná obroda, 86 %, and Lúc, 77
%, and some investment companies and Slovenská poistovna, 20 %. The VSŽ
owners also held stakes through third parties. Stakes in IRB, which was at that time
the third largest bank in Slovakia, were held by VSŽ held 15 %, and stakes in
through other co-owned companies were at least 40 %.250 In 1997, the company
admitted to holding majority stakes in 68 companies and holding minority stakes in
31 companies. In 1998, VSŽ held stakes in 102 companies in Slovakia and 16 in
foreign companies.251
In 1997, the company was still considered healthy. (January 30) ING Barings
recommended foreign investors buy VSŽ bonds because the company was highly
profitable and it had excellent preconditions established for meeting its obligations.
(February 1) Companies held by VSŽ reported investment in modern technologies
amounting to SKK 3.5bn for 1996. (March 27) The Antimonopoly Office became
suspicious and began to investigate VSŽ and ARDS. It was suspected that they had
acted in harmony as IRB shareholders without declaring a concentration of shares.
(April 9) Ludovít Cernák, opposition member of parliament (National Council)
                                                                
250 P67value, 8.3.1998, „IRB“.
251 Annual report VSŽ 1996, 1997 and 1998.
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criticized the VSŽ for low investment into modernization of manufacturing and
minimal enhancement of competitiveness. He predicted financial problems for the
company and also stated that those found responsible would blackmail the state to
"take care".
(April 15) Minister of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications and co-
owner of VSŽ, Alexander Rezeš, resigned from his office. He began to focus more
on company management, a task that had a negative impact on its performance.
(May 7) The VSŽ began a campaign to develop a new plant in eastern Slovakia
that would be designed for manufacturing cars. The new plant was supposed to buy
a part of VSŽ output. VSŽ informed Toyota about these negotiations, but Toyota
did not express great interest. (September 22) The company reported that it
produced 9 % of Slovak GDP and at the same time it announced the need for
government aid to assist in its revitalization. (December 18) VSŽ sold its 20 %
share in the Czech company, Trinecké železárny. These shares had been purchased
only a year earlier. In 1996, Trinecké železárny showed a loss of SKK 0.8bn and
the revenues declined by SKK 1.2bn (5 %), which helped the company to
compensate for the loss made in 1994 and 1995.
In 1998, VSŽ made a new investment. (January 9) VSŽ bought 68 % of
shares in the loss-making Hungarian metallurgical company, DAM Diósgyör,
whose debt amounted to SKK 1.4bn. The purchase price was a symbolic $1. The
Hungarian government had previously spent SKK 5bn. for the revitalization of
DAM. VSŽ now promised to increase DAM equity by SKK 0.7bn (March 2).
Alexander Rezeš and Ján Smerek became members of the supervisory board of
VSŽ and Július Rezeš (at the age of twenty) joined the Board of Directors. (March
9) VSŽ planned to invest SKK 5.9bn into modern technologies. (March 19)
Reports emerged that the profit of the company for 1997 totaled SKK 0.6bn instead
of the projected SKK 1.4bn. The Trend weekly noticed that VSŽ had concentrated
the import of substantial raw materials in the Trans Trade Import AG Vaduz. This
company was established in Liechtenstein and had no formal links with VSŽ.
Projections of profit reduction and changes in the Supervisory Board and Board of
Directors caused a 38 % decline in the price of VSŽ shares from SKK 660. Trend
then published an anonymous report stating that the situation in the company was
completely opaque since no one could determine which property belonged to the
company and which belonged to the members of the Supervisory Board. A price
intervention of the VSŽ was then expected. Company shares were registered by
banks as collateral for loans and VSŽ could have been asked to make up for the
emerged difference in value. State owned banks failed to undertake any such
action.
(March 30) VSŽ signed the issue of $200 Eurobonds. (May 12) Consolidated
net profit for 1997 totaled SKK 0.3mld. while, in 1996, the profit was 1 billion
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higher. The profit per share in 1997 was only SKK 16, while, in 1996, it was as
much as SKK 77. The company registered SKK 15.2bn worth of accounts
receivable after maturity (SKK +1.9bn. compared with 1996), SKK 8.9bn of long-
term liabilities (SKK +0.9 bn) and SKK 19.2bn in short-term liabilities (SKK +0.7
bn). Bank loans totaled SKK 4.3bn (SKK -1.2 bn). The company’s basic equity
totaled SKK 16.4bn and shareholders' equity SKK 26.8bn. (May 22) The general
assembly of the company voted for an increase of dividends, which also exceeded
consolidated net profit by 15 %. (July 30) The issue of Eurobonds was delayed.
(October 26) The powers of both the Supervisory Board (SB) and the
domestic shareholders were extended. As of that date the general assembly was
entitled to elect and recall members of the SB with a two-third majority. Another
SB was entitled to elect or recall the members of the Board of Directors. Some
important decisions required the presence of 55 % of shareholders at the general
assembly, but for other decisions only 30 % constituted a quorum. Jaroslav Gruber,
the Vice President of the SB and the head of the trade unions in VSŽ, had 10 % of
Hutník’s voting rights. This was justified by claiming that there was a threat to
VSŽ because 25 % of its shares were owned by foreign investors. The foreign
investors were alleged to be uninterested in the company’s development and more
interested in its decline or liquidation.
(November 5) The company reduced its stake in Slovenská poistovna from
20 % to 13 % by selling the difference to Poštová banka. The shares were sold in
two packages at SKK 1,910 and SKK  2,310 per share, even though the stock
exchange offered only SKK 800 per share. This can be explained by noting that
VSŽ had a stake in the partially state-owned Poštová banka. On the very day VSŽ
announced negative profit for 1998. (November 9) VSŽ declared the intention to
make 2000 employees redundant in 1999 and to restructure the portfolio of its 137
subsidiaries, including the Prague soccer club AC Sparta. (November 9). The
company was unable to repay the $35 million syndicated loan.
(November 10) The government continued its negotiations with VSŽ
creditors. The members of the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board
refused the suggestion that they resign. The government considered the company a
strategic one due to its size and influence on the Slovak economy. (November 20)
VSŽ stated that the banks could announce cross default. „It is a decision to be
taken by the banks,“ said the Vice President of the company. (November 26) The
government tried to increase its influence on the company through state-owned
banks. Slovenská sporitelna was designated to acquire 30 % of VSŽ shares. These
shares were to be used as collateral on a loan. As a result of this action, the
majority owners of VSŽ would lose their positions. This was basically
nationalization used as a condition to ensure repeated privatization of the company.
(December 7) Price Waterhouse Coopers prepared an in-depth audit as a basis for
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the negotiations with the creditors and also as an assessment of the company’s
restructuring potential. (December 11) At an extraordinary general assembly, Mr.
Gabriel Eichler, a foreign manager, was elected to the Board of Directors for a six
month period. Alexander Rezeš and Jaroslav Gruber remained in the Supervisory
Board, but Július Rezeš left. The Board of Directors gained greater independence
from the Supervisory Board. The goal was to restructure the total debt of the
company –(SKK 13 billion) and to find a strategic investor.
In 1999 (January 14) Slovenská sporitelna became the owner of 13 % of VSŽ
shares. The government controlled another 3 % through the Restitution fund and
10 % through Priemyselná banka.The owners to that date therefore lost their
majority in VSŽ. (February 19) Alexander Rezeš resigned after the general
assembly. (March 2) The new management planned to complete the restructuring
process by June 1999.
(March 17) The NPF tried to acquire 10 % of VSŽ shares privatized by the
company Manager (controlled by Alexander Rezeš), since the latter did not pay the
installment of the agreed purchase price. However, in the meantime Manager sold
6 % of the shares to another company. Gabriel Eichler emphasized the need of a
fast foreign investment, which would enhance the know-how and corporate culture,
including the governance and marketing. (March 29) VSŽ signed a „stand still
agreement“ to prevent the declaration of a cross default with all creditors, except
one, thus the signed agreement was not valid. (April 4) Gabriel Eichler claimed
that creditors would receive only 15-20 % of their outstanding accounts receivable
if the company were put into bankruptcy. VSŽ still employed 25,000 people and
significantly influenced another 100,000 jobs. (June 3) The Minister of Finance
announced that the state was the largest creditor of VSŽ with accounts receivable
in amount of SKK 5 billion for unpaid taxes and it owned 30 % of the VSŽ shares.
(July 29) VSŽ began to sell some subsidiaries, luxurious cars, and one jet
aircraft. The aircraft itself was initially leased for $10 million (September 16).
After meeting Alexander Rezeš, the Slovak president said that everybody agreed
that the company could be saved exclusively with domestic funds, with the help of
loans, and without foreign capital investment. (September 20) Slovenská sporitelna
sold 10 % of VSŽ  shares to the state NPF (September 24). The general assembly
strengthened the position of the government and Jaroslav Gruber was recalled.
(October 28) The Minister of Finance ordered to stop trading with 21 % of VSŽ
shares, which was supposed to return majority in the company to the old owners.
(November 11) VSŽ sold some subsidiaries, including the soccer club AC Sparta
Praha, some luxurious cars, garages, apartments, aircraft and 100 pieces of art.
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12.6 Foreign Direct Investment
Investment in any country depends on its potential return and the related risk.
The higher the risk, the higher the required return. Risk is usually linked with
political stability, or the outlook for an enhancement in the market environment,
and access to good quality information (cf. e.g., Collin and Rodrik, 1991). Local
prices of the production factors (including labor and tax reductions), infrastructure
and distance from the markets all influence the return on investment differently,
but for the very decision to place the investment they are rather of secondary
importance. If the transition countries want to attract a large volume of foreign
capital, they have to reduce the risk of investment, so that the investors may
participate also in less profitable projects.
The main importance of the foreign direct investment is to obtain the capital
required for restructuring the economy and the companies. This must be done
without straining the companies with new loans and the economy with the
possibility of a fast outflow that is typical with many portfolio investments.
Investment brings modern technologies, know how, new forms of management,
and new corporate culture. At the same time, it accelerates the country’s access not
only to global markets but also to international alliances, such as the European
Union. It is of substantial political and social importance. Foreign direct
investment, however, assumes that the transition economy will agree with the
foreign investors who acquire control over relevant companies, i.e., that their
ownership rights will be protected comparable to national owners by the law and
the executive branch of power. Foreign direct investment for companies assumes
hard budgetary restrictions, which force the current owners to search funds even at
the cost of sharing or losing control.
Slovak Foreign Exchange Act252 considers the following as foreign direct
investment: „…such use of monetary funds or other property values and ownership
rights, measurable in money, the purpose of which is the establishment, acquisition
or expansion of permanent economic relations of an investing foreign national in
an enterprise in the Slovak Republic in one of these forms : 1. establishment or
acquisition of exclusively a share in business, including its expansion ; 2.
participation in a newly established or existing business, if the investor owns or
acquires at least 10 % stake in the basic equity of the company, or at least 10 % of
the share in net equity, or 10 % of voting rights; 3. financial loan for five or more
years,  extended by the investor for business purposes, if the investor participates
in this business as defined in item 1 or 2, or a loan related with an agreement on
participation in the distribution of profit; 4. use of revenues from an existing direct
investment into this investment .“
                                                                
252 Foreign Exchange Act of September 20, 1995, section 2 paragraph k).
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In the case of Slovakia, it became quite obvious that the amount of foreign
direct investment would be based upon the rate of success of the reforms in a
transition economy. Even though Slovakia achieved excellent results in terms of
GDP growth with low inflation, the foreign direct investment coming to Slovakia
remained low. In comparison - in the period of 1990 - 1998 the Czech Republic
attracted more than SKK 13 billion, while Slovakia only less than 2 billion. (cf.
Table 13). In 1998 the foreign direct investment to Slovakia achieved its maximum
(cf. table 14), SKK 16 billion. Even though there was a 6 billion increase in the
first half of 1999, investors remained cautious of investment opportunity in
Slovakia, as was expected. Not even tax reductions and breaks253 could
substantially change their behavior as long as they were not accompanied by
changes in the overall market environment and a larger actual openness of the
economy (infrastructure of border crossings, customs duties and certificates).
According to the governmental package of economic measures of January 1999,
the government is well aware of that: „The basis for the support of foreign direct
investment is the creation of a transparent and stable business environment with
clear rules for all players in the competition.“ (item 47)
Slovakia urgently needs foreign direct investment, because it is a small, open,
and poor economy. Privatization of state stakes in banks and large companies is an
opportunity not only to raise funds for the state budget, but also is an opportunity
to acquire support for the adoption of necessary reforms.
12.7 Conclusion
The Slovak economy was a puzzle for a long time. While it had successful
growth, low inflation, and a stable exchange rate, a low interest of foreign investors
and continuing high rate of unemployment prevailed. As it turned out later, Slovak
growth was achieved at the cost of price liberalization and structural changes. To
date, the country has not been able to sufficiently ensure the protection of private
ownership, the exercise of ownership rights through corporate governance, and
hard budgetary restrictions. Company restructuring has also slowed down. The new
owners, in coalition with political parties, often robbed companies and searched for
rents. Until 1999, Slovak governments did not have a clear idea of a program for
company restructuring.
According to the report of the World Bank Mission (1999), the restructuring
program has to contain four elements:
1. Restructuring and privatization of state-owned banks. Private banks will
harden the budgetary restrictions for companies to such extent that we could
expect many changes in company ownership.
                                                                
253 In force as of July 1, 1998 According to the Act on Income Tax.
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2. Restructuring of the banks' portfolios of non-performing loans. Here too,
changes in company ownership have to be expected.
3. Enhancement of the legal framework (Act on Bankruptcy and Composition,
Commercial Code, Civil Code, Act on Banks, tax legislation) and court
infrastructure.
4. Regulation and privatization of publicly beneficial companies.
         In many cases these are companies of the country's top fifteen.
It is probable that the Slovak government will decide on a decentralized
approach to company restructuring. It will then enable the creditors, who are most
interested in satisfying their accounts receivable, to decide whether the value of a
bankrupt company is higher in case of restructuring or higher in liquidation. This
requires a significant amendment to the Act on Bankruptcy and Composition as
well as limitations on the use of the Act on Execution, which is efficient in
enforcing the collateral, but leads to a liquidation of companies, where
restructuring would be more favorable.
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12.9 Annex
TABLE 1. Development of Labor in Industry
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 I97/93
Mining 24,267 21,291 21,198 21,119 21,345 0.88
Food Production 51,394 50,963 50,102 51,047 51,810 1.01
Textiles and Clothing 55,403 55,696 55,326 53,312 50,373 0.91
Leather Goods 22,965 20,488 22,185 21,700 19,380 0.84
Wood Products 14,522 14,891 15,007 14,740 14,222 0.98
Pulp and Paper 23,103 22,498 22,676 22,229 22,001 0.95
Coke, Refined Oil Products 7,543 6,526 6,113 5,792 5,499 0.73
Chemical Products 29,336 27,517 27,025 26,900 26,636 0.91
Rubber and Plastics 13,417 14,048 15,057 15,312 14,554 1.08
Non-metallic Minerals 29,154 27,151 26,071 25,243 24,683 0.85
Metals 54,250 54,332 56,989 58,932 59,554 1.10
Machinery and Tools 80,629 72,563 71,881 69,273 67,562 0.84
Electric. and Optical Equipment 40,187 35,596 37,496 37,272 38,203 0.95
Means of Transport 28,659 26,521 28,834 28,286 27,778 0.97
Production not Classified Elsewhere 21,012 18,685 17,329 17,040 17,027 0.81
Electricity, Gas and Water 43,870 44,730 43,650 44,182 45,134 1.03
Industry Total 539,711 513,496 516,939 512,379 505,761 0 94
Data 1993: Statistical yearbook (SY) 1996 p.339, 1994-96: SY 1997 p.359 and 1997: SY 1998 p.360.
Index I97/93 = Value 1997 / Value 1993.
TABLE  2 Development of Profit and Loss in Industry, current prices, SKK
million
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 I98/93
Mining 833 810 1,270 759 369 646 0 78
Food Production 869 1,514 2,342 2,092 2,088 2,062 2.37
Textiles and Clothing 174 224 75 -369 -541 -126 -1.72
Leather Goods -142 -597 -601 -761 -1,105 -2,120 14.93
Wood Products -456 -533 -402 -404 -1,093 -530 1.16
Pulp and Paper -153 1,300 4,108 867 1,814 1,559 11.19
Coke, Refined Oil Products 1,449 3,525 3,730 2,255 3,908 1,020 0.70
Chemical Products 1,177 1,073 2,203 1,684 982 803 0.68
Rubber and Plastics 1,053 1,079 1,201 925 756 584 0.55
Non-metallic Minerals 714 397 700 -1,025 376 974 1.36
Metals 12 -380 2,318 338 -935 -2,713 -227.0
Machinery and Tools -3,719 -5,445 -3,750 -5,327 -7,901 -10,321 2.78
El. & Optical Equipment -953 -723 -953 -346 613 -210 0.22
Means of Transport -726 77 1,105 -572 299 413 1.57
Production not Classified
Elsewhere
55 -212 146 322 122 170 3.09
Electricity, Gas and Water 26,178 23,385 25,651 19,638 15,695 12,163 0.46
Industry Total 26,365 25,494 39,143 20,076 15,572 4,374 0.17
Data 1993: Statistical yearbook (SY) 1996 p.340, 1994-96: SY 1997 p.360, 1997: SY 1998 p.361 and
1998: Statistical report on basic development tendencies in the Slovak economy in 1998, table 15. Index
I98/93 = Value 1998 / Value 1993.
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TABLE 3 Development of Total Industry Sales, fixed prices Dec 1995, SKK mil.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 I98/93
Mining 14,107 9,489 9,649 10,266 11,521 13,199 0.94
Food Production 74,877 68,841 66,038 68,713 69,294 66,897 0.89
Textiles and Clothing 18,403 18,753 16,460 16,146 14,289 13,805 0.75
Leather Goods 5,239 5,286 6,093 6,072 4,950 3,910 0.75
Wood Products 6,068 6,743 7,401 7,036 7,338 6,798 1.12
Pulp and Paper 22,934 26,419 27,917 29,950 34,693 34,696 1.51
Coke, Refined Oil Products 22,740 33,677 32,572 31,211 35,585 26,469 1.16
Chemical Products 30,494 34,208 36,562 36,721 37,536 36,410 1.19
Rubber and Plastics 13,283 15,644 17,384 17,711 18,625 16,595 1.25
Non-metallic Minerals 19,785 19,165 18,588 18,303 19,691 22,045 1.11
Metals 65,361 70,330 76,603 68,169 75,824 73,092 1.12
Machinery and Tools 29,831 28,048 31,240 33,345 33,281 36,973 1.24
Electrical and Optical
Equipment
19,102 19,692 21,864 24,439 31,316 41,471 2.17
Means of Transport 15,671 15,990 26,867 31,804 37,099 69,326 4.42
Production not-Classified
Elsewhere
9,846 9,249 9,497 10,426 10,122 10,370 1.05
Electricity, Gas and Water 61,098 91,236 89,007 100,808 101,187 91,044 1.49
Industry Total 434,891 478,368 501,623 515,361 543,165 560,115 1.29
Data 1993: Statistical yearbook (SY) 1996 p.340, 1994-96: SY 1997 p.361, 1997: SY 1998 p.362 and
1998: Statistical report on basic development tendencies in the Slovak economy in 1998, table 15. Index
I98/93 = value 1998 / value 1993. SY lists data for the years 1993 and 1995 at prices of 1995, for the
years 1994 and 1996 at prices of 1996, for 1997 at prices of December 1995 and for the year 1998 at
current prices. The author used price indexes from table 5 to recalculate the data on a single basis
December 1995.
TABLE 4 Development of Export Sales, fixed prices December 1995, SKK
million
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 I97/93
Mining 1,233 1,352 1,352 1,410 1,714 1.39
Food Production 7,141 5,973 6,301 5,575 5,132 0.72
Textiles and Clothing 10,065 10,191 9,330 9,038 7,977 0.79
Leather Goods 2,620 2,396 2,487 2,321 2,332 0.89
Wood Products 2,588 3,359 3,650 3,325 3,208 1.24
Pulp and Paper 9,761 12,737 14,361 15,228 17,715 1.81
Coke, Refined Oil Products 9,897 15,244 15,951 16,133 16,164 1.63
Chemical Products 18,282 21,618 23,746 23,862 24,001 1.31
Rubber and Plastics 8,359 9,161 10,638 10,451 11,962 1.43
Non-metallic Minerals 10,222 10,044 9,804 7,111 6,938 0.68
Metals 44,305 47,269 49,563 27,475 23,173 0.52
Machinery and Tools 14,735 12,275 13,425 13,819 14,456 0.98
Electrical and Optical Equipment 8,653 10,142 11,388 12,197 16,456 1.90
Means of Transport 11,846 11,875 20,614 22,764 29,206 2.47
Production not Classified Elsewhere 3,691 3,165 3,727 4,195 3,895 1.06
Electricity, Gas and Water 942 16,144 16,345 19,098 18,765 19.93
Industry Total 166,754 195,772 216,663 197,322 203,094 1.22
Data 1993: Statistical yearbook (SY) 1996 p.341, 1994-96: SY 1997 p.361 and 1997: SY 1998 p.361.
Index I97/93 = Value 1997 / Value 1993. SY lists data for the years 1993 and 1995 at prices of 1995,
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for the years 1994 and 1996 at prices of 1996 and for the year 1997 at prices of December 1995. The
author used the price indexes from table 5 to recalculate the data on a single basis - December 1995.
TABLE 5. Development of Industry Prices, December 1995 = 100
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Mining 91.5 96.5 106.1 103.2 105.7 106.2
Food Production 76.4 90.6 100.0 104.5 110.9 117.4
Textiles and Clothing 77.8 87.0 98.8 101.1 108.0 113.8
Leather Goods 104.0 106.3 107.5 108.2 105.4 111.4
Wood Products 80.9 85.9 94.2 98.4 105.8 112.5
Pulp and Paper 69.0 75.5 94.5 92.5 87.7 91.2
Coke, Refined Oil Products 104.2 114.4 100.0 111.6 116.9 117.4
Chemical Products 81.4 88.7 102.7 105.2 107.0 107.0
Rubber and Plastics 81.0 84.5 96.4 103.5 105.9 107.8
Non-metallic Minerals 72.1 79.4 93.3 99.6 103.9 107.1
Metals 79.5 86.8 99.2 103.8 107.0 111.0
Machinery and Tools 82.3 92.2 98.5 104.9 110.6 112.3
Electrical and Optical Equipment 83.3 87.2 95.8 98.7 103.3 103.2
Means of Transport 87.4 104.5 111.8 115.6 111.5 114.8
Production not Classified Elsewhere 83.8 90.8 95.1 96.2 103.4 108.5
Electricity, Gas and Water 102.3 95.8 99.6 99.3 106.9 111.8
Industry Total 81.9 90.0 98.1 102.2 106.8 110.3
Data 1993-97: Statistical yearbook 1998 p.128 and 1998: Statistical report on basic development
tendencies in the Slovak economy in 1998, table 8.
TABLE 6. Comparison of Indexes
Profit Labor Sales Exports Prices
Pulp and Paper ++ + ++ ++ +
Food Production ++ ++ -- -- ++
Mining ++ - -- + --
Non-metallic Minerals ++ - - -- ++
Production not  Classified Elsewhere ++ -- - - -
Means of Transport + + ++ ++ -
Rubber and Plastics + ++ + + +
Chemical Products + - + + -
Coke, Refined Oil Products + -- + ++ --
Electricity, Gas and Water - ++ ++ ++ --
Wood Products - ++ - + ++
Electrical and Optical Equipment - + ++ ++ -
Metals -- ++ - -- ++
Textiles and Clothing -- - -- -- ++
Machinery and Tools -- -- + - +
Leather Goods -- -- -- - --
Calculations with the indexes of labor and exports I97/93 and indexes of profit, revenues and prices
I98/93. -- denotes x<1.Q, - 1.Q<x<2.Q, + 2.Q<x<3.Q a ++ 3.Q<x, where Q = quartile.
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TABLE 7. Company Data for 1995 According to Trend Top 1996
Rank Name of company Sector Pf Sales Profit Labor
1 VSŽ Ocel Metallurgy a.s. 38,950 1,733 10,123
2 SPP Gas š.p. 36,788 13,322 5,586
3 Slovnaft Oil a.s. 31,917 3,274 5,276
4 Slovenské elektrárne Energy a.s. 26,176 7,487 10,382
5 Volkswagen Automobiles s.r.o 13,689 397 1,421
6 Západoslovenské energet. závody Energy š.p. 11,301 335 3,771
7 Stredoslovenské energet. závody Energy š.p. 10,750 232 3,700
8 Slovenské telekomunikácie Telecom š.p. 9,883 2,802 15,306
9 Matador Tires a.s. 7,835 1,195 4,445
10 Východoslov. energetické závody Energy š.p. 6,787 169 2,084
11 Severoslov. celulózky a papierne Pulp a.s. 6,710 2,222 3,678
12 Duslo Chemicals a.s. 6,357 274 3,408
13 Chemlon Artificial fibers a.s. 4,534 29 2,967
14 Slovakofarma Pharmaceuticals a.s. 4,039 929 2,147
15 Chemko Chemicals a.s. 3,872 65 2,744
Top 15 Total 219,588 34,465 77,038
Share of Top 15 in Industry in  % 43 88 15
Sales = net revenues in SKK million, Profit = pre-tax profit in SKK million, Labor = number of
employees.
TABLE 8. Company Data for 1996 According to Trend Top 1997
Rank Name of Company Sector Sales Profit Labor
1 VSŽ Metallurgy a.s. 48,828 2,221 39
2 SPP Gas š.p. 39,439 13,792 5,941
3 Slovnaft Oil a.s. 35,889 2,307 4,984
4 VSŽ Ocel Metallurgy s.r.o 29,882 214 11,630
5 Slovenské elektrárne Energy a.s. 29,088 4,936 10,748
6 Volkswagen Automobiles s.r.o 18,187 501 1,955
7 Slovenské telekomunikácie Telecom š.p. 12,864 4,199 15,374
8 Západoslovenské energet. závody Energy š.p. 11,950 251 3,732
9 Stredoslovenské energet. závody Energy š.p. 10,804 4 3,615
10 Matador Tires a.s. 7,966 404 4,604
11 Duslo Chemicals a.s. 7,189 535 3,418
12 Východoslov. energetické závody Energy š.p. 7,153 122 2,056
13 Slovalco Aluminium a.s. 6,504 37 745
14 Severoslov. celulózky a papierne Pulp, paper a.s. 6,086 309 4,309
15 Slovakofarma Pharmaceuticals a.s. 4,413 912 2,168
Top 15 Total 276,242 30,744 75,318
Share of Top 15 in the Industry in  % 52 153 15
355
TABLE 9. Company Data for 1997 According to Trend Top 1998
Rank Name of Company Sector Pf Sales Profit Labor
1 VSŽ Holding Metallurgy a.s. 62,069 1,071 44
2 SPP Gas š.p. 41,548 9,645 6,265
3 Slovnaft Oil a.s. 40,173 3,113 4,704
4 VSŽ Ocel Metallurgy s.r.o 35,557 201 11,666
5 Slovenské elektrárne Energy a.s. 28,983 2,435 11,282
6 Volkswagen Automobiles s.r.o 21,721 343 2,745
7 Slovenské telekomunikácie Telecom š.p. 15,236 4,310 15,278
8 Západoslovenské energet. závody Energy š.p. 12,642 215 3,728
9 Stredoslovenské energet. závody Energy š.p. 11,333 68 3,648
10 Slovalco Aluminium a.s. 8,078 16 746
11 Matador Tires a.s. 7,824 185 4,375
12 Východoslov. energetické závody Energy š.p. 7,663 128 2,067
13 Duslo Chemicals a.s. 6,752 243 3,690
14 Severoslov. celulózky a papierne Paper, pulp a.s. 6,660 323 4,370
15 Chemlon Artificial fiber a.s. 4,643 -184 2,568
Top 15 Total 310,882 22,112 77,176
Share of Top 15 in Industry in   % 54 142 15
TABLE 10. Company Data for 1998 According to Trend Top 1999
Rank Name of Company Sector Pf Sales Profit Labor
1 Volkswagen Automobiles s.r.o 56,713 608 4,704
2 SPP Gas š.p. 43,514 8,574 6,440
3 VSŽ Ocel Metallurgy s.r.o 33,223 -716
4 Slovnaft Oil a.s. 31,509 910 4,341
5 Slovenské elektrárne Energy a.s. 29,592 1,535 11,313
6 Slovenské telekomunikácie Telecom š.p. 16,974 1,751 14,848
7 Západoslovenské energet. závody Energy š.p. 13,062 147 3,762
8 Stredoslovenské energet. závody Energy š.p. 11,629 -237 3,700
9 Slovalco Aluminium a.s. 8,116 56
10 Východoslov. energetické závody Energy š.p. 7,975 51 2,087
11 Severoslov. celulózky a papierne Pulp, paper a.s. 7,577 402
12 Matador Tires a.s. 7,171 215 3,878
13 Duslo Chemicals a.s. 6,350 132 3,236
14 Slovenské energetické strojárne Machinery a.s. 6,180 72 631
15 Slovakofarma Pharmaceuticals a.s. 4,600 372 2,010
Top 15 Total 284,185 13,872 60,950
Share of Top 15 in Industry in  % 46 317 13
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TABLE 11. Selected Consolidated Financial Data on VSŽ
Operating Data 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
Operating Revenues SKKmn 45,597 50,625 51,415 53,668 42,968
Operating Profit SKKmn 21 2,886 4,118 7,073 3,262
Income Tax SKKmn -176 585 1,161 3,285 1,396
- percent of profit  (%) x 67 61 62 77
Net Profit SKKmn -7,231 285 756 1,973 426
Rate of Operating Profit  (%) x 5.70 8.01 13.18 7.61
Rate of Net Profit  (%) x 0.56 1.47 3.68 0.99
Rate of Return on Basic Equity
- on gross profit  (%) x 2.69 5.76 14.68 5.31
- on net profit  (%) x 0.88 2.27 5.51 1.24
Data Per Share
Number of Shares 000pc 16,448 16,449 16,448 16,448 16,448
Net profit Per Share (SKK) -440 15.93 76.51 154.96 85
Dividend Per Share * (SKK) x 20.00 40.00 30.00 20.00
Price of Share as of December 31
at the BCPB
(SKK) 180.00 685.00 560.00 432.00 400.00
Financial Data
Working Capital SKKmn. 1,225 3,896 2,685 4,778 720
Current Liquidity 1:1.20 1:1.15 1:1.27 1:1.04
Tangible Assets– ZC SKKmn 32,563 32,833 31,821 29,325 28,225
Shareholder's Equity SKKmn 19,272 26,809 27,411 26,427 24,539
Bank Loans and Aids SKKmn 15,816 14,879 14,990 11,316 8,024
- long-term loans SKKmn ** 514 8,533 7,371 4,783 1,264
Other Data
Depreciation SKKmn 3,737 3,658 3,374 2,816 2,536
Wages and Other Personnel Costs SKKmn 8,110 6,842 6,320 5,366 4,055
Average Number of Employees *** 32,412 25,706 25,981 25,283 25,242
*Dividend per share is based on non-consolidated profit of VSŽ a.s. ** +8357 long-term debt in default.
***  Number of employees in 1999 in companies, where VSŽ owns a stake higher than 50 %. Source:
Annual report VSŽ 1996, 1997 a 1998
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TABLE 12. Development of Ownership Structure in VSŽ
2.1999 1.1998 5.1997 1.1996
Slovak Legal Persons 59 .23 55 .98 60 .61
   Slovenská sporitelna 13 .43
   Harvard Capital & Consulting Slovakia, a.s. 12 .16
   Všeobecná a.s. 10 .75 10 .79
   Hutník, a.s. 10 .22 9 .99 10 .00
   Eurotrade a.s. 9 .91 10 .01
   Priemyselná banka 9 .27
   Ferrimex, s.r.o. 3 .84 9 .65 15 .27
   Manager, s.r.o. 3 .79 6 .23
   Reštitucný investicný fond 2 .94
   Poštová banka 1 .46
   ARDS o.c.p., a.s. 1 .17
Foreign Legal Persons 24 .34 27 .21 20 .34
   Chase Nominees Limited, London 14 .23 11 .21
   The Central European Growth Fund plc., London 3 .40
   State Street Bank and Trust Company, Boston 1 .49
   Royal Trust Corporation, London 1 .14
   Creditanstalt Bankverein 6 .06
Natural Persons 16 .43 16 .81 19 .05
Slovak legal persons with more than 5 % shares, except for 1999, where with more than 1 %. Source:
Annual report VSŽ 1996, 1997 a 1998
TABLE 13. Comparison of Foreign Direct Investment
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
CR 72 595 2,889 3,423 4,547 7,350 8,572 9,234 13,457
Hungary 569 2,107 3,435 5,585 7,095 11,026 14,668 15,882 18,255
Poland 2 115 1,520 3,825 6,242 11,033 18,299 26,284 38,413
Slovakia  - - - 453 762 1,066 1,361 1,558 1,888
Cumulative data according to the balance of payments in USD million. Source: Hunya and Stankowsky,
WIIW-WIFO Database, 1999, as quoted in Hošková (1999)
TABLE 14. Foreign Direct Investment to Slovakia
Volume (SKK million) Increase (SKK million) Increase  (%)
1993 15,179 - -
1994 24,005 8,826 58
1995 31,797 7,792 32
1996 43,863 12,066 38
1997 54,812 10,949 25
1998 70,988 16,176 30
1999 76,914 5,926 8
Data as of  December 31, except for 1999, as at June 30 Source: NBS and calculations of the author
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   13 Banking Sector in the Slovak Republic
Martin BARTO
Slovenská sporitelna, a.s.
Tomáš KMET
Slovenská sporitelna, a.s.
This chapter analyzes the development and the position of the banking sector in
the Slovak Republic since 1993. It characterizes the banking sector of the Slovak
Republic using four groups of banks into which the sector can now be distinguished.
Reasons are identified for such excessive differentiation of banks, whereby increased
attention is paid to banks controlled by the state. The case of the IRB serves as an
illustration of the state's policy when acting as an owner of a bank. The situation in the
banking sector of the Slovak Republic is compared with the situation in other
Visegrad Group countries; based on this comparison, the causes of this specific
development in Slovakia are pointed out.
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13.1 Introduction
It is generally recognized that countries or regions with a functional, open and
large banking sector achieve faster economic growth than those where the banking
sector is not developed enough, where it is closed or inefficient. Another imperative
for fast and healthy economic growth is competition inside and outside the banking
sector - the existence of a healthy and strong capital market, other financial non-
banking institutions (pension funds, mutual funds, etc.), or even non-financial
institutions providing quasi-banking services (e. g., sales for installment payments).
These conclusions are backed by recent studies by Beck at al (1999) and Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) that analyzed the position of the banking sector and the
legal situation, including the position of the capital market in a large number of
countries. A recent empirical study by La Porta et al (1999) examined the ownership
relationship in the banking sector, whereby it used as its basis an older work by
Gerschenkron (1962), which defends public ownership of banking institutions.
However, the authors came to the opposite conclusion when they showed that public
ownership of banks prevails in countries with a lower per capita income, less
developed financial systems, a less effective government, government interventions
into the economy and insufficient protection of ownership rights. They also found that
state ownership of banks rather slows down than accelerates the development of the
financial sector; furthermore, this is associated with a slower growth of income,
primarily due to lower growth of productivity.
This chapter analyzes the development and position of the banking sector in
Slovakia. The first part describes the history of banking in Slovakia and introduces the
most important factors that have had an impact on its development since 1993. The
second part includes an overview of important parameters of the sector as well as its
development since 1993. The third part analyzes the four groups of banks into which
we believe the banking sector in Slovakia evolved. In part four we compare the
Slovak banking sector with banking sectors in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland. In part five we attempt to find the causes for specific development in
Slovakia.
13.2 Overview of the Development of the Banking Sector in
Slovakia
The history of banking in Slovakia dates back to early 19th century when
various savings associations, financial institutions, and credit cooperatives (often self-
supporting) sprang up on this territory. After the collapse of the empire in 1918, a
rapid development of this sector followed, but its structure remained rather scattered.
From 1953 onward, a network of state-owned savings banks was founded, and its role
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was to manage the savings of the population and to provide loans to citizens. After
1968, Slovenská štátna sporitelna was established from the network of state-owned
savings banks in Slovakia, which continued accumulating the savings of the
population. Until 1990, the needs of the business sector were served by the State Bank
of Czechoslovakia (SBCS), which was founded in 1950. However, political changes
after 1989, and the transition from a command economy to a market economy, and
later the dissolution of Czechoslovakia brought immense changes to banking in
Slovakia.
In 1990, Všeobecná úverová banka (General Credit Bank -- VÚB) and
Investicná a rozvojová banka (Investment and Development Bank -- IRB, which
operated in both republics of the federation) were separated from SBCS in Slovakia to
provide banking services to business clientele. SBCS then performed the duties as the
central bank. In the same year, Tatra banka renewed its operations. In a very short
time, VÚB, IRB, and Tatra banka also became important players also in the area of
primary deposits of the population, and thus upset the established  monopoly of
Slovenská štátna sporitelna. Between 1991 and 1993, over ten new banks were
established, some of which with foreign capital. In addition, two housing construction
savings banks and Konsolidacná banka (Consolidation Bank) were also established,
which had the task of managing loans granted before 1989 for constant inventory roll-
over. In 1992, state-owned banks received a capital injection, but with regard to their
total assets it was insufficient.
The necessity to establish a central bank of the new state emerged with the
establishment of the Slovak Republic on January 1, 1993, and as well as its currency
separation on February 8, 1993. Based on the National Council of the Slovak Republic
Act on the National Bank of Slovakia (which determines the National Bank of
Slovakia's position, functions, and tasks), the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) was
established on January 1, 1993. The NBS is an independent institution whose main
task is to safeguard the stability of Slovak currency. The National Bank of Slovakia
performs above all the following activities:
· defines monetary policy and instruments for its implementation;
· issues bank notes and coins;
· directs the circulation of money;
· coordinates payments and settlement between banks;
· supervis es the performance of banking activities;
· oversees prudential functioning and efficient development of the banking
system;
·  represents Slovakia in international financial institutions.
The Slovak Republic had taken over the Bank Act that was approved by the
Federal Parliament of CSFR in 1992. This Act reflected the level of knowledge of that
time as well as legislation valid in the European Union. Repeatedly, the National
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Council of the Slovak Republic  amended the Act on Banks; the amendments of 1994,
1998, and 1999 were especially important.
Articles that enabled banks to provide mortgage loans were added into the Act
on Banks in 1994. The slow development of mortgage banking after this amendment
was rather the consequence of the government's unclear housing policy, a non-existent
housing market, and excessive legal protection of tenants. The amendment of 1998
reacted to demands of the OECD; it simplified the procedures for granting a banking
license, and it also established equal terms for domestic and foreign investors. The
relatively extensive amendment of 1999 strengthened the position of banking
supervision for the NBS; the amendment also introduced stricter requirements on bank
owners (i.e., holding bankers accountable for their action). Changes were also made to
provisions associated with forced administration and mortgage banking; furthermore,
banks were  given the opportunity to exchange information regarding classified loans,
which in the past was prevented by the institute of bank secret. We expect that the Act
on Banks will be amended even further so that it will be in full accordance with
Basle's twenty-five criteria for prudential banking, especially in those areas pertaining
to the position of banking supervision, consolidated risk management, and transborder
cooperation of banks.
The NBS became the regulator of the banking sector in Slovakia. At the
beginning of 1994, it issued a series of measures No. 2-5/94 that govern capital
adequacy, loan engagement, liquidity rules, and regulation of the foreign exchange
positions of banks. In 1995, the NBS issued a measure on the classification of the loan
portfolio. These measures became the basis for the NBS's role as a banking
supervisor. In 1996, the NBS issued a measure on keeping a register of loans and
guarantees exceeding 3 million SKK. Most of the measures were gradually amended
to better correspond to the needs of banking supervision. Furthermore, the original
measure on capital adequacy also contained a timetable for banks to gradually achieve
the required capital adequacy of 8 percent by the end of 1996 (i.e., for banks that were
below this limit at that time). It was later modified in 1995, giving banks undergoing
restructuring an exemption from the duty to comply with this measure for a period of
three years. For these banks the method of calculation of the required resources to
cover loans has also been modified. In this way the NBS made capital adequacy
criteria softer for banks undergoing restructuring, which was also reflected in loan
engagement level, liquidity, and foreign exchange position. This procedure did not
motivate banks to operate in a prudential manner; on the contrary, it was one of the
causes leading to the gradual deterioration of the situation in restructured banks.
In 1992, coupon privatization laid the foundations for the creation of a capital
market in Slovakia. The capital market grew dynamically in 1994; the reason for
growth was not the development of alternative forms of company financing
procedures, but the struggle for decisive stakes in companies from the first wave of
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coupon privatization. The stock market served only as an instrument for assuming
control over companies. After property relations in companies were settled (i.e., every
company was controlled by a majority owner), the stock market became superfluous.
Not a single initial public offering was registered in Slovakia that would serve to
finance a developmental project. The reasons include the following:
· incorrect concept of the presence of hundreds of companies on the stock
market;
·  weak protection of minority investors;
·  generally weak enforcement of laws;
· inappropriate government interventions against investment funds that damaged
their shareholders;
·  missing interest of companies to get finances on the capital market (lacking
corporate culture).
Other components of the capital market are oriented above all at trading in
government securities; corporate bonds are traded to a substantially lesser extent.
Market capitalization is about 7 percent of the GDP, whereby the stock market
contributes to this number by about 53 percent. Therefore, the capital market does not
constitute a counterbalance or competition to the banking sector, which brings
Slovakia closer to the model typical for continental Europe (i.e., the dominance of the
banking sector in the economy). This dominance is also emphasized by the present
system of pension insurance and low popularity of collective investment.
13.3 Main Parameters of the Banking Sector
The banking sector in Slovakia saw convincing development from 1993 to
1997.254  Growth was posted in the number of banks, branch offices, and employees
(see Charts 1 and 2). Total assets and capital of banks also grew rapidly (see Charts 3
and 4). The growth of total assets was also reflected in the growth of loans to clients,
with loan expansion taking place in 1996. It was caused by two factors -- optimistic
expectations after an almost 7 percent GDP growth in 1995 and massive privatization
that created a higher need for external financing in the newly founded private
companies. However, this loan expansion also brought about an increase in the
volume of classified loans (Chart 5), which grew in the course of 1997-1998 by 31
billion SKK, and their share from the cumulative volume of loans increased from 29.6
to 35.6 percent. For this reason, the quality of assets gradually worsened and the share
of interest bearing assets in the banking sector decreased. This development was
accompanied by the growth of paid interest (Chart 6) resulting from the desperate
effort of some banks to resolve their liquidity problems by attracting sufficient
                                                                
254  Sources: Monetary review and annual reports of the NBS, Trend Top 1999 in the finance
sector
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primary deposits and lowering their dependence on the interbank market. In 1997 and
1998, the interbank market was characterized by the strong volatility of interest rates
caused by the crises of emerging markets, attacks on the Slovak crown, and an
expansive fiscal policy of the government. This unfavorable development led to great
losses in some banks; on the other hand, some banks that were not burdened by bad
loans and had enough primary resources reported extreme profits (ROE over 50
percent -- see Chart 7).
From 1993, Slovak banking underwent fundamental modernization. Banks were
forced to invest in information technology as well as in technological equipment to
prevent a complete loss of their position on the market, or to build a position in new
areas. Banks invested about 75 billion SKK on aggregate during this period. Banks
stood at the forefront of development of Slovakia's financial, foreign exchange, and
capital markets. New products and new channels were developed, such as bank cards,
automatic teller machines, POS terminals, and electronic banking. However, extensive
investments were not always effective; for example, banks often bought real estate
without properly assessing the necessity of such investment from a long-term outlook.
Similarly, some investments in information technology have shown to be incorrectly
selected. It is likely that investment activity in some banks was used as an instrument
to finance political parties, but evidence for this is difficult to uncover in the
circumstances of Slovakia's legislation.
CHART 1. Number of Commercial Banks and Branch Offices of Foreign
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CHART 2. Registered Number of Employees in the Banking Sector of the Slovak
Republic
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CHART 3. Total Assets of the Banking Sector of the Slovak Republic, billions of
SKK
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CHART 5.  Classified Loans vs Cumulative Loans of the Banking Sector, billions of
SKK and  %
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CHART 6. Average Interest Rates on Deposits and Loans,  %
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13.4 Characterization of the Situation in Banks
Heritage of the past and ownership relations in commercial banks gradually led
to the formation of four groups of banks. The first comprises of large banks with a
decisive influence of the state: Slovenská sporitelna (SLSP), Všeobecná úverová
banka (VÚB) and Investicná a rozvojová banka (IRB). The second group includes
small and medium size banks in private hands, usually with prevailing foreign capital:
Tatra banka, Ludová banka, ING Barings, Istrobanka, etc. The third group comprises
of small and medium size banks with domestic capital; the fourth group includes two
housing construction savings banks, which operate under modified business
conditions. From 1993 to 1999, development in these individual groups significantly
differed.
13.4.1 Large State Banks
In 1993, these banks controlled 88 percent of client deposits, and their total
assets made up 66 percent of the total assets of the banking sector of Slovakia.
However, at the end of 1999, only 52 percent of client deposits were in these banks,
and their total assets were only 46 percent of aggregate total assets. These figures
show that large state controlled banks were gradually losing their dominant position
on the market. This development was natural to some extent, because up till 1990
deposits and loans were concentrated in two institutions. Nevertheless, large state
banks could not benefit from this advantage, which had the potential to earn enormous
profits due to their position, and these institutions got on a trajectory of steep reduction
of their market share and profit.
This unfavorable development had several reasons. All three banks carried a
burden of zero yield loans from the period before 1989; SLSP and IRB administered
social loans and credits for cooperative housing construction; VÚB handled a certain
portion of loans for the business sector. This heritage of the past in 1993 represented
about 50 to 55 billion SKK in total (i.e., about a quarter of the whole loan portfolio).
Apart from this burden of the past, at the beginning of their operations in 1991 and
1992 (the time of small-scale privatization), these banks did not have enough
experience with lending in an environment of a transforming market and did not have
methods in place to assess loan risks (the environment largely differed from the
environment of developed economies and often new entities were involved without a
history). Inherently, this was reflected in a massive increase of classified loans in the
loan portfolio of these banks255. Legislation, above all the Bankruptcy and Settlement
Act, however, did not give banks a chance to get rid of this burden quickly and
effectively. Bankruptcy proceedings took far too long, and during this time owners
                                                                
255 December 1995: 124 billion SKK and 75 percent share, December 1999: 169 billion SKK
and 67 percent share.
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had the possibility to plunder the property; the whole process in most instances ended
with the liquidation of  the company or declaring the debtor with no assets left.
Creditors did not have a chance to quickly change the ownership situation in the
indebted entities. Due to indecisive legislation that protected debtors, banks only
collected fractions of the owed sums and all this at high cost. Banks were unable to get
rid of these claims even in six or more years. Furthermore, this development
contributed to a growth of interest rates.
The government was unable to secure the protection of the rights of creditors
(for political reasons, because there have always been concerns and unwillingness to
launch an effective process of bankruptcy and settlement); however, the state also
failed from 1995 to 1998 as the owner of large banks and also as their regulator. Since
1994, it has been unable to guarantee that capital adequacy in the three banks, under
its control, would achieve 8 percent although it had a declining tendency. This
situation required capital strengthening of the banks in 1997, at the latest, when the
consequences of the 1996 loan expansion fully surfaced (these three banks then
provided loans of 30 billion SKK). Deterioration of the quality of assets also
continued in 1998 and 1999. In 1998, the Ministry of Finance recognized that the
operating profit of the banks was no longer sufficient to enable setting aside enough
provisions. In the first half of 1999, all three banks already reported an operating loss,
which meant that the volume of received interest and charges was no longer sufficient
to pay for resources, services, and operations. At the same time, the quality of loan
guarantees deteriorated, which led to a growth of uncovered losses and capital of the
banks; therefore, they got into negative digits. The average weighted value of capital
adequacy of these three banks at the end of 1999 was 6.6 percent. At the end of 1999,
the government resolved to increase the capital in these banks and transferred a
substantial portion of non-performing loans, which resulted in achieving the required
capital adequacy of 8 percent in these banks at the end of 1999.
We believe that the banking supervision responsibilities of the NBS did not
proceed actively enough in the case of these three state controlled banks and allowed
the situation to deteriorate over a protracted period. In the case of IRB where a certain
domestic interest group assumed control 1996 without prior approval of the NBS, the
central bank only intervened when the situation in the bank significantly worsened,
and the owners were unwilling to invest their own resources to increase the registered
capital of the bank. IRB can serve as a condensed example of problems of a bank
controlled by the state in Slovakia:
· the loan portfolio contained low yield assets dating from before 1989;
· the bank did not have enough primary resources and was therefore exposed to
fluctuations on the financial market;
· the bank participated in the loan expansion in 1992 and 1996;
· the ownership structure became nontransparent;
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· capital adequacy in 1996 was only 3.51 percent despite the implementation of the
exemption of the NBS;
· the bank, since 1996, has been reporting a loss;
· banking supervision wanted to avoid implementing tougher measures against the
shareholders of the bank.
13.4.2 Small and Medium-Size Banks with Foreign Ownership
This segment began to develop in 1990 when Tatra banka renewed its
operations. Other banks were founded from 1992 to 1994. Basically, all began doing
their business "on a green meadow," which in this case meant also a certain
advantage, because they did not have to carry a burden of the past. The lack of
experience on the part of employees could be overcome relatively quickly thanks to
provided foreign methodologies and technology. It can be stated that these banks had
a prudential approach to all active transactions from the very beginning. Most of them
became active on the primary deposits market. From 1996 to 1998, deposits in these
banks doubled and now represent about 25 percent of all deposits. All banks regularly
met the capital adequacy requirement; in the first half of 1999, the average weighted
value of this indicator for this group of banks in the first half of 1999 was 15.6
percent. Similarly, these banks reported high profits; in 1998, they earned a profit after
taxes of 3.5 billion SKK. Their return on assets was 1.6 percent, and the return on
capital was 22 percent. It is clear that this enormous profit stemmed from deformation
of the banking sector in Slovakia, when ailing state controlled banks prevailed on the
market. The process of restructuring and privatization of state controlled banks will
bring about a correction in the banking sector, and at the same time slimmer profit
margins for the second group of banks. After privatization of large state controlled
banks, this group will face growing competitive pressure from the privatized banks,
which would further press down the profit margin.
13.4.3 Small and Medium Size Banks with Domestic Owners
Private banks with domestic capital were established from 1991 to 1995,
whereby the founders were industrial companies, banks, trade unions, as well as
private persons. One method of their establishment was to take over the branch offices
of Czech banks that lost their banking license. Although this group of six banks was
not burdened by non-yielding assets from the past, their development, as in the case of
large state controlled banks, was influenced by such unfavorable factors as:
·  missing experience with lending for entrepreneurial activities under conditions of
a market economy;
·  a missing system of risk management;
·  political pressure, including political motives for establishing a bank;
·  legislation protecting debtors;
369
·  banking supervision that is not effective enough.
In addition, these banks did not have wide client backing; their capital strength
was rather insufficient, and they had to invest large sums of money into their
infrastructure. The effectiveness of their investments was often highly questionable.
The economic performance of individual banks differed (the group is quite
heterogeneous), but on aggregate the group in 1998 reported a loss of at least 150
million SKK and in 1997 a symbolic profit of 30 million SKK. Two banks got into
insurmountable problems at the end of 1999, which in one instance led to a
withdrawal of the bank's license and in the other to a takeover of the bank by another
bank. The development in these banks will lead to more frequent cessation of the
independent existence of these banks, either by merging with another bank or by
liquidation. The independent existence of some of these banks would be possible in
case of specialization at a certain segment of the market. However, Slovakia's small
market, high operating costs, and the need for extensive investments into technology
will press towards the abolition of these institutions.
13.4.4 Housing Construction Savings Banks
Two housing construction savings banks were established in Slovakia in 1992
and 1993, founded jointly by German and Austrian housing construction savings
banks with the largest Slovak banks SLSP and VÚB. These housing construction
savings banks benefited from favorable conditions for doing their business:
· an annual state premium to interest of 6 000 SKK;
· required minimum reserves of 3 percent (8 percent for other banks);
· the institute of solidarity depositors (though abolished from 1997 to 1998);
· the only form of a housing construction loan under acceptable price terms;
· low interest paid on deposits and high interest yield from government bonds on
  the interbank market.
Due to these conditions, total assets of the housing construction savings banks
more than tripled from 1996 to 1998; in 1998, these banks reported a profit after
taxation of 783 million SKK. Return on assets was 1.8 percent and return on capital
12.9 percent. Operating profit was over 3.5 billion SKK. However, the housing
construction savings banks had to put aside a substantial portion of this sum as a
reserve because at the end of a six-year savings cycle it is necessary to repay the
deposits of solidarity depositors and with the growth of provided loans the number of
doubtful claims is also growing. From 1996 to 1999, the volume of loans provided by
these two banks increased from 60 million SKK to about 20 billion SKK; in 1999, we
estimate that standard loans with a reservation and classified loans constitute about 1.5
percent of total loans, although about 0.4 percent were classified loans. This figure
will presumably grow, but it cannot be assumed that it would overstep the average
share of classified loans to the population -- about 12 percent. We estimate the created
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reserves at 7 to 8 billion SKK, which, together with guaranty in the form of real estate
should fully cover presumed losses. However, it can be expected that the profits of the
housing construction savings banks would gradually decrease similarly as their market
share, where we expect the volume of mortgage financing of housing construction to
grow swiftly thanks to the state compensation to changed interest and the possibility to
get an immediate loan -- without the need for saving.
13.5 A Comparison with other Countries of the Visegrad Group
In 1989, the situation in the banking sector was similar in all V4 countries.
Several state controlled institutions dominated the financial markets and benefited
from their monopolistic positions. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, new players got
on to the market and the banking sectors began to develop dynamically. Therefore,
domestic banks suffered under these circumstances, primarily from the low quality of
management and insufficient risk management (i.e., reflected in the growing volume
of classified loans and the decreasing market share coupled with lower profitability).
The complicated financial situation of the business sector and growing competition
from foreign banks have weakened the position of domestic bank entities. Pressure
developed for a more consequent banking supervision, and the process of restructuring
and privatization of state controlled banks began. However, the pace of transformation
differed. While Hungary and Poland had already initiated the process of restructuring
at the beginning of the nineties, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic began
with the privatization of state controlled financial institutions only recently, but the
banking sectors of both countries were much more developed than in Poland and
Hungary. A comparison of the banking sectors of the V4 countries is in Table 1 and in
Charts 8-10.
TABLE 1 Comparison of the Banking Sectors of V4 countries,  %
Czech
Republic
Hungary Poland Slovakia
Degree of Concentration of the Banking
Sector
62 40 41 50
Share of Total Assets from GDP 137 77 56 112
Share of Classified Loans from Total Loans 29 4 10 33
Share of the State on Total Assets of the
Banking sector
84 37 52 74
*Concentration is calculated as the share of three largest banks on the total assets of the
entire banking sector.
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The Czech Republic256 had five large banks as of January 1, 1990. However,
small banks with domestic owners sprang up quickly, but they often had insufficient
capital strength and they had liquidity problems. From 1989, the CNB issued 63 bank
licenses. Licenses were withdrawn from fourteen banks because of their bad financial
situation and failure to observe the rules of prudential banking. Licenses of three
banks were terminated by a merger with parent companies abroad (HypoVereinsbank,
Bank Austria and Creditanstalt). At the end of 1998, thirteen foreign banks operated
on the Czech market and ten branch offices of foreign banks, and their share of
activities of the entire banking sector was 16 percent. Their importance continues to
grow constantly not only in view of their share of total assets (25 percent), but also in
view of their influence on other banks, which are forced to improve the quality of their
services to clients, improve their products, reduce costs, etc. In 1998, the number of
banks dropped to forty-five, which along with the growing volume of total assets
meant greater concentration in the banking sector. In 1994, an average bank had total
assets of 27.7 billion CZK; by 1998, this figure almost doubled. The quartet of large
banks -- CSOB, Ceská sporitelna (CS), Komercní banka (KB), and IPB represents 75
percent of the cumulative total assets of the Czech market. In the period from 1990 to
1999, the volume of deposits more than doubled, which was linked to the
development of wages, to proceeds from restitutions and coupon privatization, and to
higher levels of inflation. The issuing of loans reached its peak in 1993. Stricter
regulatory measures for loan guarantees by real estate, liquidity problems of the
business sector, and growth of classified claims decelerated the pace of providing new
loans. The process of privatization of state banks began only in 1999 with the sale of
CSOB to Belgian KBC. The privatization of CS and KB is negotiation phase.
Poland257 began its bank reform after adopting an amendment to the Bank Act
and the National Bank of Poland (NBP) Act in 1989, which regulate the banking
environment. The ambition of the Ministry of Finance and the NBP was to
demonopolize the banking sector before the privatization of the largest state controlled
banks. In 1988, six large banks operated in Poland, and in 1990 their number
increased to 75. After recapitalization of a majority of commercial banks, the Ministry
of Finance decided to launch a process of privatization of state controlled banks.
According to the original plan, two banks were to be privatized every year, but this
target could not always be met because of difficulties with finding a suitable investor
and in part also due to political reasons. Nationally oriented parties had reservations
towards a rapid sale of banks to foreign investors. As in other central European
countries, the banking sector in Poland is characterized by its concentration. The ten
largest banks have over 67 percent of net assets and generate 75 percent of gross
profit. Classified loans represent roughly 10 percent of loans of the entire banking
                                                                
256 Czesany (1999), Machala (1999), CNB (1999) and Chuchvalcová and Vinter (1999).
257 National Bank of Poland (1999), Harper and Styczek (1998), and Wojtowicz (1998).
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sector. Strong competition is originating because Poland began a reform of its pension
insurance system in 1999; it introduced mandatory individual savings through
commercial pension funds. The capital market in Poland is developing and market
capitalization at the end of 1999 was about 17 percent of the GDP.
CHART 8. The Number of Foreign and Domestic Banks in V4 countries
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CHART 10. Deposits, Loans/GDP,  %
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The banking sector in Hungary258 developed very dynamically, and from the
beginning it oriented itself towards foreign investments. In several waves, from 1992
to 1994, the recapitalization of banks took place whereby the state injected over 360
billion HUF into the banking sector. Capital adequacy of large banks exceeded 14
percent, and it remains at this level up to now. The state radically lowered its share in
the banking sector; in 1996, it dropped below 33 percent. The share of residents
decreased at a similarly dramatic rate while the engagement of foreign entities moved
in the opposite direction to their current control of over 50 percent. The volume of
classified loans is in the range of 4 percent; from this perspective, the banking sector
in Hungary is among the best of the V4 countries. Return on capital in the first half of
1999 dropped to 4.9 percent as a result of higher expenses associated with inflationary
growth and investments into branch offices and information technologies. Return on
assets dropped from 1 percent to 0.5 percent compared with the preceding year. Small
banks have the greatest problems in Hungary. Competition in Hungary is tough; at the
end of 1999, market capitalization was approximately 30 percent of the GDP.
13.6 Causes of the Specific Development in Slovakia and Lessons
to the Drawn
Development of the banking sector in Slovakia, especially the years between
1995 and 1998, was strongly conditioned and is still conditioned by the overall
situation in the economy. The following factors play a significant role in this situation:
· prevailing state ownership in the banking sector;
· lesser openness of the banking sector;
· high government consumption;
                                                                
258 Hungarian National Bank (1996, 1997, and 1999).
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· the degree of redistribution;
· low quality of institutional operations;
· virtually nonfunctional capital market;
· rising corruption;
· weak level of protection of ownership and creditor rights;
· weak law enforcement;
· a relatively extensive state sector.
These factors are reflected in the unwillingness of the state, as the owner of
several banks, to either address the problem of loss-making assets by restructuring the
banks or from the legal perspective by improving the position of creditors. They are
also reflected in the limited possibilities of the NBS's role in banking supervision to
effectively and resolutely take action in instances when rules of  prudential banking
were violated or with regard to provisions of the Act on Banks or with NBS measures.
Unlike Poland and Hungary, where a rapid restructuring of the banking sector
was undertaken and its gradual privatization, and where the capital market effectively
functioned, in Slovakia the role of the financial sector has been underestimated. In
addition, the state's role in the economy was understood incorrectly; instead of a
regulatory and supervisory function, the state actively engaged in the economy
whereby it misused its specific position.  In this aspect the situation in Slovakia was
similar to that in the Czech Republic, where in the first years of economic reform the
regulatory and supervisory function of the state has been underestimated, which
eventually led to the withdrawal of fourteen bank licenses because of their bad
financial situation and violations of rules of prudential banking. Although the state
took part in gradual increases of registered capital in Czech banks it controlled and
non-performing assets were gradually transferred from these banks to Konsolidacná
banka, the share of classified loans in Czech banks remains high. This demonstrates
that if restructuring of a state controlled bank is not followed by a change of
ownership, moral hazard is increasing as well as the probability of an irresponsible
lending policy.
The development of the banking sector in Slovakia (but also in other countries of
the V4) provides evidence of many disadvantages of state ownership. On the other
hand, it shows the important role of the state in securing the effective work of
regulatory institutions, clear and enforceable laws, as well as the protection of
ownership rights for effective functioning of the banking sector.
An inevitable condition for the functioning of the banking sector is a healthy
business sector. Banks have an irreplaceable role here in the imposition of tough
budgetary limitations for businesses. These can only be implemented when legislation
enables banks to effectively use their rights of creditor and a quick and inexpensive
termination of undertaking for unsuccessful companies.
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14 Economic Policy Recommendations
Miroslav BEBLAVÝ
INEKO – Institute for Economic and Social Reforms
The chapters in this book have focused on a variety of topics such as the
protection of economic competition and the situation in the labor market. In
addition to analyzing developments in the given area, all the chapters attempt to
review the key economic policy decisions that helped shape these developments.
Economic policies in various areas have all shared certain characteristics and
problems. These common features, spread throughout a decade of rapid change,
often can serve as a useful lesson for the future. The upcoming decade can be
expected to bring about further many changes in the economic arena. The final
chapter provides a brief overview of the main features identified and the
recommendations advocated.
1. Significant preference for short-term goals over long-term goals. Most
economic policy decisions in the nineties shared an emphasis on short-term
benefits and had minimal interest in areas that would bring short-term costs and
long-term benefits. In Slovakia, this problem took on an even greater significance
than in other comparable transition economies due to the frequent discontinuation
of reforms designed to produce short-term costs.
2. Preference for short-term economic growth over solving institutional
problems and restructuring. Economic growth is a key economic policy goal.
However, in Slovakia, short-term, unsustainable growth reached by fiscal and
monetary stimulation is not sufficiently differentiated from long-term sustainable
economic growth driven primarily by forces on the supply side. The solution of
serious institutional problems (both in formal and informal institutions) and the
problem of restructuring the economy, inherited from the socialist era, are and have
been the prerequisites for long-term economic growth. The debate on economic
policy and its implementation in Slovakia still contains an implicit notion that it is
possible to ”grow out” of problems. This notion gives preference to stimulating
growth over resolving painful structural and institutional problems. Two possible
motives may explain this attitude. The first is the above-mentioned preference for
short-term goals and achievements that is driven mainly by political incentives.
The second possible explanation is a faith that rapid growth will allow for less
painful solutions to these problems. It is becoming clear that efforts to put
emphasis on growth have failed. Despite rapid growth, institutional and structural
problems have led, for example, to a crisis in the banking and enterprise sectors
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(see chapter on bank and enterprise restructuring) and high unemployment (see
chapter on the labor market).
3. Insufficient institutional capacity of the state and the public sector. The
ability of the state to effectively resolve the society’s problems is neither a given,
nor unalterable ability. It depends on specific historical and economic
circumstances, particularly on the power of the state, formal and informal
institutions and the quality of the state administration. Every state has its evolving
institutional capacity. If the capacity is low, it is appropriate to first focus on the
basic functions of the state and gradually increase the scope of its interventions
with growing institutional capacity (see World Bank, 1997, especially pp. 3 and 4).
Almost all post-communist states, including Slovakia, were (and to a degree
still are) plagued by the following problems: (i) the presence and interference of
the state in areas where it simply should not be present regardless of its
institutional capacity (particularly the state as an entrepreneur); (ii) the presence
and activity of the state in areas that may be subject to state intervention but can be
effectively dealt with in a different way, or in areas where the absence of the state
carries no significant negative consequences. Given the insufficient institutional
capacity, the state should at least temporarily withdraw from these areas and focus
on its key tasks; otherwise there is a threat of (and usually also the presence of)
insufficient institutional capacity for the really key activities of the state. These
activities include, for example, law enforcement, provision of a basic regulatory
framework, good macroeconomic policy, provision of public goods or formation of
a stable, good enterprise environment. The insufficient institutional capacity of the
state is related to further issues.
4. Insufficient ability of the executive to adjust to a rapidly changing
environment.  Slovakia, like other transition economies, has undergone major
changes in the nineties. It has become an independent country, decentralized to a
degree. It has moved from a one-party dictatorship to a democracy based on the
division of powers between various political and economic actors and has
transitioned from a centralized economy to a market economy. The central state
administration and political parties formulating economic policies have often failed
to keep pace with these changes. They have proposed and promoted measures that
did not conform with the new environment and therefore these measures either
failed or were not implemented at all. The law on revitalization can serve as an
example (see chapter on restructuring and corporate governance and chapter on
industrial policy).
5. Independence as a key to success of some institutions. Independence
without a clearly defined status, tasks and responsibility as a problem for other
institutions. There exist certain formal institutions that demonstrate possible
solutions for several of these problems. The National Bank of Slovakia, despite a
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number of critical reservations, can be viewed as one of the best functioning public
institutions in the country and monetary policy conduct can be evaluated favorably.
In this case, the bank’s independence is the key to its success. This independence
means not only independence from political influences, but also assures personal
stability and the opportunity to form a unified institutional culture (with
independence in personnel policies including remuneration as one of its
prerequisites; see chapter on monetary policy). The Slovak Anti-monopoly Office
serves as a good counter-example. Despite its nominally independent status, it has
failed to reach equally good results from its work, particularly due to its
dependence on the government – from political interference in its activities and
changes in top posts to restrictions in the personnel area (see chapter on economic
competition).  Independence certainly is no universal antidote and its use has to be
tied to specific situations that make sense. Moreover, independence without a
certain formal or informal ”contract” – a clearly defined task, status and
responsibility – may lead to inefficiency, corruption or irresponsibility. For
instance, the implementation of active labor market policies by the National Labor
Bureau was directed by the tripartite system (with representatives of the state, labor
unions and employers represented in its leadership) and led to these phenomena
(see chapter on the labor market).
6. Preference for direct state control over a good regulatory framework.
Independence is related to preference for direct state control as a regulatory
instrument. This approach is in a certain way logical in the short-term during the
transition period – if the state has insufficient institutional capacity in the area of
regulation and politicians are highly risk-averse against potential political
consequences of poor regulation. But the term short-term is the key factor. Long-
term costs of direct state control are very high, such as inefficiency and rent
seeking, abuse of regulated prices in the political process, abuse of natural
monopolies to finance political parties and corruption. It is no coincidence that
despite declining labor productivity, wages in the industrial sector of water,
electricity and gas distribution grew at a rapid pace (see chapters on fiscal policy,
industrial policy, restructuring and corporate governance).
7. High public expenditure and insufficient will to reduce it along with the
destabilizing role of fiscal policy. Slovakia, along with other transition countries,
has a very high share of public expenditure on GDP (particularly given the degree
of economic development). In other words, the level of redistribution and taxation
is one of the highest in the world given per capita income (see IMF, 1998). After
an initial decrease in the early nineties, the level of redistribution had a stagnating
and at times even rising tendency. A high level of economic redistribution
significantly impedes economic growth. This is a serious problem for the Slovak
economy, which counts among economic with the so-called medium per capita
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income and requires high economic growth to reach EU countries’ levels.
Furthermore, fiscal policy has often had a destabilizing effect mainly due to a high
overall and structural deficit in the years 1996-1999. This directly contributed to a
high foreign trade deficit and subsequent economic problems. Insufficient state
control over a large part of the fiscal sector outside of the state budget is a related
problem (see chapters on fiscal and monetary policy).
8. Insufficient implementation of a hard budget constraint. Since January 1,
1991, there have been efforts at instituting a hard budget constraint for enterprises
(when a company has to rely on itself and in case of insolvency, instead of
receiving further financing, it becomes subject to sanctions in the form of
ownership change or bankruptcy). In spite of this, the budget constraint has in
practice been softened significantly by two factors – insufficient enforcement of
the bankruptcy law and provision of loans particularly by state-controlled banks
regardless of the likelihood of repayment. Enterprises survive not only thanks to
voluntary loans from bank, but also using involuntary ”loans” from the state (not
meeting required taxes and payments), suppliers and employees (not paying for
supplies or wages). These groups often failed to get paid or received late payments
that they were entitled to contractually or by law. This led to inter-company
indebtedness, high claims of the state towards the corporate sectors and a high
share of classified loans. The corporate sector did not undergo a cleansing process
and enterprise exit for unsuccessful enterprises (see chapters on privatization,
restructuring and corporate governance, banking and fiscal policy.)
9. Privatization which did not lead to significant improvement in corporate
governance. Privatization in Slovakia suffered from two basic problems: (i)
insufficient transparency and poor selection of owners and (ii) disregard for an
institutional and regulatory framework that would motivate the new owners to seek
more effective functioning of the enterprises instead of rent-seeking.
Until now, the attention has focused mainly on the problems in the course of
the privatization itself. The voucher scheme did not lead to clear ownership and
direct sales. These actions were characteristic of the 1995-98 period and were often
carried out under questionable circumstances that favored intransparent and
incapable new owners. The  ”post-privatization” economic policy should also be
discussed, because it contributed to privatization failures, fraud and insufficient
enterprise restructuring. It failed to secure a functional judiciary and commercial
law and putt insufficient emphasis on the capital markets’ institutional framework
(see chapter on privatization).
10. Political control of banks and inadequate bank supervision. The
consequences of the aforementioned problem of preference for direct state control
over a good regulatory framework may be illustrated using the example of banks.
Due to the specific nature of banking (almost exclusive use of others’ resources)
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and insufficient experience with banking, the consequences of this approach were
far worse and their elimination far more costly than in other sectors. The state
provided credit for many industrial enterprises that would not have secured credit
otherwise (and for good reasons) mainly through the three largest banks. The state
thus slowed down restructuring and distorted resource allocation. The cost of
restructuring these banks will exceed 100 billion Slovak crowns. At the same time,
the building of institutional capacity for banking supervision was neglected and
banking supervision intervened only ex post, when it was too late to prevent
problems. Due to the development of a fairly sizable private sector, this meant that
banking losses cumulated not only in state banks, but also in poorly regulated
private banks (see chapter on banking).
11. Preservation of the inherited industrial structure even with changing
export markets. Slovakia’s inheritance from the socialist period was an industrial
structure characterized by a high share of heavy and less sophisticated industry and
heavy machinery production (with a high share of arms production). The industry
was highly energy- and capital-intensive. Two significant changes took place
during the nineties: (i) the industry was reoriented from the former Comecon
export markets to European Union markets (while preserving the central European
market) and (ii) the machinery industry segment was focused mainly on arms
production. It failed to restructure and shift to non-arms production and gradually
disappeared to a large degree.
But with these two exceptions, the inherited industrial structure was largely
preserved despite the fact that its high energy- and capital-intensity contradicts
Slovakia’s comparative advantage and its low sophistication raises the cyclical
sensitivity of the Slovak economy and limits the room for economic growth.
Economic policy contributed to these developments by preserving the distortions
from the socialist era (distorted input prices, state investment in the energy sector)
and by the privatization mechanisms and by fiscal policy in the years 1996 – 1998.
The overall political climate and manner of privatization also led to an absence of
foreign investment, one of the key restructuring tools in the transition period (see
chapters on industrial policy, privatization and foreign trade).
12. Unemployment, which does not provide sufficient supply of workers or
pressure for greater labor market flexibility. At the onset of transition,
unemployment in Slovakia evolved similarly to other central European countries
(with the exception of the Czech Republic). Then, within a year, it jumped to over
10 % and remained at this level throughout the duration of the transitional
recession (1991-93). Developments began to differ from 1994, when Slovakia
recorded high economic growth. Poland, with a similar level of economic growth,
significantly reduced unemployment and Hungary, even with much slower
economic growth, successfully reduced unemployment into the single digits.
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Slovak unemployment, aside from a minor decline in 1995 and 1996, stagnated and
then began to rise in 1997. This development did not lead to a substantial revision
in active and passive labor market policies or to a rise in flexibility and regional
mobility in the labor market. Active employment policy focused on keeping afloat
non-performing enterprises on the basis of highly intransparent criteria and with
highly ineffective results (see chapter on labor market).
On the basis of this analysis, we provide recommendations for future
economic policy implementation in Slovakia. The state should focus on building
up its institutional capacity and restructuring its position within the society and the
economy. We have mentioned several tasks that no other entity can manage and
are key for economic success. The post-communist state should focus on having
the ability to effectively intervene in these priority areas. This assumes the
necessity of restructuring of formal institutions and instituting change informal
institutions. Both can be achieved not only through personnel reform (entry of new
people into state administration and education of current employees), and through
an overall modernization of the state apparatus. The state should withdraw from
activities that do not have high priority, since they demand scarce personnel and
financial resources. Without the implementation of the fundamental priorities, the
state will fail to achieve the same results as similar activities in stabilized and
developed economies. The state should fully restructure its direct interventions in
the economy from the position of an entrepreneur to a regulatory position (in the
areas where this shift has not yet taken place). This fundamental shift involves
recommendations in the following areas:
1. Fiscal sector restructuring and stabilization. This sector involves two
aspects. The first is institutional capacity - at present, the finance ministry as the
main "treasurer" of the state lacks direct influence and responsibility for the fiscal
sector as a whole and there is no institutional capacity to forecast, implement and
supervises overall fiscal policy. Along with building such a capacity, there has to
be the political power to implement stricter supervision over the use of public
funds and reforms. This would raise the efficiency of their use.
2. Reform of the tax system and the system of mandatory insurance leading to
fiscal stabilization and lower redistribution. The preceding point is tied with a
number of necessary tax reforms that should stabilize the fiscal sector. It should
also shift the focus of taxation from direct to indirect taxes, and provide an overall
modernization of the tax system. But reforms of the remainder of the fiscal sector,
including particularly pension, health and disability insurance, as well as
unemployment insurance, are even more key at this time. This sector shares two
characteristics – a significant propensity to run deficits and (in most cases)
insufficient efficiency. Although there are no painless solutions, reforms should be
guided by two basic criteria: (i) shifting a greater share of responsibility and rights
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to the individual, together with protection of the most vulnerable groups and (ii) by
increasing public supervision and transparency of these systems.
3. Restructuring of the status of several public institutions. In particular, this
should involve: (i) strengthening the independence of the Anti-monopoly Office
and other existing regulators; (ii) creating of a new system of regulatory bodies and
(iii) increasing supervision and responsibility of public institutions that manage
large amounts of public funds (e.g., the Social Insurance Agency, General Health
Insurance Agency and the national Labor Bureau).
4. Completing the privatization in the banking sector and the consolidation of
the private banking sector (by instituting a ”hard” budget constraint for banks –
strict enforcement of capital adequacy and prudence rules) and strengthening of
banking supervision (in accordance with the plans to separate it from the NBS).
5. Preserving NBS independence and creating a medium-term monetary
program and inflation targets. Given the proven favorable results of central bank
independence, attempts to reduce its independence must be opposed. It is also
necessary to further strengthen the quality, openness and transparency of monetary
policy. With regard to inflation targeting and the shift to qualitative monetary
policy management, it can be recommended that the one-year inflation target be
extended to the medium-term horizon. These targets should be set within an overall
medium-term monetary scenario aimed at Slovakia’s integration into the EU and
the European Monetary Union.
6. Focus on creating a suitable enterprise environment and conditions for
good corporate governance. Completion of legislative environment changes
towards better law enforcement and hard budget constraint functioning. One of the
tasks that the state should give up completely is the role of an entrepreneur.
Instead, the state should focus its institutional, personnel and financial resources
toward creating a suitable business environment (i.e., an environment where it pays
to enterprise and not focus on rent-seeking). This business environment would also
include prerequisites for good corporate governance as a condition for investment
inflows.
7. Privatization of the energy sector and of other state-owned enterprises
providing public services which do not constitute natural monopolies. High
investment requirements are needed for the restructuring of these enterprises. If
they are to be able to provide high-quality, cheap products and offer the high
benefits of competition for the economy as a whole, their reasonable privatization
is advisable.
8. Introduction of competition into some currently monopolized sectors as
fast as possible. Many sectors that had long been considered natural monopolies
are not natural monopolies – for instance, electricity generation or
telecommunications services. The introduction of competition will have favorable
383
effects in terms of creating pressure to reduce costs of the existing monopoly
producers, and will also provide significant positive externalities for the overall
modernization of the Slovak economy.
9. Completion of price regulation reform and creation of independent
regulatory bodies for the areas where the existing providers have real monopoly
status. Benefits from competition and deregulation (where one player is in a
dominant position) can only be realized in an environment with adequate market
regulation. The belief that the introduction of a market economy and competition
will suffice even without changes to the institutional and regulatory framework
was one of the mistakes of the first stage of the transition period. Without adequate
regulation, markets with insufficient competition offer monopolies a chance for
significant rents from their position.
10. Maintaining high openness of the Slovak economy allowing
specialization. The turnover of Slovakia’s foreign trade consistently exceeds 120
% of GDP. This places the country among the most open economies in the world.
This openness allows the Slovak economy to specialize in tradable goods, which
leads to higher labor productivity and economic growth. Therefore, all protectionist
pressures, with the exception of protection from unfair competition, must be
resisted. But even in preventing unfair competition, one must carefully review
whether it really involves unfair trading practices and whether these practices
really threaten the development of the Slovak economy. A key task of economic
policy is to work on opening up the neighboring markets further.
11. Attracting foreign investment primarily by a high-quality economic
environment, less so or not at all by discriminatory and intransparent conditions.
Foreign direct investment in a transition environment carries a number of positive
externalities, particularly in the areas of know-how transfer and corporate
governance. A possible multiplier effect for lagging regional economies also needs
to be considered. Governments of several transition economies offer large foreign
investors especially favorable conditions. The usefulness of this practice is
questionable for three reasons. First, several surveys among investors have shown
that special preferential treatment is merely one of the factors, and often not the
key one, investment decisions. The quality of the economic environment
(accessibility of export markets, tax system, quality and price of labor, quality of
commercial law and state administration, etc.) is far more important. Second,
beyond a certain level of incentives, it is questionable whether the costs outweigh
the benefits of these programs, especially if the funds could be used for alternative
programs. This is true mainly in conjunction with the third question – intransparent
and individual benefits create room for corruption and inefficient decision-making.
12. Labor market policy reform. The Slovak labor market needs reform in
three basic respects. First, active employment policy based on intransparent and
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inefficient selective provision of benefits to some employers should be transformed
into a system of clearly defined benefits. These benefits should provide automatic
entitlement to those who employ the long-term unemployed or other particularly
vulnerable groups. Besides, a passive employment and social system policy reform
should be considered, as these often provide disincentives for job seekers who
command only relatively low-wage employment in the labor market. Third, job
seekers with little or no education and new graduates are the dominant group
among the unemployed. These facts suggest not only a need for education as such,
but a need for education that provides students with skills that will enable them to
gain employment or start a business. The educational system and its reform thus
constitute a key factor in resolving the problem of unemployment.
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